

HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE.

PROFESSOR BARNES

has Written

SOCIOLOGY BEFORE COMTE
HISTORY OF THE PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS OF NEW JERSEY
HISTORY: ITS RISE AND DEVELOPMENT
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD
SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY
THE NEW HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES
PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY
HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE
THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR
THE REPRESSION OF CRIME
TEN YEARS

He has Edited


A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: RECENT TIMES
THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
NEW AND ENLARGED EDITION OF THE PLOETZ-
TILLINGHAST MANUAL OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY

He has in Preparation

THE HISTORY OF HISTORICAL WRITING
THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN SOCIETY
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY
WORLD POLITICS AND THE EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN
CIVILIZATION
THE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA
AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF EUROPE (WITH
KNIGHT AND FLUEGEL)

He is Editing

THE BORZOI HISTORICAL SERIES



Very truly yours
H. J. Wells

HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE

by

HARRY ELMER BARNES, Ph. D.

Professor of Historical Sociology, Smith College



NEW YORK
ALFRED · A · KNOPF
MCMXXVI

COPYRIGHT, 1926, BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO

FRANCIS SYDNEY MARVIN

Who has done more than any other English-speaking
historian directly to enlist the aid of History
in the cause of promoting social
intelligence.

PREFACE

The present work deals with the development of the "new" or synthetic and dynamic history, and indicates possible applications of this type of historical writing to some of the leading institutions and problems of contemporary civilization. The writer does not accept the view that history can in many cases be directly useful to the present generation through the discovery of alleged specific analogies between the remote past and the present day. Perhaps the greatest lesson of history is that it has no such lessons for our generation. The most striking revelation of history, when intelligently studied, is the vast differences between the period before the rise of modern science and industrialism and that which has been created by these two great forces in modern culture. Comparisons between "ancient Rome and modern America" are likely to be about as helpful as it would be to consult the mechanism of an ancient Roman ox-cart in order to diagnose the engine trouble which has caused a Packard speedster to become stalled by the roadside. Yet it is highly doubtful if history has any value, beyond its slender contribution to prose literature, unless it gives us such a knowledge of, and attitude towards, the past as will be useful in helping us more intelligently to face the present and plan for the future.

Probably the greatest service which history can render to mankind in this respect is to aid us in gradually weakening that solemn and unreasoning reverence towards the cultures and institutions of the past which is the chief cause of that distressing contemporary lack of competence and insight everywhere in evidence in man's seeming inability to cope with the issues which confront him. (We have built up a vast body of saving knowledge in the last century which would, in all probability, be relatively adequate to equip man to deal with the unparalleled complexities and the difficult problems of contemporary society; yet little of this is actually available for practical exploitation because of the paralyzing influence of the octopus of the past. Instead of turning for guidance to the natural and social scientists, who are the chief

custodians of relevant and useful knowledge in the contemporary age, we continue, in the field of ideas and institutions, to put our trust in "the tried and tested wisdom of the ages," the "old, sturdy virtues of manhood and womanhood," the "findings of mankind," the "wisdom of the Fathers" and other rationalized disguises of intellectual cowardice and inertia, and we elevate to positions of social and political power those who are the most notorious and unabashed victims of this delusion.

An intelligently conceived and forcefully expounded body of historical material should be able to disabuse our minds of this fatal worship of an inadequate and archaic past, and thus give aid in lifting the weight of the "dead hand" from the backs of our own and succeeding generations. Such a type of historical literature should not only reveal the inadequacy of the so-called "wisdom" of the past, even for solving the few rudimentary and simple social problems of antiquity, but should even more forcefully impress us with its complete futility, almost irrelevance, for the student and citizen of to-day. The chief lesson of the newer history would, then, seem to be that the main purpose of studying the past is to lose our reverence for it, though not, of course, our interest in it. It is one thing to look with great admiration upon the remarkable achievements of some long past age in the light of the great obstacles which that age had to overcome; it is quite another thing to hold that such accomplishments are of a sort which may be directly and profitably utilized to guide us in our present thought and action. Aristotle, Archimedes, Amos, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall wrought wonders for their time, but that is no reason why we should to-day revert to them for guidance instead of consulting the works of Raymond Pearl, Michelson, Dewey, Veblen, Elihu Root and Roscoe Pound.

The other great service of history to social intelligence is to be found in developing the genetic point of view—an interest in, and an understanding of, the processes of the growth of culture and institutions. Contemporary institutions and cultures can be understood and competently improved only after we have come to comprehend the prior stages of their development. Again, however irritated and restless we may be over the unnecessary slowness of the unguided social change of the present day, the study of history impresses us with the importance of the element of continuity and with the necessity of reckoning with a certain amount of institutional and cultural inertia as indispensable to the stabil-

ity of society. Even intelligently conceived and scientifically guided social change can never be speeded up beyond certain limits. There is no essential antagonism or conflict between these two chief contributions of history to social intelligence. A study of a Roman galley may help us better to understand the *Leviathan*, but it need not convince us of the superiority of the galley for a trans-Atlantic cruise. We may find in Aristotle's *Politics* the germs of certain of the political doctrines of Beard and Laski without concluding that Aristotle is the better guide to the analysis of the political institutions and processes of the post-Industrial Revolution society.

It is obvious that the first step towards the exploitation of history in the interest of social intelligence is to make use of an intelligent type of history. Fortunately, we of the present generation have available an equipment in this respect such as never before existed, and it is becoming yearly more reliable and more comprehensive. While the writer has dealt more extensively elsewhere with the matter of the nature and genesis of the "new history," the first part of the present work is devoted: (1) to a brief analysis of the difficulties which confront the historian in his effort to face and execute his task in an intelligent manner; (2) to a brief survey of the recent contributions to a more dynamic type of historical literature, chiefly those in the English language; and (3) to a discussion, by means of extended book reviews, of some of the chief problems raised and the progress made in a few of the more representative books which have recently appeared in the field. Each of these books has been selected because it illustrates either a notable aspect of the process of broadening the historical outlook or some of the more conspicuous obstacles which must be overcome in constructing an objective and profound type of historical literature.

In the past development of both humanity and historical writing nothing has been more potent in distorting historical vision and social judgments than patriotism and national hatreds, whether it be the primitive superstitious fear of tribal societies, the contempt of Jew for Gentile or of the Greek for the Barbarian, or the traditional arrogance and hatreds of modern nationals. Closely connected with the patriotic bias has been the misleading myth of racial superiority and inferiority. And of all sources of patriotic and ethnic animus and distorting prejudices none are so important for the present generation as those which lay back of and produced

the late World War, and have continued with even greater intensity since its close. In the second part of this book the attempt has been made to put the resources of scientific history at the service of the development of international intelligence through exposing the grotesque errors and anachronisms which lie at the basis of the patriotic and race cults, and the current notions of war-guilt. The concluding chapter in this section endeavors to indicate the implications of these problems with respect to the reconstruction of our concepts and methods in historical writing in the particular field of international relations.

One of the chief obstacles to an intelligent approach to the study of the past, particularly of one's own country, is the almost universal tendency towards the building up of an epical and reverential attitude towards the figures and episodes in ages remote from our own. Such periods often appear to have been peopled by austere, metaphysical giants like unto the present generation only in their gross anatomical characteristics. Criteria and methods which are used in the analysis and study of contemporary figures and problems are taboo when approaching heroes and events in the national past. Mundane characteristics and motives are not to be sought for in these golden ages. We have not escaped from this mythologizing even in our country which possesses so slight a past as compared with the national antiquity of the states and cultures of Europe. In Part III we take up briefly some conspicuous episodes and certain illustrious figures from the "Patristic Period" of our development and indicate how the well established facts of scientific history serve to dissipate the mists and fogs created by the epic mongers, without in any sense lessening legitimate respect for the achievements and the distinguished personalities of this age.

Democratic institutions are held to be the pivotal element in modern politics and culture. Still we are by no means certain as yet as to what democracy really is. We cannot be sure that it has thus far been actually realized, or, if it has, that its survival can be assumed to be certain or its success assured. In the concluding part of this work the attempt is made to deal with the history of democratic theory and practice, some leading contemporary problems and issues in the actual operation of democracy, and the outlook for the future. Special attention is given to Woodrow Wilson, because he is believed by the writer to be one of the most conspicuous representatives of the first, and per-

haps the last, stage of democracy, namely, that of the doctrinaire and the metaphysical idealist. It may frankly be conceded that American public life and public leaders have since declined in an abysmal fashion as compared with the level attained in the first Wilson administration, but it is equally true that this has been largely due to the fact that Wilson attempted to lead America and the world on the basis of excellent intentions and seductive rhetoric rather than through a control of the cogent facts of human behavior and contemporary social organization. Unless we are able to supplant doctrinaire idealism by "social engineering," founded upon the best results of natural science, technology and the social sciences, there is no prospect whatever that democracy or any other type of political institutions will be able to cope successfully with the ever-increasing complexities of contemporary civilization. Woodrow Wilson, in the opinion of the writer, will ultimately be seen to have been a sort of borderland figure between the *a priori*, metaphysical and rhetorical statesmanship of the past and either the scientifically guided social control or the chaos and disintegration of society which is to come. The last chapter in the book indicates some of the reasons for holding that we stand between the alternatives, as Wells has expressed it, of education in the social sciences or social catastrophe.

It is believed that the present volume will have a wider and more general appeal than anything which the writer has previously published, and the book has been put together primarily in the hope that it may interest such of the general reading public as have intelligence enough to be concerned about either history or contemporary social issues and problems. With respect to general point of view and the scope of its interests and subject-matter, this volume is designed as a sort of sequel to Robinson's *Mind in the Making*. It takes up the story at about the point where that book leaves off. It is also the desire of the writer that the volume may be found useful to students of contemporary social history, and to teachers of the so-called "social studies" who must of necessity concern themselves with the problems of the socializing of the content of history, and with the issues raised by nationalism and democracy. Finally, it is hoped that the book may at least to a feeble degree serve the cause of historiography by illustrating to some extent the attitude and interests of the newer type of historical writing. Both the style and content of this book will at times doubtless outrage the sensibilities of some of the most

solemn mandarins of my profession, but these very qualities will make the work that much more interesting and valuable to those for whom I am writing.

The writer desires to express his thanks to the editors of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, the *American Mercury*, the *New York Times Current History Magazine*, the *New Republic*, the *Nation*, the *North American Review* and the *American Review* for permission to reprint material in these publications in the present volume.

For efficient aid in reading proof the writer is indebted to his wife, Grace S. Barnes, and to his friends and former students, Grace A. Cockroft, John Burke O'Leary, Leslie A. White, Ernest R. Perkins, John V. Ford and Harold W. Landin.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Northampton, Mass.

February 22, 1926.

CONTENTS

PART I

ASPECTS OF THE NEWER HISTORY

CHAPTER

I. CLIO: OBSTETRIX VERITATIS?	I
I. Truth: A Compensatory Illusion	I
II. The Sneer Method Versus the Drool Method in History	4
III. Truth and History	9
1. Initial Handicaps of the Historian as a Wooer of Truth	9
2. Religious Bias and Bigotry	10
3. The Myth of a Racial Hierarchy	12
4. Patriotic Ardor	15
5. The Illusion of Party	19
6. Caste, Class and History	21
7. The Spontaneous Generation of the Historical Epic	23
8. The Herd and the Teacher	24
II. THE NEWEST HISTORY	28
I. The Rise of the New History	28
II. Pre-Literary History	30
III. Oriental Culture	32
IV. Classical Civilization	34
V. The Middle Ages	35
VI. The Origins of Modern Civilization	37
VII. The Revision of the American Epic	39
VIII. The World War and After	42
III. RECENT HISTORICAL TENDENCIES	52
I. Our Primitive Heritage	52
II. At Last a History of Civilization	55
III. The Adolescence of Clio	65
IV. The Evolution of Metropolitan Economy	69
V. The New American History	72

VI.	Descriptive Social History	77
VII.	Respectable History	81
VIII.	War Hysteria and Nationalistic Bias	87
IX.	A Daniel Come to Judgment	103
X.	Objective National History	110
XI.	Clio and Freud	116
XII.	A Critical View of Progress	122
XIII.	The World Outlook in Modern History	125
XIV.	The Twentieth Century	129
XV.	The Comedy of Man	135
XVI.	The Cosmic Perspective of Mr. Wells	139

PART II

HISTORY, AND SOME PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM

IV.	THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM	145
I.	Introductory Definitions	145
II.	A Brief Historical Sketch of the Stages in the Origins of Nationality and Nations Previ- ous to the Rise of the Modern National States	147
1.	Tribal Society	147
2.	Early City-States	148
3.	The Patriarchal Empires of Antiquity	151
4.	The Middle Ages	154
III.	The Commercial Revolution and the Rise and Development of the Modern Dynastic Na- tional States	157
IV.	The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Period and the Popularization of National Sentiment in Europe	164
V.	The Industrial Revolution, National Imperial- ism and the Latest Stage in the Evolution of Nationalism	168
VI.	Nationalism and Internationalism	188
V.	NATIONALISM AND HISTORICAL WRITING	193
I.	The Foundations	193
II.	Germany	194
III.	France	197
IV.	England	201
V.	Minor European Countries and the Jews	204

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS	xv
VI. Archival Materials	208
VII. The United States	210
VIII. The Outcome	215
VI. THE RACE MYTH	218
I. Race Theory and History	218
II. Origins of the Race Myth	219
III. The Critique of the Race Myth	221
VII. WORLD WAR GUILT	226
I. The New Documentary Evidence	226
II. The Pre-War International Situation	231
III. Distribution of Responsibility	237
1. Austria	237
2. Germany	243
3. Russia	248
4. France	256
5. Great Britain	263
6. Italy	267
7. Belgium	268
IV. Final Conclusions	268
VIII. HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	271
I. The Orientation and Objectives of the New History	271
II. War Guilt and the International Outlook	274
III. World War "Bunk" and Some International Realities	278
IV. The Place of History in the Cause of Peace and Good Will	285

PART III

CREATION TALES

IX. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION	296
I. Introductory Observations	296
II. Expansion of Europe and the Colonial Movement	296
III. The Eve of the Conflict	302
IV. Conciliation and Independence	305
V. Some Conclusions	310

X. THE FATHERS AT WORK, WORSHIP AND PLAY	313
I. The Patristic Inspiration	313
II. The Patristic Enthusiasm for Revolution	314
III. The Fathers as Fore-Runners of Karl Marx	319
IV. The Fathers Inspire Professor Beard	324
V. The Fathers as God's Stewards	328
VI. Contemporary Appreciation of the Federal Constitution	332
VII. The Fathers and Pure Politics	342
VIII. Bryanism and the Fathers	347
IX. Were the Fathers Joy-Killers?	355
X. Conclusions	366
XI. HUNTING BOLSHEVIKS IN 1798	368
I. The Radical Bogy: Ancient and Modern	368
II. Background of the Alien and Sedition Laws	370
III. Reaction Against the Repressive Legislation	373
IV. The Defeat of the Reactionaries	377
XII. THE SECOND WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE	381
I. The Epic of 1812	381
II. The Aftermath of the Revolution	382
III. The Impressment of Seamen	384
IV. The Orders in Council and the Treachery of Timothy Pickering	386
V. The Realities of 1812	390
VI. Reconciliation and the Monroe Doctrine	392

PART IV

THE RISE AND FALL OF DEMOCRACY

XIII. SOME ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY	394
I. Introductory	394
II. Democracy in Primitive Society	394
III. Democracy in Early Political Society	396
IV. Democracy During Classical Times	396
V. Democracy in the Middle Ages	399
VI. Democracy from the Commercial Revolution to the Industrial Revolution	401

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii

<u>VII.</u>	Democracy from the Industrial Revolution to the Present Day	406
— 1.	Practical Achievements in Democratic Progress	406
— 2.	Progress of Democratic Theory	419
 XIV.	 THE POLITICAL PARTY IN DEMOCRACY	 427
I.	The Importance of Parties in Modern Political Life	427
II.	The Nature and Function of Political Parties	427
III.	The Historical Development of the Political Party	436
IV.	Origins of Party Government in the United States	438
V.	Abuses in the Party System	440
VI.	Efforts and Achievements in the Reform of Party Abuses	446
 XV.	 THE ELECTION OF 1924 AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY	 452
I.	Party Government in America and Political Intelligence	452
II.	Explanations of the Coolidge Landslide	454
III.	Decline of Political Independence in the United States	469
IV.	The Triumph of Reaction and Mediocrity	471
 XVI.	 THE COST OF DEMOCRACY	 479
I.	Historical Background	479
II.	Unscientific Methods of Raising and Expending Revenue	481
III.	The Growing Army of Job-Holders	485
IV.	Effect of Election Costs	490
V.	The Challenge of War to Civilization and Economy	492
VI.	Waste in the States	495
VII.	Prospect of Relief	496
VIII.	Political Waste and Social Waste	497
 XVII.	 WOODROW WILSON: AN ESTIMATE	 505
I.	The Problem	505
II.	Woodrow Wilson as Student and Writer	508
III.	Wilson's Political Career in Apology and Criticism	512
IV.	Some Possible Explanations	516

V.	Woodrovian "Liberalism" and Its Disappearance	519
VI.	Problems of the Wilson Personality	522
XVIII.	WOODROW WILSON: CONTEMPORARY APPRAISALS	526
I.	Mr. Annin's Analysis	526
1.	Woodrow Wilson and the Princeton Problem	526
2.	Wilson as a Statesman and a Politician	534
3.	The World War and the Destruction of Wilson	537
4.	The Personal Traits of Mr. Wilson	540
II.	Mr. Lawrence Versus Mr. Annin on Woodrow Wilson	544
III.	William Allen White on Woodrow Wilson	551
XIX.	SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY	562
I.	Historical Setting of Democratic Problems	562
1.	Importance of the Historical Orientation	562
2.	General Backwardness of Western Society in 1750	563
3.	The Secular, Dynamic and Complex Contemporary Society	568
II.	The Historical Basis of Liberalism	578
III.	The Necessity of Social Science for the Solution of the Problems of Contemporary Democracy	584
	INDEX	591

HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE

I

CLIO: OBSTETRIX VERITATIS?¹

I. TRUTH: A COMPENSATORY ILLUSION

It is often naïvely believed by many pious and faithful souls that when Pontius Pilate parried with Jesus with his famous interrogation as to what the latter meant by Truth, there then originated the concrete interest of mankind in this perennial problem. As a matter of fact a millennium and a half earlier Ikhnaton, the ill-fated and unhappy father-in-law of his lately exhumed majesty, Tut-ank-amen, whose recently discovered mortuary equipment in the shape of furniture, clothing, and baggage for his anticipated celestial journey has covered him with more glory than came to Ramesses with all his victories, seems to have been much concerned over the truth with respect to philosophy and religion, as a result of which idle curiosity his political prestige and prospects declined as sharply as those of Ingersoll and Bertrand Russell.

In the sixth and fifth centuries B. C., Milesians and Eleatics wrangled over the merits of the scientific and metaphysical paths to truth, and the Sophists were laying the basis for a laudably humble epistemology by showing the dubious and relative nature of all that passes for demonstrable fact. Socrates seems to have been the first to make the search for truth the main business of a lifetime, perhaps because he had fallen down badly in all the other pursuits he had cultivated. His persistence in this quest led to the termination of his dialectical exercises and conjugal infelicities by accepting the prescription of poison hemlock. Aristotle elaborated the indispensable, if heavy and pedantic, technique of logic and the laws of reasoning, but they were not much exploited until the "subtle doctors" of the medieval period utilized them to weigh the validity of the arguments of various authorities as to the number of teeth in the mouth of a horse or the standing

¹ This article was published in large part in the first number of the *American Mercury*.

room available for angelic figures on the point of a needle. The Christians felt that they had a monopoly on *the* truth, so they did not have to concern themselves with such a base matter as mundane and secular fact. When the schism came in the ranks of these jailors and custodians of truth, the apologists and protago-nists of the "Teufels Nest zu Rom" and the "Crazy Monk of Wittenberg" developed such zest for libel, slander and invective that Truth bolted in dismay to show her head only cautiously and sporadically in answer to the persistent pleading and seductive efforts of the few embryonic natural scientists and critical philosophers whose work began in the seventeenth century. Since that time we have made some little progress towards the valuing of accurate facts with respect to the action of the benzoic compounds, electrons, radio-activity, or the structure of the atom, but there is little reason to believe that with regard to most of those problems connected with the various types of social relations and institutions we are any more earnest or enthusiastic in our quest for veracity than was Plato when he began the noble excursus in the quest of Justice which ended in the production of his *Republic*.²

The fact is that we as humans are not interested in discovering realities and verities in most problems of a social, economic or political nature. What we desire is to be told why our particular state, nation, culture, race, sect or party has been a product of a majestic effort of divine inventive or creative power and why our opponents are feeble-minded servants of the devil. In the processes of social evolution, which have been operating on human material for the last half million years, the rewards of approval and survival have gone to the conforming majority, and, as a result, the dearest of human emotions is the approving eulogy of the herd. By history, fact and definition the herd can rarely be right, for, as Sumner has so clearly shown, their mental content and equipment are fashioned from the archaic debris of past attitudes and interpretations, which never get stereotyped into ideas and institutions until they have become highly anachronistic. For the sake of that coöperative social activity, which seems to have been essential to race survival, we have paid the price of sacri-

² For material conducive to reflections on these points see W. A. Dunning, "Truth in History," in *American Historical Review*, 1914; G. L. Burr, "The Freedom of History," *Ibid.*, 1917; J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Chaps. vii-viii; C. L. Becker, "Detachment and the Writing of History," in *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1910.

ficing far the greater part of human originality, and have bred a race in which docility and deference to herd opinions, and savage intolerance of doubt and dissent are the most characteristic of our behavior patterns. It is psychologically easy to understand why Thomas was the most intolerable of the disciples, evidently more irritating than Judas Iscariot, and the necrology of the great doubters of history from Socrates through Abelard, Bruno and Jaurès is most impressive. In short, there is no more monstrous error than the supposition that the human animal lusts after or relishes the truth, and in a democratic society, which is supposedly based upon the dogma that the majority should have what they want, we assume a rather heavy responsibility by our labors of *supererogation* in forcing our conception of the truth down their reluctant throats. John Morley once said that he was honored by a friend who had possessed many more opportunities for foreign study and personal contacts than Morley himself, but this friend expressed it as his reasoned conviction that he had met in his lifetime just four persons actually interested in the truth. Morley leaves one with the impression that he had a sneaking suspicion that his distinguished contemporary had put the figure a little too high.³

Of course, many will inquire as to why we omit those ostentatiously honest folk who would testify to the adultery of the wife of their best friend on the witness stand—who are honest to the point of being dishonorable. Freely granting the existence of such personality types, we only need to turn to the first axioms of psychiatry to learn that such conduct is but compensation for fundamental and basic dishonesty with respect to the major facts of personal experience and obligation—such a person could well be trusted in most cases to gorge a heavy horse with lime-water or to pack a noisy differential with thick grease preceding a trade or sale, or to exact the last farthing of interest on a mortgage from a destitute widow. Or an offensively conspicuous honesty may well be a compensation for a mean inferiority-complex growing out of a lack of all the other constructive qualities of personality. Finally, it is probably equally true that the formal emphasis placed upon the significance and virtue of truth in human society is but a collective compensation for a deep sub-conscious realization that

³ On these matters see Robinson, *op. cit.*; W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*; W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*; E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*.

of all forms of human indulgence its pursuit is the most rare and abhorrent. Indeed, we may assume that most of those courageous spirits who take special delight in pointing out absurdities in accepted traditions and conventions derive their zest less from any abstract esteem for absolute verity than from a personal anti-authority complex which impels them to assault all the cherished ideals and convictions of their elders. An iconoclast of international reputation may well be fashioned by a half dozen severe rawhidings from the parental hand.⁴

II. THE SNEER METHOD VERSUS THE DROOL METHOD IN HISTORY

The general stubbornness and persistent recalcitrance of the human race and its tendency to stampede when confronted by the truth is nowhere more evident than in its reaction to history. As is admirably stated in the preface to Anatole France's *Penguin Island*: "If you have any new insight, any original idea, if you present men and affairs under an unwonted aspect you will surprise the reader. And the reader does not want to be surprised. He seeks in a history only the stupidities with which he is familiar." In the recent and still continuing war of the accountants, plumbers, salesmen, drug-clerks, blacksmiths, barbers and yokels, who constitute our school committees, upon feeble and helpless historians who have been making some faint beginnings in the way of telling the truth with respect to our national development, this contempt for the truth has been frankly avowed in the slogan that our histories in the future shall tell what is "proper" rather than what is true.

In the July number of the *American Historical Review* for 1923, Dr. J. F. Jameson introduces his readers to "A Pure History Law" passed in the most progressive state in the Union—Wisconsin—which thus encourages fearless candor on the part of textbook writers: "No history or other textbook shall be adopted for use or be used in any district school, city school, vocational school, or high school which falsifies the facts regarding the war of independence, or the war of 1812, or defames our nation's founders or

⁴ W. A. White, *The Mechanisms of Character Formation*; A. G. Tansley, *The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life*; K. Jung, *Psychological Types*; F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*; E. R. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*.

misrepresents the ideals and causes for which they struggled and sacrificed, or which contains propaganda favorable to any foreign government." The law further provides that the state superintendent of education must hold a hearing when any five citizens complain that a book does not, for example, make it clear that the Irish volunteers won the Battle of Bunker Hill, fails to emphasize properly the fact that the Loyalists were a gang of degenerate drunkards and sex perverts, mentions the smuggling proclivities or land piracy of the Fathers, or suggests that there has ever been a civilized German. If, with an eye to his political future, the superintendent rules the book unfit for exhibition to the young morons whose parents have manifested their righteous indignation, the book is to be immediately withdrawn from every school in the state under penalty of forfeiture of all state pecuniary aid in the *wissenschaftliche Ausbildung* of the youth of the offending district. Dr. Jameson thus characterizes the probable nature of the grave process of determining the erudition and objectivity of the product of some historical savant who has devoted a lifetime of patient labor to the cultivation of his chosen topic: "Picture the scene at the county courthouse. On the one side the five complaining citizens eager to protect their cherished offspring from the danger of learning any facts or thoughts unfamiliar to their parents, and armed with clippings from the Hearst newspapers and other authoritative texts. On the other side, the publisher's agent, reluctant to sacrifice the poor author, but willing to make 'reasonable concessions' and nowise bigoted in matters of history. As a judge, a school inspector, who very likely 'had History I' when in college." The miserable burlesque of attempted suppression of relatively honest and frank textbooks recently staged in Boston and New York is familiar to all who consort with the public press.⁵

There appeared in the columns of the *Historical Outlook* for June, 1923, an article entitled "The Sneer Method in the Teaching of History," by Dr. James Sullivan, the retiring state historian of the Empire State. For years a worthy servant in the cause of antiquarian historical research, he had just accepted a position in

⁵ See the illuminating exposé of the New York situation published in the *New York Tribune* in the fall of 1923. The American Legion has just prepared a "proper" American history textbook for the public schools. See the letter by C. H. Van Tyne in the *New York Times*, July 24, 1925; B. L. Pierce, *Public Opinion and the Teaching of History*.

the state education department and doubtless felt it necessary to signalize his ascent from scholar to politician by evidence of eligibility to membership in the Ku Klux Klan or the Daughters of the American Revolution. The distressed *ex-Historiker* bemoaned the fact that "In America there is no cheaper and easier way to win the plaudits of the students in the college history class-room than by sneering at some national character or institution or anything else which up to the time the students have revered and respected."

By a constructive synthesis of the opposites of the concepts and practices which the good doctor wrathfully condemns we may formulate the ideals as to the exposition of Clío's secrets, which we may well designate the "Drool Method" in historical pedagogy. The latter is now faithfully followed in so overwhelming a preponderance of cases that we may marvel at Dr. Sullivan's solicitude about the sinister activities of the one percent of canny instructors. The "Drool Method," as applied to the exposition of American history, would include the following essentials: We would start with Gobineau's dogma of the superiority of the Aryans—the sole builders of civilization—and then show how all able-bodied and super-moronic American citizens are the noblest of all the Aryans—the Anglo-Saxon strain of the lordly Nordic blood. The colonial period should be so expounded as to emphasize the fact that the spiritual urge to complete religious and political liberty was the sole cause of our ancestors embarking on the wintry seas for America. Only the meanest character would mention the limited passenger capacity of the *Mayflower*. No hint should be given of sordid economic motives for colonization nor any suspicion aroused as to possible shortcomings in the ultimate colonial realization of the fullest liberty in every field of human endeavor. Least of all should one hint that by 1775 over half of the inhabitants of one of the most populous of the colonies were descended from indentured servants and redemptioners, or that there was a large admixture of deported criminals in our "Nordic" colonial ancestry. It should be made clear that all the French and Indian wars in the colonial period were won solely by the colonists who supported their own armies.

In treating the Revolution the movement should be interpreted as a determined effort of all Englishmen to back their German king in the effort to exterminate the loyal but liberty-loving Americans, who were united as a man in the disinterested effort to repel

foreign tyranny and secure for the world at large the blessings of freedom. Drawing and quartering would be inadequate punishment for the teacher who dared to utter the slanderous falsehood that New Englanders were addicted to smuggling, or the landlords and frontiersmen to envy and lust after the land west of the Alleghenies. Only punishments not permissible to name in print would be sufficient to fit the case of a pedagogue so degenerate as to suggest that the Loyalists were about as numerous as the Patriots and really constituted the intellectual and social aristocracy of the colonial age—before whom the Patriot leaders had been only too willing to scuff and bow a few years earlier. Blasphemy laws might be invoked against those who could have the shameless audacity to aver that George III was eager to conciliate the colonists and not to conquer them, and that his commander-in-chief in America was as appropriately appointed as though Mr. Wilson had selected the Great Commoner from Lincoln, Nebraska, or Eugene Debs, instead of General Pershing, to lead our troops overseas in 1917. And what of the base being who would be so vile as to insinuate ever so slightly that the Patriots were the first to use Indians against their white opponents, or that Independence was won not by the capture of Cornwallis, but by an overthrow of the British cabinet which followed as a result?

Space does not permit the continuation of this syllabus of "proper" American history to the present time, but most requirements will suggest themselves to the reader. It will, for example, be readily apparent that no one would think for a moment of mentioning the gigantic land steals synchronous with the establishment of independence and unity, or of inquiring just how George Washington had millions thrust upon him in moments of absent-mindedness, so that this purely metaphysical being who, like Aristotle's God, was continually absorbed in lofty introspection and detached meditation, died the richest man in the country, or of questioning the unswerving loyalty of Timothy Pickering, the dignified bearing and incorruptible character of Ben Butler, the calm analytical powers of Andrew Jackson, the aristocratic leanings and other-worldly detachment of Abraham Lincoln, the wise and statesmanlike tolerance of Thad Stevens, and the political subtlety and acumen of General Grant. John Brown's distinguished achievements as a horse-thief should be adduced only as a proof of his need of ever swifter steeds to carry him forward in the Lord's work. And, of course, an attractive daily chant, written by

Harry F. Atwood, would need to be provided on the basic *motif* of Gladstone's revelation, to the effect that the American constitution "is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." It should not fail to be reiterated frequently that the personnel of the federal government has invariably been of a type highly appropriate and fully adequate to the execution of this unique instrument of government. The Assyrian technique of impaling should be revived for the teacher who suggests that the "pork-barrel" is the key to a practical understanding of American government.

As to choice of subject-matter the "Drool Method" would recommend sole attention to, and undivided concentration on, the record of gentlemanly activities: the diverse major and minor slaughters in our national history, the intrigues and escapades of diplomats, and the quadrennial political debauchery and buffoonery, as a result of which one batch of grafters and incompetents is replaced by another. The heroic achievements of "great" men should be described at length, but it must be borne in mind that true "greatness" is a quality possessed alone by generals, diplomats and politicians. Only a pensioner of George V could suggest that Franklin was greater as a scientist than as a diplomat, no one but a snivelling subaltern of Ludendorff would hold Eli Whitney to be more important in his country's history than General Gates, and no more certain proof of the receipt of a weekly check from Moscow could be found than the dastardly hint that Cyrus McCormick or William Kelly ought to rank higher in American annals than William H. Marcy or Winfield-Scott. The history of ideas, opinions and institutions is especially to be eschewed, for no one short of the most fanatical follower of Bill Haywood and Emma Goldman could recommend the cultivation of this field, which might well lead to the conviction that the majority of our conventional views are about as anachronistic as the spinning wheel, sickle and distaff, or, perhaps, the *coup de poing*. Text-books like those of Robinson, Breasted, Beard, Flick, Webster, Hayes and Schapiro, which introduce the student to such amazingly improper and incendiary material, should be burned with formal ceremony. Above all, the instructor should be properly impressed with the gravity of the responsibility imposed by his task of proving the American race, language, culture and institutions superior to all other, and hence inferior, examples of God's creative inge-

nuity. He should preserve an austere solemnity, such as would be appropriate in reading an especially sonorous section of the *Book of Common Prayer*. He should remember that wit, humor and facetiousness are as out of place in the history class-room as during the administration of the sacrament of extreme unction.

Those who follow piously and consistently the precepts of the "Drool Method" may not achieve undue success in all university history departments, some of which are now honeycombed with anarchists, communists, renegades and traitors, but they will develop great popularity with the alumni of many colleges, will be highly esteemed in the public school systems, approvingly decorated by superintendents, commended by state departments of education, invited to address the most diverse Hundred Percent organizations on Washington's Birthday, Patriots' Day and the Fourth of July, offered an opportunity to syndicate articles on cosmic philosophy, universal history and contemporary politics in the daily press, and be in line for election to the head of the history department in the University of Valparaiso.

III. TRUTH AND HISTORY

1. *Initial Handicaps of the Historian as a Wooer of Truth.*

We have now expended much laborious phraseology to elaborate a self-evident platitude to the effect that to desire veracity is not human—that few care to search for the truth and still fewer to have it revealed to them. Exception might be made as to scientists and artists, but only with respect to their narrow professional interests. We may expect, with little probability of disappointment, that both will be as incompetent on matters of politics or economics as any sheriff or bull-fancier. Therefore, it is largely an esoteric and academic diversion to discuss the elusiveness of truth as the problem is viewed by an historian. Yet it is not a wholly useless enterprise, because it should have a chastening influence—should help to generate a salutary modesty and humility with respect to what we can actually know about any historical episode or situation. If the most dehumanized savant can only hope to approximate to the truth with respect to some insignificant diurnal detail after a lifetime of emotional immolation, what may be said about the validity of opinions on the Magna Carta, the Mercantile System, the Revolutionary War or the history of

American political parties possessed by the average Oklahoma barber, Kentucky deacon or New York sheriff!

We may admit at the outset that in their palmyest days neither Kid Lavigne nor Tommy Ryan possessed any approximation to the shiftiness and elusiveness of truth as she is wooed by the historian. The historian begins his attempt at seduction with the handicap of two millstones about his neck. He is himself a frail product of clay, with his own complexes, restrictions, biases and prejudices derived from his Baptist, Republican, Nordic, Confucian, single-tax, protective tariff, Christian Endeavor, Pennsylvanian or Texan heritage. Hence, his most painful *tour de force* in the effort to achieve impartiality can do little better than suspend momentarily and partially the operation of the more flagrant of his prejudices on some particular topic. In addition to these personal defects, he can rarely gather his data by direct observation, and has to rely for his information upon the accounts and interpretations of what have normally been a more notorious group of liars and distorters than himself, the telling of a falsehood in the interest of the Lord or some patron prince being a commonplace service in the past, requiring even less compensatory and defensive rationalization than it does today. Hence, in our wobbly approximations to truth in the historical realm we must thus face the fact that both the sources and the student and interpreter of these sources are subject to the biases springing from religion, race, nationality, partisan zeal, economic interests and attachments, and the universal tendency of the human race to fall under the spell of the old and misunderstood and carry forward the spontaneous generation of the historical epic.

2. *Religious Bias and Bigotry.*

Religious prejudice has been one of the most persistent influences leading to the debasing of history from the days when Assyrian monarchs praised God that He had made it possible for them to serve him sweetly and humbly by gathering pyramids of heads of their slain rivals, when the Jewish scribes and prophets offered thanks for the wholesale slaughter of the enemies of Yahweh, and when Orosius summarily dismissed all pagan culture as a product of diabolical instigation, to those of Schaff's eulogy of Luther and Denifle's biting slanders on

his personality.⁶ The precedent for this simple-minded Christian sweetness towards our religious and political neighbors, so frequently asserted and exhibited during the late World War and its aftermath, is to be found in such samples from Holy Writ as the following from the tenth chapter of Joshua:⁷

So Joshua smote all the land, the hill-country and the South, and the lowland, and the slopes, and all their kings: he left none remaining, but he utterly destroyed all that breathed, as Jehovah, the God of Israel, commanded. And Joshua smote them from Kadesh-barnea even unto Gaza, and all the country of Goshen, even unto Gibeon. And all these kings and their land did Joshua take at one time, because Jehovah, the God of Israel, fought for Israel.

The spiritual ancestry of Newell Dwight Hillis is here very clearly indicated.

It is difficult for a typical youthful Protestant to comprehend that a Catholic playmate can actually be a member of the same biological species, even though the juvenile papist seems able to swear, swim, and steal apples with almost Protestant zeal and efficiency. If his parents were pressed as to their reasons for holding the Catholic an inferior product of organic evolution, they would be hard put to it for anything beyond some vague innuendo concerning certain alleged idolatrous Catholic practices and a disloyal and hyphenated acquiescence in papal suzerainty. Any candid historian of European religion and theology could readily assure them that the points of difference are vastly outweighed by the resemblances, the controversial elements revolving about points which Christ would have indignantly refused to accept as having any relation whatever to his religious teachings, but this would have as little avail as it would to assure a middle-aged Georgian that William Tecumseh Sherman was a human being.⁸ It would, of course, be futile to expect those whose ancestors murdered thousands in the controversy over *Homoiousius* vs. *Homooousius*, would be moved by any such considerations of obvious common sense and decency. But both Catholic and Protestant are willing to unite in a mutually savage *pogrom* against

⁶ See G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, Chaps. xxvi-xxvii; E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de l'Historiographie Moderne*, Livre III. Most of these types of bias are discussed in H. Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*.

⁷ See Graham Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, Chap. xii.

⁸ J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 117-118; H. Van Loon, *Tolerance*.

the Jews, from whom they both received a vast majority of their religious practices and beliefs, bigotry, and illusions. And, Catholic, Protestant and Jew will, when occasion arises, lock arms in a savage onslaught on Mohammedans, Buddhists or free thinkers. The futility of all this is evident to those educated and civilized persons who recognize that the orthodox of all these groups resemble, as one writer has expressed it, "a blind man in a dark room searching out a black cat that isn't there." The present swarming of the Ku Kluxers, Fundamentalists and other fanatical groups indicates, however, that the end of heretic and infidel baiting is not in sight.⁹

3. *The Myth of a Racial Hierarchy.*

One of the most weird and vulgar of all the prejudices distorting the vision of the historian is that growing out of the alleged hierarchy of racial capacities. It can scarcely be shown that even as between the three major races into which the human race is divided there is any proof of comprehensive superiority. The hierarchy of races is as yet as incapable of demonstration as hell-fire. The Chinese had a genial and urbane civilization of respectable antiquity when our "Nordic" ancestors were drinking the blood of their enemies out of human skulls, and the negro exhibits a marked superiority over the white race in meeting the requirements of the environment in which he was differentiated and to which he is adjusted.¹⁰ But this is the least of our troubles with the racial mythology; we are asked, by various chauvinists, to believe that only the Nordic, the Celtic, the Slavic or the Iberic type within the white race is capable of civilization. The most offensive nonsense which has been recently adduced in this field is that which has spread from the

⁹ J. M. Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan*; T. V. Smith, "The Bases of Bryanism," in *Scientific Monthly*, May, 1923. See the illuminating editorial entitled "Monkeying," in *New York Nation*, August 1, 1923, p. 104. For incredible illustrations of this perpetuation of primitive thought into our own day consult the files of the *American Standard* and the *Christian Statesman*. They even compare unfavorably with the Catholic publications *America* and *Columbia*.

¹⁰ An admirable work on the history of the racial mythology is T. Simar, *Étude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des races*, Brussels, 1922; English translation, *The Race Myth*. For a pulverizing criticism of the racial dogmatism see F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Chap. 1; and his article in the *American Mercury*, October, 1924.

initial virus of Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race*. This book, consciously or unconsciously but a doctrinal rehash of Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, is in its implications as flagrant a blast of *Deutschland über Alles* as ever was issued under Potsdam auspices, and would have led to the deportation of its author if he had proved to be an East Side Jewish socialist instead of a rich New York lawyer. Progressively debased, this doctrine has been widely disseminated by William McDougall, Lothrop Stoddard, Clinton S. Burr and Charles W. Gould, until now we are asked by one Eckenrode¹¹ to interpret the American Civil War as a struggle between the degenerate "Commercial Nordics" of the North, and the lordly "Tropical Nordics" south of Mason and Dixon's line. Perhaps the most atrocious expression of this racial prejudice and arrogance which has been recently divulged comes from the pen of a sweet-mannered follower of the lowly Nazarene and an apostle of brotherly love, one Leonard Doughty, a member of the bar of the Lone Star State:¹²

(After condemning all the worth-while books which have appeared in the last generation, he says:) It might have been thought of the Teuton, that he had reached earth's nadir of stupid badness and graceless shame in Hauptmann and Sudermann and their frowzy compeers. But the race that could produce Sudermann and Hauptmann, and their like, knows no nadir of mental sordidness or moral perversion; there are depths below all other depth for them. The actual, original scientific writings of Krafft-Ebing are less vile and pervert than the current "Literature" of the Germans of today. The stain of that yellow, bastard blood is upon much of the "authorship" of the United States. It is only a matter of procuring a grade school "education" under our free system, and Americanizing an ungainly name. Except for these the modern "authorship" that makes these "books" upon our stalls, is of those dread middle races, Aryan, indeed, but interminably mixed and simmered in the devil's cauldron of middle Europe, and spewed out of Italy and France, and off the dismal Slavic frontiers, and out of that more dismal and cankered East. Like a horde of chance-laden rats they are brought to swarm down the gang-planks of a thousand ships upon our shores. It is the spawn of the abysmal fecundity of this seething mass, which now, with the mental and moral deficiency of a thousand generations of defective parentage and low breeding behind and within them,

¹¹ *Jefferson Davis: President of the South*, N. Y., 1923.

¹² *The Alcalde*, University of Texas, January, 1923.

emits these "volumes," as the insane emit shrieks, or as a putrid corpse emits odor. Theirs are the little, the inexplicable minds, restless as maggots; void of outlook, void of culture or capacity for culture, or of any ancestral inheritance of dignity or of worth. They are manifestly the minds of those weak and wicked "Morons" of every generation, whose activities sometimes take the direction of overt and ghastly crime, sometimes of mere secret social sin, and again as now, the shameless and, indeed, unconscious "exhibitionism," as plainly seen in these "books" of "prose" and "verse," as in the unconscious and continuous action of the sexually insane who tear and rend all vesture placed upon them. By a strange and cruel malformation within them, evil appears to them good, and all things that are pure or true or of fair repute, come to them through the muddled haze of a bestial fancy, as objects of no worth, and as senseless and weak restrictions—"barbarous in the midst of civilization, heathen in the midst of Christianity."

The validity of this savage onslaught, directed in part against James Branch Cabell, is well commented upon by Mr. Mencken, who points out that by ancestry Cabell is as much whiter than Doughty as an albino is of fairer complexion than Jack Johnson.

The preposterous absurdities of this doctrine ought to be apparent even to one with an IQ of 60 or the historical knowledge normally possessed by the inspector of historical studies in a public school system. The plain facts of history are that the Nordics in relative purity have never built up a single high civilization save in Scandinavia in modern times, which singularly enough Mr. Grant repudiates. They seem, in general, to have been more gifted in war and physical prowess, but whatever their innate intellectual and cultural capacity, they have so far fallen short of the cultural achievements of the Celtic and Mediterranean types. Then it should not be forgotten that all of the great historic civilizations down to those of western Europe in modern times were, without exception, non-Nordic in their physical basis.¹³

The worthless nature of such puerility as the Nordic nonsense becomes even more apparent when one critically examines the attempt to expound national culture on the basis of race.¹⁴ Granting, for the sake of argument, that France, for instance, has pro-

¹³ R. B. Dixon, *The Racial History of Man*; and J. J. Smertenko, "The Myth of Nordic Race Superiority," *New York Times Current History*, April, 1924. See below chap. vi.

¹⁴ W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, Chap. vi.

duced the highest civilization in the history of mankind, shall we interpret this as due to the Nordics of the northeast, the Celts of the central plain and the northwest, the Mediterraneans of the south, or the more numerous mongrels who are a mixture in varying degrees of all these types? The most regrettable aspect of this comedy of errors is that its absurdities have tended to confuse or discredit the real significance of biological factors in history. The important element is not the indeterminate, and perhaps non-existent, differences in capacity between separate races or sub-races, but the very real and demonstrable differences in capacity between members of the same race. If it cannot be shown that the evolution of culture has been due to "Nordic" impulses, it can at least be demonstrated that all civilization has been the product of the labors of the able minority. As Professor Thorndike has phrased it: "The ability of a hundred of its most gifted representatives often accounts more for a nation's or race's welfare than the ability of a million of its mediocrities." The racial mythology also diverts attention from the very important problem of population increases in relation to the means of subsistence, something which has engaged the attention of biologists and social scientists from the time of Malthus onward. The biological key to history, then, is to be found along the path pointed out by Galton, Pearson, Carr-Saunders, Schallmayer, Conklin and Holmes, rather than in the illusory labyrinth suggested by Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Madison Grant or Lothrop Stoddard.¹⁵

4. *Patriotic Ardor.*

Nationalism and patriotism are sentiments not less barbarous and uncivilized than racial egotism and arrogance, to which they are so closely, if fallaciously, allied.¹⁶ To be sure, if one defines patriotism as the sense of civic obligation, such as was a common notion with the best philosophers of classical antiquity and the German and English idealists, then we may frankly admit that it is one of the highest and noblest of human emotions. We are not concerned with that here, for what passes for patriotism

¹⁵ See R. Gonnard, *Histoire des doctrines de la population*; S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race*; E. M. East, *Mankind at the Cross-roads*.

¹⁶ See e. g. C. C. Josey, *Race and National Solidarity*. See the article "Nationalism: Its Historical Development," in the new edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, or below chap. iv.

with the vast majority of the population of modern states is not this lofty sentiment, but that essentially savage type of attitude and behavior, the contemporary American manifestation of which is popularly known as "Hundred Percentism." The tribal instinct or behavior pattern, which has been unleashed in modern patriotism, has now a singular virulence and potency because of our new technical achievements in the art of slaughtering our fellow Christians.¹⁷

The tribal hunting-pack ferocity towards neighbors and strangers endured but little impaired and diluted among the great mass of mankind down to the middle of the eighteenth century. The modern methods of communication, embracing telegraph, cable, radio, telephone, Associated Press organization, cheap popular newspapers, city and free rural mail delivery were suddenly foisted upon these barbarians, who still looked upon a stranger as an emissary of the devil or strange gods. In this way a hundred millions of these who still retain almost unimpaired the psychological behavior patterns and attitudes of the Todas or Bantus towards their neighbors are able simultaneously to open their daily papers containing an Associated Press dispatch to the effect that the American consul in Timbuctoo has been slain by a native official while in the act of rape, murder or robbery, and be moved with almost perfect synchronism to righteous indignation and to the immediate demand that our country's honor be summarily avenged by the invasion of this dastardly land and the putting of its inhabitants to the sword.¹⁸ We need to have it adequately rammed home that to give full and complete cultural harmony, propriety and symmetry to the breakfast table equipment of the average Hundred Percenter, we should add to his coffee, roll, shredded wheat and morning paper a tomahawk and scalping knife, if there is any probability that a communication of international import is likely to appear in the press. However much one may long for international peace and world organization, he must indeed be a most naïve optimist who expects much from such feeble organizations as the League of Nations taken by itself in the face of the realities of human

¹⁷ J. H. Robinson, "What is National Spirit?" in *Century Magazine*, November, 1916; S. Herbert, *Nationality and Its Problems*; B. Russell, *Why Men Fight*; W. Irwin, *The Next War*.

¹⁸ See F. S. Chapin, *Historical Introduction to Social Economy*, Chap. xvi; T. Veblen, *The Nature of Peace*, pp. 1-76; W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*; L. Perla, *What is National Honor?*

group savagery and barbarism which have infinitely increased rather than declined since 1914.¹⁹ It is for this reason that the Bok Plan seems like clutching at a straw in a hurricane.

The manner in which this affects historical writing is easy to understand. The most scholarly historian is something of a group-conditioned savage even in time of peace, and may be entirely so in time of war, as is evidenced by the words and behavior of many American historians in 1917-19 who had shown remarkable poise and judgment in treating of their country's earlier international involvements, including even the sanctified Revolutionary period itself. As if his own weaknesses were not enough, the mob camps on his trail, seats itself resolutely on the library steps awaiting his exit, and clamors for his head if he has the courage and honesty to exhibit intelligence and candor in his utilization of the sources of information at his disposal, which are themselves likely to be very largely the product of an earlier barbaric interpretation of the relations between states. While there are in some cases relatively good approximations, it may safely be said that there are not in existence a half dozen complete and candid impartial histories of the foreign relations of the leading modern states.²⁰

Yet it cannot be held that this defect is especially significant because of the lust of the herd for what it desires to believe—what it likes to think is true. This is well brought out by the present state of affairs with respect to the prevailing attitude towards the origins of the World War in the United States at the close of 1925. Due to revolutionary overturns in several of the major states which were at war, particularly Russia, Austria and Germany, the heinous activities of the various politicians and

¹⁹ See F. H. Hankins, "Is a Permanent Peace Possible?" in *Journal of Race Development*, Vol. VIII; and "Patriotism and Peace," *Ibid.* Vol. XII; W. B. Pillsbury, *The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism*.

²⁰ Article "History: Its Rise and Development," in *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. XIV, pp. 234-43; "History and International Good-Will," *New York Nation*, March 1, 1922; H. M. Stephens, "Nationality and History," *American Historical Review*, 1916; J. F. Scott, *Patriots in the Making*. Patriotism and class bias affect the histories of international relations in diverse ways. W. R. Thayer's books on John Hay and Roosevelt represent an exuberant enthusiasm for the American *Politik*. G. H. Blakeslee's *Recent Foreign Policy of the United States* is a good example of excessive scholarly caution. Scott Nearing's *American Empire* is a case of honest but somewhat overdrawn criticism.

diplomats from 1908-1914 have been revealed to their own generation—something hitherto unique in the history of war and diplomacy. These newly opened archives have completely upset all of the hypocritical mythology upon which the Allies and Wilson built their high-sounding appeals to the idealism of the world. Not only is this material available in great collections of documents, most of them translated into French and English, but it has been analyzed, sifted and clearly condensed by Pevet, Morhardt, Fabre-Luce, Ewart, Barbagallo, Fay, Gooch, Beard, Renouvin and Montgelas.²¹

Nevertheless, this has scarcely affected by an iota the thinking of the French, English or American world.²² Not only have all the criminals who brought on the war escaped the gallows, in spite of the fact of perfectly demonstrable guilt, but Poincaré, probably the most culpable of the lot, has been allowed to do as much injury to Europe in the last few years as was caused by the war itself. Perhaps the most impressive example in history of the irrelevance of distasteful historic truth for personal beliefs and actions is afforded by the fact that President Wilson could formulate much of his compensatory idealism after he was well aware of the atrocious Secret Treaties of the Entente.²³

More serious, then, than the difficulty of getting truth upon foreign relations is the fact that even if we did have it we should still continue to be unaffected by it and would direct our thoughts and actions according to the content of the criminal propaganda ground out in the public press at the command and behest of the politicians in power. It may not be an insoluble problem, but it will certainly require centuries of concerted effort to educate out of man the psychology of the hunting-pack in his attitude towards neighboring nations and peoples.²⁴

²¹ See survey of the literature of "revelation" in article by L. S. Gannett, "They All Lied," in *New York Nation*, October 11, 1922; and in my article on "World War Guilt and the Literature of Disillusionment" in the *American Review* for October, 1925.

²² Nor of some eminent historians. See C. D. Hazen, *Europe since 1815*, Vol. II. See also the editorial "History Gone Mad" in *New York Herald-Tribune*, May 5, 1925.

²³ See the interesting discussion of this matter by Mr. Lippmann and Mr. Baker; and W. Weyl, "Woodrow Wilson: Prophet and Politician," *New Republic*, June 7, 1919.

²⁴ Graham Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, Chaps. iii, iv, ix. See G. Demartial, *La Guerre de 1914. Comment on mobilisa les consciences*. An

5. *The Illusion of Party.*

Not less foolish, but also no less human and natural than religious, racial and patriotic bias is the myopia due to partisan affiliations and obsessions. As is well stated in a paragraph cited by Professor Schlesinger from the *London Chronicle* of over a century and a half ago:²⁵ "Party is a fever that robs the wretch under its influence of common sense, common decency, and sometimes of common honesty; it subjects reason to the caprice of fancy and misrepresents objects; we blame and pity bigotry and enthusiasm in religion; are party principles less reprehensible, that, in a worse cause, are apt to intoxicate and disorder the brain, and pervert the understanding?" This type of distortion of history has, like the others mentioned above, operated over most of the period since the Father of History showed how God's will was manifested in the discomfiture of the Persian hosts. While parties, in their contemporary extent and thorough-going organization are a relatively modern product, parties in one sense or another have existed from the origin of civil government. Aristotle seems to have left Athens at the end of his days more as a result of party intrigue than because of intellectual intolerance. Since that day republican and imperial historian, supporter of pope and emperor, protagonist of Whig and Tory have slanderously assaulted the deeds, motives and policies of their opponents and recommended their own brand of thievery and imbecility to the body politic.

Partisan zeal has corrupted the history of our own country from colonial days. An almost Persian cosmic dualism appears in the strictures of John Church Hamilton on Jefferson and his party, while in Randall's genial apology Jefferson appears as in daily communion with the Almighty. The following comment of Theodore Dwight, an eminent publicist of the Jeffersonian period, upon the aspirations of the followers of the Sage of Monticello reminds one of some of the hysterics of the Lusk *Report* dealing with the fatal and dastardly menace of American "Bolshevists." The Jeffersonians, he contended, "aim to destroy

interesting example of the "fixed idea" and the imperviousness of even a cultivated mind to the facts of diplomatic history is to be found in the case of Simeon Strunsky. See his review of the book by the former German Crown Prince in the *New York Times*, August 30, 1925; and his editorial in the *New York Times*, September 14, 1925, on Poincaré.

²⁵ *New Viewpoints in American History*, p. 269.

every trace of civilization in the world, and force mankind back into a savage state. . . . We have a country governed by block-heads and knaves; the ties of marriage with all its felicities are severed and destroyed; our wives are cast into the stews; our children are cast into the world from the breast and are forgotten . . . Can the imagination paint anything more dreadful this side of hell?"²⁶ Yet it was little more than a decade later when we find George Bancroft passing a eulogy upon Jeffersonian democracy and preparing the way for the egalitarian orgy of Jacksonianism by declaring that "the popular voice is all powerful with us; this is our oracle; this, we acknowledge, is the voice of God." And again, "true political science venerates the masses. Listen reverently to the voice of lowly humanity!"

This sort of burlesque and buffoonery continued in the interpretation of American party history through the Abolitionist-Slavery controversy, the Civil War and Reconstruction, to Bryan and our own day. The New York *Tribune* said of the Silver-Tongued Orator of the Platte in 1896: "Its nominal head was worthy of the cause. Nominal, because the wretched, rattled-pated boy, posing in rapid vanity and mouthing resounding rotteness, was not the real leader of that league of hell. He was only a puppet in the blood-imbued hands of Altgeld, the anarchist, and Debs, the revolutionist, and other desperadoes of that stripe." And twenty-four years later it proved that it had lost none of its virility of expression when it upheld the apostle of "Normalcy" by speaking thus of his amiable adversary: "In the manufacture of buncombe Candidate Cox, in his remarks to the Ohio state convention, exceeded his previous high mark. In the attainment of new levels of pietistic demagoguery he may be called the Landon of politics . . . It is not strange that Candidate Cox is accumulating the repute of being the smallest and cheapest politician who ever secured a presidential nomination from one of the major American parties. His mock morality, his jumping from side to side, his choice of arguments that he apparently thinks have popular appeal constitute about the greasiest hypocrisy our national annals show."

It may, of course, be conceded that James Ford Rhodes and Professor Dunning had ere this eliminated much of the diabolism and eschatology from the history of the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, and that Professor Hart had secured a group

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

of scholars who told the whole story of American political life with reasonable freedom from partisan distortion, but the majority of American citizens still view their party opponents and their past in the temper of Dwight and the editorials of the *Tribune*. The writer remembers that as an exuberant youthful Republican he was perplexed by the possession of an unusually talented and genial relative who had by the vicissitudes of conjugal misalliance, been born under the astral auspices and party crest of the donkey. He impressed me as possessing most of the physical stigmata of *homo sapiens*, but it was apparent by definition that he thereby presented a biological illusion.

The nonsense in this partisan psychosis should be disconcertingly clear to any superior moron who has attained a grade of D— in a sophomore course in American history. Granting the existence of some fundamental differences in aim and principle in some of the periods from 1796 to 1840, and in the campaigns of 1860 and 1896, it is, in general, true that party-shifts in American history have been little more than an exchange of one group of illiterate and grafting nonentities for another. The candid historian will admit but one difference in the last fifty years, namely, that the Republicans (at least up to 1921) have looted the public treasury with rather greater finesse and dignity than the Democrats, albeit much more thoroughly. One may choose his American party affiliations, then, largely on the basis of whether he prefers to be blackjacked by a thug and relieved of ten dollars or courteously waylaid by a gentleman in full evening dress and dispossessed of one hundred dollars. Yet it avails nothing to indulge in even the most appropriate epithets with respect to party larceny, imbecilities and futilities. The indictment is not pertinent against parties, which seem to be the highest achievement to date in the way of the machinery of democratic government; it is rather a challenge to the political capacity of mankind.²⁷

6. *Caste, Class and History.*

Scarcely less disconcerting than the partisan travesty is the interpretation of history in terms of the alliance of God with a

²⁷ Schlesinger, *op. cit.* Chap. xii; cf. H. Stearns (Ed.) *Civilization in the United States*, pp. 21–35. R. Michels, *Political Parties*; R. D. Brooks, *Corruption in American Politics and Life*; J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*.

particular economic class. From the time of Cato and the Gracchi we have had interpretations of history representing all culture and civilized decency as the sole product of the landlords, the *bourgeoisie* or the laborers. The landlords held sway until the seventeenth century, when the *bourgeois* epic began to make its appearance, culminating in the dithyrambic pæans of Macaulay, Guizot, James Mill, Say, Bastiat and John Fiske. Then, beginning with Marx, we discover the appearance of the proletarian apology and the critique of capitalism, though the panegyrics and prostrations to *bourgeois* benevolence and omniscience have not ceased, as is evidenced by the rantings of Chancellor Day, Walker, Hillis, Eddy and Francis. The honest and fair-minded historian will find much to accept and more to reject in all of these warped claims for the possession of a monopoly on divine aid and wisdom by any of these classes. He will freely admit the remarkable contributions to culture and civilization wrought by landlord, merchant and manufacturer, but will also accept much of the proletarian claim that without the lowly laborer the efforts of agrarian and town classes would have been futile and immaterial.

In the present stage of this controversial discussion—that between the capitalist and socialist—the historian who has an eye for the facts of history and the realities of human nature will be sceptical of wholesale whitewashings and condemnations. He will frankly admit the fact that what separates us from the barbarism of the Middle Ages has been chiefly a product of various phases of *bourgeois* effort and achievement, yet he can obtain from the most evidently *bourgeois* sources ample evidence of the “decay of capitalist civilization” with its indescribable wastes and injustices. At the same time, the most elementary principles of differential biology and psychology would seem to indicate that we would but pass from the frying-pan into the fire to exchange capitalism, with all its deficiencies, for egalitarian socialism and democracy. In short, it is difficult to understand how either a capitalist or a socialist could feel like showing his face again publicly after having read Marx’s works; the capitalist from shame over the waste and cruelties which his system has perpetrated, and the socialist from mortification over the naïveté and simple-mindedness of the Marxian proposals for a substitute. One point is, however, worth making here, in as much as it is rarely called to the attention of the

contemporary reader of history, namely, that, whereas we are adequately warned against the biases of the socialistically inclined historians, we are never cautioned against those of the infinitely greater number of professional historians who assume that the capitalistic system is as permanent and faultless as the wisdom of God. No honest and educated person can well maintain that we need less to be put on our guard in reading the last two volumes of Rhodes's *History* than in preparing for the perusal of Gustavus Myers's *History of Great American Fortunes*.²⁸

7. *The Spontaneous Generation of the Historical Epic.*

Another bitter source of discouragement to the optimists who expect an interest in truth on the part of the human race is the tendency of the human intellect to collapse when confronted with an antique exhibit from the museum of the past follies of mankind. We tend immediately to lose our critical spirit and to fall into a reverential and credulous mood whenever we are asked to contemplate ancient myths and institutions, and we almost identify good and evil with the old and the new respectively, much as the ancient Persians symbolized good by light and evil by darkness. This tendency is probably in part a vestige of the primitive myth-making proclivity and the worship of ancestors and ancient taboos. In part it may also be a neurotic flight from reality, seeking compensation for the inadequacy of the present in the illusion of a better past.

This particular variety of human mental frailty leads to what may be described as the "spontaneous generation of the historical epic." An institution which was originally approved and adopted only after a bitter struggle, and which at the time was admitted by its most ardent protagonists to be but a working approximation to adequacy, becomes after several generations a colossal product of collaboration between God and superman. Likewise an ordinary mortal who may have attained to some position of importance through a lucky combination of fortunate ancestry and accident, and who exhibited during his lifetime every symptom of human qualities will, after a few generations, be erected

²⁸ The argument is carried on in a vital and dignified manner by R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*; S. and B. Webb, *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*; and H. Withers, *The Case for Capitalism*. A more vigorous clash may be observed in G. Myers, *History of Great American Fortunes*; and J. R. Day, *The Raid on Property*.

into a giant of unimpeachable virtue and unparalleled omniscience. The American constitution and its framers are a case in point.²⁹ Even Hamilton and Madison admitted that the Constitution was far from their ideal of a perfect instrument of government, and Patrick Henry and Luther Martin were as favorably impressed with it as William D. Guthrie and Stanwood Menken are with the political system of Soviet Russia. Yet our Hundred Percent organizations would foist upon us a psychology of mystical taboo with respect to it, more absurd than that which the primitive Hebrews threw about the Ark of the Covenant. The same situation applies to the framers of the Constitution, most of whom McMaster, Beard and Smith have shown to be well fitted from the standpoint of political morality for the office of mayor in a contemporary American municipality or for state committeemen in a modern party organization. We may accept the verdict of Jefferson that they averaged well for their generation, but could be matched for ability and vastly excelled as to political knowledge by any subsequent generation in American history. There seems no doubt whatever that any one of a half dozen state constitutional conventions assembled within the last decade or any annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, provides more first-rate political intelligence and expert political knowledge than was exhibited by the group that consorted and consulted with God in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. It is this fact of the spontaneous generation of the historical epic which, more than anything else, vindicates the "Sneer Method," with all its admitted defects, as an infinitely more salutary and healthy approach to history than the attitude fostered by the "Drool Method."³⁰

8. *The Herd and the Teacher.*

The above minor qualifications upon the usual assumption of the lust of man for "the whole truth and nothing but the truth"

²⁹ E.g. J. M. Beck, *The Constitution of the United States*. See the review by T. M. Powell, *New Republic*, February 11, 1925. See below chap. x.

³⁰ Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Chaps. i, vii, viii; J. B. McMaster, *With the Fathers*. The most absurd examples of the epical interpretation are H. F. Atwood's *Back to the Republic*, and *Safe-guarding American Ideals*, which are highly praised by many prominent Americans, including Dean Harker of the University of Illinois College of Law.

will probably make it reasonably clear that the majority of mankind, and even a majority of the teachers of history will have little regard for the majesty of truth. Even those who have been able to emancipate themselves from the more vulgar types of national and racial prejudice are rarely able to keep an open mind on all subjects. An historian, for example, who can preserve a nice balance of impartiality in regard to the question of Celt versus Teuton in the Middle Ages or of Democrat versus Whig may develop a moral fervor surpassing that of Tacitus when confronted with a case of sex-dereliction. The writer once remembers sending a Freudian analysis of the character of Abraham Lincoln to a distinguished historian who had triumphed over both partisan and sectional bias. His enthusiasm for this document, which was based wholly upon repugnance to the sex issue involved, was comparable to that which might be exhibited by a Southern Baptist Kleagle towards a plate of Irish stew.

But the immunity of society from the ravages of truth is further safeguarded by the obstacles interposed in the path of the rare bird of the historical plumage who has a real urge to disseminate the truth and possesses enough intelligence to acquire some slight modicum of his stock in trade. He will be viewed with suspicion by trustees of colleges, denounced in the columns of newspapers, who will also send his books for review to notoriously unfavorable critics, excluded from respectable periodicals, railed against by ministers of the gospel, ostracised from the favor of school committees who select textbooks, persecuted privately and publicly by innumerable Hundred Percent organizations, and regarded as queer and unstable by his closest neighbors and intimate circle of friends. He may even be driven from the academic field to fall back into the professions of life insurance agent or plumber, which may enable him to acquire a competence and enjoy an old age of contemplative leisure. The pressure upon secondary school teachers to induce them to refrain from any ogling, to say nothing of wooing, truth is even more direct and effective.⁸¹

Yet, while we may well bewail the fate of the exceptional historian who meets disaster as a result of professional candor, we

⁸¹ T. Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America*; U. Sinclair, *The Goose-Step*; and *The Goslings*; B. L. Pierce, *The Control of History Teaching*; and *Public Opinion and the Teaching of History*.

are in danger of unnecessary and misplaced grief concerning the alleged "repression" of a vast host of teachers who, we tend to assume, would carry the flaming torch of truth with ecstatic enthusiasm but for their fear of dismissal. As a matter of fact, the majority of history teachers swallow with real gusto the great collection of bunk which constitutes the mental equipment of the man on the street, assimilate readily what is true to what is "proper," and approve heartily the martyrdom of their few intelligent and courageous colleagues. Mr. Pierce has drawn the following admirable picture of the mental content and attitude of the majority of secondary school teachers, which would probably apply equally well to the most of the teachers in the smaller and more stereotyped colleges:⁸²

Knowing nothing thoroughly, unable to take pride in his skill or to feel a sense of mastery, the high school teacher cannot be a real scholar. He cannot achieve a critical intelligence. He thinks as he teaches, without depth. One need never fear, when he is invited to meet a group of his colleagues socially, that he will have to exert himself mentally. Nowhere on Main Street is a critical discussion or a serious conversation more taboo than among the high school teachers. The weather, the children, a show, a concert, school politics and a few empty platitudes comprise our subjects of conversation. . . . Indeed, for intellectual stimulation, the last place to go is to a group of teachers. Discussions about capital and labor, foreign events, local civic affairs or even important movements in education itself, are limited to the barest and most elementary observations. If one were to mention Bryan and evolution, or the Rev. Dr. Grant and Bishop Manning, or the higher criticism, our confrères would stand aghast and the subject of conversation would be hastily changed. . . . In his social life the high school teacher has not emancipated himself from the mores of the small town. . . . Physicians, lawyers and engineers do not permit the most conservative elements to dictate their social life. Teachers do. They tamely submit when an ignorant village parson raves at dancing and the sin of an occasional game of bridge.

In the midst of his early enthusiasm Christ is said not only to have believed in the possible attainment of truth, but also that it would emancipate man from his fetters of superstition and bondage. At the close of his ministry, when he could boast of

⁸² *The Survey*, May 15, 1923. A comparable critique of college teachers is contained in Ludwig Lewisohn's *Up-Stream*, Chap. vii.

more contact with human material, he had become so disillusioned in this respect that he declined to accept the invitation of the representative of the majesty of the Roman Empire to open a discussion of the matter. Most thoughtful and seasoned historians can make a valid claim to an *imitatio Christi* in this respect, if in no other.⁸³

SELECTED REFERENCES

Altschul, C., *The American Revolution in Our School Textbooks*; Beard, C. A., *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*; Boas, F., *The Mind of Primitive Man*; Brooks, R. C., *Corruption in American Politics and Life*; Bury, J. B., *History of the Freedom of Thought*; France, A., *Penguin Island*; McMaster, J. B., *With The Fathers*; Mencken, H. L., *Prejudices; A Book of Prefaces*; Pierce, B. L., *The Control of History Teaching*; Rose, J. H., *Nationality in Modern History*; Ross, E. A., *Roads to Social Peace*; Schlesinger, A.M., *New Viewpoints in American History*; Scott, J. F., *Patriots in the Making*; Simar, T., *The Race Myth*; Sinclair, U., *The Goose Step*; Spencer, H., *The Study of Sociology*; Stearns, H. (Ed.), *Civilization in the United States*; Stoddard, L., *Racial Realities in Europe*; Sumner, W. G., *Folkways*; Teggart F. J., *Prolegomena to History*; Trotter, W., *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*; Van Loon, H., *Tolerance*; Webb, S. and B., *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*; White, A. D., *A History of the Warfare of Science and Theology*.

⁸³ J. H. Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, pp. 57-69; C. W. Alvord, "The Musings of an Inebriated Historian," in the *American Mercury*, August, 1925; H. Van Loon, *The Story of Wilbur the Hat*.

CHAPTER II

THE NEWEST HISTORY

I. THE RISE OF THE NEW HISTORY¹

ONE sagacious contemporary observer has asserted that the historians are in general the most learned and at the same time the most futile of the social scientists. The writer must admit that there is no little truth in this estimate. History, being the most respectable of the social sciences, perfected its technique earlier than the rest, and gathered its data in a more thorough and reliable fashion. It has also possessed an older and more thorough-going hold upon higher education. These facts, along with others of significance, explain why it can be positively asserted that, in general, the historians represent a somewhat more advanced and more mature intellectual and scholarly group than the economists, political scientists or sociologists. The reason that they are at the same time the most futile and exert the least influence upon the citizenry of the republic is due, in the first place, to the prevailing methods and orientation of the historians, and, in the second place, to the relative human incapacity to apprehend or exploit the lessons of the past.

By and large, the historians have been for the most part concerned with the record of personal anecdotes and events which, however well understood, have little or no significance for mankind in the twentieth century. The Assyrian head-hunting in the ancient Orient, the petty wars of ancient Greece, or the political cliques of the last century of the Roman republic certainly have slight bearing upon the problems of twentieth-century America. Still, it must be admitted that even though the historians had a very vital outlook, were concerned with the most significant subjects, and placed these very clearly before the people, the great mass of mankind would find it utterly impossible to understand the significance of such historical material or to apply it to a

¹ From the *American Mercury*, May, 1925.

solution of contemporary problems. This situation is likely to persist, and history will probably remain justifiable chiefly on the ground of the fact that it furnishes real satisfaction to the cultivated intellect to secure adequate information about those things in the past which arouse his lively interest. If, in the course of progressive enlightenment, such information can also be rendered slightly more valuable to the majority, this will be an incidental advantage not to be overlooked. That the day is far distant when the facts of history can be intelligently applied to public policies is admirably demonstrated by the attempt to enforce the Dawes Plan, after the time when every reputable historian thoroughly comprehends that every premise upon which its existence rests is thoroughly invalidated by the facts concerning the origins of the World War.

Perhaps the chief reason why one may expect the "idle curiosity" of the historian to become somewhat more interesting and fruitful is the fact that there is coming to be more and more of a break with the old and respectable tradition that history should be concentrated primarily upon trivial personal anecdotes, party intrigues or diplomatic chicanery. The beginning of impatience with this infinitesimal calculus in the field of history dates back to men like Green, Rambaud, Freytag, Altamira and McMaster. Writers of this sort possessed little or no systematic philosophy or methodology, but refused to let their interests be constrained by the respectable tenets of Droysen, Stubbs and Freeman.

Since their day there has developed a systematic movement toward a more vital and realistic type of historical subject-matter. The father of this movement was Karl Lamprecht, together with other disciples at Leipzig such as Steinhausen and Breysig. Weird as were some of Lamprecht's own theories, there is no doubt whatever that he envisaged the probable future of dynamic history and pointed the way to the most fruitful analysis by his insistence upon the significance of material culture in aiding to establish the collective psychology of any age.

This attitude has been taken up with much greater insight and flexibility by Henri Berr and his associates in France, by F. S. Marvin and his fellow workers in England, and by what is known as the Columbia school of historians in the United States. This school, which was originally organized by James Harvey Robinson, James T. Shotwell, Charles Austin Beard, William R. Shepherd, and Franklin Henry Giddings, represented unques-

tionably the most advanced and progressive group of historians yet gathered in any institution of higher learning, and it is without doubt the greatest disaster which has befallen historical science in the last generation that they should have been separated and their energies dissipated. At the present time the interest in the newer history has extended to Pennsylvania, Chicago and Cornell, where it is being forwarded by such historians as Cheyney, Lingelbach, Bowden, Breasted, Thompson, Schevill, Dodd, Becker, Smith and others. But if Columbia, Pennsylvania, Chicago and Cornell are preëminent in the newer history at the present time, it is likewise true that the younger generation of historians in general in this country are becoming more and more restive under the restraints imposed by the conventional and orthodox list of historical topics, the departmental requirements of courses, and the pedantic pettiness of the programs of the American Historical Association. Their restlessness is, however, severely mitigated by the fact that for the most part the history departments are still headed by men whose sympathies are wholly with military, diplomatic and constitutional history. Hence the younger men discreetly "sit tight" and await the new régime. There is no doubt whatever that within another generation we shall see an enormous revolution in the subject-matter, teaching and writing of history in this country. In the next few pages we shall set forth the more significant phases of the recent progress in historical writing, with major emphasis on those books which have been published in English or have appeared in English translations.

II. PRE-LITERARY HISTORY

In attempting to catalogue briefly the more conspicuous phases of progress in historical writing in the last two or three years, it is interesting to note at the outset that the greatest productivity and the most significant work seems to be going on at present with respect to the origins of human progress and culture, and the period since 1910 which is associated with the origins of the World War. While there is plenty of suggestive and important work being forwarded by historians dealing with the brief period between the close of the neolithic age and the invasion of Belgium in 1914, it is by no means as imposing as the work of the archeologists and the historians of the World

War. Ten years ago it was extremely difficult for the educated man not technically proficient to obtain an adequate knowledge of the so-called "pre-historic" age. There were a few learned manuals in French and German, and the revision of the old English treatise by Lord Avebury. In the last few years, however, the situation has been entirely changed. Mr. Osborn has provided us with a sumptuous volume on the eolithic and paleolithic ages. This was followed by the work of Professor J. M. Tyler on the neolithic. The transition from the neolithic, and the developments in the copper and bronze periods have been described with unusual thoroughness by V. Gordon Childe in his *Dawn of European Civilization*. The bronze age had already become known through the researches in Crete and the Ægean area by Sir Arthur Evans and his followers. The entire pre-historic period has been admirably summarized for us in the last three years by MacAlister, Crawford, Burkitt, Wilder, DeMorgan and others, and only about a year ago there was published the most complete and up-to-date manual which has thus far appeared in any language, namely, Dr. George Grant MacCurdy's *Human Origins*. The facts have been expounded in popular fashion by the Quennells.

The work of DeMorgan and Breasted has served to link up in a thorough-going fashion the pre-historic and the historic ages, so that the old mystery connected with the period before 4000 B. C. has completely disappeared. To the trained cultural historian there is no longer any more of a definite break between the so-called pre-historic and historic periods than there is between the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages, or between the Middle Ages and modern times. The passage from the stone to the metal cultures was extremely slow and gradual, as was also the mastery of the alphabet and the art of writing. It is doubtful if any discreet historian would to-day attempt to state that the historic period began with any particular date which could not readily be shifted a thousand years either way.

Not only have the archeologists furnished us with a vast body of facts concerning the material culture of antiquity, but the scholarly cultural anthropologists have likewise been showing unusual activity, and have paralleled the work of the archeologists by extremely stimulating work in organizing, synthesizing and interpreting this material concerning primitive culture, which they have supplemented by careful studies of existing primitive

peoples. Ten years ago one possessed in this field only the chatty little introduction by Marett and Professor Boas' highly scholarly but somewhat abstruse and difficult little book on the *Mind of Primitive Man*. To-day we have admirable general works on primitive culture by Goldenweiser, Lowie, Wissler, Kroeber, Tozzer and Lévy-Bruhl, with several more in immediate prospect. These deal acutely and lucidly with every phase of primitive institutions and mental orientations and processes. Never before has the historian been so richly equipped at the threshold of history, and he is at last beginning to understand that a mastery of anthropology and archeology is, if anything, more essential to the equipment of the intelligent historian than an adequate control of diplomatic and paleography.

One of the most fruitful phases of this newer comprehension of the nature and importance of anthropology lies in the fact that historians are now beginning to understand that the very term pre-historic is a dubious one. If history comprehends everything in the past concerning which we have any knowledge from any source whatever, it is quite obvious that nothing can be pre-historic about which we know anything, whether from elaborately written sources or the splintered remains of a petrified human femur. In fact, the purely archeological evidence is in many cases more enlightening as to the mode of life of primitive people than are the written sources with respect to the culture of many historic peoples. In other words, this intensive cultivation of the "pre-historic" age seems likely to effect very shortly the complete disappearance of this word.

III. ORIENTAL CULTURE

Much the most elaborate and ambitious historical undertaking ever promoted, with the possible exception of the more intensive series by Professor Shotwell noted below, is the combination of Henri Berr's great series on the *Evolution of Humanity* with Georges Renard's *Universal History of Labor*, which is gradually being brought out in English translation by Alfred A. Knopf. This will be the most comprehensive set ever published on the history of civilization, running, perhaps, in its ultimate form to around 200 volumes. It will make available to every intelligent reader of the English language the results of work in the field of dynamic history in the last generation. The books will con-

stitute a synthesis of the best and latest scholarship by highly competent experts. It will thus be the first truly comprehensive and scientific world-history ever executed in the long record of such efforts since the days of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

In the field of the history of the ancient Orient the most spectacular achievement of recent years has been the excavation of the tomb of Tut-ank-amen, which has revealed to us with unprecedented completeness the remarkable development of art and material culture at the height of Egyptian civilization. This has not, however, altered to any great extent our general notions of Egyptian history, and it is probable that it is less significant for the historiography of the Orient than DeMorgan's discoveries of pre-historic tombs of the Egyptian neolithic, or Professor Breasted's work on the diffusion of the Egyptian civilization over the Near East. Archeological work in the Near East is progressing, and its relation to our knowledge of ancient history has been recently summarized in a competent popular volume by Dr. James Baikie with a somewhat misleading title, *The Life of the Ancient East*. Our knowledge of Egyptian civilization has been summarized by the admirable little book of Professor Petrie on *Social Life in Ancient Egypt*. We need an equally serviceable summary of the social life of ancient Mesopotamia, Sayce's book being distinctly out of date. Far and away the most impressive work which has appeared in recent years on the history of western Asian antiquity is Professor Olmstead's *History of Assyria*, a companion volume to Breasted's monumental *History of Egypt*. It should and doubtless will be followed by another volume by Professor Olmstead on the history of Babylonia, a subject to which he has already contributed many important monographs. A comprehensive treatment of the history of the ancient Orient has been begun in the extensive work entitled, *The Cambridge Ancient History*, of which two volumes have already been published. While the product of competent scholars and possessing some excellent chapters on the history of civilization, it is distinctly inferior in orientation and vitality to the work of such American scholars as Breasted, Olmstead and Jastrow. The long needed comprehensive history of ancient Persia is now upon the point of completion by Professor Robert W. Rogers, author of the erudite *History of Babylonia and Assyria*. We may expect a great addition to our knowledge of the history of western Asia from the recent mastery of the

Hittite cuneiform, and Wace and others are continually adding to our information about the civilization of Crete, the Ægean and the Greek mainland in the period before the rise of the classical Greek civilization.

IV. CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION

The accuracy and extent of our information concerning the civilization of Greece and Rome seems likely to be revolutionized by the great series entitled *Our Debt to Greece and Rome*, which is being published by the Marshall Jones Company in a large number of small but attractive volumes. While in large part the product of subtle propaganda for the maintenance of the position of the classics in American higher education, it is, nevertheless, an historical achievement of the first magnitude for which every fair and liberal-minded historian must be duly grateful. In addition to this great series we have had in the last two or three years an unprecedented number of interpretations of classical civilization by such writers as Toynbee, Van Hook, Dickinson and Croiset, together with excellent composite volumes on the *Legacy of Greece* and the *Legacy of Rome*. Then particular mention should be made of Professor Tenney Frank's *Economic History of Rome*, which has for the first time brought together in comprehensive fashion our knowledge of this subject, though it is to be regretted that he gives so little material on the imperial period. The weak spots in the history of classical civilization remain, as they have been for the last generation, the treatment of the Hellenistic Age and of the Roman Empire after Tiberius. Probably the most significant ages of classical culture, they have been curiously neglected, doubtless due primarily to the fact that ancient history has been written and taught chiefly by students of classical philology, who have been mainly interested in those periods which produced the great classics of Greek and Roman literature. J. B. Bury and his associates have produced an interesting little volume on the Hellenistic period and O. Seek has compiled a voluminous sociological work on the decline of classical civilization. The promise in the profound essay of a decade ago by Westermann has not been fulfilled in a substantial book on the passing of the classical age.

One should not finish this brief survey of the progress of knowledge in regard to the history of Greek and Roman civiliza-

tion without calling attention to the enormous mass of new information which is continually coming to hand from the great body of *papyri* recovered from Egypt and other areas, which is now being classified and edited by a large number of earnest scholars. So important has this source of information become that there has now been founded a new science called *papyrology* or the science of utilizing these *papyri*. There are many enthusiasts who now claim that only in this field can constructive and important work be done in ancient history. But probably, as Professor Rostovtzeff and others contend, archeological and other sources will continue to be of very great importance, and what is needed more than anything else at present is an adequate synthesis of our knowledge of Greek and Roman civilization, interpreted from the standpoint of the newer dynamic history. We can scarcely expect that this achievement will be satisfactorily executed by the closing volumes of the *Cambridge Ancient History*.

V. THE MIDDLE AGES

In the field of medieval history there has been some rather interesting and valuable work since the war. The more significant facts concerning the obscure but highly important Celtic basis of early medieval civilization has at last been rendered accessible in readable and popular form in A. L. Guérard's *French Civilization to the Close of the Middle Ages*, which is based largely, for the earlier period, on the monumental works of Camille Jullian. From now on, even school teachers will have relatively less excuse for continuing the misleading practice of beginning a study of the medieval period with the Germanic tribes and their so-called "invasions" of the Roman Empire. We also have in English a thoroughly up-to-date and scholarly study of these very invasions in the revised edition of J. B. Bury's *History of the Later Roman Empire*. His work brings together the latest scholarship on the subject and constitutes a complete refutation of the old mythology which dates from writers like Charles Kingsley. Instead of a myriad of countless millions of virtuous forest-children working the avenging will of God in sweeping over the Roman Empire, the Germans appear to have been relatively few in number, many of them to have been settled for a long time in the Roman provinces as a dependent class, and the actual conquest to have been chiefly a capture of the political machinery of the Empire. The process

was not unlike the gradual capture of the political machinery of New York City by the Irish chieftains, following the invasions of the '40's and '50's. The second volume of this same work by Bury constitutes the most thorough study of the reign of Justinian and the early Byzantine Empire in any language. The intelligent reader and alert teacher can now approach the study of the Middle Ages with a sane orientation and an adequate factual equipment.

Perhaps the most important work which has actually been done on the Middle Ages in the last few years relates to the intellectual history of this period. Hitherto our knowledge of this subject has been limited to information which could be obtained from monumental French and German works, or obscure monographs. Professor L. J. Paetow has recently provided us with a masterly bibliography and guide to the intellectual and cultural history of medieval Europe, thus making a knowledge of the more obscure sources available to the intelligent reader. Professor Lynn Thorndike, in what is by far the most formidable contribution yet made by a single individual to medieval intellectual history, has presented us with two enormous volumes on the history of magic and experimental science through the thirteenth century. This work is, in reality, a vast source-book and commentary on the intellectual life of the medieval period. A more severely scholarly, but rather more restricted and less widely useful, work has been produced by Professor Charles H. Haskins on various aspects of medieval science. The most original and valuable part of this work is the sketch of Arabic science in the Middle Ages and its adaptation by the Christians. In a widely different work, which is a masterly piece of scholarly popularization, he has given us our first clear and interesting brief interpretation of medieval university life. In a brilliantly written and highly penetrating work entitled *Medieval People*, Miss Eileen Power has presented us with an interpretation of the life and outlook of representative medieval types from the period of Charlemagne to Henry VII of England. One also gains new insight into the psychology and culture of medieval France from the brilliantly written, if slightly careless, work by F. Funck-Brentano on *The Middle Ages*, in the National History of France Series. Hearnshaw has edited two very useful books on the thought and culture of the medieval period. A general survey of medieval history based upon the best and latest scholarship has been provided in the careful if somewhat conventional manual of Professor Dana C. Munro. But what is perhaps

the most promising project of all in regard to illuminating the medieval period is the resumption of activity in the publication of the *Records of Civilization* under the direction of Professors J. T. Shotwell and A. P. Evans of Columbia University. This series will provide well edited translations and commentaries on the chief intellectual figures of the Middle Ages.

Rapidly we are getting away from the old and grotesque misconception of the Middle Ages as a period of uniform and unbroken stagnation of culture. What is most needed just at present is a thorough-going study of medieval industrial life. Already we know that the older assumption of the uniformity and universality of the gild and manorial systems as the basis of medieval industrial and agricultural organization needs some qualifications. Likewise our interpretations of feudalism, as Professor J. W. Thomson has well insisted, have been based too largely upon specialization in the history of some particular medieval country, usually England or France. A large amount of interest has been aroused in the history of the medieval gilds by the popularity of gild socialism as a scheme of economic reform, but unfortunately much of this study has been designed to secure historical evidence to support a particular hypothesis, rather than to discover the actual facts about the highly complex and varied industrial system of the Middle Ages. Preliminary efforts at a synthetic exploitation of the new monographic material on medieval economic life are to be found in the substantial works of Professors Köttschke and Boissonnade.

VI. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION

There has been no more vital or significant contribution to our interpretation of human history made in the last generation than the new views of the nature and origins of modern times. Until relatively recently it has been the custom of even progressive historians to account for the origins of the modern age on the basis of influences coming from either the Italian Renaissance or the Protestant Reformation. More thorough-going studies of both of these movements, divorced from a sentimental and sectarian basis, together with a more thorough understanding of the nature of the medieval period, have served completely to discredit this older, if still common, view of the situation. It has been shown that both the Renaissance and the Reformation were primarily

backward-looking movements, the former to the literary canons and styles of classical writers, and the latter to the Pauline version of Apostolic Christianity. While the Renaissance may have done something in the way of reviving a slight interest in things of this world, and the Reformation something in the way of breaking down the unity of organized obscurantism, they both pale into insignificance when compared with the large number of vital and dynamic influences flowing from the expansion of Europe overseas and the resulting commercial and cultural revolutions. This chastened attitude towards the Renaissance and Reformation is admirably illustrated by the recent work of H. O. Taylor on the thought and culture of the sixteenth century; Preserved Smith's original study of the Reformation, and his brilliant biography of Erasmus; and W. C. Abbot's *Expansion of Europe*.

This point of view, earlier anticipated by J. R. Seeley, has been in our day chiefly advanced by Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia University and such disciples as Gillespie and Botsford, together with scholarly, if somewhat less original, work by Professor W. C. Abbott. Professor Preserved Smith, in what is far and away the most original and thorough-going interpretation of the period of the Reformation, has recently shown that even these religious developments cannot be properly understood without a comprehension of the commercial and consequent political revolution which the new commerce and industry produced. Professor A. H. Lybyer has at last shattered the venerable myth that the capture of Constantinople by the Turks produced the discovery of America, and has shown that this movement came rather as a result of the commercial ambitions of the western seaboard towns and their jealousy of the monopoly of the Levant trade by the Italian cities which had been gradually built up following the Crusades. The incomparable study of the early developments of capitalism which accompanied this European expansion has been embodied in the work of Werner Sombart, a new edition of which is now appearing in Germany. The intellectual exuberance which was produced by this change, resulting in a crop of theories of human progress and the perfectability of mankind, has been judiciously analyzed by Professor J. B. Bury in his *Idea of Progress*. The important point in all this new literature is the well established thesis that the change in European civilization, which constitutes the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times, came not so much from anything within Europe as from

the contact of different world cultures which the process of expansion produced, with the resulting intellectual curiosity which proved fatal to the medieval orientation and organization.

Unfortunately, relatively little work has recently been done on the great scientific, technological and industrial revolutions which have produced the modern scientific and mechanical age. The great work of P. Mantoux is now being revised, and the long promised English edition is about to appear. Very recently Witt Bowden has sketched in a scholarly and lucid fashion the salient phases of the progress of the Industrial Revolution in England to 1800, and E. Halévy is bringing out a classic work on English society in the last century. A large amount of information is contained in Mrs. L. C. R. Knowles' work on the *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain*, and Clapham's volume on the developments in France and Germany is a preliminary work of real merit, but a thorough-going and comprehensive work on the progress of the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries has yet to be executed. The history of the Industrial Revolution will doubtless have to wait until a more adequate group of monographs have been produced on the industrial and commercial history of the various states involved. It is the most important task to be executed in the field of European history, as it is the story of the greatest and most pregnant revolution which mankind has yet undergone, and which may be but the cultural prelude to human self-destruction and the disappearance of man from the planet. The first dynamic interpretation of the history of the last century has been executed by Eduard Fueter.

VII. THE REVISION OF THE AMERICAN EPIC

In the field of American history there has been significant progress in the last few years. A new, more comprehensive and more dynamic approach to the whole problem of the foundation of American society has been sketched by the industrious California professor, Herbert Eugene Bolton, and his associate, T. M. Marshall. He has distinctly broken away from the older Puritan and French obsessions of Bancroft and Parkman, has shown that it is necessary to view the exploration and colonization of the two Americas as a broad general movement, and has quite clearly proved that in preparing the way for subsequent American his-

tory the Spanish explorers and settlers were, if anything, more significant and important than the English or the French. The monumental work on the institutional political history of the English colonies by the late Professor Herbert Levi Osgood is now being published in four volumes, which will bring the work down to the eve of the Revolution. While limited largely to institutional political history, it constitutes the greatest monument to exact American historical scholarship which has yet been produced in this country. More stimulating, if less impressive, have been the striking volumes by J. T. Adams, which have reconstructed the history of the New England Colonies in the light of the newer and fresher scholarship of the last generation. These volumes represent a sort of combination of the spirit of Charles Francis Adams with the dynamic scholarship of Charles M. Andrews. They constitute the first adequate history of colonial New England and should rapidly dissipate the superficialities and prejudices embodied in the earlier work of Henry Cabot Lodge.

C. H. Van Tyne has brought together in a comprehensive volume the results of the scholarship of the last generation with respect to the causes of the American Revolution, completely dissolving the old epic of Bancroft and others. It is defective only in its serious ignoring of many of the more vital economic and social causes of the Revolution. Professor C. H. McIlwain has presented a striking juristic plea for the legality of the colonial position preceding the Revolution, which, in particular, introduces an original interpretation of the colonial attitude towards the King down to the eve of the Revolution. Professor S. E. Morrison, author of the *Maritime History of Massachusetts*, one of the most striking products of the newer historiography in this country, has recently edited an excellent source-book of relevant documents on the Revolutionary period. What we now need is a general synthesis of the Revolutionary age which will combine the work and viewpoints of writers like Andrews, Schlesinger, Becker, Adams and Alvord with the legalistic studies of McIlwain and an adequate appraisal of the machinery and technique of propaganda and organization during the Revolution. But the works of the last decade have already forever destroyed any possibility of the maintenance of the American epic among civilized and educated people.

On the middle period of American history little of importance has recently appeared, with the exception of the notable work of

Justin H. Smith, correcting our views in regard to the Mexican war, and the vitally important work of Professor Turner, continuing essentially his *Rise of the New West*. Professor Edward Channing is persistently continuing his remarkable *History of the United States*, each volume of which is becoming progressively more original and entertaining, and further removed from the Freemanesque standards of the earlier volumes. E. P. Oberholtzer is carrying forward his *History of the United States since the Civil War*, strictly in the spirit and methods of his teacher, McMaster. After a long period of inactivity, James Ford Rhodes is bringing to completion his *History of the United States since the Compromise of 1850*, but the later volumes are more important on personal grounds as the work and interpretations of a distinguished American, than for their specific content. As an interpreter of industrial America and its political system Mr. Rhodes is distinctly inferior to the Rhodes who first eliminated the savagery from the northern interpretation of the Civil War and the Reconstruction periods. Professor F. L. Paxson has just brought out a comprehensive history of the frontier movement in American history, which is, unfortunately, primarily descriptive rather than analytical and sociological, after the spirit and method of Turner.

A long neglected field of American history, namely, the history of utopias and uplift in this country, has at last been dealt with by Professor F. E. Haynes in his *Social Politics in the United States*. A general manual, written in admirable style, has recently appeared from the pen of Professor D. S. Muzzey. Announced as a benign polemic against Beard and his school, the work itself distinctly surrenders to the new point of view in the second volume, and is eminently superior to what he led his readers to expect from the preface. A somewhat more advanced stand has been taken in the comparable work of Hockett and Schlesinger. The interest in the dynamics of American development is attested to by the recent publication of a number of excellent manuals on the economic history of the United States, in particular those of Lippincott, Van Metre, and Faulkner. Especially significant has been the appearance of a large number of books on recent American history by Haworth, Lingley, Paxson and Shippee, thus indicating a growing consciousness of the supreme importance of the period since the Civil War in the shaping of our contemporary American civilization. The whole period of our national development has been recently surveyed in a dynamic

interpretative fashion by several leaders of the new history in this country, W. M. West, Max Farrand, Carl Becker and A. M. Schlesinger. Suggestive summaries have also come from William MacDonald and S. E. Forman. Schlesinger is editing a monumental coöperative work which will for the first time attempt to survey American history from the standpoint of cultural development rather than from that of the growth of political methods and constitutions. An extensive series on American history, giving much attention to social and economic history, has been edited by Allen Johnson in his *Chronicles of America*. No pretentious biographical works of enduring value have recently appeared in this country, with the exception of Bishop's work on Roosevelt, and McElroy's biography of Cleveland, but Harvey O'Higgins has suggested the need of a more vital psychological approach to biographical work.

Another progressive symptom in regard to American history is the gradual abandonment of the old view of America as limited to that part of the western hemisphere between Key West and Seattle. Within the last two or three years there has been a veritable crop of rather substantial books on Latin America, among which should certainly be mentioned those of Priestley, W. S. Robertson, Graham Stuart, Warshaw, Beals and others of this general type. Most of them are written in a tone of reasonable candor and frankness, and can in no sense be regarded as official publications of the American State Department. The great defects to date in books on Latin America is that they still remain primarily studies of diplomatic and political history. A dynamic and synthetic account of Latin American civilization as a whole, of which we had a brilliant harbinger in Shepherd's little volume in the Home University Series, is an achievement still calling for execution. Without it our knowledge of Latin America will always remain distressingly inadequate.

VIII. THE WORLD WAR AND AFTER

To go on to the progress which has been made in regard to the origins and nature of the World War, we may pass over without mention the beginnings of the disruption of the Entente epic represented by the group of studies beginning with Professor Fay's courageous articles and ending with Gooch's masterly *History of Modern Europe since 1878*. We are rapidly getting new light

on the background of the war through the progressive publication of the monumental German series—*Die Grosse Politik*—which represents a thorough-going publication of the documents in the German Foreign Office since 1870 under highly competent and impartial editorship. These documents have already enabled Professor Lord to reconstruct and establish on relatively permanent grounds our knowledge of the origins of the War of 1870. They are also necessitating the complete revision of all books on diplomatic history from 1870 to 1914. Dr. Mildred S. Wertheimer has just completed a painstaking study of the Pan-German League, in which she thoroughly disrupts the nonsense perpetrated before the war by writers of the stamp of André Chéradame. She has shown it to have been but a small group of noisy super-patriots who had relatively no influence upon either the Kaiser or the Reichstag. They were simply the German exemplification of the patriotic zealots to be found in various organizations in every country both before and since the World War. Those who once were much affected by "The Tentacles of the German Octopus in America" will need seriously to revise their war-time convictions. In the literature of the Central Powers little else of significance has recently appeared save several competent histories of German diplomacy since 1870, and Volume IV of Conrad von Hötzendorf's memoirs, in which he makes a very damaging revelation with respect to the malicious intervention of von Moltke in the face of the pacific efforts of the German civil government. Moltke telegraphed secretly and on his own responsibility, urging the Austrians to remain firm in their plan to punish Serbia. While this probably had little or no effect upon the Austrian policy, it does prove very clearly the generally damnable attitude of the military mind in diplomatic crises. The best German work on war origins, that by Count Max Montgelas, has recently appeared in English translation.

In the literature bearing on the Allied case there has been much of importance recently published. Stanojević, a Serbian historian, has proved beyond the possibility of a doubt that the plot to assassinate the Archduke was laid by the chief of the Intelligence Division of the Serbian General Staff. Further, Mathias Morhardt, in his recent trenchant book *Les Preuves*, has shown that the Serbian conduct after the assassination was far from the docile and conciliatory one which we were formerly led to believe. Not only was the Serbian diplomatic conduct less than what had been

expected by Austria, but the whole attitude of the Serbian press was one of open glorification of the assassination. It is further shown that all of the Allied countries were pretty much agreed that Austria was justified in rather severe action in regard to Serbia and made little attempt to protest until after Poincaré's visit to Russia. The already damaging case against Izvolski, the Russian ambassador at Paris, is made much more decisive by the complete publication of the German edition of his letters from 1908 to 1914, together with an illuminating volume by Professor Stieve, analyzing the significance of this material. It would seem rather certain that we can now say that Izvolski ranks next to Poincaré in personal responsibility for the onset of the World War. The case against Poincaré is becoming monthly more impressive, and only the vested interests of French revenge and militarism can save him from exile or worse. Morhardt shows the crucial significance of his Russian trip in bringing about a concerted Allied aggression. This is further described in already available material such as Paléologue's memoirs. Morhardt proves pretty conclusively that however eager the Russians may have been for a World War which would enable them to capture Constantinople, they would never have dared to move against Austria except at the insistence and encouragement of Poincaré.

There has been recently a considerable trend in the revisionist opinion about war origins to throw the larger portion of the blame upon the Russians, primarily perhaps because the Russian government of 1914 is now extinct. It would seem, however, that the ultimate responsibility for the Russian aggression rests primarily upon Poincaré, though the part taken by Sir Edward Grey appears now to be much more serious and important than we had hitherto supposed. A somewhat calmer and more judicious, if no more convincing or significant, book has just appeared by Alfred Fabre-Luce entitled *La Victoire*, in which he arrives very definitely at the thorough-going revisionist view of the origins of the war, placing the responsibility for the immediate precipitation of the war primarily upon the Allies. Perhaps no better statement of the facts has ever been made than his crisp summarization: "The action of Germany and Austria made the war possible, that of the Triple Entente made it inevitable." The diary of Georges Louis, the pacifically inclined French ambassador to St. Petersburg, who was recalled by Poincaré to be replaced by the more belligerent Delcassé, has been edited by E. Judet and contains

even more significant material on the policy of the Franco-Russian diplomats than did Paléologue's. In what is easily the most scholarly French work on the origins of the World War Pierre Renouvin has thoroughly accepted the revisionist point of view and rejected all of the ancient myths, with the exception of a strange aberration with respect to the allegation that Germany decided on the war course by the close of July 30th. In reality this was but a temporary holding up of moderating telegrams to Vienna until the report of Russian mobilization on the German frontier could be verified. Such works as these have utterly demolished whatever remained of the conviction of a pacifically inclined and defenseless France. There seems absolutely no doubt any longer that the crucial impulse which stiffened Russia and made possible her fatal mobilization came from Poincaré and the French military clique, however much they may have been encouraged by Izvolski at Paris.

Perhaps the most striking new turn in regard to material on war origins is the development of a very damaging case against Sir Edward Grey. This was first stated a few years ago in Loreburn's *How the War Came*. In general, however, even critical authorities were inclined at the time to regard Loreburn's judgment of Grey as too harsh, though Morel and others had drawn an even more severe indictment of him. Now Dr. Ernest F. Henderson, in the first installment of his *Verdict of History*, has shown very definitely that it is doubtful if we can any longer truthfully say that Grey actually did not desire war, and it is certain beyond any debate that his actual operations were not those designed to avert war. The most fair-minded of all the German students of war origins, Hermann Lutz, goes even further and contends that Sir Edward Grey was probably more responsible than any other person for the Russian mobilization. As early as July 25th he gave Benckendorff to understand that he would countenance a Russian mobilization against Austria. While final judgment on this matter must be held in abeyance until the opening of the French and British archives to historical students, it is certain that Grey must now take his place among the group of scoundrels who directly helped on the great cataclysm of 1914. Nothing has done more to strengthen the case against Grey than his own miserably weak apology which is matched only by that of Asquith. The most interesting and significant fact in regard to the case of Great Britain is the announcement just made that the British gov-

ernment would allow G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley to investigate the documents in the British archives bearing on war responsibility. This is a liberal and statesmanlike step of first importance, and we may expect from it most illuminating revelations.

Little or nothing of significance has appeared recently in regard to the causes for American entry into the World War. The suggestive and courageous book of John Kenneth Turner was so obviously biased as to fail to carry with it the conviction which its mass of concrete material justified, and no American scholar of reputation has as yet devoted himself to the problem of America's obvious unneutrality in the war with its causes and results. It is probable that we shall ultimately find that the causes of America's entry were extremely complex, involving Mr. Wilson's own British proclivities, the intense Anglo-mania of Ambassador Page,² Mr. Wilson's wounded personal pride at the attacks made upon his mild efforts to remain "neutral," and the pressure of investors and manufacturers who feared a speedy Allied defeat or a drawn battle, which would in either case have produced a great falling-off in business profits.

We may look forward with confidence to the appraisal of all this new material on war origins by Professor Fay in his soon forthcoming book on the origins of the World War. Judicious and technically equipped scholars are no longer in any doubt as to the background of the World War, but the facts have not as yet penetrated even the whole world of historical scholarship. When Professor Hazen's grotesque distortion of facts in his latest manual was sent to the *American Historical Review* for review, the editor did not send it to a competent and judicious authority on contemporary diplomacy, such as Coolidge, Fay, Langer, Seymour or Schmitt, but rather sent it to Professor F. M. Anderson of Dartmouth College, one of Hazen's closest personal friends and next to Hazen the most passionate Franco-maniac in the United States. Uninformed readers who should consult the *American Historical Review* as to the facts in the recent controversy about war origins would certainly derive from Professor Anderson's review information of slight value, but would go away from it with their war-time prejudices even more strongly fortified. If the truth cannot penetrate historical circles, with any frankness and certainty, how can we find it in our hearts to condemn bankers

² See C. H. Grattan in the *American Mercury*, September, 1925.

and politicians who fail to grasp the truth when they have definite material interests at stake in the enforcement of the Dawes Plan?

No little progress has been made on the history of the World War. The best English work to date is that of John Buchan. In France Gabriel Hanotaux is bringing out an elaborate *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*, of which some sixteen volumes have now appeared, bringing the story down to early 1918. The Germans have produced a ten-volume work of a somewhat military and nationalistic orientation, *Der Grosse Krieg, 1914-1918*, under the editorship of M. Schwarte. But far and away the greatest historical enterprise connected with the World War, and the most impressive historical project yet undertaken by man is the voluminous *Economic and Social History of the World War*, edited by Professor James Thomson Shotwell of Columbia University and published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment. The project embraces over two hundred volumes and has enlisted the labors of a majority of the most distinguished European historians, economists and publicists. The series is characterized not only by its elaborateness, but by its original and dynamic conception that the most important aspect of a war is not its military events but the economic and social displacement and readjustment which it causes. J. L. Garvin has edited for the Encyclopedia Britannica Corporation a composite two volume work describing the political, scientific, industrial and cultural progress in the twentieth century. W. K. Wallace has contributed two suggestive volumes dealing with the history of the modern world designed to support the thesis of the progressive decline of the importance of political factors in history and society. Harold Temperley has edited a monumental history of the Paris Peace Conference and its results.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Men of the Old Stone Age, by Henry Fairfield Osborn. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*, by John M. Tyler. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; *A Textbook of European Archeology*, by R. A. S. MacAlister. New York: Macmillan; *Man and His Past*, by O. G. S. Crawford. Oxford: Oxford University Press; *Prehistory*, by M. C. Burkitt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; *Man's Prehistoric Past*, by Harris W. Wilder. New York: Macmillan; *Prehistoric Man*, by Jacques de Morgan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; *Human Origins*,

by George Grant MacCurdy. New York: D. Appleton and Company; *The Old Stone Age. The New Stone, Bronze and Early Iron Ages*, by M. and C. H. B. Quennell. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; *The Origin of Civilization*, by James Henry Breasted. New York: Science Press; *Early Civilization*, by A. A. Goldenweiser. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; *Primitive Society. Primitive Religion*, by Robert H. Lowie. New York: Boni and Liveright; *Man and Culture*, by Clark Wissler. New York: Crowell; *Anthropology*, by A. L. Kroeber. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company; *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, by A. M. Tozzer. New York: Macmillan; *Primitive Mentality*, by Lévy-Bruhl. New York: Macmillan; *The History of Civilization*, edited by C. K. Ogden and H. E. Barnes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf (Embodying the H. Berr series on the *Evolution of Humanity*, and the G. Renard series on *The Universal History of Labor*, and embracing two hundred volumes); *The Life of the Ancient East*, by James Baikie. New York: Macmillan; *Social Life in Ancient Egypt*, by W. M. Flinders Petrie. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *A History of Assyria*, by A. T. Olmstead. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; *The Cambridge Ancient History*, edited by J. B. Bury *et al.* New York: Macmillan; *Our Debt to Greece and Rome*, edited by Andrew F. West *et al.* Boston: Marshall Jones (An elaborate series on all phases of classical history and culture); *The Legacy of Greece*, edited by R. W. Livingstone. New York: Oxford University Press; *The Legacy of Rome*, edited by Cyril Bailey. New York: Oxford University Press; *An Economic History of Rome*, by Tenney Frank. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; *The Hellenistic Age*, by J. B. Bury *et al.* New York: Macmillan; *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, by O. Seeck; *French Civilization from Its Origins to the Close of the Middle Ages*, by A. L. Guérard. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *History of the Later Roman Empire*, by J. B. Bury. New York: Macmillan; *A Guide to the Study of Medieval History*, by Louis J. Paetow. Berkeley: University of California Press; *A History of Magic and Experimental Science during the First Thirteen Centuries of the Christian Era*, by Lynn Thorndike. New York: Macmillan; *Studies in the History of Medieval Science*, by Charles H. Haskins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; *The Rise of Universities*, by Charles H. Haskins. New York: Henry Holt and Company; *Medieval People*, by Eileen Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *France in the Middle Ages*, by F. Funck-Brentano. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; *Medieval Contributions to Modern Civilization. The Social and Political Ideals of Some Great Medieval Thinkers*, edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw. New York: Henry Holt and Company; *The Middle Ages*, by Dana C. Munro. New York: The Century Company; *The Records of Civilization*, edited by James T. Shot-

well and Austin P. Evans. New York: Columbia University Press; *Allgemeine Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Mittelalters*, by Rudolf Köttschke. Jena: Gustav Fischer; *Life and Labour in the Middle Ages*, by P. Boissonade. New York: Knopf; *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*, by H. O. Taylor. New York: Macmillan; *The Age of the Reformation*, by Preserved Smith. New York: Henry Holt and Company; *Erasmus*, by Preserved Smith. New York: Harper and Brothers; *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700*, by J. E. Gillespie. New York: Longmans, Green and Company; *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*, by J. B. Botsford. New York: Macmillan; *The Expansion of Europe*, by Wilbur C. Abbott. New York: Henry Holt and Company; *The Idea of Progress*, by J. B. Bury. New York: Macmillan; *A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century*, by Elie Halévy. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company; *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century*, by L. C. A. Knowles. New York: Macmillan; *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, by J. H. Clapham. New York: Macmillan; *World History, 1815-1920*, by Eduard Fueter. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company; *The Colonization of North America*, by H. E. Bolton and T. M. Marshall. New York: Macmillan; *The Foundations of American Nationality*, by Evarts B. Greene. Boston: American Book Company; *The English Colonies in the Eighteenth Century*, by Herbert L. Osgood. New York: Macmillan; *The Founding of New England. Revolutionary New England, 1691-1776*, by J. T. Adams. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press; *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution*, by C. M. Andrews. New Haven: Yale University Press; *The Causes of the War for Independence*, by C. H. Van Tyne. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *The American Revolution*, by C. H. McIlwain. New York: Macmillan; *Sources and Documents on the American Revolution*, by S. E. Morison. Oxford: Oxford University Press; *Jay's Treaty*, by S. F. Bemis. New York: Macmillan; *The War with Mexico*, by Justin H. Smith. New York: Macmillan; *History of the United States*, by Edward Channing. New York: Macmillan; *History of the United States since the Civil War*, by E. P. Oberholtzer. New York: Macmillan; *History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley. The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, by James Ford Rhodes. New York: Macmillan; *A History of the American Frontier*, by Frederick L. Paxson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *Social Politics in the United States*, by F. E. Haynes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *The United States of America*, by David S. Muzzey. Boston: Ginn and Company; *Economic Development of the United States*, by I. Lippincott. New York: D. Appleton and Company. *Economic History of the United*

States, by T. W. Van Metre. New York: Henry Holt and Company; *American Economic History*, by H. U. Faulkner. New York: Harper and Brothers. *The United States in our Own Times*, by Paul L. Haworth. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; *Since the Civil War*, by C. R. Lingley. New York: The Century Company; *Recent History of the United States*, by F. L. Paxson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *Recent American History*, by L. B. Shippee. New York: Macmillan; *American Democracy*, by W. M. West. Boston: Allyn and Bacon; *The Development of the United States*, by M. Farrand. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *The United States: An Experiment in Democracy*, by Carl Becker. New York: Harper and Brothers; *Three Centuries of American Democracy*, by William MacDonald, New York: Henry Holt and Company; *Our Republic*, by S. E. Forman. New York: The Century Company; *New Viewpoints in American History*, by A. M. Schlesinger. New York: Macmillan; *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, by J. B. Bishop. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; *The Chronicles of America*, edited by Allen Johnson. New Haven: Yale University Press; *The American Mind in Action*, by Harvey O'Higgins and E. H. Reede. New York: Harper and Brothers; *The Mexican Nation*, by H. I. Priestley. New York: Macmillan; *History of the Latin American Nations*, by W. S. Robertson. New York: D. Appleton and Company; *Latin America and the United States*, by Graham H. Stuart. New York: The Century Company; *The New Latin America*, by J. H. Warshaw. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company; *Mexico: An Interpretation*, by Carlton Beals. New York: B. W. Huebsch; *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*, by G. P. Gooch. New York: Henry Holt and Company; *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, edited by J. Lepsius et al. Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte; *The Origins of the War of 1870*, by R. H. Lord. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; *The Pan-German League*, by Mildred S. Wertheimer. New York: Longmans, Green and Company; *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, by Conrad von Hötzendorf. Vienna: Rikola Verlag; *The Case for the Central Powers*, by M. Montgelas. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; *Les Preuves: Le Crime Du Croit Commun: Le Crime Diplomatique*, by Mathias Morhardt. Paris: Librairie du Travail; *La Victoire*, by A. Fabre-Luce. Paris: Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française; *Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis, 1911-1914*, edited by F. Stieve. Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte; *Iswolski und der Weltkrieg*, by F. Stieve. Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte; *Georges Louis*, by E. Judet. Paris; *How the War Came*, by Lord Loreburn. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; *The Verdict of History: The Case of Sir Edward Grey*, by E. F. Henderson; Monadnock, N. H.: Privately

printed; *Shall it be Again?* By John Kenneth Turner. New York: B. W. Huebsch; *A History of the Great War*, by John Buchan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; *Der Grosse Krieg, 1914-1918*, edited by M. Schwarte. Leipzig: Barth; *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*, by G. Hanotaux. Paris: Gonnouilhou; *Economic and Social History of the World War*, edited by James T. Shotwell. New Haven: Yale University Press (The most extensive historical work ever undertaken. A coöperative project in some three hundred volumes financed by the Carnegie Endowment); *These Eventful Years*, published by the Encyclopedia Britannica Company; *The Trend of History. The Passing of Politics*, by W. K. Wallace. New York: Macmillan.

.

CHAPTER III

RECENT HISTORICAL TENDENCIES

I. OUR PRIMITIVE HERITAGE¹

WHILE the formal science of anthropology was, in a sense, founded by Edward Burnett Tylor only some forty years ago, man's interest in his primitive predecessors is as old as folklore and tradition itself. To limit ourselves only to written records: the Oriental creation tales and heroic lore, the Hebrew legends of Adam and Eve, the age of giants and Noah and the dispersion, Plato's interest in primitive civilization and the troglodytes, Seneca's conception of a primitive golden age, the Patristic account of pristine paradise and the fall, the early modern interest in the life of man in "the state of nature," which culminated in Rousseau's grotesque eulogy of the noble savage, and the beginnings of a pseudo-scientific study of primitive life with Herder, are but a few of the well known examples of the perennial concern of the typical leading thinkers of the past with the problems of primitive culture. And while most of their doctrines on the subject were wholly a priori, deductive, and grotesque as to details, their "hunch" as to the importance of early civilization was a sound one. Modern man is pleased to think of himself as quite different in kind from the savage, yet this is but a defensive delusion and a flattering fiction. Except for a precarious and variable veneer of material culture, and the alteration of psychic responses and secondary rationalizations conditioned thereupon, our whole biopsychic and social background and equipment are those which we share in common with primitive man and, to no small degree, with the animal kingdom in general.

The great impulse to the study of anthropology came from the evolutionary hypothesis and the discovery of the geological age of man. A vast literature grew up around the subject of the life of

¹ From the *New Republic*, November 29, 1922.

early man in the period from 1860 to 1890. Most of these works, however, were based on deductive theorizing, founded on the assumption of the possibility of applying the processes and mechanisms of biological evolution to an explanation of social and cultural development. Classic examples of this type of work were Spencer's theories of primitive mentality, Morgan's synthesis of primitive social organization, Frazer's voluminous analysis of religion and mythology and Tylor's studies in primitive culture. Tylor was much the most scholarly of the early group, and his *Anthropology*, first published in 1881, was the best comprehensive statement of the outlines of anthropological science as it was formulated by the evolutionary school.

Penetrating students of primitive culture were soon to see the necessity of supplanting arbitrary deductions by critical and discriminating analysis of adequate collections of representative data, thus raising anthropology to the level of a science. It may be something of a satisfaction to Americans to know that it has been due almost solely to the efforts of an American scholar, Franz Boas, that this significant achievement has been realized. By his extensive field researches, his elaboration and application of a severely scientific method and his training of a number of worthy disciples, he has created the real science of anthropology. The nature and results of his methods he has summarized in his notable work on *The Mind of Primitive Man*. Clark Wissler has put the synthesis of native American culture on a scientific basis in his *American Indian*. Robert H. Lowie has contrasted the actual facts of primitive social organization with the imaginative fictions of the older anthropology in his *Primitive Society*. Many others among Boas's students have done notable work in the way of a discriminating collection of data in the field. Now Dr. Goldenweiser has attempted the difficult but extremely necessary task of summarizing the findings of critical anthropology in the various fields of method, cultural development, social organization and mental evolution. His work² may be regarded as occupying something like the same position with respect to the newer critical anthropology that Tylor's *Anthropology* did to the views of the evolutionary group.

The book opens with an analysis of certain general considerations which may be regarded as the essential prolegomena to any

² *Early Civilization: An Introduction to Anthropology*. By Alexander A. Goldenweiser. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

detailed survey of anthropological material, such as the psychic unity of man, the lack of correlation between race and culture, the nature of civilization as a cultural concept and the weaknesses of the older evolutionary and comparative method in anthropology. It would have been well if the discussion of the relation between culture and environment, which appears much further on in the work, had been included in the introduction. Next comes a section devoted to the concrete description of some five representative primitive cultures selected from the most diverse areas. This material is utilized to confirm the introductory considerations and to furnish the basis for subsequent reflections throughout the work. In the third part of the book, primitive industry, art, religion and social organization are surveyed in an illuminating manner, and the laws and processes of cultural and institutional growth are discussed. The work closes with a critical examination of the theories of primitive mentality and mental evolution held by Spencer, Frazer, Wundt, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl and Freud. A number of helpful diagrams and illustrations are introduced into the text. While the book is well organized and clearly written, the vocabulary is somewhat scientific and the treatment methodological and generalized. For this reason it is scarcely an ideal book for beginners in the study of anthropology or for introductory courses in undergraduate work in college. It has little of the intimacy and literary charm of Tylor's old manual or Marett's admirable little summary, and while it will be of infinite value to teachers and advanced students it can scarcely be hoped that it will popularize the newer anthropology.

Dr. Goldenweiser adheres to the general point of view of the Boas school that civilization must be dealt with chiefly as a cultural fact and process. Older concepts of a racial hierarchy or geographical determinism are rejected. Culture is the vital and dynamic element in human development, though Goldenweiser handles this "culture-concept" in a moderate manner and does not push it to the border of the mystic and the occult, as did Kroeber and some others. Throughout, the book is well-balanced. In the development of culture the contributions of both the individual and society are weighed and estimated, and, in the explanation of cultural parallelisms, due consideration is accorded to the operation of both independent development and diffusion. The latest views on the origin of religion, such as the mana concept, are well presented and the diversity of forms of early social organization

clearly indicated. The anachronisms in the anthropology of Spencer, Letourneau, Frazer and Morgan are thus fully revealed. The criticism of the chief attempts to construct a psychology of primitive man is judicious and constructive.

Dr. Goldenweiser's book should do much to arouse European anthropologists from their "dogmatic slumbers" in the comparative and evolutionary method, and it brings together for the first time the data of scientific anthropology so that it may be put at the service of historical sociology and institutional economics. If, and when, historians become interested in the development of civilization, they will find awaiting them an admirable summary of indispensable prolegomena to their subject.

II. AT LAST A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION ^a

Since about the beginning of the present century historical sociology has been the least thoroughly and adequately cultivated of the various fields of sociology. To the American Sociological Society it seems to have become a non-existent phase of sociological study. The salutary effort of Professor E. C. Hayes, when president of the Society, to create a special section interested in historical sociology appears to have been abortive, and since that time the annual meetings have been devoted chiefly to wrangling over current problems in social psychology, various phases of contemporary social problems and diverse sermonizing—all extremely worth while and relevant, but scarcely the whole field of sociology. The reasons for this decline of interest in historical sociology seem relatively clear. The anthropologists have for the most part worked on the "prehistoric" period, though Professor Kroeber has recently shown how fruitful the anthropological method may be when applied to historical data. The philosophy of history of Comte, Spencer and others has been discredited, and the historians proper have been so thoroughly absorbed in a consideration of the unique, accidental, episodic and anecdotal aspects of political history that they have had little to contribute to the history of culture and social institutions. And, for the most part, the sociologists have been too pure and God-fearing to make much use of historical economics, which has been in part contaminated by the theory of economic determinism. With the rich and extensive material being put at their disposal

^a From the *Journal of Social Forces*, March, 1925.

by the biologists, psychologists, statisticians and anthropogeographers, and the always vivid interest in social betterment, it is not difficult to understand why sociologists, not without justice, have come to regard the field of social genesis as of little importance, or as impossible of fruitful exploitation, however significant. Yet, without a sound knowledge of the genesis of the various forms of human culture and the leading social institutions there can be no complete understanding of contemporary life and problems, and no valid plan for improvement in the future.

Now we have in a single great series the prospect of the complete reversal of the whole situation. We are promised a well planned set of around two hundred volumes by leading experts which will cover the whole history of human civilization from the eolithic period to the second quarter of the twentieth century, and which will make the equipment of the historical sociologists more complete and up-to-date than that of any other workers in the general field of sociology. Among the French cultivators of social history and historical sociology there has been no more enthusiastic or ambitious student than Henri Berr, whose *La Synthèse en Histoire*, published in 1911, deserves to rank with Karl Lamprecht's *What Is History?* and James Harvey Robinson's *The New History* as a promulgation of the principles of the newer dynamic and synthetic historical writing. He has since planned a remarkable series on the history of civilization, known as *The Evolution of Humanity*. Another French historian, chiefly interested in economic and social history, Georges Renard, produced a somewhat smaller series on *The Universal History of Labor*, probably the best general economic history ever projected. The English series on *The History of Civilization*, edited by C. K. Ogden, of which the books listed below constitute the first eight volumes, is even more ambitious, as it combines the *Evolution of Humanity* and the *Universal History of Labor* with a large number of other volumes planned to round out the series more thoroughly and to make a more complete record of the history of human civilization. The English series will run to over two hundred volumes, and constitutes veritably an epoch in the history of history itself. It is the most ambitious and important historical project ever undertaken from the standpoint of the sociologist, and the most impressive and extensive from any viewpoint, with the sole exception of Professor J. T. Shotwell's voluminous series on the *Economic and Social History of the War*, to be

published in some three hundred volumes under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment.

While the English set is thus far more comprehensive than the French project, the same general plan runs through it all as existed in the mind of Henri Berr when working out the dominating concepts of *The Evolution of Humanity*. Hence we may quote briefly from his general introduction as to the dominating conceptions which have governed the planning of the volumes:

It will have a real unity: not merely the unity of its subject—history in its entirety—but unity of plan, firmly binding together all the various parts; and also unity of the activating ideas. The problem with which we are faced is how to prevent incoherence and yet to avoid the opposite error of over-systematization. In the present state of our knowledge, a single individual cannot accomplish this task alone, and even to organize it he must exercise very great discretion. Certain ideas will run through the whole enterprise, but they will not be dominating theories thrust upon the collaborators, and through them, upon the facts; rather will they be experimental ideas, hypotheses pervading the whole work, and subjected to the control of actual facts by unfettered investigation, allowing complete autonomy to the collaborators. Our undertaking is thus something in the nature of a vast experiment, to be gradually undertaken under the eyes of the public to the great profit, as we hope, of historical science; and the ideas put forward will emerge from the test either confirmed or rectified.

Within this unity of the whole each part will have its own unity. The series has not been planned in terms of large collective volumes, grouping together more or less unconnected chapters written by various collaborators, but as independent volumes of moderate size. The number of these will, therefore, be considerable, since they will correspond to the great problems and the organic divisions of history; and each, as far as this is possible, will be entrusted to a single scholar of recognized authority. Each will be an independent work, will carry the imprint of one personality, and will be the more interesting in that it will have been written with greater freedom and pleasure. Each volume will have its own life; so too will a given group of volumes, and they will thus, from different view-points, form a whole within a whole, partial syntheses within a total synthesis. Our task, in short, is to combine the advantages of an historical encyclopedia with those of a continuous history of human evolution. . . .

To unite Science and Life: such is the formula which expresses the ideal we desire to attain. . . .

From the standpoint of scholarship, then, our undertaking will

at once mark achievement and provide a point of departure for work still to be done. . . .

But the aim of the series is not merely to be erudite: it is also to be scientific in the full sense of that term. Scholarship may enable us to prepare and assemble materials: it is science alone, however, that brings order into them. . . .

Without claiming that the method of scientific synthesis can actually be fixed for history in any definite fashion it may be assumed—at least, as a tentative hypothesis—that the facts of which human evolution is woven, can be grouped in three quite distinct orders. The first are the contingent, the second the necessary, and the third those that relate to some inner logic. We shall try to make use of and to harmonize the very diverse explanations that have been attempted, by endeavoring to show that the whole content of human evolution falls into these general divisions of contingency, necessity and logic. It seems to us that by this tripartite division, history receives both its natural articulation and its whole explanation. Indeed, this classification opens up a deeper view of causality. It invites us to probe into the mass of historical facts and to attempt to disentangle three kinds of causal relations: mere succession, where the facts are simply determined by others: relations that are constant, where the facts are linked to others by necessity: and internal linkage, where the facts are rationally connected with others. On this view of the nature of the causes operating in history, a synthesis may not appear easy, but it is at least conceivable. . . .

In fine, to unravel the complicated skein of causality: to distinguish the "accidental" or the "crude facts" of history, the institutions or the social necessities, the needs or the fundamental causes that flower in the form of ideas within reflective thought: to study the play of these diverse elements—contingent, necessary and logical—their reciprocal action and what may be called the rearrangement of causes: this should constitute the essential object of this synthesis. . . .

Although profoundly scientific in intention this series will not, for that reason, be any the less alive. It has been supposed, quite erroneously, that the introduction of science into history is opposed to life, that the resurrection of the past is the privilege of art. It is analysis which reduces the past to a dust-heap of facts; what erudition collects is saved not from death but from oblivion. Synthesis resurrects the past, otherwise than does intuition, and better. Its task as defined by Michelet, "the resurrection of the whole of life not merely in its surface aspects but in its inner and deeper organisms," cannot be fulfilled by genius; but science can accomplish it by deepening its theory of causality and endeavoring, through its synthesis, to reconstitute the interplay of causes.

It is this purpose, then, that animates our work: to render intelligible by the study of its causes, and to enable us to follow that progressive movement—not continuously and absolutely progressive, but as a whole and from certain points of view—which gives meaning to the life of humanity. . . .

Our enterprise may thus be of great value to further decisive progress in the study of human evolution. Its object is the proper arrangement of labour and the elaboration of a true scientific method with the purpose of initiating the public into the more serious and engrossing aspects of history as a whole. In the natural sciences, laboratory research, however technical and ungrateful it may be, always results in theories or in a practical outcome to which the public cannot remain indifferent: and, for that reason, there is abundance of encouragement for those who cultivate these fields. On the other hand, because of its over-erudite and insufficiently scientific character, history as presented by learned historians has become an arid speciality, in which the public manifests no interest—accepting in its place anecdotal and romantic works put together by clever popularizers in the guise of true history.

Thanks to the eminent collaborators who have coöperated in this undertaking, things may perhaps be changed for the better. Our programme is vast and our ambition must appear to many over-sanguine. But we must take the risk. It is obvious that a desire for action, a confidence in the spontaneous forces of life have been revived amongst us. There would be a disquieting side to this if, as some tell us, it has taken an anti-intellectualistic turn. It is essential that this need for action, this revival, should also manifest itself in intellectual courage. Life expands with knowledge. And an historic science understood in a living manner—the consciousness of humanity springing from reflection—is necessary to direct the tumultuous powers of instinct.

Only the volumes on “prehistory,” oriental antiquity, classical times, and the Middle Ages have yet been announced,⁴ but even

⁴ *Social Organization*. By the late W. H. R. Rivers. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Company, 1924, x, 226 pp.; *A Thousand Years of the Tartars*. By E. H. Parker. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Company, 1924, xii, 288 pp.; *The Earth Before History*. By Edmond Perrier. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Company, 1925, xxiv, 345 pp.; *Language: A Linguistic Introduction to History*. By J. Vendryes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Company, 1925, xxviii, 378 pp.; *The History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boethius*. By Pierre de Labriolle. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Company, 1925, xxiii, 555 pp.; *Prehistoric Man: A General Outline of Prehistory*. By Jacques DeMorgan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Company, 1925, xxiii, 304

here we can envisage the great value of the series for every aspect of historical sociology. The volumes on "prehistory" cover such important subjects as the social organization of primitive peoples, the passages from "tribe to empire," the geographical basis of history, race and history, the diffusion of culture, woman's place in primitive society, cycles in history, prehistoric archeology, and the origins of language. From the beginning of the "historic" period provision is made for the description and analysis of the growth of every phase of culture and institutions. The thoroughness of the treatment increases with the recency of the period covered, there being about as many volumes assigned to the Middle Ages as to the prehistoric period, oriental antiquity, and the classical age combined. The editor states that the number of volumes on the period since the seventeenth century will be approximately equal to those on the time prior to this date. The scope of the series is admirable, not only with respect to the range of subjects covered, but also with regard to the area encompassed. For example, in addition to the thorough treatment of Roman society, there are no less than nine volumes devoted to the history of the world outside the Roman Empire during this period; and in the medieval and early modern periods there are a number of volumes on Oriental history and the influence of the East on western Europe. In the medieval period, where the series becomes fully expansive, there are not only a number of volumes on the various fields of social, economic, political, juristic, artistic, intellectual and scientific development, but also competent histories of such special subjects as money, costume, witchcraft and medicine. All in all, there is every indication that the historical sociologist will here find ample information of a highly reliable type on every subject which might legitimately enlist his curiosity or attention. Further, by a judicious selection of the volumes, the sociologist may secure an admirable sequential account of social evolution, literally and specifically considered. When the series is completed even the psychological sociologist may well cast envious eyes at his colleagues interested in social genesis.

The eight volumes which have thus far appeared are of far less interest to the sociologist than the next batch just announced

pp.; *The Threshold of the Pacific*. By C. E. Fox. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Company, 1925, xvi, 379 pp. *A Geographical Introduction to History*. By Lucien Febvre. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925, xxv, 389 pp.

for early publication. Only those by Rivers and De Morgan are of primary relevance for historical sociology. Rivers' work, like his earlier *Kinship and Social Organization*, is about mid-way between the older views of Morgan and the strictly critical analysis of social organization to be found in the works of Lowie and Goldenweiser. He defends Morgan in many cases, but wisely more on the subjects of group-marriage and relationship systems than on the clan-gens succession and the uniformity and universality of institutional evolution. Rivers' theoretical position as to cultural growth and development remains that of the discriminating diffusionist. His volume seems to the writer much less valuable and satisfactory than Lowie's *Primitive Society*. De Morgan's volume, while by no means as authoritative and thorough as MacCurdy's recent *Human Origins*, is the most compact, up-to-date and readable book on the pre-literary period in any language. It has the special advantage of bringing in a large amount of information based on Oriental archeology. This is probably the most original and valuable aspect of the work. De Morgan has spent years in Oriental excavation and is an expert on this area. As most students of prehistoric archeology have devoted themselves primarily to the western European area it is interesting and important to have this orientation and absorption supplemented and balanced by the discoveries and information of a scholar who has specialized on the Near East. In his treatment of Oriental origins De Morgan apparently has little bias in favor of the priority or ascendancy of any particular country. The book is logically organized about the evolution of primitive industries from the eolithic period to the iron age, the daily life of prehistoric man, and intellectual and artistic, including religious, development. The only serious weakness is the absence of any adequate discussion of the chronology of the pre-literary age.

Parker's work gives a connected account of Tartar history and of the relation of the Tartars to other peoples. Perrier provides an excellent survey of the development of the earth, and especially of the growth of organic life on the planet before the appearance of man. It is, in other words, an excellent presentation of the biological background of, and threshold to, history. Vendryes divides his survey of linguistic origins into a treatment of sounds, grammar, vocabulary, the structure of language, and the origins of writing. It serves its purpose as a "linguistic introduction to

history" particularly well through its emphasis on the social and psychological basis of the origins and growth of language. The book lacks, however, some of the subtlety and philosophic grasp of Edward Sapir's classic work. Dr. Fox's book is a detailed monograph on "the social organization, magic and religion of the people of San Cristoval in the Solomon Islands." It ranks with such works as Rivers' book on the Todas or Seligmann's on the Veddas. It would have been far more useful if, instead of a specialized work on a small group in a limited area, this volume had been a general survey of the ethnography of the Pacific area. Labriolle's book meets a need which is not satisfactorily served by any other existing book, Krüger's *Early Christian Literature* being brief and out of date, and Bardenhewer's *Patrology* being little more than an encyclopedic collection of names, dates and titles.

For the historian of civilization unquestionably the most valuable volume in the first group issued in English is Lucien Febvre's *Geographical Introduction to History*. This is the best critical book ever written on the subject, and a final refutation of the older and naïve view of geographical determinism. It is as far ahead of Ratzel and Semple in method and concepts as they were beyond Montesquieu and Buckle. As a student of Vidal de la Blache, Febvre is a protagonist of regional geography and the detailed study of the interaction of nature and man in particular areas in the various stages of historical development.

Febvre shows that there has been from the first an intimate relation between history and geography, not only due to the influence of geographic factors on human culture, but also as a result of the fact that human geography was really founded not so much by physiographers as by historians from Ritter, through Michelet, Curtius, and Duruy, to Vidal de la Blache, himself, who started his professional career as an historian. Neither history nor geography can flourish in a dynamic or realistic sense if divorced from each other, because nature and man are ever acting and reacting upon each other:

Man is a geographical agent, and not the least. He everywhere contributes his share towards investing the physiognomy of the earth with those "changing expressions" which it is the "special charge" of geography to study. Through centuries and centuries, by his accumulated labor and the boldness and decision of his undertakings, he appears to us as one of the most powerful agents in the modification of

terrestrial surfaces. There is no power which he does not utilize and direct at will; there is no country which does not bear the marks of his intervention. . . .

To act on his environment, man does not place himself outside it. He does not escape its hold at the precise moment when he attempts to exercise his own. And conversely the nature which acts on man, the nature which intervenes to modify the existence of human societies, is not a virgin nature, independent of all human contact; it is a nature already profoundly impregnated and modified by man. There is perpetual action and reaction. The formula "the mutual relation of society to environment" holds equally good for the two supposed distinct cases. For in these relations, man both borrows and gives back, whilst the environment gives and receives.

In his treatment of methodology Febvre opposes the conceptions of Vidal de la Blache as to the futility of large scale generalizations and impressive theoretical systems, the desirability of concentration upon the study of specific geographical regions, and the rejection of geographical determinism to the views of Ratzel, Miss Semple, and others, whose writings, he contends, represent in their most extreme form these very fallacies of method and attitude which Febvre desires to combat. In many ways Febvre's assaults upon the systematizers in anthropogeography is similar in attitude and methodology to the attack of Boas and his disciples upon the systematizers of the classical school of anthropology, such as Morgan, Spencer, Letourneau, Frazer, and others of this group.

Febvre rejects totally and repeatedly the hypothesis of geographical determinism. He accepts the views of the cultural anthropologists and historians to the effect that culture is the dynamic factor in the history of society and institutions, and holds that nature presents to man in any environment a large number of possible modes and types of potential exploitation and adjustment. The inhabitants will select from these possibilities certain specific ways of reacting to nature according to the particular folkways and traditions of the group. Not only is there no strict geographic determination of culture; the effects of the environment are for the most part very complicated and primarily indirect. The simplicity and directness of the environmental influences as assumed by the older anthropogeographers must be repudiated as an illusion associated with the ignorance or ex-

ubérance inseparable from the origins of a science. Febvre would even reject all generalized theory of geographical influences as a handicap to the progress of human geography :

We can never repeat too often that the object of geography is not to go hunting for "influences," such as that of Nature on Man, or of the Soil on History. These are dreams. Such words in capital letters have nothing to do with serious work. And the word "influences" is not to be found in the scientific dictionary: it is an astrological term. Let us then leave "influences" once for all to the astrologers and other "charlatans," as good old Bodin would say—Bodin who was steeped in them himself. . . .

In the place of the older technique of generalization and comparison we must have concentration upon the study of particular geographic regions, in which both the geographic facts and their operation upon man will be thoroughly investigated. The real problem is to discover the *relations* between man and his environment in every geographic region the world over. Throughout the book the author organizes his discussion around the historico-culture concept now basic in modern critical anthropology and the history of civilization.

As a whole this book is probably the most thorough-going critique of the Ratzel stage of anthropogeography, and the most adequate invitation to soul-searching on the part of anthropogeographers which has yet been produced. It is a more thorough piece of work on this subject than has been brought out by any of the cultural anthropologists or historians. The chief criticism of it is the worshipful discipleship and Gallicanism which exudes from nearly every page. Vidal de la Blache was a great geographer, and regional geography seems to hold the promise of the future in this field of work, but Ferdinand von Richthofen was certainly the equal of Vidal, and the Germans have done much more in the field of regional geography than the French, when their work outside of Europe is considered.

Other volumes announced for immediate publication will indicate the immediate value of the series to the historian and social scientist. Among the more notable are *The Ægean Civilization*, by G. Glotz; *Greece at Work*, by G. Glotz; *The Dawn of European Civilization*, by V. G. Childe; *From Tribe to Empire*, by A. Moret; *The Peoples of Asia*, by L. H. D. Buxton; *Life and Labour in Europe in the Middle Ages*, by P.

Boissonnade; *Life and Labour in Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth Century*, by G. Renard and G. Wenterse; *China and Europe*, by A. Reichwein; *London Life in the Eighteenth Century*, by M. Dorothy George; *Race and History*, by E. Pitard; and *A History of Witchcraft*, by Montagu Summers.

III. THE ADOLESCENCE OF CLIO ⁵

The historian is presumably interested far beyond all other members of the human tribe in problems of genesis and development. Yet historians have exhibited a strangely non-historical attitude towards their own subject, as is witnessed by the fact that there is not at this late date a single work in any language giving a comprehensive account of the development of the science and literature of history. There are some excellent monographs on special periods of the development of history, such as those by Olmstead, Bury, Peter, Wattenbach, Fueter, Flint and Gooch, but there exists no adequate general account of the growth of historiography as a whole and a unity. This strange situation is not due to the fact that historians have deliberately avoided the task or minimized its importance, but rather because the preparation of a history of historical writing would have involved exhibiting an interest in the history of thought and culture and would have required some considerable degree of reflection and analysis. Not only have such interests and such a mode of mental exertion been repugnant to the respectable historians since Ranke, Stubbs and Freeman, but absorption in such a subject as the history of history would have required a complete deviation from concern with the acceptable and highly esteemed subject-matter of approved historical writing—military episodes, dynastic changes, diplomatic entanglements, party alignments and mutations, and anecdotes concerning distinguished gentlemen in the rôles of generals, diplomats, pirates, robber-barons, tyrants, political grafters and plutocratic practitioners of *Machtpolitik*.

Yet nothing is more needed as an aid to the historian than a competent account of the development of the science of history, in order that one may have a proper sense of the nature, problems and difficulties of his subject and an adequate appreciation of the superior nature of modern historiography. Nothing could more surely indicate the need for a history of history than the fact

⁵ From the *New Republic*, September 27, 1922.

that a former president of the American Historical Association in his presidential address advanced the thesis that Thucydides and Tacitus were not only relatively but absolutely the greatest of all historians, or the attitude of another distinguished American professor who closed his course on modern European history with the events of December 31, 1869, on the ground that no one could write or teach reliable history concerning events falling within his own generation, and who yet contended time and again that Thucydides and Tacitus, both strictly historians of contemporary events, far surpassed all modern devotees of Clio.

The proper person to prepare the best history of history is not a philologist or an ultra-critical specialist in textual or literary criticism, but rather one who has an unusual grasp upon the history of human thought and culture in general, who has real powers of philosophic analysis, who is informed with respect to the methods and results of the allied social sciences, and who is thoroughly acquainted with, and appreciative of, the latest tendencies and developments in his own science of history. Fairly adequate accounts of the historical writings of particular epochs and areas are already available; what is now needed is a person of the critical and synthetic power to weld these monographic contributions into a coherent and unified whole. Such qualifications are possessed by Professor Shotwell to a degree not surpassed by any other living historian and equalled by very few. He has been one of the leaders in the development of an interest in the history of thought and culture; his philosophic grasp is so well recognized that one of his colleagues once remarked that his greatest service lay in keeping the department in touch with the cosmic processes; he is almost unrivaled among historians in his knowledge of the social sciences as a group; and he has been second only to Professor James Harvey Robinson as a protagonist of the newer history in this country. As editor-in-chief of the great Carnegie Endowment *Social and Economic History of the World War* he is in charge of incomparably the most extensive historical enterprise ever undertaken—one which makes Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* seem like the work of a puny and primitive amateur by comparison. From such a person we may expect a magisterial synthesis of the development of history, and this first installment of the work is in no important sense a disappointment.

The present work⁶ is the first of a series of two or three volumes designed to cover the whole field of the history of history. It sketches the development of historiography from the legends of primitive peoples through the historical writing of the Patristic period. After chapters on the nature and meaning of history, pre-historic myths and legends, the development of the art of writing and book-making, and the discovery of the science of chronology and the introduction of a time-perspective in history, the work gets fairly under way with a discussion of the few and fragmentary contributions made to history by the Oriental peoples from the Egyptians to the Persians. The Hebrew contribution to history is believed to be of sufficient importance to receive a separate section of five chapters. Greek, Roman, and Patristic historiography each receive a section, the longest of which is, appropriately, devoted to the Greek historians. The work closes with a reprint of the brilliant article, "The Interpretation of History," contributed a decade ago to the *American Historical Review*.

The details of Professor Shotwell's analysis of the merits and defects of the writers on history down to the close of the Patristic period would interest only the technically trained historian, but his general estimates are significant to all who have any concern with history or literature. While the Egyptians and Babylonians have left many valuable archeological and written sources for the history of their achievements, they produced little or nothing in the way of systematic historical narrative, which the Hebrews must be assigned the honor of having first created. This appears at its best in the Jahvist history in Samuel and the opening of the Book of Kings, and in First Maccabees. While the Old Testament is handled in a purely secular manner, what it loses in religious uniqueness it gains in significance as history and literature. Of the Greek historians, Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius only are worthy of inclusion in the first rank. Herodotus contributed the most interesting and vivid narrative and approached the closest to producing a history of civilization, but his work was diffuse, digressive and marred by exaggerations and misconceptions. Thucydides was more straight-forward in his narrative and more severely critical, but it would be absurd to place him in the same class as a scientific historian with moderns like Fustel, Rambaud,

⁶ *An Introduction to the History of History*. By James T. Shotwell. New York: Columbia University Press.

Maitland and Turner. His approach was that of the poet craving the dramatic. He had no grasp whatever on those deeper social and economic forces operating in human society which Aristotle so clearly perceived. He had no conception of time-perspective. He ignored Athenian civilization and concentrated on the details of petty battles and military preparations. The political history was interpreted from the naïve standpoint of a theory of personal causation. He followed the general procedure of antique historiography in inventing speeches for his characters, by which device he presented most of the political and diplomatic history in his work. Of the trio Polybius was far the most profound and scientific, and the twelfth book of his *History of Rome* constitutes the first great treatise on historical science. Yet even he conceived of history as primarily something to be written from personal observation and the reports of eye-witnesses, and he was contemptuous of those who, like Timæus, compiled histories solely by the use of documents. The simple-minded Xenophon is sufficiently characterized as an excellent stylist and a good memoir-writer. Later Greek historical writing was paralyzed by the dominance of the rhetoric of Isocrates and his school and followers. History became a branch of æsthetics rather than a science of accurate narrative.

Among the Romans the most profound contribution to the historical point of view was contained in Lucretius's remarkable poem, *De Rerum Natura*, "the most marvellous performance in all antique literature." Cæsar produced the unrivaled war-memoirs of antiquity. Sallust was an excellent stylist, but was ignorant of geography and chronology and suffered by leisurely detachment from the events he described. In one sense he was a modern, namely, that he originated the method of hiring impecunious scholars to do his research work. Livy was the great national historian of Rome, contributing the epic of the development of the Roman world-state. Yet, whatever his excellencies as a stylist and patriotic stimulant, he was a poor scientific historian. His work was built upon the naïve assumption of religious causation. There were frequent lapses into moralizing. He had no critical or discriminating sense in the use of sources. He was a victim of the rhetorical standards, and invented hundreds of imaginary speeches for his characters. The content of his work was such as to make it but "a vast repertory of archaic wars." Tacitus, though the greatest of Roman historians and an avowed

disciple of Thucydides, is unreliable because of the large subjective element in his writing. Like Juvenal he was not in sympathy with his times. The disastrous moralizing element in his writings was so strong that he held it to be "history's highest function to let no worthy action be uncommemorated, and to hold the reprobation of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds." Yet Tacitus was unrivaled among antique historians as a character-painter and a narrator of crises and dramatic events. As a scientific historian, however, he cannot be said in any way to approach the best of present-day writers on the subject.

Inadequate as was the historiography of pagan antiquity, that of the Patristic age was infinitely worse. "There is no more momentous revolution in the history of thought than this, in which the achievements of thinkers and workers, of artists, philosophers, poets, and statesmen, were given up for the revelation of prophets and a gospel of worldly renunciation." Among the new elements introduced by Christianity which degraded history were the all-absorbing interest in eschatology, the reliance upon faith rather than verifiable truth, the wide acceptance of allegory, the unchastened belief in miracles, the grotesque and unique importance assigned to Jewish and Christian history and the sharp differentiation between sacred and secular history, and the sanctification of a definite but absurd chronology. Eusebius, the systematic Patristic historian, exhibited most of these weaknesses, yet his work was relatively one of "scholarly accuracy combined with great learning," and embodied many precious documents which exist to-day only by virtue of their inclusion in his *Church History*.

Not only is Professor Shotwell's work one of high scholarship and interpretative profundity, but it is also admirably written, and the stylistic effort rarely demands a sacrifice of accuracy. The only regret that the reader or the student of history will have in closing the book is that the other volumes will not follow in rapid succession.

IV. THE EVOLUTION OF METROPOLITAN ECONOMY ⁷

While economic history has been one of the most fruitful of all the various phases of historical enterprise during the last half century, it has been developed under rather definite and serious limitations. For the most part, economic historians have shown

⁷ From the *New Republic*, May 23, 1923.

admirable capacity to investigate and narrate in a scholarly fashion the detailed aspects of the development of a particular phase of a given economic system, but have rarely exhibited any evidence of ability to work out a synthesis of economic and social development in any given stage or type of economic evolution or to trace the genetic connection between successive socio-economic systems. This has been due in part to the fact that they have been too respectable and God-fearing to work on any hypothesis which savors so much of socialism and materialism as the economic interpretation of history, and still more to the fact that only in a few instances have they had that indispensable training in sociology which would have enabled them to work out the relation between the economic and other factors in society and to trace the genesis and mutations of economic and social systems.

The previous publications of Professor Gras on *The Evolution of the English Corn Market* and *The Early English Customs System* well illustrated the work of the conventional economic historian at its best—scholarly but highly specialized and only in part linked up with the general problems of the prevailing socio-economic order. But many of his friends knew that he possessed wider training and interests than these works indicated; in fact, that he had no little appreciation and no mean knowledge of sociology. As concrete proof of this he has now produced an illuminating series of chapter-essays on the economic evolution of western society, describing typical phases of industrial and social development.⁸ It is, strictly speaking, an excursus into genetic economics, rather than what is conventionally known as economic history.

Professor Gras distinguishes some five chief stages in the development of the European economy. The first was the primitive "collectional economy" in which peoples "supplied all their needs by appropriating what nature had provided in the immediate district." The next was "cultural nomadic economy" which was "distinguished by a combination of three practices, continuing to collect, roaming about, and cultivating systematically a large part of the things which they needed." This age ushered in the so-called "historic" period. Third in order was the "settled village economy." This was reached "when residence in one spot is continuous from season to season, and is ostensibly permanent from

⁸ *An introduction to Economic History*. By N. S. B. Gras. New York: Harper & Brothers.

year to year, when no change is contemplated, or is a part of the regular order of events." In its developed form in western Europe this has been known as the era of the manorial economy. The village economy was of two successive types—the free village and the dependent village.

In the free village no nobleman, no bishop, no monastery claimed a whole village as exclusive property. Political chiefs existed and to these the villagers owed allegiance, but there was no feudal nobility, no class of landed aristocracy collecting rents and demanding services from the whole village. In the second phase, such aristocracy did exist and, indeed, when the phase was well developed, there was no land, no village, without a lord.

The fourth type of economy was the "town economy" or "the organization of many villages and one town, so as to constitute a single economic unit." Contrary to a widely prevalent belief, the basic function and characteristic feature of the town was its trading ascendancy and not its specialization in manufacturing. The most original aspect of Professor Gras's classification of the stages of economic evolution appears in his characterization of the fifth type of economy—the "metropolitan."

We may think of metropolitan economy as an organization of people having a large city as its nucleus, just as a town economy had a town as its centre. Or we may put it this way, metropolitan economy is the organization of producers and consumers mutually dependent for goods and services, wherein their wants are supplied by a system of exchange concentrated in a large city which is the focus of local trade and the centre through which normal economic relations with the outside are established and maintained.

The modern economy is, thus, according to Professor Gras, not a national economy in matters pertaining to production and exchange, but a metropolitan economy, though the national state may still be regarded as the unit of economic administration. The rise of this metropolitan economy is traced in an illuminating manner through its commercial origins, the revolution in the technique of manufacturing, the development of new modes of transportation and the evolution of the modern financial and credit organization. This chapter is one of the best of the brief surveys of the rise of modern industrialism known to the reviewer. In itself alone it justifies the appearance of the book. It would seem that

Professor Gras has adequately established his thesis as to the fundamental nature of the metropolitan economy and has amplified, if not introduced, an epoch-making contribution to the analysis and terminology of economic history. It severely challenges the nationalistic interpretation of List, Schmoller, Bücher, Ashley and others, and represents an economic critique of the nationalistic bias somewhat akin to pluralism in political theory and to functionalism and regionalism in social theory. We may well hope that Professor Gras will follow this introductory treatise with a series of substantial volumes elaborating his suggestive treatment of economic evolution.

Only a few critical comments seem necessary to the reviewer. Professor Gras appears to have little or no acquaintance with the literature of the newer critical anthropology, and his earlier chapters distinctly suffer from having missed such indispensable material as Boas's analysis of the economic life of the Kwakiutl Indians or the work of Wissler on the industrial operations of the American Indians. There is also at times a little more than a safe and cautious use of the comparative method. Again, he adheres to the "stage" theory of history which has been expounded by Morgan in anthropology, Roscher and his associates in economics, and Lamprecht and Breysig in history. While illuminating in many ways this method of presenting material development is somewhat artificial and over-simplified. What Professor Gras describes might, perhaps, best be denominated "types" rather than "stages" of economic evolution. Finally, it must be admitted that the book is in form and content a series of admirable essays on certain typical phases of industrial development rather than a coherent and well-articulated introduction to economic history.

V. THE NEW AMERICAN HISTORY⁹

"History," a distinguished historian has recently said, "may mean either the record of events or the events themselves." It is more or less generally realized that, in the sense of events, American history has made enormous progress since 1865, so that Lincoln would be less at home in the Chicago of to-day than in medieval London. It is not by any means as widely comprehended that, with respect to history as a *record* of events, equally revolutionary progress has been made. It is for the purpose of impressing the

⁹ From the *New Republic*, July 26, 1922.

latter fact upon the intelligent public and the teaching profession that Professor Schlesinger has prepared his admirable summary exposition of some of the major phases of the achievements of scholarly historians of the present generation in constructing a dynamic analysis of the evolution of American civilization. A few years ago Professor Max Farrand, in his brief but penetrating work on *The Development of the United States*, surveyed the history of our country on the basis of the newer scholarship and interpretations, but the aim of this work made it rather difficult to concentrate upon specific results of the improvements in American historiography. In this way Professor Schlesinger's work supplements that of Professor Farrand, and the two combined constitute the best introduction to the revised American history for both the educated public and the progressive and conscientious teacher.

The significance of the revolution in historical scholarship which is revealed in the present work can, perhaps, best be indicated by contrasting it with the accepted epic of the genesis and mission of the United States, as it has been formulated by our major literary historians and by the first generation of American academic historians. The American epic was formulated under the guidance of a combination of two long since discredited Germanic and Anglo-Saxon dogmas—the conception of history as past politics and as a dramatic unfolding of the mission of the *Weltgeist* and of national destiny. The culture and institutions of the Germanic-Anglo-Saxon-American peoples were believed to be but an elaboration and further development of the Aryan culture of our Indo-Germanic ancestors. The first important event in American history was the battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 A. D., in which our Germanic predecessors began their historic task of hurling back the effete and decadent Romans. Human liberty was born in the democratic Teutonic folkmoot, and was cherished and nourished along solely by Germanic peoples on the Continent and in the British Isles, being occasionally specifically manifested and embodied in such documents as the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, and finally transplanted to this country in the New England town-meeting and the Federal Constitution. Fleeing from European tyranny our colonial forefathers established a polity in which every form of human liberty flourished. After a century of democratic experiments they arose in virtuous indignation to defend the principles of "law and order" against "the revolutionary tyranny of a

German king." This done, they established a central government and provided liberty with a permanent domicile through the production of "the greatest work that was ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."

The spirit of liberty and democracy was still further extended until, in Jackson's time, there came in the democratic wave of the "thirties" "the culmination of God's wonder-working in the life of mankind." Carried on by the beneficent ideal of manifest destiny we brought within the fold of civilization the Louisiana territory, Florida, the great Southwest, and the Oregon territory. Then the North, under divine instigation and guidance, crushed the demon of slavery, subdued the rebellious South, and preserved the Union, thus both completing the second great crusade for liberty and vindicating our Teutonic heritage of political capacity. These same groups who had won the Civil War immediately resisted the pusillanimity, if not treasonable leniency, of President Johnson, abolished racial distinctions, made liberty the heritage of the human race, and gave the Negroes full rights of citizenship under the fourteenth amendment, which deserves to rank with the Declaration of Independence as a charter of American liberties.

Under wise and "constructive" Republican rule we have since developed maturity and mellowness, culminating in the ascendancy of those "Christian men to whom God, in his infinite wisdom, has given the control of the property interests of the country," prosperity for the farmer, the "full dinner-pail" for the laborer, and the magnanimous extension of the liberal American dispensation to the benighted and barbarous peoples of the West Indies, Central America and the Islands of the Pacific. These noble achievements were the work of the male sex alone, the female existing solely to forward generation and nutrition, for historians as well as husbands during this period conceived of the rôle and place of woman according to a strict adherence to the Old Testament-Pauline-Augustinian view-point. Nor was our national record stained or sullied in the slightest degree by considerations of material interest; only spiritual and moral causes were operative in bringing to fruition our divinely designed and approved destiny.

The patient research and courageous expository writings of such historians as Andrews, Osgood, Fisher, Farrand, Beard, Libby, Turner, Schlesinger, Alvord, Justin Smith, Dodd, Becker, Paxson and many others of their type have assailed and demolished this epic at every point, and Professor Schlesinger, by

setting forth only their more notable achievements, has clearly and vividly demonstrated how great a revision of the conventional views is necessary, if we are to have anything approaching an accurate notion of our national development.¹⁰ Our history can by no means be restricted to a record of political and military development. The most notable American achievements have been non-political in character. There is no ground whatever for an Aryan, Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon myth as the racial basis of American development. An unprecedented volume of immigration and a unique degree of racial mixture is the most striking fact about the biological and racial basis of American culture. Nor is our history an epic representing the mystic unfolding of the American manifestation of the *Weltgeist*, but rather the record of the building up of a modern civilization in a new land—a process severely conditioned by such geographic factors as separation from Europe and the topography of the frontier, and dependent upon technological and economic progress in Europe, as well as in the United States. With the exception of the confusion of the Revolutionary period and the epoch of Jackson, there has been no reasonable approximation to democracy in this country—the successive systems of dominant socio-political types having been antique aristocracy, slavocracy and plutocracy. While all of the great constructive achievements of our history were the products of the representatives of the radicalism of their day, their work was not highly esteemed or eulogized until the forward march of historic events had left them far behind as seeming conservatives, to be canonized by the “stand-patters” of a later age. In this manner there developed the legend of “constructive conservatism.” In the dynamic and dramatic story of American development the achievements of our women demand decent place and consideration, for they have borne the major hardships and been denied the compensation of public recognition of their contributions. Finally, the tendency to regard the colonial, revolutionary, constitution-making and abolitionist periods as a heroic age, with the resulting assignment of most of the space and attention in historical teaching and writing to these eras, has led students of American history to overlook the fact that the most significant period of our history, with respect to its bearing upon the explanation of contemporary conditions and problems, is that since

¹⁰ *New Viewpoints in American History*. By Arthur Meier Schlesinger. New York: The Macmillan Company.

the Civil War. The economic revolution, including the industrial revolution, the extension of transportation facilities, and the completion of western settlement, has brought about a new era of civilization. Not only have our economic and social institutions been completely revolutionized, but also the chief political, constitutional and international issues have been either created or very strictly conditioned by the economic changes of the last half century.

The newer scholarship is not less destructive of the older views when its results are considered with respect to specific periods and phases of our development. Discovery and colonization were motivated quite as much by economic ambitions as by religious or political aspirations. The American Revolution must be interpreted as the result of the economic reaction of various classes to the new British imperial policy. The great seaboard merchants, while not desiring open warfare, hoped to intimidate the British statesmen by a show of opposition, and encouraged the rabble of the port towns in their rioting and harangues. Ultimately they found themselves unable to stem the movement they had set in motion. The landlords of the southern tidewater district, overwhelmingly in debt to British merchants, looked upon independence as perhaps the only way in which they could escape from the octopus of perpetual indebtedness. The frontiersmen were irritated by the ban upon occupation of the lands west of the Alleghenies. These classes, so diverse in nature and derivation, united in opposition to Great Britain and the social, political and intellectual aristocracy of the colonial period—the so-called Loyalists. The Federal Constitution was a practical document drawn up by representatives of the class of property-owners, security-holders, speculators in western lands, merchants and bankers, who wisely desired to escape from the economic and fiscal chaos of the government under the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution was opposed by the debtors, chiefly from the agricultural districts, who, in Hamilton's words, "did not wish to see a government established, one object of which will be to restrain the means of cheating creditors." Jacksonian democracy was neither a divine dispensation nor the product of personal or partisan depravity and perversity. It grew out of the frontier experiences, which rested upon an observed equality of men, and out of the reaction of the industrial proletariat against their oppressive treatment in the new factories of the east. The dogma of states-rights has

not exhibited the pattern of a moral and constitutional principle rigidly adhered to by any particular section or party, but has been an opportunist policy followed by almost every state in the union at different times when "economic interest or some other local advantage" has made the doctrine of state-sovereignty one which could be appealed to with profit. "Political parties have been almost as variable in this respect as the states." The history of political parties in the United States since 1865 well illustrates the sociological principle of the frequent triumph of organization and machinery over principles and issues. Neither party has taken any vital or constructive stand towards the issues of the contemporary era or maintained any position whatever in a consistent manner. The only significant issue between the major parties is the spoils of office. The difference in their policy is one of degree only, namely, that, on the whole, since 1865, the Democratic party has been slightly more solicitous of the welfare of the common man.

This is, in brief outline, the picture of some of the newer interpretations of American history which Professor Schlesinger draws in language distinguished alike for clarity and moderation of tone. The only regret that the reviewer would desire to express is that the newer viewpoints on several other vital phases of American history, such as the history of the fourteenth amendment since 1866 or the possible correlation between economic interests and the majority decisions of the United States Supreme Court, were not included, and that the chapters on biological, geographic and economic factors were not supplemented by one indicating the importance of psychological and cultural elements. Perhaps the author will favor us with these in a second edition.

One may distinguish some four main stages in the development of the historiography of this country in the last century. The first stage was characterized by the literary and epic historians, such as Bancroft, writing under a strong subjective, theological and nationalistic bias, with the content of their works chiefly political, military and diplomatic episodes. The next was the severely critical and highly objective political history, such as is exemplified by the writings of Henry Adams, James Schouler,

¹¹ From the *New Republic*, September 13, 1922.

J. W. Burgess and J. F. Rhodes, which reached its highest and best expression in the history of the colonial period by H. L. Osgood. The third was the production of the rapidly flowing and descriptive narrative of social history, in which the political, military and diplomatic episodes and anecdotes were not allowed to crowd out the narration of cultural, economic and social conditions and developments. Of this type of work the great example is J. B. McMaster's *History of the People of the United States*. The fourth stage may be called that of sociological history, though many of those who have contributed works of this type would probably deny any formal knowledge or approval of systematic sociology. In this form of history the writers have not been content to narrate in parallel chapters accounts of political, diplomatic, social and economic events, but have attempted to show the interrelation of the various causative factors operating in human society, and to indicate the manner in which the political, military and diplomatic history has reflected the influence of the deeper and more profound technological, economic and social forces. While this school has as yet produced no monumental and comprehensive work, harbingers in the way of preliminary monographs have appeared from the pens of such writers as C. M. Andrews, F. J. Turner, C. A. Beard, C. W. Alvord, A. M. Schlesinger, Carl Becker and W. E. Dodd. The great task of the next generation will be a sociological synthesis of American development.

As a former student, an avowed disciple and the continuator of Professor McMaster, Dr. Oberholtzer has brought out a work which falls within the third category of the types of American historical writing.¹² In the reviewer's opinion the two volumes which have thus far appeared mark about the highest level to which this sort of historical work can attain. The work is objective, reliable and well-documented. It is, if anything, more brilliantly and vividly written than McMaster's work, and that is certainly high praise. The chief query which is likely to occur to the reader is how the period is to be adequately treated in a work announced to be of five volumes, when the first two cover but six years. If the treatment is as detailed in the succeeding volumes, the fifth volume will close with the inauguration of Garfield.

The present volume deals with the period from 1868 to 1872,

¹² *A History of the United States Since the Civil War*. By Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer. (In Five Volumes.) Vol. II: 1868-72. New York: The Macmillan Company.

that interesting, if disheartening, epoch which culminated in what Professor Dunning has well denominated "the nadir of national disgrace." Dr. Oberholtzer had earlier established his reputation as a specialist in the history of these years by his voluminous biography of Jay Cooke. The work opens with a vivid chapter describing the "Carpet-bagger" régime in the South and the methods and results of "Radical" reconstruction. Next come chapters on the impeachment of President Johnson and the campaign of 1868. Then the political history of Grant's first administration is recounted. The activities and suppression of the Ku Klux Klan are next described. Turning to diplomatic history, the author narrates the history and settlement of the Alabama claims. He then devotes a chapter to the rapid development of the far west, the extension of the railroads, the Isthmian canal projects and the diplomacy involved in the relations of the United States with the far east. The work closes with a brilliant chapter on the unprecedented public and private corruption of the newly created plutocracy.

Space will allow comment only upon the manner in which Dr. Oberholtzer has handled some of the more significant and controverted events and episodes which fall within this period. On the whole, he has maintained a fine objectivity and has not been a victim of either sectional or patriotic bias. In treating the methods of reconstruction in the South under Radical domination he is not slow to condemn the vicious and deplorable activities of "Carpet-baggers," "Scalawags" and "Galvanized Yankees," and to indicate the disastrous results of the failure to carry out the wise and moderate policy of Lincoln and Johnson. The lethargy, obtuseness and culpability of the North is not left unnoticed. "The greater the scoundrel (among Carpet-baggers and Scalawags) the more intense was his loyalty and the higher did he seem to stand in the favor of the Northern Radicals." While not by any means attempting to excuse the violence of the Ku Klux Klan (e. g. pp. 352-4), he makes it clear that the real responsibility for the existence and activities of this organization must be laid at the door of the Northern fanatics.

In describing the notorious impeachment trial of President Johnson he is fair to this much maligned person, whom he pronounces "a President whose honesty none can fairly impugn, and whose devotion to the Constitution, as he understood its letter and purpose, no magistrate has ever surpassed." While in his earlier

volume he had fully recognized the personal indiscretions of Johnson and his temperamental unfitness for the office, he here contrasts his dignity and that of his counsel with the outrageous conduct of the Radicals, led by the "vituperative demagogue," Thaddeus Stevens, and "that eminent ruffian" Ben Butler, "whose whole person breathed contention and effrontery," and whose tirades during the trial were "perhaps the most distasteful and unfitting ever delivered in a court of justice." In no other history has the preposterous nature of this culmination of sinister Radical political intrigue been more clearly revealed.

Grant's career as President is examined with a candid scrutiny peculiarly disconcerting for the year of his centenary. His utter unfitness for the position, his nepotism and favoritism, his vindictiveness and his naïveté and ignorance are revealed in detail with a just but damaging frankness. After reading these chapters some, though certainly not the present writer, would even thank God for Mr. Harding or Mr. Coolidge.

It is in the last chapter, however, that the author's fearlessness is best exhibited in setting forth the degradation of public and private morality in the realm of politics, business and finance during the reconstruction period. Dr. Oberholtzer draws a graphic picture of

Durant, living in exotic grandeur in New York, made rich out of the Union Pacific; a half dozen men who, as by a magician's wand, were flourishing on the profits which came from building the Central Pacific, now rearing themselves splendid palaces in Sacramento and San Francisco; "Commodore" Vanderbilt and Daniel Drew, who with so much advertisement of their movements robbed each other and other men in "corners" in Wall Street; James Fisk, Jr., and Jay Gould, whose morals in connection with the Erie Railway were as low as any thief's; William M. Tweed and his confederates in the Tammany "Ring" who were stealing the whole city of New York under the very eyes of the population; the infamous nomads who under the name of "Reconstruction" were carrying booty out of the stricken South, and a host who followed such example and whose only God was Mammon, had come, so it appeared, to control the life of the country.

In analyzing the notorious Crédit Mobilier episode Dr. Oberholtzer makes out a pretty satisfactory case for the allegation that Oakes Ames was but the "goat," much less culpable personally than many who voted for his "absolute condemnation." Indeed, he

holds that Ames's transactions were constructive and praiseworthy by comparison with Blaine's conduct with respect to the Little Rock and Fort Smith railroad, while he was Speaker of the House.

All in all, this is a book which will not only be helpful to scholars but exceedingly interesting to the intelligent public. From the two volumes which have thus far been published the latter may obtain the most vivid and illuminating account of the stirring years just following the Civil War which has yet appeared, and may be relieved of a number of misleading myths about this period which still linger in our Northern and *bourgeois* consciousness.

VII. RESPECTABLE HISTORY¹⁸

"In the consensus of learned people, Thucydides and Tacitus stand at the head of historians. . . . Thucydides and Tacitus are superior to the historians who have written in our century, because, by long reflection and studious method, they have better digested their materials and compressed their narrative." Thus spoke (on December 27, 1899) the president of the American Historical Association, a man who fifteen years earlier had retired from active business as an Ohio ironmaster, and who by devotion to literary effort in the field of history had secured for himself the highest formal honor within the reach of an American historian. Such views on historiography and such a professional achievement must evoke no little curiosity as to the personality and training involved.

James Ford Rhodes was born in Cleveland in 1848. After an incomplete collegiate education in this country, he went to Europe and secured intensive technical training, particularly in metallurgy, together with some little experience in journalism. Returning to the United States he entered his father's iron manufacturing business, amassed a comfortable fortune by 1885, retired and applied himself to the production of the most ambitious history of our country since 1850 which has yet appeared. While Thucydides and Tacitus were his models as to style and content, he possessed that personal knowledge of public men and affairs which Polybius had insisted was the chief prerequisite of the successful historian, and he followed the precedent of Sallust in utilizing his pecuniary

¹⁸ From the *New Republic*, February 28, 1923.

means to secure competent research assistance. With the efficient aid of men like D. M. Matteson he brought out his seven impressive volumes on the *History of the United States, 1850-1877*, between 1893 and 1906. There the work rested. In the preface to Volume VI he justified in the following manner his intention to end his work with the year 1877:

With the subsidence of the Southern issue, other social questions have arisen, the inception of which, or the progress of which may well be studied from 1877 on. To write purely a narrative history from 1871 to 1885 or to 1897 would be to shirk a duty and to miss the significance of the period; and, for attacking the social questions involved, I feel as yet a lack of basic knowledge. Nineteen years' almost exclusive devotion to the study of one period of American history has had the tendency to narrow my field of vision.

Then he may have remembered what so many other admirers of Thucydides and Tacitus seem never to have comprehended, namely, that both wrote almost solely of their own generation. At any rate, he gained fresh courage, and, after a long interval of thirteen years, a survey of the period from Hayes to Cleveland appeared in 1919. As Professor Beard pointed out in a brilliant review (*New Republic*, December 17, 1919), there was no evidence that Mr. Rhodes had remedied his lack of "basic knowledge" of social and economic history or that his "field of vision" had become any less narrow. Three years later the narrative has been continued through Roosevelt's administrations.¹⁴ Many will hope that the distinguished author will be spared to complete his story through the period of the World War.

Mr. Rhodes was equipped for his ambitious task with unquestionable integrity and honesty of purpose, a powerful intellect, dignity of expression, and, especially in his later volumes, an extensive personal knowledge of the events and figures described. As compared with contemporary academic historians, who had been prepared in the seminars of Ranke, Droysen, Waitz and Monod, or in the *École des Chartes*, Mr. Rhodes was almost completely defective in the matter of severe training in historical methodology, and seriously lacking in his mastery of the general literature of historiography. No man possessing a thorough ac-

¹⁴ *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909*. By James Ford Rhodes. New York: The Macmillan Company.

quaintance with the development of historical writing could well have prepared the above mentioned presidential address.

As to content and method Mr. Rhodes, like Henry Adams, his distinguished contemporary, followed the precedent of the great literary and episodal historians in treating chiefly of public events—political campaigns, congressional crises, military strategy and diplomatic manoeuvres—all interpreted as the outcome of the activity of highly individualized and unique personal agents very imperfectly and inadequately placed in their economic and social background. His advance over the earlier literary and nationalistic historians lay in the greater degree of objectivity and the relative lack of national, sectional or partisan bias which characterized his history. While political history, it was chiefly biographical, episodal and anecdotal rather than the institutional political history, such as is to be found in Professor Osgood's work on the colonial period, and which marks the highest possible development of purely political history. Further, there is no evidence that Mr. Rhodes ever thoroughly grasped the real significance of American history since 1850, and particularly since 1865. The sweeping economic transformation, which completely revolutionized American civilization during the period which he has made his own, is nowhere clearly presented in his work. In general, his figures might well have functioned in any preceding age of American or universal history. Neither by a dramatic type of descriptive social history, as with McMaster, Oberholtzer and Paxson, nor by a more penetrating economic and sociological analysis, as with Beard, Turner, Dewey, Lingley and others, does Mr. Rhodes synthesize or interpret the evolution of American society and culture in the last three-quarters of a century.

Mr. Rhodes has acquired a marked reputation for impartiality, but this is an impartiality only with respect to controverted partisan and sectional issues, and was built up chiefly because of the fact that he was the first important Northern historian of the period of Civil War and Reconstruction who dealt fairly with the South, and indicated the excesses of the Abolitionists and the so-called congressional "Radicals." Some critics have suggested that even this type of impartiality is not as evident in Mr. Rhodes's later volumes as in the earlier part of his work, his point of view having been gradually adjusted to his Cambridge (Massachusetts) environment. Yet, the most important issues of the period since 1865

were not connected with the military or political aspects of the Civil War and its aftermath, but were economic and social. In this range of problems Mr. Rhodes cannot be said to be impartial. His work has been constructed on the basis of as definite an economic philosophy and as fixed a set of social pre-conceptions as Gustavus Myers's *History of the Supreme Court* or A. M. Simons's *Social Forces in American History*. Mr. Rhodes writes from the standpoint of a Cleveland Democrat, with the social philosophy of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, and the economic doctrines of Cobden. He apparently believes with Henry Cabot Lodge in the efficacy of "natural forces" in the solution of modern economic and social problems. This outlook, in at least a sub-conscious manner, colors all his judgments on such matters, and, to no small extent, has determined his selection of material. Further, impartiality is not objectivity. Mr. Rhodes is not objective, but apparently holds with Tacitus that an important function of the historian is to pass severe moral judgments upon his characters.

The present volume does not differ in any important way from its predecessors, unless it be that for these years Mr. Rhodes's own personal acquaintanceship and contacts furnish an even more interesting and substantial basis for his narrative and estimates than could well be the case in regard to most of the earlier volumes. It furnishes something of a thrill to realize that one is reading a history written by the brother-in-law and business partner of the man who made McKinley president and did his best to prevent Roosevelt from being nominated as vice-president. National politics, military campaigns and diplomatic problems and achievements occupy at least three-quarters of the space. The remainder is taken up chiefly with estimates of leading personalities. In his choice of prominent characters there is little to mar the æsthetic symmetry of the most eminent respectability. Mark Hanna, McKinley, Hay, Roosevelt, Root, Lodge, Taft, J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie are "the giants who moved in the land." There is no attempt to portray the Bryan of 1896 and 1900 as the leader of a great section of American opinion and aspiration; La Follette is not once referred to in the volume; the "Muckrakers" appear only indirectly in a speech by Roosevelt condemning their activities and methods; and one has a sure intuition that it would be futile to consult the index for Debs. *Lockner vs. New York*, probably a more important case than that of

Dred Scott, is not mentioned. In Mr. Rhodes's estimates of personalities there is a ponderous seriousness and an air of finality which leads the reader to suspect that he not only believes that historians of a century hence will turn to his pages for the definitive characterization of these individuals, but that he is also certain that St. Peter will rely to no small degree upon these judgments at the "Great Assize."

The reader gets from the volume little or no inkling of the tremendous economic and social conflict that was smoldering and preparing from 1895 to 1908. Even the secondary political reflections of this impending struggle are not adequately indicated. The weaknesses of the work in these respects can best be understood by comparing it with the remarkable account in Beard's *Contemporary American History*. The startling economic abuses which Roosevelt recognized and endeavored at least partially to arrest are minimized or omitted, and the "malefactors of great wealth" appear in immaculate dress in the midst of books, libraries and art museums, and we have oft-reiterated assurance of their uprightness, moral soundness and conspicuous public-spiritedness. As to Roosevelt, while most progressive historians have come to agree with Professor Morison that "as his administration recedes into history, one finds that it produced more noise than results," in Mr. Rhodes's estimate of his policies one gets, even if very gently suggested, the picture of the man who initiated "the raid on prosperity." How far Mr. Rhodes's intimacy with Hanna is responsible for this it is impossible to say. In discussing even the timid effort to extend governmental power in the Hepburn Rate Act of 1906, Mr. Rhodes rises to almost dithyrambic praise of one of the most anachronistic speeches of Henry Cabot Lodge, in which the Senator from Massachusetts expressed himself as thoroughly in accord with the Spencerian philosophy as to the potency of "natural forces" to solve our economic problems, and easily divined the diabolic origin of the rate-fixing proposal, to say nothing of government ownership. It is evident that Mr. Rhodes has not been greatly affected by the estimates of E. G. Lowry or the *Mirrors of Washington* in framing his characterization of Mr. Lodge.

At the same time, the book is not without its excellent qualities. Mr. Rhodes has made good use of Croly's *Mark Hanna* to dispel the persistent tradition that this gentleman was an unspeakable corruptionist. Doubtless, the fact that he was his brother-in-law

does not make Mr. Rhodes any less happy to accept this rather favorable estimate of the qualities of Marcus Alonzo. His summaries of the achievements, and his estimates of the characters of the leading capitalists, while obviously partisan, are valuable as a corrective of the equally one-sided picture drawn by the "Muck-rakers." The chapters on diplomatic history are particularly full and judicious, though even here there is no presentation of the deeper forces and currents which one finds so admirably analyzed in Weyl's *American World Policies*. Still, Mr. Rhodes does not attempt to whitewash questionable American acts and policies. He reveals McKinley's weakness and duplicity in concealing the Spanish reply to the American ultimatum, and concludes that "we may rest assured that if Mark Hanna had been President there would have been no war with Spain." While sharing the normal American pride with respect to the Panama Canal, he concludes that "Roosevelt had better have exerted the virtue of patience." The high light of humor in the book, while probably unconscious on the part of both Mr. Rhodes and McKinley, is to be found in the description of the specific expression of the will and desires of the Almighty upon American colonial policy, as revealed to President McKinley in his hesitation over the disposition of the Philippines:

"... I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly.

In conclusion, aside from a lack of a distinguished style, it may safely be held that traditional and respectable history is not likely to advance far beyond the standards set by Mr. Rhodes. Though we

may not approve of its premises or results to the full, Americans may well be proud of the fact that they have had a James Ford Rhodes, and that in 1885 he decided to turn aside from a possible emulation of H. C. Frick or Mark Hanna into the cultivation of the history of the period almost exactly synchronous with the limits of his own life. No man has lived through a more interesting age, and if Mr. Rhodes has largely failed to see it in its proper perspective or to grasp its major contributions, he has at least given us valuable descriptions of striking personalities, dramatic crises and interesting episodes.

VIII. WAR HYSTERIA AND NATIONALISTIC BIAS¹⁵

While other goddesses and muses have doubtless wilfully and brazenly executed more voluntary amorous achievements and episodes than Clio, it will hardly be denied that the latter has been compelled to bestow her favors unwillingly and under protest far more frequently than any of her more fortunate sisters. Her purity has been sacrificed innumerable times in the interest of state, party, religion, and family throughout the ages since the Hebrew Jahvists of the ninth century before Christ performed the obstetric services that secured her parturition from folk-lore and mythology. Her fair form has been ravished by compensatory Jewish exaggerators of the wealth and prestige of ancient Israel, by Greeks boasting of their superiority over oriental "barbarians," by patriotic protagonists of the Roman republic, and soured critics of imperial developments and policies, by pious but prevaricating Church Fathers, by apologists of Guelphs and proponents of Ghibellines, by Papist and Lutheran, by Prussian and Gallican, by Anglo-Saxon and Hibernian, by Whig and Tory, Republican and Democrat. No race, state, party, creed or sect has failed to avail itself of her helpless condition and defenseless situation. But she has weathered these indignities of millenniums, gathered an ever-increasing body of more worthy devotees, and, at the opening of the twentieth century, appeared far more coy and seductive than when, in short dresses, she was ogled by the Greek *logographoi* of the seventh century before our era. While the World War caused her to fall from grace and indulge in the dizziest and wildest debauch of her entire career, she gradually gave evidence of penitence and contrition, regained poise and respect-

¹⁵ From the *New Republic*, March 19, 1924.

ability, and seems now well on the way to secure the devoted and untiring attention of the most ardent and competent group of admirers of whom she has ever boasted, most of them determined that hereafter her amours shall be only voluntarily bestowed solely on those whose offerings at her shrine merit her attention and gratitude.

Of all the influences which have assailed Clio's integrity and diverted her from the path of rectitude the most powerful has been war. The classic examples usually selected by teachers of historical method to illustrate the prejudices and biases of historians have been the accounts of the great conflicts of the ages. Herd impulse in the face of a crisis appears to have been the most potent of all unbalancing factors. The enormous progress of historical scholarship and objectivity between the Franco-Prussian War and 1914, however, inclined many to the hope that in the event of another calamity of this sort, the historian's poise and professional serenity and pride would triumph over state, nation and party. This aspiration and supposition was cruelly and roughly wrecked by the onset of the World War. In every country the greatest of historians behaved like clerks or shopmen in the capitulation to herd pressure and hysteria. The example was set by Eduard Meyer, by common consent the greatest of living historians, but he had a great flock of worthy imitators in every modern state.

Still many hoped that with a cessation of hostilities objectivity would return, and their aspirations have in some degree been realized. A number of historians have shown a laudable desire to know the truth about the origins of the War and have made real progress in this direction, aided by the unprecedentedly rapid revelation and publication of the pertinent documents. But the progress in making the facts known to any large body of readers through general manuals summarizing the conclusions of technical monographs has been slow. Until success in this matter is achieved, however, we shall continue to harbor the myths and delusions that were current in 1917-18, will fail to recognize the futility and needlessness of the horrible tragedy of 1914-18, and will be fatally handicapped in any concrete and intelligent effort to prevent a recurrence of such a cataclysm. Hence the historian who essays to inform his countrymen concerning the origins of the War assumes a heavy and serious responsibility of the highest educative and moral significance. The dangers inherent in a fail-

ure can perhaps best be realized by an analysis of a concrete example, and we are fortunate in having just been presented with the most pretentious manual on modern European history which has yet been published in English, one which is bound to be accorded a wide and varied acceptance and adoption, and will doubtless help to shape the historical opinions of several hundred thousand citizens of the United States concerning the most absorbing, if gruesome, topic in modern history, and the new order which is beginning to arise out of it.

The author of this work ¹⁶ is the successor of William Milligan Sloane in the chair of Modern European History at Columbia University, a *Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur*, and Professor in the University of Strasbourg in 1920-22. He has been a notable producer of books in his field. In 1897 he brought out an interesting and suggestive work on *Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution*. Twelve years later appeared his most important work, *Europe Since 1815*, a comprehensive college textbook. This was condensed and an introductory section on the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era prefixed to constitute his *Modern European History*, which was published in 1917. The introductory portion also appeared separately this same year in an edition de luxe as *The French Revolution and Napoleon*. He also brought out in 1917 a snappy little volume on *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule*. In 1919 he published the sections in his *Modern European History* on the period since 1870, together with an additional chapter on the World War, as *Fifty Years of Europe*. This chapter on the War was later appended to the *Modern European History*, which, with some other minor additions, appeared in 1920 as *Modern Europe*. The present work is an extension of the original edition of the *Europe Since 1815* to include the material from the *Modern Europe* on the period from 1909 to 1919, and much additional information on Europe since 1919, which is far the most notable phase of the revision. In addition to these works, Professor Hazen has edited several valuable compilations including one on the *Kaiser versus Bismarck*. While dealing with all the major states of modern Europe, Professor Hazen's chief interest has been in the history of England and France, particularly the latter. So warmly has Professor Hazen espoused the cause of France that one commentator has remarked that his series might

¹⁶ *Europe Since 1815*. By Charles Downer Hazen, Ph.D., two volumes. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

well be called, reminiscent of Orosius, *Historiarum Adversum Germanos Libri Septem*.

Of these books the *Europe Since 1815* has been much the most significant and serviceable. It combined a discriminating selection of material previously available in English only in such voluminous and somewhat tedious manuals as those by Fyffe, Seignobos, Andrews and Rose with clarity and an easy familiarity of expression, and constituted a well-nigh ideal textbook on the internal political history of Europe during the last century. Written fifteen years ago, when respectable historians in Europe and America stated explicitly or implied by the organization of courses in their departments that pertinent, relevant and reliable European history ceased upon the landing of Napoleon at St. Helena, the book was something of a pioneer and a salutary historical therapeutic. It proved an unmitigated blessing to the few original and independent history teachers who quite rightly perceived that, for an understanding of contemporary European politics, the history of Europe since Waterloo is more significant than the record of events from Sargon of Agade to the Duke of Wellington. It was, of course, almost wholly narrative political history, and since 1909 the synthetic tendency and the interest in economic, social and intellectual history, as evidenced in this field by Beard, Fueter, Hayes, Ogg, Schapiro, and others, have rendered Professor Hazen's outlook somewhat antiquated. But there will always remain a place for political history, and there is no evidence that Professor Hazen's book is likely to be displaced as a text in this field on the period before 1914 by anything now available or on the horizon.

We shall not attempt a detailed summarization and estimate of the contents of the original book, which is itself now a matter of history, but some brief comment may be made on the nature of the revision. Professor Hazen gives evidence of the effect of infection from contagious contact with Professors Shotwell, Beard and Hayes at Columbia, and of a recognition of the general shift of historical interests in the last generation, by adding new chapters on the Industrial Revolution and the development of modern social reform programs. There is, however, little attempt to work out a synthesis of economic, social and political factors and influences, and the book still remains primarily a treatment of political and diplomatic history rather than a synthetic effort like that of his colleague Professor Hayes. Beyond bringing the material down

to 1923, there is little change in the chapters as originally published in 1909. The chief alterations consist in making somewhat more evident, *ex post facto*, the German menace to the world from 1890 to 1914. He has made use of his crisp pamphlet prepared for the Creel Committee on Public Information to emphasize the undemocratic nature of the German government before the War, which aroused the unbounded enthusiasm of not a few American college presidents and exchange professors. German naval ambition, foreign policy, colonial expansion and business methods are presented as bent upon world domination, and a threat to all free and self-respecting peoples. All of these were rendered the more dangerous because of the eccentric, egoistic and domineering character of the Kaiser. Perhaps the most novel paragraph is that in which the coöperation between the German government and German business is stigmatized as disruptive of world peace. "The German will to conquer, by fair means or by foul, could only in the end arouse the determination of other peoples to defend themselves. The latter would not be willing permanently to acquiesce without a struggle, and in an attitude of impotence and resignation, in their own strangulation by a power bent on Germanizing the world."

The reader's interest and curiosity will, quite naturally, be centered upon Professor Hazen's treatment of the period since 1914, and, in particular, upon his analysis of the origins of the War, the Peace Treaty, reparations and the Russian Bolshevik revolution and social and economic régime—in other words those episodes, issues and movements which best test the accuracy and objectivity of the historian. Professor Hazen's first discussion of the origins of the World War appeared in his *Modern European History*, the preface of which is dated January, 1917. Here, as might be expected, the story is the familiar one credited by the great majority of historical scholars at that time. Germany, the bully of Russia in 1908, with her eye on the domination of the Near East and Mesopotamia, encouraged Austrian aggression in the Balkans, which, planned for 1913 but mysteriously postponed, drove the Serbians to the border of desperation and led to the murder of the Archduke in June, 1914. In the subsequent relations between Austria and Serbia Germany "backed Austria from start to finish," if, indeed, she did not instigate the Austrian policy, the details of which were known from the start and warmly approved by the Kaiser and his ministers. Austria forthwith proceeded to at-

tempt an unprecedented bullying of a weak and peaceful state, presuming, as in 1908, upon Russian cowardice or hesitation. Russia, however, this time refused to be bluffed out of playing the benevolent and disinterested part of big brother to her tiny Slavic kinsman. Thereupon Germany precipitately declared war upon Russia, thus necessitating participation by a hesitant, peace-loving and defenseless France, which was led to intervene more in the interest of the preservation of European civilization than because of binding obligation. The Entente was not an alliance but only a courteous understanding among gentlemen, though there is implicit recognition of the force of the Franco-Russian alliance. England, however, was fettered by no agreement whatever with either France or Russia; she was perfectly free to act as she might choose. Her entry was brought about by the dastardly invasion of Belgium, a crime against international decency and honor which could never have been contemplated, much less executed, by any state save Germany. The cause and the issues were so clear that the overwhelming judgment of the world was immediately expressed as to the primary and sole responsibility of Germany and Austria for the terrible cataclysm, and this verdict was rendered permanent and irrefragable by the action of Italy. This state, hitherto thoroughly enamoured of Germany and Austria, refused to sell her honor by joining with her allies of the Triple Alliance in a war of spoil and territorial aggrandizement; later she entered the crusade of the righteous wholly free from material ambitions.

This epic may well be forgiven, for we possessed in 1916 but the most incomplete knowledge concerning the outbreak of the War, and even the Potsdam Conference was accepted by the majority of historians, though as early as 1914 it was known that England was morally bound to join France and would have done so irrespective of the invasion of Belgium. Indeed, the writer in the summer of 1917, at the instigation of several historians of international reputation, aided a bullet manufacturer in preparing for the National Security League almost as absurd and misleading an account of the background of the War as that which appears in Professor Hazen's text. The same version of the coming of the great conflict is repeated almost without the slightest verbal change in his *Fifty Years of Europe*, where there is added a brief survey of the course of the War, which, as he tells us, was finished "on the day the armistice was accepted and which therefore represents only

incomplete knowledge and hurried impressions of a mighty moment in history." This modest apology was apparently intended to apply only to the history of the War and not to the account of its origins, as the same narrative appears for a third time in the *Modern Europe*, which was published in 1920. In the interval of two years there had appeared, among other significant material, the published *Secret Treaties of the Entente*, the *Kautsky Documents*, Gooss's important work on Austrian policy and the origins of the War and his voluminous *Austrian Red Book*, Pribram's *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, and a flood of controversial works containing much illuminating information. Professor Sidney B. Fay was also beginning his epoch-making series of articles, which for the first time made available for English and American readers the implications of the above material.

Still, one could find cause for a good-natured tolerance towards Professor Hazen. He could allege that his book was intended for high school students and college freshmen and that he had not yet been able to find time to sift the new evidence. His friends expectantly awaited the revision of his *Europe Since 1815* to discover a carefully digested and impartial analysis of the onset of the War, in the first detailed manual on modern European history written by a professor of established position and leisure, and late enough to allow the production of a perfectly definitive judgment and exposition. Their hopes were badly, if not fatally, chilled through a review by Professor Hazen of Schevill's *Political History of Modern Europe*, which appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly* for June, 1922. Professor Schevill had made good use of Fay's articles, and his account of the genesis of the War is one of the fairest and clearest to be found in the same number of pages in any book which had thus far appeared in our language. Of this admirable summary Professor Hazen wrote "It would have been better had the three new chapters never been written, for they present a view of the causes of the war which would be much more appreciated in the schools of Germany than in those of the United States" (Sic!). Professor Hazen is apparently determined to be "appreciated" in the schools of his country, for, in spite of another year of grace and the advantages of European travel and study, the reader of the revised *Europe Since 1815* discovers to his dismay, if not to his astonishment, that he is presented with the fiction of 1916 as dispensed in the *Modern European History*, with scarcely a change of word or punctuation. The only noticeable

alterations are the inclusion of the substance of his review of Schevill's book and the change of a "v" to "b" in the spelling of Serbia.

This is not the place for a summary of the historiography of the World War since 1920, but even a brief enumeration of the more important work done will indicate the enormity of Professor Hazen's offense in submitting in an advanced manual an account of the origins of the War based solely on materials available in 1916. Friedjung has revealed by using the secret unpublished documents how preposterous a misconception we formerly entertained concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908. Instead of Russia's being frightened off by an arrogant German Kaiser in "shining armor," she took part through Izvolski in the negotiations over the annexation, giving her consent in return for the promise of Austro-German pressure on Turkey for the opening of the Straits to the Russian army. And not only did Izvolski take part in the negotiations; it was he who put the idea in the Austrians' minds by suggesting that they annex these provinces. And Germany averted an Austrian attack on Serbia in 1913. Fay proved very clearly that Austria had been the aggressor towards Serbia in 1914, that Germany had been only very meagerly informed concerning the terms of the Austrian ultimatum before its delivery, that Bethmann and Jagow when they read its contents thought it too strong, and that the Kaiser and his Chancellor regarded the Serbian reply as satisfactory, and did everything possible to localize the conflict. He also proved that the Russians took the ultimatum to Serbia as a declaration of war, and began preparatory mobilization measures against both Germany and Austria. Gooch goes even further and contends that the Tsar's order to suspend mobilization, in answer to the Kaiser's request, was intercepted by the Russian militarists, though this is still a disputed point. Much more material has since come out on the Austro-Serbian situation. Baron Szilassy has shown that Berchtold was but a weak-willed tool, pliant in the hands of Conrad von Hötzendorf, the war party and sympathetic functionaries in the foreign office. Hötzendorf has frankly admitted the long standing and ill-concealed ambitions of the Austrian general staff for a war with Serbia. Heinrich Kanner has clearly implicated the diplomatic representatives of his country and proved their primary responsibility for aggressive action towards Serbia. Most astonishing of all, a Serbian scholar, Stanojevič, has recently revealed the fact

that the assassination of the Archduke was planned under the direction of the chief of the intelligence bureau of the Serbian general staff, a fact apparently not known to Berchtold in July, 1914. Not a few impartial historians have admitted that the integrity of the Dual Monarchy depended upon a firm and vigorous attitude towards Serbia in 1914. We certainly made war on Spain, and intervened in Mexico on far slighter pretexts.

With respect to Russia, the *Siebert Documents*, Paléologue's *Memoirs*, Marchand's *Livre Noir*, and the recently published analysis of the *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, present an overwhelming indictment of Russian imperialism, aggression, and zeal for war in 1914. They further make it clear that Russia took the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia as a declaration of war, and that the war was really *on* from that moment. The Russian attitude rendered futile any attempt at delay and arbitration. These documents also reveal the close collusion between the Russian militarists and the French group led by Poincaré. Izvolski admits the Russian bribery of the French press, the sordid details of which have recently been revealed in *L'Humanité*, in the *New Republic* and in the *Nation* for February 6, 1924. In regard to England, the *Siebert Documents* have shown her involvements with France and Russia, particularly with the latter in the Near East, and her conversations with Russia in regard to naval union and action against Germany. Grey has confessed his agreement to intervene to protect the coast of France irrespective of the German invasion of Belgium; Haldane has boasted that the plans for landing English troops on the continent had been worked out and settled for a decade prior to 1914; and Churchill has admitted that from 1912 onward the navy began to prepare for a war with Germany in both a psychological and material way. Finally, the Belgian archives reveal conversations regarding the possibility of landing English troops on Belgian soil in event of a war with Germany, and one of Sazonov's reports to the Tsar contains a promise from the English king that England would sink every German merchant ship she could lay her hands on in the event of war. For France one does not need to turn to Bausman's demonstration of the persistent French military tradition, to Gouttenoire de Toury's indictment of the French war party, commended by Charles Seignobos, to Pevet's damaging examination of the evidence for aggressive French policy in regard to the origins of the War or to Poincaré's weak apology. Ample material to eliminate once and for all the

myth of a helpless, terrified and reluctant France, as far as those in control of her policy are concerned, is available in such sober collections of documents as the *Siebert Documents*, the revelations in regard to the falsification of the Russian *Orange Book*, and, above all, Marchand's *Livre Noir*. They prove Poincaré and his group willing by 1913 to risk a general European war in order to recover Alsace and Lorraine. Further, Demartial has described the manner in which the French war party deluded the majority and induced them to accept the fiction of a defensive war. France was unquestionably an alert partner in the Franco-Russian alliance in the years from 1909 to 1914, probably the more aggressive of the two after 1912. Finally there are ample Belgian documents proving that Belgium feared an invasion by France quite as much as by Germany in the case of a European war, and France had apparently considered this eventuality in her military plans.

Little information has subsequently come out regarding Germany designed to alter seriously the interpretation worked out by Professor Fay on the basis of the *Kautsky Documents*, though there has been plenty to corroborate it in the works of Valentin, Haller, Hammann, Montgelas and others. The fact of the autocratic government, militaristic tradition and imposing armament on land and sea remains unimpaired, something we are often in danger of forgetting in the midst of absorbing interest in the newly revealed documents, but the thesis of a deliberate German plot against the peace of the world in the summer of 1914 does not have the slightest support, though there is evidence that the German leaders were thoroughly worried in May and June of 1914 over the Anglo-Russian naval discussion and the tightening of Franco-Russian encirclement, and recognized the necessity of prompt action in the event of an impending attack. Finally, the case for Italy's entry into the War in the sole interest of cosmic justice was set tottering by the publication of the Secret Treaties, and has been pulverized by the recent revelation of the documents in the Russian archives bearing on the Italian dickering with the Entente from July, 1914, to her entry into the conflict. The fact that Italy had made a secret treaty with France in 1902 not to engage in any war upon the latter greatly reduces the validity of Italy's non-participation in 1914 on the side of the other members of the Triple Alliance as a test of her judgment of the guilt of Germany and Austria. Germany and England appear to have been the only

states honestly desirous of peace in 1914, though Austria certainly did not want a general European war.

Much of the above material was sifted and analyzed by Professor Charles A. Beard in the introduction to his *Cross-Currents in Europe Today*, and a magisterial synthesis of the whole literature, forecast in his admirable brochure on the diplomatic revelations, has appeared in the recent history by Professor G. P. Gooch, which is declared by no less an authority than Archibald Cary Coolidge to be far the best work on the diplomatic background of the war that has appeared in any language up to the present moment. On the basis of these revelations the arrogance and insolence of Mr. Asquith's recent work is no less than appalling—almost as disconcerting as the discovery that Professor Hazen lists many of the above collections and monographs in the bibliography appended to his chapter on the War.

It is in the light of the above researches and disclosures that one can best comprehend the grotesquely misleading nature of such a statement as the following:

The responsibility for this tragic, monstrous, unnecessary crime against civilization, against humanity, was lightly assumed. . . . The opinion of the outside world as to where that responsibility lies has been overwhelmingly expressed. . . . The world was stunned by the criminal levity with which Austria-Hungary and Germany had created this hideous situation. The sinister and brutal challenge was, however, accepted immediately and with iron resolution by those who had done their utmost during those twelve days to avert the catastrophe, and not only great powers like France and England, but small ones like Belgium and Serbia, never hesitated, but resolved to do or die. That the contest was not merely a material one, but that the most precious moral and spiritual interests were involved, was clearly seen and stated at the very beginning of the war by the responsible statesmen of France and England. In those early days, Mr. Asquith, prime minister of Great Britain, expressed the common resolution of the western powers when he declared: "We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." A cause dedicated to such aims as those was worthy of the supreme sacrifice it would pitilessly exact. . . .

Had England rendered no other service than this of making the seas safe for freedom and dangerous for despotism, the debt of humanity to her would be incalculable. But she was doing far more than this. The utterances of her statesmen, like those of France, from the first of August, 1914, defined the issues at stake, and set forth adequately the appalling gravity of the crisis. Not only were those utterances profoundly educative but they were veritable trumpet blasts, summoning to action, in the interest of all that men in Western Europe and in America had long held most precious. In the darkest hours, and there were many such during those first three years, there was no faltering in high places, no talk of compromise of right with wrong, no weakening of resolution, no abatement of effort. It must never be forgotten that the leaders of France and England, and the nations they represented were constant and valorous defenders of the New World, as of the Old, that it was their heroism and their immeasurable spirit of sacrifice that barred the way of a mighty and conscienceless military power toward universal domination. Never did men die in a holier cause. And they died in enormous numbers, literally by the million.

As might be expected, Professor Hazen has little patience with those who advocated objectivity on the part of America in the face of this cosmic dualism—who counseled hesitation in our joining the forces of Ormuzd against the devilish hosts of Ahriman:

In such a contest as that the United States belonged, body and soul. If she was to preserve a shred of self-respect, if she was to maintain inviolate the honor of the American name, if she was to safeguard the elementary rights of American citizens, if she was bound in any sense to be her brother's helper in the defense of freedom in the world, then she must take her stand shoulder to shoulder with the hosts of freemen in Europe who were giving and had long been giving the last full measure of devotion to that cause, then she must spend her manhood and her wealth freely and without complaint, as France and England and Belgium and Serbia had done.

From very early in the war there were Americans who endeavored to arouse their country to a sense of its danger and its duty, to persuade it to prepare, to fire it with the resolve to keep the nation's 'scutcheon clean. Among those who, by their quick and intelligent appreciation of the situation, by their courage and activity, rendered invaluable service in the campaign of national education were ex-President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood. Many Americans enlisted in foreign legions.

From August, 1914, to April, 1917, America passed through a painful, humiliating, and dangerous experience. Her declaration of

war was the expression of the wisdom she distilled from that experience. Her entrance into the war was the most important event of the year 1917, though not immediately the most important, for the collapse of Russia, occurring also in that year, had a quicker and more direct bearing upon the military situation. But in the end, if America kept the faith, she could tip the scales decisively.

We entered the war finally because Germany forced us in, because she rendered it absolutely impossible for us to stay out unless we were the most craven and pigeon-hearted people on the earth. Any one who counted on that being the case was entertaining a notion for which he could certainly cite no evidence in our previous history.

Professor Hazen can at least claim the virtue of consistency. He carries the epic through with logical, if brazen, thoroughness. The 1917 stories of German frightfulness and submarine atrocities are repeated in full and without the slightest qualification. Admiral Sims is apparently regarded as untrustworthy. God's rebuke to the Kaiser and Ludendorff was no less apparent and certain than it was to Sennacherib before Jerusalem. The Peace of Versailles left little or nothing to be desired as an instrument of absolute and impartial justice and constructive international statesmanship. "The place chosen for the Peace Conference was appropriately Paris, which Meredith once called 'the goddess of the lightning brain,' 'valiant unto death for a principle' and which had been the nerve center of the Allied cause, the throbbing heart of the coalition, from the first day to the last of the racking struggle." The offspring was like unto the place of parturition. Not even the reparations as originally determined come in for a mild word of doubt or disapproval—except for a protest later on in regard to German failure to pay them in full. There is no sympathy for Germany, or suggestion of injustice or inconsistency in regard to the Fourteen Points. "Time has brought its complete revenge" for Prussian aggression in 1870. "The drastic provisions, if executed, will destroy that German militarism which has cost the world so intolerable a price." "By the Treaty she accepts the responsibility of herself and her associates for all the loss and damage to the Allied governments and Allied peoples caused by the war. But as the payment of so monstrous a sum (the actual war loss, not the stated reparations) is quite beyond her and their resources, she is to escape from a large part of what would be only a just penalty." One will obtain from his pages no intimation what-

ever that the very question of reparations from Germany is now as anachronistic as witchcraft or astrology in the light of the well established facts concerning the origins of the War. Even Poincaré has admitted that proof of divided responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict would carry with it inevitably the acceptance of the principle of the division of the costs of the war among all participants. The objective, unbiased and disinterested opinion of Lloyd George is introduced as a final and definitive proof of the justice of the Peace Covenant! (pp.760-61)

Unfortunately, some of the parents of this beautiful child refused to accept the responsibility for her maintenance. Petty politics in the United States and sordid materialism in England have prevented her from being nourished into robust youth. This has forced France into other policies to compensate her for the loss of the support of the United States and England. "Guarantees of a military nature France must have, and this was her most poignant pre-occupation at the Conference of Paris; and reparations, too, have an obvious connection with national security." She has attempted to gain compensation and security by alliances with the new powers of central and eastern Europe. "The international influence of the Republic is stronger and more commanding than it has been in a long while. The power and prestige of her eastern neighbor no longer overshadow her. The most authoritative voices in the councils of Europe are those of France and England. France is the most active and powerful defender of the treaties upon which the new order of the world rests, and as such she is the natural ally of the states of central and eastern Europe who find their title deeds in those very treaties. One of the members of the Great Entente, her connections with the Little Entente are close and are likely to become still closer. French diplomacy has a wider field than ever for constructive achievement. German models and methods are destined to enjoy a lesser vogue, and a renewed radiation of French influence has begun." The occupation of the Ruhr as an example of this "radiation" is heartily approved. "What the French did was to seize the most valuable single asset of the defiant and slippery debtor." It will be noted that he has made no attempt to draw the parallel between French atrocities in the Ruhr and German atrocities in Belgium. Nor is anything said about corruption and graft in the French private claims for reparation funds.

However misleading Professor Hazen's book may be with

respect to war origins and war guilt, it will undoubtedly forward the progress of scientific historical writing in another respect. When the Bernheims, Georges, and Langlois and Seignobos of the future are preparing their illustrative anthologies of national and class bias Hazen may well succeed to the place now occupied by James Anthony Froude in the critical works on the historiography of the present day. The Bolsheviks naturally offend and repel one with Hazen's aristocratic and cultured associations, and the chapter on Russia is literally pure diatribe rather than history. It could appropriately be circulated in pamphlet form by the Better American Federation of Los Angeles. There is no effort to portray the deep-seated and complicated background of the Russian upheaval or to present the Bolshevik régime as the logical outcome of the historic circumstances in the case, however little one might approve of their system of economic and political life. While Hazen is violently repelled by the dictatorship and "lawlessness" of Lenin and his associates, he is equally enamoured of the mild, sweet-mannered and law-respecting Mussolini who saved Italy from Bolshevism. Even his talents as a chauffeur are warmly commended as proof of his adaptation to the peculiar requirements of the contemporary Italian political system. Military precautions, secret diplomacy and non-fulfillment of agreements and obligations on the part of Germany are sharply condemned, and praised with equal fervor with respect to her enemies. In his enthusiasm for the new territorial creations which have grown out of the Allied victory, Hazen fails to make clear the notable defects in the Polish *Politik* or the backward and primitive political life of the Balkan states which will continue to threaten the peace and civilization of Europe for generations to come.

Many reflections are suggested by this book and its methods. Professor Hazen can be forgiven for his pro-French attitude. The writer shares this bias, at least as regards the traditional and semi-mythical France, which is the France of Hazen. Those things for which France is supposed to stand: tolerance, contempt for sordid and compensatory Puritanism, an appreciation of the æsthetic, cultural pluralism and diversity, antipathy to regimentation, and resistance to mechanical industrialism and unbounded fecundity attract me as much as I am repelled by the mass production, quantitative standards, bigotry, superficiality, regimentation, insistence upon conformity, and the worship of a dizzy birth-rate, which characterize the typically industrial and *bourgeois*

civilizations, such as those of Germany and the United States. Yet one's subjective estimate of cultural and psychological values is no adequate basis for the rejection of historical facts. Again, while it is difficult for a writer to be certain of the spiritual advantage or desirability of subordinating a great moral passion to the exigencies and requirements of prosaic facts, yet the growing disposition to do this is what has constituted the progress of historical method and scholarship from the time of the composition of the Book of Chronicles to the work of Sorel and Gooch. And when a reputable historian refuses absolutely to take cognizance of a vast mass of first-hand source material which has completely revolutionized our knowledge of what he himself regards as the greatest crisis and episode in human history, we clearly have a case of "criminal levity" which is beyond the scope or competence of the historical critic.

Perhaps the most astonishing thing about the book is that it appeared under the editorship, and, hence, with the apparent approval, of Dean Charles Homer Haskins of Harvard University. Now concerning the scholarship of Professor Hazen there are differences of opinion, with neither extreme of which would the writer care to align himself, but with regard to Professor Haskins there has been no question as to erudition and scholarship. It is no exaggeration to say that no historian has yet lived who has been better prepared technically for the study of history, who has given evidence of a more keen, discriminating and objective scholarship, or who has been more uniformly rigorous in applying scientific historical methods in his own monographic researches. Yet the reviewer can say from personal knowledge that if a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in Harvard University had submitted in Professor Haskins' course on historiography a paper on the causes of the Hundred Years' War, which ignored the sources as thoroughly as does Professor Hazen's account of the origins of the World War, this student would not only have been dropped from the class but also from the graduate school. And when we reflect that even the most scholarly of historians have to depend for source material upon contemporary authorities who were invariably less adequately trained than Professor Hazen and often more subjective, we are almost driven to the conclusion that there was no little validity in the dictum of the wizard of the flivver concerning the nature and utility of history.

One fact and recommendation is beyond cavil, namely, that the

publishers are under a moral obligation to arrange for a thoroughgoing revision of the second volume by some such person as Professor Coolidge, Professor Langer, Professor Seymour or Professor Schmitt ere it misinforms and perverts the historical judgment of thousands of college students and general readers in the present and coming generations. In a general work of a popular sort, unsponsored by professional historians, the dictates of a free press would probably require the granting of poetic license even to a writer on historical subjects, but there is a greater moral obligation to approximate candor and truth in a book designed to instruct the citizenry of a democratic republic. A textbook is no place for a violent partisan polemic, however exalted the spirit of the author. Of course, some might urge in extenuation liberty of interpretation, but there are certainly limits to this concept and process, and Professor Hazen cannot take refuge here unless he is willing to share his retreat with Orosius and Carlyle, and to grant the validity of the allegorical method in historical literature.

The absolute immunity of a respectable and aristocratic historian, however serious his offense, is well exemplified by the experience of Professor Hazen since publishing the above revised edition of his book. He has been elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, and made chairman of the nominating committee of the American Historical Association. Most significant, if least astonishing, of all, his book was reviewed for the *American Historical Review* by Frank Maloy Anderson.

IX. A DANIEL COME TO JUDGMENT ¹⁷

This book ¹⁸ is unquestionably the most adequate, reliable and convincing work which has thus far appeared in the English language on the much discussed and warmly debated problem of the guilt of the various powers in bringing on the World War. In Dr. Ewart's book we have at last a comprehensive work on war origins by a writer who is neither a "boy historian" nor one who can be accused of being in the pay of Wilhelmstrasse. He is the

¹⁷ Set up as the leading review in the New York *Herald-Tribune* supplement "Books" for Sunday, June 28, 1925, and withdrawn because of editorial pressure.

¹⁸ *The Causes and Roots of the Wars*. (1914-18). By John S. Ewart, KC., LLD., New York: George H. Doran Company, two volumes.

most distinguished of living Canadian international lawyers and the Canadian counsel in the famous North Atlantic fisheries dispute argued before Hague court in 1910. Dr. Ewart occupies a position in public life and events in Canada entirely comparable to that achieved by Elihu Root in this country. The author is quite obviously an honest and conscientious person who has become "fed up" on the propaganda and mythology which have passed for the truth about war origins and war guilt in the English-speaking countries from 1914 onward. In these weighty volumes he has made an impressive and generally successful effort to assemble the cogent facts and set them forth so that those willing to face the unpalatable but salutary truth may no longer have any valid excuse for refraining from doing so in the Anglo-American world.

The method followed is primarily that of the lawyer rather than of the historian, but fortunately he is dealing with a contemporary problem and with data where the legalistic ability to marshal facts and weigh evidence is even more important than the possession of the sweeping perspective and genetic orientation of the historian. His biography and footnotes indicate that he has had at his disposal in the preparation of his volumes most of the vitally important source-material and many monographic works. There are, however, some notable gaps, especially in the Russian and German literature. His detailed interpretation of the all-important Russian mobilization activities is inaccurate in many places, as he has not seen the important work of Dobrorolski or the monograph of Professor Frantz. Yet these books would only serve to make even more effective his indictment of Russia. He seems to be unaware of the extremely damaging proof of complete official Serbian complicity in the plot for the assassination of the Archduke which has been set forth in the last year or so by Stanejović, Yovanovitch and Nenadovitch. Neither, apparently, has he used the *Grosse Politik*, without which any account of the "roots of the war" must of necessity be shaky and misleading in many respects. Nor does he give any evidence of serious acquaintance with the chief monographic summaries of war origins by Fay, Valentin, Montgelas, Morhardt, Fabre-Luce and Barbagallo. This last omission is, however, in itself significant and impressive. It would seem that he has been led to much the same conclusions as these authorities through a study of the documents, memoirs and monographs, instead of having shaped his views

through a reading of the existing summaries of the evidence. Unquestionably, the greatest defect in the textual equipment for his task is to be found in the absence of the best German material, not merely the *Grosse Politik*, but also the important monographs of Valentin, Haller, Hammann, Rachfahl, Mandl and others. Yet it must be said that none of these unseen books contains anything which would necessitate any serious modification of any of Ewart's major conclusions as to war guilt and would only serve to strengthen his case against the Entente epic.

The work is rather strangely constructed. The greater part of the first volume is devoted specifically to the reasons, real and alleged, why the various participating powers entered the war. The next five hundred pages are given up to the analysis of the under-lying roots of the war: namely, the diplomatic alignment and disputes and the economic rivalries in Europe from 1870 to 1914. Then the last one hundred and seventy-five pages consider the immediate events connected with the murder of the Archduke and the outbreak of actual fighting throughout Europe. The subject-matter is voluminous and varied, including texts of diplomatic documents, reminiscences of diplomats and statesmen, excerpts from press opinion and analyses of commercial and military statistics. But the lawyer's sense of the cogent and relevant prevents the diffuseness of the work from leading to serious confusion, and Dr. Ewart employs the admirable practice—another legalistic contribution—of summing up the main points established in each chapter. Consequently it is possible to discover in a few hours the conclusions of this large work of some twelve hundred pages.

The "roots of the war" were eight in number: the desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, the growth of the commercial and naval strength of Germany, Germany's replacement of France as the chief western rival of Great Britain, the challenge to the Anglo-Russian hegemony in the Near East offered by German advances in this area, the struggles over Persia and Morocco, the Serb grievances in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Balkan entanglement, and modern imperialism, generating mutual fear and hatred. Together with these were generally favorable conditions making for war, such as national arrogance, militarism and economic rivalry. But the crux of the whole matter in the diplomatic situation was the French revenge spirit and the desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine:

Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of the maze of military combinations and counter combinations which had perplexed European diplomats for over forty years. During the latest ten, reasons for anxiety had rapidly accumulated; the combinations had hardened; the work of the diplomats had become more difficult, more complicated, more continuous, more urgent; the general staffs of the Allied nations, in conference with each other, had diligently elaborated their plans of campaign; every year had witnessed an increased expenditure upon war preparations, of many millions of money; almost every year had witnessed a narrow avoidance of hostilities; no effort had been made, by removal of fundamental disagreements, to escape from the ever-quickenings rapids which were certain to tumble into maelstrom; indeed, well informed statesmen knew that many of the international rivalries could not be peaceably adjusted; all were well aware that some incident might at any moment produce general war.

Such are the salient facts concerning the general background of 1914, stated with commendable precision and compression. Judge Ewart not only examines the actual facts and assembles them; he also effectively disposes of a number of the most voluptuous myths which have luxuriated in Allied propaganda, among them German determination to seize and dominate the planet, the unique and wholly disproportionate German expenditures for militarism, and the choice of July, 1914, as the God-given moment for Germany to strike in order to realize with assurance her plan for world dominion. His conclusions on the first point are an admirable discriminating summary of fact and rejection of fiction:

1. That Germany sought to dominate the world is a very ridiculous assertion.

2. That Nietzsche, Treitschke or Bernhardt advocated world domination is untrue.

3. That Germany desired to be able to exert the chief influence in world affairs is as true as that the United Kingdom has occupied that position for the last hundred years.

4. Germany's desire for a strong navy was based upon the same reasons as those which actuated the United Kingdom, namely (1), protection of coasts, (2) protection of commerce, (3) protection of colonies and (4) diplomatic influence.

5. Of imperialism all virile nations have been guilty. The victors in the recent war—and their friends—have made the most of their opportunities. Previous to her defeat Germany was no exception to the general rule.

6. The prose and poetry of all nations boastfully assert superiori-

ties and reveal imperialistic proclivities. German authors were and are as foolish as the others.

The myth of unparalleled German militarism and military preparedness proves as easy for the author to demolish by recourse to the actual facts, as it is for him to show how events since the War have proved the arrant hypocrisy in the pretensions of the Allied leaders that they were "fighting to crush German militarism." He further fully exposes the absurdity in the frequent assertion that July, 1914, was "Der Tag" for which the Germans had impatiently waited in order that they might take Europe unawares and strike down resistance with ease. "The publication of the Foreign Office records of Germany and Austria-Hungary makes perfectly clear not only that Germany did not select 1914 for a European war, but that she was strongly opposed to its outbreak." Even the most vigorous German militarists, who may actually have desired a war at an opportune moment, are known to have been disappointed when it broke out in 1914. Ewart does not, however, stress sufficiently the pertinent fact that, whereas 1914 was a bad time for a war from the German point of view, it was not only a desirable, but almost an indispensable, date for the French and Russians, lest in another year the English might be detached as a result of the success of the Anglo-German negotiations in June, 1914.

As to the immediate precipitation of hostilities in 1914, Ewart accepts the view almost universally held to-day by reputable scholars, namely, that the chief responsibility rests directly upon Russia because of her precipitate mobilization:

Responsibility for precipitation of hostilities must be attributed (1) to Serbia, because of her unneighborly conduct; (2) to Austria-Hungary, because of continuation of her truculent attitude after receiving Serbia's reply, and (3) and chiefly—conclusively—to Russia, because of interruption of negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

As to the Austro-Hungarian quarrel with Serbia, while Ewart as a friend of peace, naturally expresses the wish that Austria might have accepted the Serbian reply as the basis of negotiations, he is aware that she could have been expected to do so only on the assumption that the Serbian menace and guilt were less than Austria insisted was the case. He admits that the Serbian reply was far from the satisfactory one which was alleged by the Allied

spokesmen. "Nor can it be denied that the Serbian agitation was a serious menace to the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary." Ewart comes to these significant conclusions without any apparent knowledge of the recent serious revelations concerning the actual complicity of the Serbian army and civil government in the murder of Franz Ferdinand which has been fully demonstrated by Stanojević, Yovanovitch and Nenadovitch, proving that the plot was laid by the chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff and was known to Premier Pashitch at least three weeks before the assassination took place. It would be interesting to get Ewart's revised judgment of the Austro-Serbian crisis in the light of this additional information. Ewart also brings out clearly the fact that it was a quite different type of war—a localized punitive expedition—which was desired by Austria and acquiesced in by Germany from that general European conflict envisaged and sought by Sazonov, Izvolski and Poincaré.

In his attitude toward Russia it is my opinion that Dr. Ewart is distinctly too severe. There is no doubt that it was the Russian general mobilization which actually brought on the war, but Dr. Ewart does not get at the causes of the mobilization in full. On the basis of the latest evidence it would appear that it was Grand Duke Nicholas and Sazonov rather than the Minister of War who secured the fatal mobilization, which was recognized by all as equivalent to war. The most serious defect in his judgment of Russia, however, is his failure to emphasize adequately the responsibility of Poincaré and his party in encouraging the Russians to take this action. He scarcely makes it properly emphatic that France did nothing to restrain Russia, but rather secretly urged on the crucial Russian military preparations. Poincaré's blank check to Sazonov during his visit to St. Petersburg in July, 1914, is not given its proper setting in regard to the Russian mobilization. Nor does he mention Sir Edward Grey's blunder in indicating to Benckendorff, as early as July 25, that he believed the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia would necessitate Russian mobilization. The Russian mobilization brought on the World War, but the Russian mobilization would never have been undertaken without the cool plotting of Poincaré and the confused bungling of Sir Edward Grey, dominated by the Slavophile Nicolson, his Under-Secretary.

One of the most interesting, courageous and realistic sections of Dr. Ewart's book is that dealing with the reasons why

the various states other than Austria and Serbia entered the war. There is a most refreshing absence of every whit of the Asquithian and Wilsonian drivel and bunk, and a frank and realistic statement of indubitable facts. Russia entered, not because she had any treaty or moral obligations to protect Serbia, but because she wanted the Straits, which could not be obtained except through a European war. France did not enter the war because of interest in Serbia or because of her treaty obligations with Russia. She "entered the war because of the 'wound'; because the hour of *revanche* had arrived, because she felt confident of her military powers and because she deemed that her freedom from future menace could be secured only by the abasement of Germany. In other words, France entered the war because urged thereto by her own interests."

Likewise with Great Britain:

British self-interest was the reason for the form of the Belgian treaty in 1839; for entente relations with France and Russia; for support of these powers in various crises; for military and naval conventions with France; for naval arrangements with Russia; for Sir Edward Grey's letters to the French Ambassador of 22 November, 1912, and 2 August, 1914, and for entering the war. . . . Speaking generally then, we may say that the United Kingdom joined in entente relations with France and Russia and entered the war because her interests pointed a course in opposition to Germany.

The invasion of Belgium was not a cause but a subterfuge with respect to Great Britain's entry into the war. Great Britain was not bound by treaty, precedent or promise to protect the neutrality of Belgium. On two earlier occasions, 1870 and 1887, she had evaded or repudiated any such obligation.

Thus with Italy, "it was solely for the purpose of acquiring territory—not only territory owned by her ally (Austria-Hungary), but other extensive tracts—that Italy, after many weeks of posturing on the auction-block, declared war upon her third-of-a-century friend."

With respect to the United States, Ewart quite correctly insists that we did not enter the war to vindicate Belgium, to "make the world safe for democracy," or to advance the cause of abstract justice. Rather, we entered solely "in defense of American lives and property as against attack by German submarines." The author does not wrestle with the problem as why we did not go in

several years earlier to protect our lives and property against attack by the British violations of our rights as neutrals. We were "sold out" to British propaganda by Page years before Wilson sold us out to metaphysical idealism.

Ewart has taken us a considerable way along the path of that recognition of the distasteful facts about the late world calamity upon which any achievement of permanent peace must ultimately rest. We may hope that his book will receive its deserved attention, and that the author will bring out a second edition based upon an assimilation of the new Russian, German and Serbian material.

X. OBJECTIVE NATIONAL HISTORY ¹⁹

The problem of the Jew in national and international politics has attracted the attention of statesmen, philosophers, theologians and historians since the time of "The Pharaoh who knew not Joseph," but it has rarely been more significant, and certainly never more interesting, than it is to-day. The period since 1914 has brought to the Jewish peoples greater mortality and more misery and suffering than any other period of equal length in their history, not even excepting the years immediately after their captivity, those following 70 A. D., or those during the Chmelnicki uprising in Poland and Russia after 1648. Anti-Semitism has followed the War on the continent of Europe with a vigor not equalled in the '80's, and has, for the first time, spread to England and the United States. As a compensatory ideal and aspiration Zionism has enjoyed a corresponding growth during the last seven years, and has now passed from a semi-eschatological concept to a secular plan, which has been duly recognized by international law and sanctioned by the great powers. In view of these circumstances there has existed a very real need for a competent survey of the whole Jewish movement and its relation to the Zionist aspirations. While many seemed satisfied with the exposition of the issues by Mr. Morris Gest and Mr. Henry Ford, there has been a growing insistence on the part of intelligent persons for a reliable treatment of this timely subject. Such a narrative and analysis has been supplied by Professor Kallen's work.²⁰

¹⁹ From the *New Republic*, November 23, 1921.

²⁰ *Zionism and World Politics—A Study in History and Social Psychology*, by Horace Meyer Kallen, Ph.D. Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Co.

It is doubtful if another writer could have been found who possesses Professor Kallen's many-sided competence for such a task as the history and analysis of Zionism. His mastery of the academic equipment in the fields of philosophy, political theory, theology, history and economics is unusual. He has been able to write with the intimate knowledge of one who knows the movement from the inside, without at the same time being either a violent partisan or a soured opponent. He is thoroughly imbued with the critical spirit, and makes no attempt to conceal the fact that the Jews are no less the victims of their own prejudices and bigotry than of those of Gentiles. He is appreciative of the high ideals which underlie Zionism, without being blind to the sordid nature of many details of the practical phases of the execution of the project or to the well-nigh fatal divisions of the Jews over the solution of their ethnic, religious and national problems. Though enthusiastic over the possibilities of the *Vita Nuova* which has been opened up to the Jews in transforming their millennium-long idealistic aspirations into a realized achievement, he is not unconscious of the fact that they may ultimately fail through fatal delays, sectarian differences and undue optimism. Whatever opinion one may hold with respect to the Jew or Zionism, no fair-minded and educated person can well doubt that Professor Kallen has brought out the authoritative and definitive treatment of the subject in all of its major manifestations and mutations down to the present year.

Professor Kallen wisely does not content himself with a narrowly conceived and executed history of Judaism detached from the general history of western civilization. As he well expresses the situation, "the freedom and security of the Jew, it cannot be too often reiterated, has always been in Christian Europe, the barometer of the civilization, the culture, the prosperity, the democracy of the countries of his sojourn." A realization of this fact calls for a work which sets forth the Jewish problem in its relation to the chief phases of development of western culture, and a brief outline of the contents of the book under review will indicate how well the author has executed his study in harmony with this dominating conception. He treats adequately the following phases of the subject: the basis and nature of Zionism; the position of the Jews in the era of the religious imperialism of the Medieval Church; the breaking up of the unity of Christendom with the Reformation and the development of the doctrine of

natural rights, with its significance for Jewish nationality and liberty; the rise of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe, and its answer in the development of an ardent defensive Jewish nationalism and the Zionist project in its practical aspects; the Near Eastern Question and Palestine before 1914, including the deplorable condition of the "Pre-Zionist Jewry"; the remarkable growth of the Zionist movement since 1914 as a reaction against, and a compensation for, the horrible treatment of the Jews in central and eastern Europe during the war and the period since; the development of an active interest in the Zionist problem on the part of the Jews in America since 1914; the Peace Conference of 1918, with its formal recognition of the rights of minority nationalities to freedom and justice, and with its warm enthusiasm for political democracy existing in juxtaposition with its frantic fear of economic and social democracy and its neo-Persian eschatology in the alleged cosmic dualism of capitalism and bolshevism; the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration regarding a Jewish Palestine in the Treaty with Turkey, agreed upon, April 25, 1920; the perils of the Zionist project on the eve of its actual realization, in the face of the opposition of French and British imperialism in the Near East, Arabian nationalism, the economic backwardness of Palestine, and the inability of the Jews adequately to recognize the fact that Zionism is no longer a mystical and other-worldly ideal to be realized by eschatology or the intervention of Yahweh, but a potential and immediate secular reality which can be secured only by the most intelligent and earnest efforts and coöperation of the Jews of the world; and the post-war Anti-Semitism, including the notorious episode of the publication of the forged "Protocols of the Elders of Zion."

Limitations of space forbid any attempt to present a detailed summary of the excellent exposition of these topics, but it should be stated that the author treats every phase of his subject with admirable objectivity, and sometimes with almost amazing frankness. He neither hesitates to reveal bias and weakness in personal leaders in the Zionist movement nor to point out the serious defects and cross-purposes which have often existed in the various programs which have constituted the successive stages in the evolution of Zionism. A Gentile could not have written the book with greater candor, and certainly not with equal authority and insight.

Not only is the work a masterly review of the Jewish problem;

it would be well worth reading if one had not the slightest interest in this subject, on account of the numerous brief but trenchant summaries of critical periods and tendencies in cultural and economic history. Such are the summary of the Christian Epic (pp. 21-23); the analysis of natural rights (pp. 32 ff.); the critical estimate of nationalism (pp. 44 ff.); the history of imperialism in the Near East (Chaps. x, xii); the account of the transformation of social institutions and social theory due to modern industrialism, and the conflict between the old agrarian ideals and modern industrial realities (pp. 198 ff.); and the incisive summary of the essentials of an adequate program of industrial democracy (pp. 295 ff.).

It would seem fair to draw the following conclusions concerning the Jewish movement and Zionism from Professor Kallen's work. The Jewish question is but a microcosm of the development of western civilization and the problems it has created. The persecution of the Jews has been but a phase of the struggle within the development of occidental culture between intolerance and bigotry, chauvinism and imperialism, on the one hand, and scepticism, tolerance and scientific advance, and cosmopolitanism and international coöperation, on the other. Again, in the same way that Christendom has witnessed struggles between science and obscurantism, modernism and medievalism, cosmopolitanism and nationalism, social democracy and plutocracy, so the Jews of the world have been divided by criticism and pietism, by reformist tendencies and orthodoxy, by assimilationist proposals and resolute and stubborn separatism, by tolerance and bigotry. Zionism has had its origin in, and received its vital impulse from, bigotry, prejudices and medievalism within both Jewish and Gentile circles, but to the intolerance of the Gentiles must be assigned the larger share of the responsibility. Even if one could assume the speedy disappearance of the religious bigotry and fanaticism and the aggressive nationalism of the Gentile, there would be ample justification for a favorable attitude towards the Zionist project on the part of scientifically-minded individuals who contend that nationality unrepressed is a creative cultural force. But with no such prospect at all imminent, liberal and tolerant people are still more likely to admit both the necessity and desirability of establishing this Jewish asylum from the Gentile terrorism of central and eastern Europe. Many critics regard it

as somewhat pathetic that the project seems likely to be realized at this late date, just when biblical criticism, anthropology, ethnography and history have finally demolished all the superstitious and pseudo-scientific notions upon which have rested the stimulus to, and justification of, the doctrines of unique religious verity, a chosen people, and the special "mission" of any cultural group, whether Jewish or Gentile. It must be remembered, however, that these sane and scientific views are at present espoused by but few among both Jews and Gentiles, and to demand that the Jews alone shall be the ones immediately to shuffle off the cloak of medievalism is to require the impossible. With the majority of the most ardent supporters of Zionism wholly orthodox and dwelling among equally medieval and intolerant peoples in central and eastern Europe, one can scarcely suggest that they remain in these regions and endure another century of indignities, until the progress of science and criticism shall have ended obscurantism and intolerance among both Jews and Gentiles.

Fortunately, as Professor Kallen makes clear, secular and territorial Zionism does not render impossible the parallel progress of reformist tendencies and assimilation on the part of the Jews of the Occident who do not choose to return to Palestine. Indeed, it is likely to hasten the process of reform and enlightenment among both Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, and to drain off much Gentile antagonism. Ample scope can in this way be given to orthodoxy and nationalism, and to modernism and cosmopolitanism among the Jews, as well as among the Gentiles; and to contend that the Jews shall be the only group in western society who must base their conduct solely on rational and scientific considerations is to expect something unprecedented, and to reveal the naïveté of the ordinary patriot and obscurantist communicant.

In indicating the implications of the change in the nature of the Zionist movement in the last decade, and especially since the Conference of San Remo, Professor Kallen offers the following challenge to the intelligence and united devotion of all Jews:

Within six of the most trying years in the history of the western world, six of the most bitterly tragic years in the history of the Jews, a tradition of consolatory aspiration has been precipitated into a condition of compelling fact. By public law and international guarantees a hope of Zion, which was an age-old sentiment and a

compensatory fantasy, has been turned into the hope of Zion, which is the hard, barren, sordid geographical and ethnographic reality of Palestine, with its needs of economic rehabilitation and cultural development, its political complications and religious cross-currents, its problems of public health and social justice. . . . Here at last is the salutation which has been the sustaining hope of the heart of Jewry through the bitter ages, challenging them to a new life. Yet the manner in which they respond to it leaves room to doubt whether the attainment of this new life shall not become a process painful, lingering, and—disillusioning. . . . Nowhere except among the handful of American leaders does there appear to be any adequate realization that Palestine is not any longer a symbolic vision of another worldly future of salvation from death and the fear of death; that Palestine is at last a present solid and coercive fact, whose saving power can be brought into operation only by swift and extensive readjustments of temper and attitude; readjustments, moreover, not merely to Palestine, *an und für sich*, as Hegel used to say, but to the specific and concrete and living Palestine which is a node in a network of complicated relationships that stretch from England to India and around the world, involving the whole economic process of modern civilization, with its political and ethnographical and religious relationships. . . . Our survey of the mind of Europe, past and present, regarding the Jews shows that the climax has been reached. The alternative to success in Palestine and coördinately, normalization in the Diaspora, is destruction—violently as in central Europe, or through progressively swifter assimilation as in the United States. But the old ambiguity of the Jewish position is doomed.

The leader who can solve these problems for the Jews is likely, by the relatively greater magnitude of his performance, to be as destructive of the reputation of Moses as is Brooks Adams in the second edition of his *Emancipation of Massachusetts*. But, perhaps, as of old, an Aaron will be the more popular with his people!

The conclusion of the whole matter, then, is that we shall have a Jewish problem, Zionism or no Zionism, until religious bigotry, obscurantism and chauvinistic patriotism have been eliminated among men. Only those who, like the late Chancellor Day, enjoy the fullest confidence of the Deity would be discreet in prophesying when that day will arrive. When it does come, however, it may well be regarded as an adequate fulfilment of the vision of the writer of Revelation XX, 1-3.

XI. CLIO AND FREUD²¹

This stimulating and suggestive book by Mr. O'Higgins and Dr. Reede²² is perhaps more important because of the problems of method and approach which it raises than on account of the highly interesting material which it contains. Historical biography may be of two types, the purely narrative and descriptive which confines itself to concrete acts and events and makes no attempt to assign or explain motives and causes, and the interpretative which endeavors to indicate the relation of an individual to his physical and social environment, to illustrate the interplay of cause and effect, and to discover the motives for acts and attitudes. The first type is relatively simple and calls only for adequate historical source-material and some constructive literary capacity on the part of the author. The second form is a far more perplexing and complicated task. It not only demands all the information and creative ability required for narrative biography, but also an understanding of the sociological basis of human conduct and the psychology of human motives, and a rare power of balanced synthesis. It so happens, of course, that the technical foundations of such knowledge have but recently been provided, and in only a tentative and incomplete manner. Further, even when an author possesses this rare equipment, he frequently finds that the information upon which such an analysis must be based is largely lacking and that only insupportable conjecture could emerge from the utilization of such as exists.

Consequently, it is quite apparent that, whatever its literary, rhetorical, and æsthetic virtues, the interpretative historical biography prior to the development of sociology and dynamic psychology could possess but little validity. If accuracy was attained it could have been solely a result of chance and accident and could not have been due to any scientific knowledge or acumen. In general, the literary biographers of the past possessed no technical knowledge of psychology at all. Indeed, down to the last generation there was no valid psychology for them to master and exploit. As a rule such writers had to content themselves with a projection of their own rationalized complexes into the personality of the subject of their biographical activity. As a matter

²¹ From the *American Review*, November-December, 1925.

²² *The American Mind in Action*, by Harvey O'Higgins and E. H. Reede. New York: Harper and Brothers.

of fact they knew little or nothing of their own basic drives and motives, for as Professors Robinson and Ogburn, to say nothing of the clinical psychologists, have recently shown, the human mind has unlimited capacity for the obscuration and rationalization of facts concerning motives and desires not unqualifiedly approved by the individual or his group. But had a writer been able to penetrate clearly into the innermost recesses of his own psyche this would not have afforded him any reliable key to the personality of another. Hence, biography to date has been valuable either chiefly or solely as an enumeration of concrete facts and achievements, or for its literary and rhetorical merit. As an interpretation of personalities it has been next to worthless, and usually the only psyche revealed at all has been that of the writer rather than of the person supposedly written about. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that so dubious and exaggerated a psycho-analytic biography as Freud's exercise on Leonardo Da Vinci possesses far greater plausibility and validity than Carlyle's effort to interpret the characters of Cromwell and Frederick the Great. Therefore, tentative as the modern "psychographs" may be, they should be welcomed, as they represent in all cases at least a guess in the right direction and a definite advance over the rhetorical goose-eggs represented by the older literary biography.

It is a matter of common knowledge among educated persons that, as Stanley Hall indicated so clearly in his autobiography, the dynamic or Freudian psychology has been the only branch of psychological research which has offered any significant contributions to an analysis of the human personality and the motives which dominate our conduct. That this type of psychology should sooner or later be exploited in biography was inevitable. But what not only men of literature, making an amateurish effort to employ the Freudian mechanisms in biography, but even clinical psychologists themselves, seem to have overlooked is the rarity with which one can discover sufficient available material concerning an historic personage to make a psycho-analytical biography plausible or convincing. When one reflects that it takes a skillful psychiatrist working with a sympathetic patient, blessed with a good transference, from forty to two hundred hours to carry through a successful analysis by means of dream-analysis, word-association, direct questioning, and all possible information from parents and relatives as to childhood experiences and tendencies, it is instantly apparent how futile it is to hope to discover a

comparable volume of information concerning any person from the past. This possibility is rendered all the more remote when it is understood that the significant information concerning personality and character formation is chiefly that bearing on the years prior to puberty. As few great men are identified in their early years we are rarely able to secure any impressive amount of trustworthy information concerning the facts of their youth, which are swallowed up in and buried beneath a vast body of apocryphal tales. Of course, a psychological biography of a suggestive sort and some degree of accuracy may be constructed with less information than is required for successful therapy in the case of a psycho-neurosis, but even the modicum of information essential is almost never available.

Even more impossible is it to obtain the supplementary information from differential psychology and endocrinology. Writers have attempted to psychoanalyze figures from ancient history, but as far as the reviewer knows, no one has yet been rash enough to estimate the I Q., mental age, or endocrine balance of Julius Cæsar or Theodosius, and it is scarcely a demonstrable fact that Goliath was a victim of hyperpituitarism. Hence, it would seem that if we desire reliable interpretative biographies we must require all eminent men to submit to mental testing, psychoanalysis, and physiological and neurological examination and have the results preserved until such a time as it would be proper and legal to exploit this information. But even here the results would not be wholly satisfactory, as an involuntary analysis would rarely be successful. The up-shot of the whole matter, then, seems to be that historical biography must continue to be either irrelevant or unreliable, or both, to a distressing and disconcerting degree. With these inevitable and persistent limitations in mind we may turn to the effort of Mr. O'Higgins and Dr. Reede to apply the Freudian technique, moderately conceived, to an analysis of the American mind as a whole and of some illustrious personal illustrations of its characteristics.

While almost uniformly interesting from cover to cover the chapters possess differing degrees of validity. Those on the American mind in general and on the mind of American women as a group are masterpieces, convincing in character and moderate in tone. They constitute the most acute brief analysis of the American psychosis known to the writer and are to be heartily recommended to all Comstockers and Hundred Percenters. The

chapters devoted to an indication of the complexes of individual Americans are at times less plausible, but certainly not less stimulating and original. Mr. O'Higgins finds the American to be primarily a Puritan, that is, a Christian of the Pauline variety who views life primarily as an arena for the struggle of the spirit with the ways of the flesh and the devil, which are symbolized and represented by all earthly pleasures, particularly the pleasures of sex. In the new virgin environment of America the Puritan was able to transform a portion of his internal conflict into a struggle with and conquest of nature, a feat which has brought him his material prosperity and business sagacity. Rejecting the Catholic mode of securing an anæsthetic for the conscience through ritual and sacerdotal intervention, the Puritan achieved the soothing of his conscience (as far as he did it at all) through gaining the esteem of his group. But this was a double-edged device, as it served to render the tyranny of conscience even more comprehensive by making him pathologically sensitive to herd approval and condemnation. The peculiarly important position of the mother in the Puritan family made possible a partial compensation or substitute for lack of a healthy sexual life and expression through a common form of emotional infantilism—the hold-over of the mother-image into the adult life and the psychic transference upon the mother of much of the repressed sexual energy.

In spite of the progress of enlightenment little has been achieved to rid the typical American of the Puritan neurosis, as rational education has not yet entered the field of morals and conduct, and the American is still afflicted in youth by the inculcation of the Pauline view of religion and morals. In some cases education has actually affected him adversely by destroying the efficacy of the forms of orthodox belief and practice, which earlier furnished a means of resolving to some degree his perpetual internal conflict, without at the same time affording direction and guidance in a sane theory of conduct. At the opposite pole in many ways was another early American type, the Virginian, which represented the leisurely and cultured European gentleman transferred to America. But the United States was destined to be an industrial society, and in the economic struggle the urbane Virginian was no match for the shrewd and restless Puritan with his boundless energy created by the necessity of working off his intolerable psychic conflicts.

The chapter on the mind of the American woman is less important, but significant. It emphasizes the manner in which the impurity-complex prevents any sex education in the home; how the informal sex education or experience gained through play-mates and associates intensifies the Puritan sense of guilt and shame; the psycho-genesis and apotheosis of the "home-and-mother type" of woman in America; the rise of the "chorus-girl" and flapper type as a revolt, and her struggle with the home-and-mother type for ascendancy with the American male; and the effect of the intellectual, economic and political emancipation of woman on the feminine mind in America.

Some might urge that Mr. O'Higgins has reversed cause and effect; that the American has not been industrious because he is a Puritan neurotic, but has become the typical Puritan because industry and self-denial were essential to the success of an ambitious but impecunious population in a new and undeveloped country. Doubtless there is much to be said for both view-points. And too much of an impression of chastity and celibacy is created in his analysis of the Puritan. There have been few more licentious types than the Puritan, as Mencken and others have repeatedly pointed out, though his lust was usually indulged in an approved and institutionalized fashion, namely, in the family embrace. What the Puritan lost in extra-conjugal amorosity he made up for in domestic uxoriousness, and Dr. Lay could uncover much evidence in support of his "plea for monogamy" by an examination of the series of gravestones in New England cemeteries attesting to the plural sacrifice of wives to the virility of Puritan deacons. And not a little Puritan piety is known to be but over-compensation for surreptitious achievement.

With the effort to bring under psycho-analytic scrutiny some of the most interesting and eminent figures in American political, literary, and industrial life, we can deal with less assurance. It can at least be said that the author has traveled in the right direction, even if his guide-posts have been quite inadequate, and that he has apparently made use of the best biographical material in his search for data on the complexes of these notables. He finds Mark Twain to be the victim of an inferiority-complex and the persistent censorship of the mother-image which was continued by his wife, all culminating in a philosophy of despair and pessimism. Lincoln suffered from cyclothemia, a melancholia disorder induced by a mother attachment and rebellion against the father, neither of

which was resolved by a happily consummated marriage. O'Higgins overlooks, however, Lincoln's peace of mind after his conversion which followed the death of his favorite son. Emerson's serenity was the product of a Jehovah-complex due to the absorption of God within himself. Repelled by the Puritan culture he became an introvert and fled from reality to a degree which ultimately resulted in serious amnesia. Carnegie was saved by his European youth from the Puritan lesion in early life, and his industry and sweet temper were due to love for, and desire of approval from, his mother. Anthony Comstock is introduced as one whose Puritanism took the form of direct and belligerent fanaticism, while P. T. Barnum is exhibited as an admirable example of compensatory Puritanism. Franklin is shown to have escaped from Puritanism and conflict through maternal indifference, probably begotten of her despair and preoccupation with the affairs of the enormous family. There was no strong mother-image to pursue and torment him. His energy and activity seem to have been due to a desire to triumph over the tyranny of older brothers. Longfellow appears as the romantic Puritan. His close relations with a cultured and tolerant mother, free from the savagery of the typical Puritan, gave him ever a romantic and idealistic attitude towards the other sex which freed him from inner conflict. Walt Whitman and Mark Hanna are presented as illustrations of efforts of Quakers to adjust the clash between the impurity-complex and the biologic urge. O'Higgins rejects the conventional tradition of Whitman as an accomplished *roué* and contends that his erotic verse was but compensation in phantasy for the failure of a really successful revolt against repressions. Mark Hanna is said to have resolved his conflicts through securing the esteem of his fellows as the successful "leader of his gang" in play, business, and politics. Julia Ward Howe illustrates the home-and-mother type brought about by a youth of distressingly thorough inculcation of Puritanical ideals. Anna Howard Shaw is alleged to be the typical Puritan spinster who rebels against male domination in state or family. Her attitude was largely conditioned by youthful revolt against her father. Margaret Fuller completes the list as the æsthetic rebel against Puritanism. Her views were produced primarily by her mother's love of beauty, but she was prevented from full expression of her natural bent because of her father's influence on her education, which was thoroughly Puritan in its cultural content and orientation. Just why

Poe was not included is not clear, especially as we have a good psycho-analytic study of him by Miss Pruette.

That many of the sketches are the most suggestive and plausible characterizations of the individuals studied which have yet been set forth is, of course, no final guaranty of their validity. Doubtless much material which would lead to a different conclusion has been overlooked, and perhaps the most significant facts bearing on the lives of these men and women are nowhere available. The defects of the book are those inherent in any such attempt, but the method is the only rational approach to interpretative biography. Mr. O'Higgins has done the work as well as it is likely to be achieved. No other figure in American literature to-day possesses greater command of the facts of dynamic psychology, and he has been further aided by a competent psychiatrist. The psyche of the departed is likely to remain a closely guarded secret for the most part; not even Freud and possibly not even God can furnish the key which will unlock the mystery.

XII. A CRITICAL VIEW OF PROGRESS ²³

A distinguished scholar, in commenting upon the *Syllabus of Errors* issued by Pius IX, remarked that the propositions condemned would make an admirable summary statement of the progress of modern thought from 1750 to 1864. It would be equally true to observe that those things which Professor Shafer assaults constitute the more remarkable and significant contributions to progressive thinking in the half century from 1860 to 1920. This is, indeed, a strange book. The author, an intelligent and amiable professor of English, whose philosophy is a seeming combination of the views and attitudes of Parmenides, Plato, St. Paul, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Kant, Cardinal Newman, Pius IX, Judge Gary, J. J. Walsh, and Dean West, has apparently been much irritated by the dynamic trends in modern thought and has "taken it out" through inveighing against them in some two hundred and fifty interesting and well-written pages.²⁴

Among the significant landmarks in modern philosophical, scientific, political, social and educational thought which are condemned, as varying from containers of a slight kernel of truth in a gigantic

²³ From the *Journal of Social Forces*, May, 1924.

²⁴ *Progress and Science: Essays in Criticism*. By Robert Shafer. New Haven: Yale University Press.

husk of error to completely pernicious influences, are E. G. Conklin's attempt to indicate the bearings of modern biology upon social evolution and social problems; Henry Adams' effort to obtain a cosmic background for the interpretation of history, and his view that "man's development is the record of the progressive degradation of vital energy"; F. S. Marvin's thesis that we have decent assurance of progress through the advances in pure and applied science, the growth of mechanical industry, and the material basis which these developments have contributed to the evolution of world unity; H. G. Wells' summary of history as a progressive, if variable, development toward a world state; the constructive criticism of the "acquisitive society" produced by unregulated capitalism, which is found in the works of G. D. H. Cole, R. H. Tawney and Bertrand Russell; Miss Follett's proposal for political reconstruction on the basis of a recognition and revitalization of the group and the group process; H. G. Wells' contention that the only way out of our present critical and intolerable situation is through the introduction of a rational system of education; the notion of Dewey, Flexner and others that this education should be concentrated on socially useful activities and should be adjusted to the practical needs of the age; and Walter Pater's endeavor to adapt a modified hedonism to the requirements of scientific naturalism. Just why James Harvey Robinson's *Mind in the Making* was not included in this extensive exhibit of the horrors of modern thought is not apparent. And we may hope that Mr. Shafer will never discover Freud!

Instead of these "intolerable dogmas" we are gravely assured that those who accept as a working hypothesis the notion of human progress "are hardly doing us any good, but are promoting rather beliefs and hopes which may in the end work an intolerable mischief in the world." Further, "there is neither any known law of human progress nor any likelihood that one will ever be discovered. There is good reason for suspecting that this may be not only because of the limits of human capacity but because none exists. . . . It is plain that the concept of social progress—far from doing what to the popular mind it at present seems to do—really empties the individual's life of all meaning and value."

Even more, we must escape from the transient and ephemeral things of this material existence and cultivate the transcendental realities of the world of the spirit. "The distinguishing charac-

teristics of man are not those which link him to other animals, but precisely those which differentiate him from them. . . . Long ago Plutarch remarked that a man had better be a pig than an Epicurean; that, in other words, a healthy pig approaches the Cyrenaic ideal more closely than can a being endowed with human faculties. . . . The fundamental values of life are inner, not outer; spiritual, not material; and an unmistakable warning has been given those men who place their dependence upon material satisfactions and upon the material rewards of industrial civilization. . . . We may shut our ears to words of gloomy warning and attempt so fully to enjoy ourselves as to forget, for a space, death's approach;—yet whatever we do we cannot banish that intruding figure, which will soon enough make an end of full meals and gay dances and joy-riding and all the variegated pride of life. . . . Life is fundamentally a struggle, and a struggle, moreover, which is never won, yet which is not always lost. And the field of this struggle is within the individual, whose fight is not against his fellows but against himself. . . . For plainly only he who realizes that there is a portion of his being which differs from and even opposes itself to his moral constitution and its surrounding world—only that man has become in the full sense of the word human and has freed his whole nature for the tasks and problems of life.”

In spite of its anachronistic core, its supernaturalism and casuistry and its ever obvious and evident dogmatism and irrelevancies, the book is not without a pertinent message. It shows rather conclusively that the remarkable scientific, technical and economic progress of the last century,—namely, the triumph of the “empire of machines”—does not necessarily mean demonstrable and universal improvement in human well-being. It further challenges the easy-going optimism of many prophets of progress and utopia. But the remedy is not to be found in a leap with Plato and Plotinus into the realm of the transcendental and spiritual, nor in a Pauline-Kantian contest within the soul. Such obscurantist and mystical avenues of relief are even more futile than the proposal of men like Tolstoi to go back to a pre-Industrial Revolution economy. The only possible and courageous solution is a scientific and eclectic scheme for a reconstruction of human motives and the proper social utilization and rational control of the unparalleled material advantages which we now enjoy, as a result of scientific and technical advances. And those writers

which Mr. Shafer flays are none other than the major prophets and creators of the new order, if there is to be any such.

Perhaps, fundamentally, the book is most interesting as an exhibit of the outlook of educators whose viewpoint is that of the pre-social science age. It expresses the outraged nature of the exponents of the punitive and penitential pedagogical ideals of disciplinary futility and "eternal values," as they contemplate the development of pluralism and pragmatism, the application of scientific psychology to education, and the growth of a vital interest in human and social problems. Mr. Shafer differs from numerous colleagues in the American university world chiefly in the fact that he has had the energy and opportunity to set down his grouch in print. The apostle of liberalism will be likely to express the pious wish that all of them will find it no less hard than did St. Paul to "kick against the pricks." And finally, the book is highly instructive as an illustration of the dangers to be met in leaving the field of one's technical proficiency and competence. The superiority of the chapter on Pater to the others in the book indicates the loss to literary criticism sustained as a result of Professor Shafer's unchaperoned foray into the field of social science and history.

XIII. THE WORLD OUTLOOK IN MODERN HISTORY²⁵

This is one of the most important contributions to modern European history which has been made by any writer in recent years.²⁶ It is also a contribution of major significance to what is at the same time the most neglected and yet the most important phase of international relations, namely, the general cultural significance of the contact of different peoples. The great historic importance for European society of the expansion of Europe and the commercial revolution between 1500 and 1750 had been appraised by Raynal in his *Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of Europeans in the East and West Indies*, published in 1771. Attention had also been called to this fact by Seignobos in Chapter XVII of his *Medieval and Modern*

²⁵ From the *Journal of International Relations*.

²⁶ *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700*. By James E. Gillespie. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. The work by J. B. Botsford, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*, is the logical sequel to Professor Gillespie's book.

Civilization, and by Seeley in Lecture V of his famous *Expansion of England*. Oversea expansion had also been woven into the general narrative in Professor W. C. Abbott's comprehensive account of modern history, *The Expansion of Europe*. But most of the conventional historians ignored this influence and serenely persisted in explaining modern times as the product of one or the other of two completely non-modern and backward-looking movements—the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation. It remained for Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia University to work out the first adequate synthesis of the origins of modern times in terms of the reaction upon European society of the expansion overseas and the resulting commercial revolution. His conclusions he summarized in three informing articles on "The Expansion of Europe" which appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly* in 1919. These may be regarded as the harbinger of a systematic work on the subject. In the meantime a valuable substitute may be found in Dr. Gillespie's book, which deals with the reaction of overseas expansion upon the country most influenced by this movement.

The book under review is a doctoral dissertation which follows very closely Professor Shepherd's line of interpretation as specifically applied to England. It describes in a forceful, comprehensive, and entertaining manner the effect of overseas expansion upon England in the fields of social relief and readjustment, manners and customs, commerce, industry, finance, morals and religion, thought, literature, art, and political development. The net result of the work is to impress upon the reader the fact that almost every phase of modern life was either called into being or powerfully advanced by the forces and influences flowing from the contact of England with lands across the sea. After assimilating the contents of this volume few writers will possess the temerity to associate either the Renaissance or the Reformation with the dawn of the modern age. Particularly important for students of international relations is the demonstration of the relation of the commercial revolution to the rise of nationalism in politics and economics.

The chief defect of the book is that it stops short at a wholly illogical point, 1700, instead of carrying the subject down to 1785 as Professor Shepherd does in his course on the expansion of Europe. Yet enough material is given to establish once for all

the determinating influence of the expansion of Europe in creating the modern world.

Perhaps the most vigorous exhortation in H. G. Wells' *Outline of History* was that historians attempt to write history from the point of view of a world outlook rather than from a narrow and artificial nationalistic type of arrangement and exposition. We have before us a highly successful effort to present the history of the last century according to this criterion for the reconstruction of historiography. It comes not from an amateur in historical writing, but from one of the most distinguished and progressive of European historians, Professor Eduard Fueter of Zürich. The author is already well known to American students through his monograph *Der Anteil der Eidgenossenschaft an der Wahl Karls V*, his masterly survey of the political origins of the modern age, *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559*, and above all, by his remarkable critical exposition of modern historiography, *Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie*, probably the most notable work on the history of historiography.

His *Weltgeschichte*²⁷ being a concrete and descriptive account of the leading events of the last century, this review can attempt no more than an estimate of the character and aims of the work. Probably the most important aspect of the book is its method of organization and the mode of selection and presentation of material. Professor Fueter expresses his guiding thoughts in the following paragraphs:

Previous world histories have been only a conglomeration. It was thought that a world history had been written when the events of the various continents had been articulated in a formal external fashion. Writers have chosen to be satisfied by mere juxtaposition when what was needed above all was a recording of the reciprocal action of the occurrences taking place in separate localities.

The present exposition has set for itself another problem. It will endeavor to survey the history of the last century actually from the standpoint of universal history. Not a schematic effort to set forth the history of the various continents as of equal importance is aimed at. A world history which bestowed as much attention upon the chance happenings of a group of African negroes

²⁷ *Weltgeschichte der letzten hundert Jahre, 1815-1920*. By Eduard Fueter. Zürich: von Schulthess & Co.

as upon the development of the British Empire would be as unworthy of the name as a history of Italy in the nineteenth century would be if it handled the history of the Duchy of Parma with as much detail as it did the history of the Kingdom of Sardinia. The selection of material must be so guided that occurrences of significance for world history will stand out in the foreground, and the criterion of importance must be the universal and not the local consequences. Europe and the European nations may, to be sure, be given first place; but from their history must be set forth intelligently, in precedence to all other matters, those phenomena which have been most influential beyond the European sphere of civilization.

A brief and lucid exposition is far better adapted to the achievement of this aim than a detailed narrative. If one has to refrain from discussing many interesting details it is all the easier to make clear the major lines of development and the connecting threads in the history of lands and peoples. The outlines of the background stand forth all the more clearly when the number of decorative figures in the foreground of the landscape is restricted to the most significant and essential ones.

The intelligent reader will be able to console himself if a popular and conventional anecdote or a name dear to him is either briefly mentioned or passed over entirely. For he will admit that what the present needs above all is a grasp upon history from the standpoint of a world outlook and not a collection of anecdotes. Far too long already has the conventional historical instruction in the schools represented the development of Europe as an isolated incident. It is high time that such a state of affairs should be terminated. And also from practical considerations. When, a century and a half ago, the historians of the *Aufklärung* for the first time undertook to create a real world history, their anticipation was scarcely more than a by-product of speculation in the field of the philosophy of history. In the twentieth century world politics and world economics have long since ceased to be mere academic problems. To this demand history must now adapt itself if it is to be seriously considered as an introduction to politico-economic thought.

Book I treats of the general background, forces and tendencies of the period discussed. Book II describes the rise and disintegration of the international (Quadruple) alliance against revolutionary tendencies after 1815. Book III traces the transition from the old colonial era to the age of modern national imperialism and world politics. Book IV analyzes the all-important struggle against the rise of the Fourth Estate, and traces the completion of the national state system in Europe. Book V sur-

veys modern national imperialism and world politics, including also the attempt to repress socialism, Russian and Austrian expansion in the Balkans, and the World War.

The allotment of space is symptomatic of the more recent tendencies in writing European history. Only about one hundred and thirty pages are given to the period before 1850, and three hundred and seventy pages are allowed for the treatment of the development of nationalism and imperialism. Considerable attention is paid to economic and social matters and their analysis is well woven into the general narrative. As an effort at synthesis it marks a step in advance of Hayes, for it not only assimilates the social and economic material to the political results, but also attains fair success in organization around the great tendencies and movements of the nineteenth century rather than about the progress in the several national states of Europe. While some would suggest the changing about of a few chapters, the book is, on the whole, logically arranged, the style is clear, and the tone objective and fair. On account of his life-long contract with European events the author moves with far greater ease, certainty and accuracy than the American textbook writers in untangling the complicated web of modern European history. It will probably be regarded as the best book available in which to secure an introduction to present-day world history, and it is gratifying to Americans to learn that steps are already being taken to insure the appearance of an English translation.²⁸

XIV. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ²⁹

Historians from the time of Herodotus have been prone to regard the events of their own age as of crucial importance, pivotal and epoch-making in the development of mankind. Hence it is not surprising to discover that the two massive volumes under review are alleged to deal with "the most momentous period of all history."³⁰ Yet it may be suspected that there is tangible and concrete evidence for believing that such a claim can be more justly

²⁸ Since executed by Professor Sidney Bradshaw Fay (New York: Harcourt, Brace).

²⁹ From "Books," the New York *Herald-Tribune*, September 21, 1924.

³⁰ *These Eventful Years; The Twentieth Century in the Making as Told by Many of Its Makers*. Edited by Franklin H. Hooper. The Encyclopedia Britannica Company.

and appropriately made for the last quarter of a century than for any other generation in the human past.

In addition to their vital relevance and immediacy for the intelligent general reader, these volumes are significant and instructive as illustrating some of the more notable tendencies in the historiography of contemporary times. In the first place, they demonstrate the unprecedented complexity and variety of the data, and the unparalleled richness of the sources at the disposal of the historian of the present age. It would be necessary to resort to considerable padding with irrelevant material of the most casual sort to fill two volumes of this bulk with the history of Western Europe during the thousand years from 200 A. D. to 1200 A. D. Yet as one examines the present work devoted to the developments of a quarter of a century, in spite of the eminence of the authors and their unusual success in scholarly compression and condensation, the most striking and uniform impression is likely to be that of the superficiality and inadequacy of every chapter from the standpoint of the specialist in that particular field or subject.

In the second place, these volumes illustrate the fact that this novel range and unique diversity of subjects has compelled the historical writing on the twentieth century to be a coöperative enterprise; scientists from many fields, technicians, statisticians, social scientists, explorers, prophets, literary critics, theologians, statesmen and diplomats need to be drafted for the service. What could be more instructive than to find along with the names of professional historians such as Professors Breasted, Hayes, Seymour, Latané and Chapman, those of Ludendorff, Jellicoe, Bertrand Russell, O. P. Austin, A. L. Bowley, Nitti, Wells, Brandes, Freud, Shailer Matthews, J. A. Thomson, Sir Oliver Lodge, Clive Bell, Madame Curie, H. E. Howe, Schwab and Colonel House!

The work is also coöperative in that American, French and German, as well as English, writers have participated, thus avoiding the insularity and provincialism which has characterized the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in earlier periods as to authorship and topics. Indeed, the editor appears to have overstepped himself in this regard and has perhaps relied too heavily on American writers. There are a number of topics intrusted to Americans which could have been more competently executed by certain English authorities. Finally, the work is a definite challenge to, and

an adequate refutation of, the traditional illusion that one cannot successfully write on the history of his own age.

The choice of authors for the various chapters has on the whole been a happy one, and if the editor's boast that he secured the "best writer" in the world for each chapter can scarcely be confirmed it is true that he gathered a distinguished group of scholars and publicists for the task at hand. While there are some cases where the choice has not only been relatively but absolutely bad, these instances are rare and are offset by many more in which it is literally true that the world's foremost authority has been secured to cover the particular topic of the chapter.

The editor has also been notably fair-minded and tolerant in arranging for the presentation of different views on the same subject. Thus, for example, we find Erich Ludendorff and Maximilian Harden discoursing from most sharply divergent standpoints upon the history of Germany since 1914; we read a critical account of contemporary French militarism and *revanche* in the long introductory section by J. L. Garvin, and the eulogy, rare and significant for a so-called Socialist, of the same events and policies by Albert Thomas; we discover the misleading and inaccurate statement by Dr. Wilbur that psycho-analysis has been a therapeutic failure, to be followed directly by a chapter by Freud himself which is characterized by an equally dubious claim for its comprehensive, diverse and versatile therapeutic potency. These illustrations of editorial fairness and tolerance and of the divergent views of authorities could be multiplied.

There are, however, some instances of unquestioned bias and unfairness. The vigorously anti-Bolshevik chapter by Mr. Farbman is not qualified by any favorable interpretation in another chapter, and it is a highly questionable procedure to introduce the photographs of Bela Kun and Admiral Horthy (Vol. II, p. 122) and allege that Horthy's superior military bearing and manly pulchritude is a proof of his higher character and more statesmanlike policies. History in general affords as little substantiation of the alleged and implied correlation between beauty of face and physique on the one hand and statesman-like sagacity and judicial poise on the other as does the history of Hungary since 1918. Many chapters show a definite *tendenz* which is left unchallenged; but for so vast an enterprise and so varied a group of contributors, the level of fairness and objectivity is unusually high. Nor should a reviewer fail to commend the editor for his

catholicity of interests. Few, if any, important subjects remain untouched in a work which ranges from the United States Steel Corporation to psychic research, from world trade statistics to psycho-analysis, and from the *Pithecanthropus erectus* to Clive Bell.

It would be quite futile to attempt to outline the scope and contents of these two volumes in any detail, as the mere table of contents occupies more space than that allotted to this summary, but the general plan, structure and space allotment can be adequately indicated. The background is constructed in a long introduction of some two hundred pages by J. L. Garvin, of *The London Observer*, in which he reviews the political, military and diplomatic history of the world from the Boer War to the Japanese earthquake of 1923. Though journalistic in tone, it is interesting and racy, generally accurate and discriminating, and distinctly progressive and constructive in viewpoint. The remainder of the two volumes is devoted largely to the World War, the peace negotiations and the world state by state, and assigns the last three hundred pages to a history of science, technology, industry, literature and other cultural developments, and social reform experiments and achievements.

This organization of material and the apportionment of space to the various topics reveal the most conspicuous weakness of the work as a dynamic and realistic history of the twentieth century. Though much material dealing with economic and financial matters is introduced, the framework and orientation of the work are still primarily political, military and diplomatic, and three-fourths of the space is devoted to such subjects. There is little effort to indicate the all-important fact that the basis for even the political and military history is to be found in scientific, technological and industrial changes and developments. These are slipped in at the close of the work as rather incidental to the main story, and the space given to them, though considerable, is quite inadequate, with the result that the significance of such analysis and description as are provided will be largely missed by all except up-to-date and synthetically oriented historians and social scientists.

The fact is that the scientific, technological and industrial developments alone can give the proper clew to an understanding of the history of the last century, and are so indispensable to the accurate interpretation of the events and tendencies of the last

quarter of a century as largely to invalidate any work which proceeds from any other premise. These novel material aspects of our civilization are what separate by a most impressive gulf the era of Napoleon and Metternich from our own day. When we turn to the political, military and diplomatic history we find the same old line and pattern of diplomatic duplicity, rhetorical bunk and political manipulation, whether we compare the policies and technique of Talleyrand and Clemenceau, Metternich and Poincaré, Napoleon and Foch, Alexander I and Woodrow Wilson, Castlereagh and Lloyd George. There has been no progress and no change of methodology; it may even be maintained that Kaunitz and Talleyrand might have offered illuminating instruction in diplomatic subtlety to the "Big Four" at the Paris conference of 1918-19 or that the French delegates at this meeting could have suggested much to Napoleon with respect to retaliatory savagery and oppressive exploitation of a conquered people. Even such contrasts as are evident in the battles of Ulm and Austerlitz as compared with Tannenberg and the Marne are due primarily and almost exclusively to progress in science and technology. And, as Professor Shotwell and his colleagues are abundantly proving, the war itself was most significant and instructive as an unparalleled displacement and readjustment of economic and social life and processes.

The most important aspects of the treaty were not the diplomatic and political, but the economic and financial, particularly the reparations sections and their disastrous aftermath. These likewise furnish the clew to the dominant political and diplomatic problems of Europe to-day, with the Dawes Plan as the latest culmination. Technology, as envisaged in the *aéroplane* situation, furnishes the key to Anglo-French relations since 1922. The Russian problem, in aspects varying from the Bolshevik legislation to the resentment of French holders of Russian bonds and the recognition policy of Secretary Hughes, is at bottom purely an economic and financial issue. The disarmament conference, so far as it related strictly to disarmament, was precipitated and controlled wholly by certain definite technological changes and situations, together with the financial considerations involved. And, finally, contemporary diplomacy is so thoroughly concentrated at present not merely on general economic issues, but upon a specific economic objective, that it has not inaccurately been designated as "oil-burning diplomacy."

If this history of our times had been planned according to the concepts and orientation of dynamic historiography it would not have been introduced by a superficial sketch of political history. It would instead have provided at the outset a long chapter by such a man as Professor Thomson on scientific progress since 1900. Then would have come a chapter outlining technological developments by some such writer as Professor Vierendeel. Next would have followed an account of the resulting alteration of economic institutions and processes by some such authority as J. A. Hobson, Sidney Webb, John Maurice Clark or Walton Hamilton. Finally, the setting would have been completed by some authority of the Veblenian persuasion, who would have shown the striking and ominous discrepancy between the enormous scientific, technological and industrial progress and the slight advance of political, social and ethical institutions and processes and the accompanying ideas and behavior patterns in the last century and a half. Then three-fourths of the remaining space could well have been devoted to a detailed survey of the scientific, technological, industrial, financial and cultural developments by particular fields, leaving about as much space at the close of the second volume for the political, military and diplomatic history of the last twenty-five years as that allotted to Mr. Garvin for his introduction. And this space would have been most instructively exploited if devoted primarily to indicating the anachronisms of contemporary politics and diplomacy as compared with the premises, technique and methodology of the men of science or the technician. Thus constructed, a work of the scope and bulk of *These Eventful Years* would have been able not only to give an adequate account of what has taken place therein but would also have offered many illuminating and helpful explanations as to why such things happened, and might have aided to no small degree in suggesting some possible methods of solving the perplexing and serious socio-politico-economic problems of to-day. As it is, the work is one of the most notable illustrations known to the writer of the not uncommon situation where a product of historical writing may be remarkably accurate in matters of fact and detail and still present a misleading general impression and interpretation of the period.

In spite of his strictures on the basic conception and plan of the work as a whole, the writer feels that the enterprise was not only highly worth while, even in its present form, but that its content

is pragmatically more valuable to the social scientist and publicist of to-day than all the combined historical works ever written on the period prior to 1700 A. D.

XV. THE COMEDY OF MAN ³¹

In this delightful satire ³² the talented author of the *Story of Mankind* treats himself to a hearty and comprehensive, if at times subtle and ironical, laugh at man and his ways from the Pithecanthropus Erectus to Calvin Coolidge. The brief text is just as uniquely Hendrickian as are the inimitable drawings which more than illuminate it. Here Van Loon brings into play his versatile equipment reaching from the illustrations of the favorite maxim of his old teacher that "the great lesson which history teaches us is that it teaches us nothing" to his penetrating facetiæ on the doings of the solemn, honest-to-God and right-thinking people in our midst. It is an allegory of urbane disillusionment which takes the form of a dialogue between "Wilbur"—a Hundred Percent Stetson—and Cedric the Cricket who plays Virgil to Wilbur's Dante in a cultural voyage which, like that of the great Italian, encompasses and envisages cosmology, theology, the history of civilization, philosophy and sociology. The elect will at once recognize instead of Cedric and Wilbur, Hendrick giving a typical contemporary "right-thinker" a "ride."

The movement begins with Zeus seated before the celestial "loud-speaker" endeavoring to listen in on Eddie Cantor, but interrupted by Wilbur's resonant Nordico-Bostonian arrogance over his position among Mr. Haddock's foreign-born habiliments. Enraged, Zeus summons Æolus and directs him to blow Wilbur to Kingdom-Come. Æolus starts for Wilbur, but finds the Greek quota at Ellis Island already full. So he has to borrow a pen from an attendant and write to his American cousin, Tam the Tornado, who carries out the request and whisks Wilbur out of the universe. Once out, he falls for eight hundred years and half an hour at the rate of 128954389785¾ yards per second until he lands in Lake Hi and Ho in that part of the world that does not exist. Here Cedric climbs aboard and begins his task of piloting Wilbur down the ages of history through the intricacies of

³¹ From "Books," New York *Herald-Tribune*.

³² *The Story of Wilbur the Hat*. By Hendrick Van Loon. New York: Boni and Liveright.

modern society. In hopeless dismay he finally leaves him convinced that enlightenment is impossible, and goes to live happily on the Island of the Ashes of the Martyrs, while Wilbur, fished out of a mill-pond and sold to a college sophomore for a dime, is likewise left to abide thereafter in peace and comfort.

By textual implication and illustrations Van Loon contrasts the Einsteinian cosmology and its concepts of vastness, complexity and order with the infinitesimal scope of Dante's puny single-tract cosmogony. Even more, he drives home the futility of hoping to "get over" the modern scientific view to the average man. Wilbur is allowed to reach the center of the cosmos and to stand at the heart of the problem of all Being. Here, in the footsteps of Spinoza and Kant, he announces with a loud guffaw that "the thing looks just like the inside of a Ford."

The theology of the Wilburnian drama is slight but cogent. One of the earliest exhibits pointed out to Wilbur by Cedric is a vast pile of defunct Gods which could not be disposed of once and for all "because they had meant so much to so many people for so many thousands of years." Everlasting fame rather than everlasting life is the reward which passes for heaven. There is no hell. The substitute for punishment is occasionally to allow people to do what they have long wanted to do. What passes for hell is a vast darkened enclosure constructed according to their own specifications for those who, when on earth, preferred to be in the dark about matters and live on in ignorance. In spite of the fact that residence herein is optional only seventeen have left in the last forty million years. But two devils are required, and they are given custody of the first man who told little children that "if they were not good they would go to Hell and burn." The whole arrangement seems dubious to Wilbur who argues that "hell is all right in its own way. We have got to have something of the sort for the common people. They must be kept in order." Christ is revealed on a lonely island as "He who spoke the wisest words that were ever uttered. But people paid no attention to what He said. They were indifferent. They fought and were uncharitable and did cruel things to each other. Then came the great war. It destroyed all that was good and fine and noble and it broke His heart. He left that nevermore might He hear the voice of man." Wilbur expresses great astonishment and remarks that Christ's despondency is quite unreasonable in the light of Wilbur's consistent record as a church-goer. This is the

blow that forced Cedric to jump off Wilbur's forecandle and make for the shore.

As an historian Wilbur qualifies instantly for the front trench among the solemn and respectable members of the American Historical Association. Egypt with its invention of the alphabet to allow the preservation of human thought and speech reminds him of Heinz's "fifty-seven varieties." He can see little of significance in the Babylonian discovery of time (historians did not until Professor Shotwell dwelt upon the subject a decade ago), and the origins of music, poetry and philosophy seem to him but the disastrous provision of so many more ways of wantonly wasting time. Greece and the Acropolis evoke no comment other than that they smell of onions. But at the sight of Rome, the memory of battles, walls and party struggles arouse Wilbur to vivid enthusiasm. Here is a "town that amounted to something." "This is what I call a city." He is unable to "get" Cedric's allusion to "shambles" in this connection. But Rome does not satisfy Wilbur. He confides to Cedric "there is one man for whom I would give all the rest of history. His name is Napoleon. I would rather see him than all those other strange birds further down the river." Cedric produces Napoleon but expresses his preference for Punch and Don Quixote, who never existed and hence would live forever.

The keenest satire is naturally found in the underlying philosophy of the dialogue. The figures most highly esteemed in the "world which does not exist" are the "men who made the world rock with laughter." Of these the four most eminent displayed by Cedric are Socrates, Erasmus, Montaigne and Lincoln. Wilbur is outraged to find that Cedric could conceive that Lincoln would consort with such lewd and ungodly company. Next in order come the men with ideas, who dominate and direct this non-existent world, and are the only fellows capable of up-setting planets. Wilbur is puzzled. Characteristic intellectual types are passed in satirical review. The professor is aptly likened to a stove so stuffed with coal that it generates neither glow nor heat. The doctrinaires and dogmatists are revealed on "the high pinnacles of their own perfection," rendered immune to the discomforts of their exposed positions "because they are too busy arguing. They are all of them right, absolutely r-i-g-h-t, and they love to tell the world so." Cedric then shows Wilbur the labyrinth built to order for the logicians and metaphysicians who

"spend all of their days syllogizing and disputing and controverting and building up arguments that could not possibly lead anywhere." They will never get anywhere, and "that is exactly where they want to go." The theologians are introduced under the guise of Turks who have erected ever so many delicately balanced inverted pyramids which could be toppled over only through the mention of one mystic word. Unhappily Wilbur chances to hit upon this very word, and at the utterance of the word "Truth" all the pyramids tumble to the ground. Wilbur is aghast at the damage he has wrought, but Cedric reassures him by telling him that nothing will please the theologians more than to begin the whole process over again in exactly the same manner.

Cedric and Wilbur are dazzled by a brilliant light which Cedric explains to be the signal, occurring about once in a century, indicating that a genius is about to be born. Wilbur inquires as to why so much fuss should be made over a genius, and Cedric answers him severely that geniuses appear "so that we need not altogether despair of the human race." Wilbur contends that we cannot all be geniuses, but Cedric counters that at least we can hitch our wagons to stars. Wilbur demurs that this is far too dangerous an enterprise, but Cedric suggests that it will provide illuminating and instructive entertainment up to the moment of the potential neck-breaking plunge. The very idea, however, so frightens Wilbur that he longs above all else for the protecting presence of the traffic cop on the corner of Forty-second Street and Fifth Avenue.

The comment on economic and social aspects of life and history is devastating. Cedric shows enthusiasm in exhibiting the origins of technology in fire, weapons and the wheeled vehicle, but grows despondent at its culmination in the "empire of machines" which even Wilbur recognizes to have made over mankind into a race of "funny little ants," scampering out of the smoke-infested factories. Still Wilbur retains his admiration for the great engineers and inventors, particularly those who have erected our modern bridges and sky-scrapers, and asks Cedric to produce the greatest of all builders. Cedric agrees and hauls forth Stradivarius. Wilbur has never heard of him, and when he learns that he is a fiddle-maker he thinks Cedric "as crazy as a loon." Cedric reveals to Wilbur humanity in action under the form of "fussy little men who spend their lives doing fussy, inconsequential things" comparable to picking petals off perennially recurring crops of daisies;

of industrious plutocrats who, having sacrificed all for money, are busily engaged at the end of the rainbow searching for the pot of solid satisfaction which does not exist; and of a herd of God-fearing klansmen chasing a terrified representative of their own kind. So much for the descriptive sociology!

In his qualitative analysis of *homo-sapiens* Cedric presents most of the classic and familiar types. There are first the sages who roam the world alone in conspicuous solitude. At the other extreme is found the greatest crowd of all, made up of those "people who in the world were always going to do something nice for some one else and then forgot about it." But Cedric tells Wilbur that in the world which does not exist they consider even worse that great horde of "first-rate citizens who are good because they don't do anything bad and are proud of it." Wilbur alleges that Cedric slanders this saintly band and demands that he be shown the complete record of their lives and deeds. Cedric readily assents and presents to Wilbur's gaze a large and impressive sheet of blank white paper. Yet the most unfortunate of all humans are those who are given over to eternal worrying about what their neighbors think of them. These are represented by Cedric (with Hendrick's artistic aid) as standing on a tight rope over a great chasm with a roaring fire at the bottom and huge serpents menacing them from the cliffs on either side. The saddest thing about it all is that they are not privileged to fall into the flames and have it all over with at once. Wilbur was moved to unpleasant introspection by the spectacle.

Few of our fellow-countrymen will ever see this book, most of those who pick it up will look at the funny pictures it contains in much the same manner as they examine the comic section of the *Sunday American*, others will sagely recommend it as a collection of charming bed-time stories for infants, but a favored few will find in it more subtle and relevant wisdom than can be gleaned from all of Dante's colossal epic. Meanwhile the comedy will proceed according to the familiar patterns.

XVI. THE COSMIC PERSPECTIVE OF MR. WELLS ⁸³

Limitations of space makes it impossible to attempt in this place a detailed estimate of the contributions of Mr. Wells to historiog-

⁸³ From the *Journal of International Relations*.

raphy.³⁴ Opinions have varied widely from the eulogies of the *New Republic* and James Harvey Robinson to the critical estimates of J. S. Schapiro and Ellsworth Huntington and the severe strictures of Carlton Hayes. Only a few of the more significant characteristics can be noted. A most important aspect of the book is the treatment of the geological and biological background of history. Like Stanley Hall and the genetic psychologists, he compels us to follow the pages of our "family album" back to the trilobites; indeed, he goes back to the cosmic processes and the evolution of the earth. The novel, thorough and convincing reconstruction of our time perspective is the most impressive phase of Mr. Wells' work and makes the orthodox views of Ussher and Lightfoot stand out as curious anachronisms and vestiges of primitive thought. This section is followed by a good readable summary of the cultural development of man in the so-called "pre-historic" period and furnishes the final argument for the discarding of that term. The "background" of history is thus covered in a more thorough and illuminating manner than in any previous and readily accessible work on history in the English language.

Wells' attitude toward the interpretation of history is evident from his statement that since the time of the Cro-Magnon man "all history is fundamentally a history of ideas," biological improvement having ceased thousands of years ago. Though Mr. Wells does not consistently hold to this criterion in his selection of material, the declaration of outlook is significant. In the section on oriental antiquity the only notable chapter is that on social classes and conditions. He does, however, bring India and China out of the conventional oblivion and links them up with the history of the near orient. In dealing with classical antiquity he has good summary chapters on Greek thought, literature and science. The history of Rome is disappointing and misleading. In a manner which must have made Mommsen turn in his grave and Warde Fowler boil with rage Wells goes far beyond Ferrero in belittling Julius Cæsar, who appears in his pages as a fated adventurer, opportunist and libertine. Not only does he fail adequately to point out even the conventionally recognized contributions of Rome to human culture in the fields of law, imperial administration and engineering, but there is no synthesis of the social history of Roman decline such as one finds in Fowler, Dill, Friedländer, Vinogradoff and

³⁴ *The Outline of History*. By H. G. Wells. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920, two vols., xix, 648 pp.; x, 676 pp.

Marquardt. Yet there are many brilliant passages in the treatment of Rome which perform an invaluable service in putting the necessary quietus on the excesses of the classical enthusiasts. The treatment of the origins of Christianity is one of the most effective portions of the book. Supernaturalism is utterly absent, yet there is a proper recognition of the revolutionary nature of Christianity and the social message of Jesus. This chapter should be read along with those tracing the rise of Buddhism and Mohammedanism as models of objective handling of difficult emotional subjects.

The second volume, much more than the first, descends from illuminating, if incomplete, synthesis to conventional epitomizing. The record of history from 800 to 1914 is chiefly a judicious and well written compendium of the more impersonal phases of the conventional political history, though with some significant references to economic, social and intellectual factors in chapters xxxv and xxxix. The social history of the middle ages is ignored and that of modern times very inadequately dealt with. This is a surprising omission from the pen of a "social absolutist." The World War is convincingly demonstrated to have been but the logical and inevitable outcome of the "armed peace." Excellent diagrams, charts and maps are provided to aid and orient the reader. It would, of course, be presumptuous for an academic historian even to praise Mr. Wells' style.

It is rather difficult to appraise the success of his work, as one may readily condemn him for failing to achieve that which he in no way undertook to accomplish. It is doubtful if the *Outline* is anything like as good a synthesis of world history as is to be found in a combination of Breasted's *Ancient Times*, Robinson's *Western Europe*, and Fueter's *World History*. Those who have been fortunate enough to attend Professor Shotwell's famous course at Columbia University will readily realize how far Wells has failed to present a synthesis of the social history of the western world. By comparing Book III of Wells with Part II of Breasted's *Ancient Times* or his articles on "The Origins of Civilization" in the *Scientific Monthly* one can determine for himself the gap that separates the enterprising amateur from the technically competent historian with synthetic powers. Or a comparison of the second volume of Wells with Hayes' *Political and Social History of Modern Europe* will prove the former's relative failure to assimilate the political history to the economic and social background. The two great transitions in modern times, the expan-

sion of Europe and the Commercial Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution, do not stand out clearly from his pages.

Yet, with these obvious defects, Mr. Wells' achievement marks an enormous advance over Freeman, Stubbs, Gardiner and the political, episodal and anecdotal historians in the demarcation of the field and subject-matter of history—and is fairly representative of the shift of interests in historical interpretation. It is probably better for the future of history that Mr. Wells has succeeded to some reasonable degree in doing this than it would have been to have had a technical historian accomplish a far better synthesis. For the scholar the synthesis already is available in a few well selected works with which he is familiar. But thousands will read Wells where one will read such works as those by Breasted, Jastrow, Zimmern, Botsford, Marquardt, Luchaire, Cunningham, Gillespie, Sombart, Pollard, Mantoux, Bowden, Marvin, Abbott, Zimmermann, Hayes, Fueter, Becker and Turner. *Wells will make the indispensable connection between the intelligent public and the "new history,"* and his work will be likely to prove a landmark in historical standards and appreciation comparable to the appearance of Gibbon, Green or Andrew D. White's *Warfare of Science and Theology*. Exponents of progressive historical concepts will have easier sailing with the generation that has absorbed Wells. This, it would seem, is the main significance of Mr. Wells' work for historiography.

Students of international relations will be interested in Mr. Wells' work chiefly because of his effort to interpret history from the standpoint of world unity and the progressive approximation to world order and organization. As the author says in his introduction:

This book has been written primarily to show that *history as one whole* is amenable to a more broad and comprehensive handling than is the history of special nations and periods, a broader handling that will bring it within the normal limitations of time and energy set to the reading and education of an ordinary citizen. . . .

The need for a common knowledge of the general facts of human history throughout the world has become very evident during the tragic happenings of the last few years. Swifter means of communication have brought all men closer to one another for good or for evil. War becomes a universal disaster, blind and monstrously destructive; it bombs the baby in its cradle and sinks the food-ships that cater for the non-combatant and the neutral. There can be no peace now, we

realize, but a common peace in all the world; no prosperity but a general prosperity. But *there can be no common peace and prosperity without common historical ideas*. Without such ideas to hold them together in harmonious coöperation, with nothing but narrow, selfish, and conflicting nationalist traditions, races and peoples are bound to drift toward conflict and destruction. This truth, which was apparent to that great philosopher Kant a century or more ago—it is the gist of his tract upon universal peace—is now plain to the man in the street. Our internal politics and our economic and social ideas are profoundly vitiated at present by wrong and fantastic ideas of the origin and historical relationship of social classes. A sense of history as the common adventure of all mankind is as necessary for peace within as it is for peace between nations. Such are the views of history that this outline seeks to realize.

It may readily be conceded that Mr. Wells has succeeded in this aspect of his work far better than in producing a synthesis of historical data. Yet even here there are serious shortcomings. His understandable hatred of war makes it hard for him to do justice to states that have figured as conquering nations. This is, perhaps, most obvious in his history of Rome. But the greatest defect in this phase of his work is his revival of the "Aryan myth." To be sure, he recognizes that linguistic affinities do not signify racial unity, but the term "Aryan" symbolizes and implies so much which was wholly vicious in the nineteenth century history, politics and anthropology that it is most unfortunate that it has been revived and given wide currency at a time when it was about to be shoved into the limbo of anachronistic monstrosities. One finds it difficult to imagine what good use the term can serve when it includes within the category of "Aryan-speaking peoples" such widely different physical types as Teutons and Celts, or when the linguistic similarities are discernible only by trained philologists, and the actual verbal communication between the various groups of "Aryans" is impossible without interpreters and translations. As a practical fact there is little in the remote linguistic affinities alone which would make a Frenchman any more congenial to a Teuton than to a Turk. The Aryan obsession was probably the most potent cause of racial egoism, in nineteenth century Europe, from Gobineau to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and it is doubtful whether Wells' world outlook in his history will do as much good as his revival of the "Aryan" fallacy will harm. As bad as the revival of the "Aryan" myth is Wells' reliance upon the vagaries

of Elliot Smith regarding the diffusion of culture which leads him to separate the Mediterranean type from the Teutonic as to original derivation.

Wells' handling of the World War, its antecedents and results, constitutes a most powerful argument in favor of those who look forward to an establishment of a stable world organization. Whatever one may think of Mr. Wells' achievements in organizing and presenting world history, his work as a whole is the most voluminous and convincing historical defence of constructive internationalism which has been contributed by any writer. If, as seems likely, this was his dominating purpose in producing the work, he may feel justly proud of his performance.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Andrews, C. M., "These Forty Years," in *American Historical Review*, January, 1925; Barnes, H. E., *The New History and the Social Studies; The Social History of the Western World*; Chapter on "Recent Tendencies in History," in E. C. Hayes (Ed.), *Recent Tendencies in the Social Sciences*; Cheyney, E. P., "Law in History," in *American Historical Review*, January, 1924; Dunning, W. A., "A Generation of American Historiography," in *Publications of the American Historical Association*, 1917; Haskins, C. H., "European History and American Scholarship," in *American Historical Review*, January, 1923; Kroeber, A. L., *Anthropology*; Marshall, L. C., *The Story of Human Progress*; Robinson, J. H., *The New History; The Humanizing of Knowledge*; Schlesinger, A. M., *New Viewpoints in American History*; Teggart, F. J., *Prolegomena to History; The Processes of History*; Todd, A. J., *Theories of Social Progress*; Wallace, W. K., *The Trend of History; The Passing of Politics*; Wells, H. G., "History for Everybody," in *Yale Review*, July 1921.

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM¹

I. INTRODUCTORY DEFINITIONS

No concepts in history, politics or sociology are to-day more important or evident, and, yet, at the same time, more difficult to define than the terms *nationality* and *nation*. To the writer it seems that a *nation* is a culturally homogeneous social group, which is at once conscious and tenacious of its unity of psychic life and expression. Some writers, especially Ernest Renan, have emphasized the "will" or desire to live together as the essence of a nation, but as more profound students, particularly the sociologists, have made clear, this will to live in, and to preserve the unity of, the group exists only where there is a very high degree of cultural and psychic likeness and unity. The most fundamental basis and characteristic of a nation, then, is cultural homogeneity, from which the will to exist in contiguity naturally proceeds. If such a group is at the same time politically organized within a given territory it may then be designated a *national state*. The term *nationality* is frequently used to describe a culturally homogeneous group which has not yet attained complete national and political unity, but it seems that this view only brings a confusion of terms. Rather, the term *nationality* should be used as a general descriptive and collective expression somewhat analogous to the broader meaning of the term *politics* in relation to a study of the state. It is a generic and comprehensive concept which refers to and describes that variable ensemble of physical and psychic elements which generate the cultural homogeneity and group self-consciousness and solidarity forming the foundations of a nation. The dynamic expression of the cultural and political activities and ambitions of a nation or national state is most usually and logically known as *nationalism*. While frequently used in the invidious sense, indicating political or cultural aggressiveness, such an implication is

¹ From the *Encyclopedia Americana*.

not essentially involved in the definition, even if it is normally to be observed in the practical operation of nationalism. In the static or analytical sense, nationalism is conventionally used to designate the modern political system or order, based as it is upon the unit of the national state. The history of nationalism then is essentially the tracing of the rise and development of the nation and the national state.

The history of the development of nations and national states is a most complicated problem. So difficult is it to determine just when tribal or pre-political society ends and political society begins and so many and deep-seated are the aspects of psychic life and cultural characteristics which are carried over from the tribal period into the political, that it is well-nigh impossible to say that one can fix any definite period as marking the origin of nations. One can scarcely agree with Israel Zangwill that the tribally organized Jews of ancient Palestine constituted a national state in the sense which that term would be used to describe the Germany of Bismarck and Treitschke and Reventlow, or the Italy of Crispi and Carducci and Sonnino, and, yet, it is not easy to deny the force of his criticism of those writers who find nations to be wholly a phenomenon of very recent origin. Rather, it is best to agree that modern nations have their constituent psychic elements deeply rooted in the tribal past and that the history of nationalism and of nation-building is essentially the tracing of the expansion of cultural entities and of the sociological centers of emotional fixation; in other words, the record of the expansion and rationalization of "herd-instinct." As human society has undergone tremendous transformations in the period from the gradual breakdown of tribal society to the twentieth century, there are differences of corresponding scope and significance between the nature and the mode of expression of group psychology and culture in tribal society and in the national states of to-day. The most profound and far-reaching of these contrasts are connected with the conversion of the basis of group solidarity, from the standpoint of social control, from blood-kinship, real or assumed, to a definite territorial habitat, and with the development of what is conventionally known as "political society." The distinctions will appear clearly only upon the careful historical analysis of the development of the constituent principles of the nations of to-day. It is this fact that renders such a survey of vital importance, entirely aside from the specific content of the historical facts enumerated.

II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE STAGES IN THE ORIGINS OF NATIONALITY AND NATIONS PREVIOUS TO THE RISE OF THE MODERN NATIONAL STATES

I. *Tribal Society.*

It is now generally agreed among students of cultural anthropology that the earliest well-defined units of social organization were either the village and local group, or the clan, both of which were normally grouped with others of the same type in a larger and looser entity—the tribe. While much of the psychology of tribal relationships and activities has been carried over into modern society, the contrasts between tribal society and the modern national state are many and obvious. Tribal society was primarily based upon blood-kinship, either real or assumed, and tribal relations were personal rather than political. Force, custom and blood-feud were the foundation of tribal juristic concepts and methods. The “instinct of the herd” had a much fuller sway over the group than it has at the present day. Cultural solidarity was more intense and there was little personal individuation, except that which set off a few leaders from the mass of the group. An intense religious loyalty and attachment to all the symbols of group unity were ever present and evident. So great was the domination of the group over the individual that some eminent students, such as Durkheim and his school, have even gone so far as to claim that all of the categories of religion, thought and knowledge in the primitive group were derived from the expressions of, and reactions to, group life and activities. Indeed, Durkheim finds that the essence and foundation of religion is but the psychic exuberance or stimulation from group life and activities and Trotter holds the “instinct of the herd” to be the primordial and all-pervading psychic force controlling man from the origin of the race to the present day.

Whatever may be the exaggerations of these writers in matters of detail, it is generally agreed that the struggle for the preservation and extension of group solidarity has been the basic factor and process in the evolution of mankind, and it was inevitable that the psychic traits developed in this process would become grounded deep in the mental life of humanity. The tremendous importance of this discipline in group life for the subsequent development of humanity has been admirably summa-

alized by Professor Hankins: "Man is in fact fundamentally social by nature. He has never lived in isolation but always in groups. Lacking special organs of defense he found strength, as did the ants and the bees, in group solidarity. Consequently the struggle for existence on the human plane has been fundamentally a struggle of group with group. Since his survival turned largely on the perfection of his gregarious instinct, there has been achieved in man a keen sensitiveness to the call of the group. This herd instinct, as Trotter calls it, is, therefore, the very basis of human society and the most profound aspect of man's social nature. It is for the group what the instinct of self-preservation is for the individual. It is aroused only in times of stress and danger; group fear in some form is essential to its development; when awakened it not only grips every tribesman in an atmosphere of electrified suggestibility, but stirs within his bodily mechanism the internal secretory apparatus whose products are essential to deeds of valor. It is in its strength and vigor an assertion of the group will to live, and is therefore as deep and mysterious and indeed as permanent as the eternal *nisus* of nature, the insistent push of everything that throbs with life and energy."

Further, tribal groups were relatively small, as compared to modern political aggregates, and were little attached to any particular territory. While such groups often held with great tenacity to particular areas on account of special economic advantages, such as better fishing or hunting grounds, it was the economic phases of the attachment rather than the purely territorial which played the predominating part. There was little hesitancy in leaving a particular locality to follow migrations of game or fish. This matter has been well summed up by Professor Robinson: "Patriotism, the love of one's *terra patria*, or natal land, is a recent thing. During far the greater part of his existence man has wandered over the earth's face as a hunter and can hardly have had any sweet and permanent associations with the tree or rock under which he was born. But the fore-runners of territorial emotion were the group loyalties of the tribe, clan, family and totemistic group, in whatever order and with whatever peculiarities these may have originated and come to exist side by side."

2. *Early City-States.*

The transition from tribal groupings and modes of life to the city-state, the earliest type of political organization, was gradual

and slow. The chief contrast between tribal society and that of the proto-historic city-states was that in the latter the basis of group and individual relations was gradually coming to be political and territorial, rather than purely personal and consanguineous. For many and diverse reasons, groups tended to consolidate about certain vantage points determined by considerations of fortification and protection, religious significance, economic superiority and better potentialities for robbery and brigandage. Stability replaced the earlier nomadic life, and the habitat became more or less permanent. The early city-states did not, however, at all resemble the modern urban centers of life and industry. Life was still primarily agricultural, and the "city" was little more than a citadel surrounded by the homes of the peasants who would retire within the walls in time of danger. As trade developed and the division of labor between city and country was established, the early city-states assumed more of a commercial character and the coming of foreign merchants produced those problems of assimilation and the extension of citizenship which were a chief force in breaking down the remaining vestiges of tribal society and in creating the origins of the modern political order. A few historical or semi-historical instances of this specific and all-important change from tribal to civil society have been preserved in historical records. Such were the occupation and retention of ancient Palestine by the Jews and their subsequent choice of a king; the constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes in Attica at the close of the sixth century B. C.; the alleged reforms of Servius Tullius in early Rome and the subsequent constitutional struggle between the patricians and plebeians; and the breakdown of Teutonic tribal society and the establishment of political relations in the interval between Arminius and Alaric—the transition which Paul Vinogradoff has called "one of the most momentous turning-points in the history of the race."

Important as were the city-states of antiquity as a stage in political and social evolution, they were soon submerged in the great patriarchal empires which arose in the "state-making age" through the superior force and aggressiveness of one of these cities which compelled the submission and enforced the subjection of others. The ancient Egyptian Empire was a product of the forcible subjugation of the numerous city-states of the Nile Valley; the Babylonian, Assyrian and Persian empires were built up out of the progressive amalgamation of the city-states of the valleys of the

Tigris and Euphrates and the coast of Asia Minor. Only the cities of ancient Hellas retained their independence long enough during the historical period to give any adequate conception of the type of cultural solidarity and political reactions which characterized the antique city-state. Here personal and kinship relations had been replaced by the institution of citizenship, based upon residence and naturalization instead of blood-relationship or elaborate initiation ceremonies designed to confer the sanction of artificial relationship. Groups were generally more populous and civilization more advanced than in tribal society.

Most of the psychic characteristics of tribal life, however, were, if in a modified degree, present in the civilization of Athens, which may be taken as the most advanced product of the ancient city-state civilization. Group solidarity was still intense. The elements of common culture were prized even to the extent of being vested with a sacred significance. Ceremonies, costumes, legal and political forms and practices, moral codes, religious festivities, and even amusements were tinged with the divinity of their alleged origin. The gods were limited to the group and were regarded as wholly solicitous for the welfare of the particular political and social entity. The attitude toward foreigners was well exemplified by the well-known contrast between "Greek and Barbarian," in which Aristotle was able to find a justification for the subjection of inferior peoples to the Greek "genius" for governing. The group leaders passed after their death into the realm of the gods or supermen and their magnified and exaggerated prowess became a most highly prized group possession. In addition to these phases of group solidarity and symbolic unity, which had their roots in tribal psychic life, a new attachment to territorial possessions arose when fixity of habitat had become the rule. Not only were particular sacred places, such as Olympus and Delphi, prized and venerated, but the whole habitat of the group was valued as a special gift from the gods. Aristotle found that the fortunate situation of the Greeks in their geographical habitat served sufficiently to explain the "superiority" of Greek genius.

The ancient city-states seemed well on the way toward transforming group life from the tribal to the modern national basis and had made notable advances in that direction. Had their progress not been arrested by the development of the great patriarchal empires, mentioned above, the national state in its completeness

might have been a product of antiquity. For better or worse, however, this was not to be, and even Athens itself was swallowed up in the imperial domains of the Macedonian conqueror after its African and Asiatic prototypes had long before bowed to the might of Thebes, Memphis, Babylon, Nineveh, Ecbatana, Sardis and Susa. James Bryce has admirably described the general absence of anything approaching a national cultural or political unity before the conquests of Rome: "Men with little knowledge of each other, with no experience of wide political union, held differences of race to be natural and irremovable barriers. Similarly, religion appeared to them a matter purely local; and as there were gods of the hills and gods of the valleys, of the land and of the sea, so each tribe rejoiced in its peculiar deities, looking on the natives of other countries who worshipped other gods as Gentiles, natural foes, unclean beings. Such feelings, if keenest in the East, frequently show themselves in the early records of Greece and Italy; in Homer the hero who wanders over the unfruitful sea glories in sacking the cities of the stranger; the primitive Latins have the same word for a foreigner and an enemy; the exclusive systems of Egypt, Hindostan, China are only the more vehement expressions of the belief which made Athenian philosophers look upon a state of war between Greeks and barbarians as natural, and defend slavery on the same ground of the original diversity of the races that rule and the races that serve."

3. *The Patriarchal Empires of Antiquity.*

The formation of the extensive and autocratic patriarchal empires in what Bagehot has somewhat loosely called "the nation-making age" was one of the most important and sweeping transformations in the political and social evolution of humanity. Paradoxical as it may seem, they both stifled and promoted the growth of nations and nationalism. Their development was invariably brought about by the cumulative extension of the power and prestige of some more powerful and aggressive city-state at the expense of its neighbors. This very process naturally produced an enormous inflation of group pride and egotism on the part of the conquering city. Also, while subject cities were severely treated and their national culture sternly repressed, nothing makes a group so proud and tenacious of its cultural characteristics and possessions as persecution, and the conquerors unwittingly only intensified the particularism and local pride of such

subject communities as maintained and preserved their corporate existence. The history of the ancient empires is little more than a record of constant warfare produced by the attempt of the ruling city and dynasty to repel and suppress the revolts of subject cultural groups.

This process of ancient empire-building culminated in the expansion of imperial Rome, in its task of absorbing most of the then-known world and of bringing into existence the ideal "reign of universal peace" and uniform law. It is probable that the process of Roman expansion marked the nearest approximation to the spirit and methods of aggressive nationalism that was witnessed before the dynastic wars surrounding and accompanying the development of the modern national states. The crude and almost tribal expression of collective egotism in "international" policy; the public theory that all her wars were "defensive" and that Rome was always threatened by aggressive states; the alleged conviction that the gods were always favorable to these defensive wars; the control of diplomatic and military policy by the landed "Junker" aristocracy—the Senate: the ambition for private or family glory in war, as manifested by Claudius in the first Punic War and by Flaminius in the second Macedonian War; the "surplus population" argument for expansion; the "scrap of paper" attitude toward treaties as evidenced in the second Samnite War; the harsh and brutal treatment of conquered populations, extending to the devastation of fields, the burning of cities and the enslaving of populations; the insatiable greed for further expansion; the disregard of the "rights of small nationalities"—all of these aspects of Roman expansion, which are so familiar to students, sound exceedingly modern.

While this process of the formation of empires was most influential in creating the tradition of the glory of territorial expansion which was to serve as an important impulse to the aggressiveness of the modern national and territorial state, it should not be forgotten that there was a most radical difference between the political and cultural basis of such a political entity as the Roman Empire and the German Empire of a decade ago. Though there was a uniform and universal political system, there was no cultural homogeneity or common sentiment of loyalty, which are the indispensable foundations of the national state. Only the citizens of Italian Rome felt any emotional thrills or patriotic reaction at the triumphal processions of the conquering emperors or generals and

at the recitation of the Virgilian epic of the growth of the *Pax Romana*. Though the subject peoples might formally acquiesce in the apotheosis of the Roman emperor and render a lip reverence and allegiance they preserved openly or secretly their admiration for their own heroes and leaders and retained their deeper loyalty and allegiance to their own pantheon. A common spontaneous patriotism and a general loyalty to the sovereign imperial state were quite unknown in the ancient empires, and the cultural homogeneity which must precede the political expression of national life was as remote from realization. Even the prevailing political philosophy—Stoicism—decried the sentiment of nationalism and patriotism, and lauded the notion of the brotherhood of man and the cosmopolitanism of world-citizenship. Lord Bryce thus depicts the nature and operation of the Roman imperial system, so different from the modern political order based on the national state: "No quarrels of race or religion disturbed that calm, for all national distinctions were becoming merged in the idea of a common Empire. The gradual extension of Roman citizenship through the *colonia*, the working of the equalized and equalizing Roman law, the even pressure of the government on all subjects, the movement of population caused by commerce and the slave traffic, were steadily assimilating the various peoples. . . . From Rome came the laws and language that had overspread the world; at her feet the nations laid the offerings of their labor: she was the head of the Empire and of civilization, and in riches, fame and splendor far outshone, as well the cities of that time as the fabled glories of Babylon or Persepolis."

Had Rome continued to exist with an improved method of imperial administration and economics for 2,000 years after her "fall," it might have been possible for her to have welded her diverse subject populations into a single loyal and unified national unit, but the experiment was not allowed. In 378 A. D., the Teutonic barbarians from the North, who had been gradually filtering into the empire for three centuries, broke their leash and started on their migrations, which submerged the ancient world in the return of pre-classical barbarism and produced a Clovis, a Charlemagne and an Otto the Great to repeat the tasks of an Agamemnon, an Alexander and an Augustus. The ancient world, then, passed without producing the complete parallel of the modern national state, but it laid the psychological and political basis upon which it could develop, though it must not be forgotten that the

growth of the modern national state has been to a large degree a process *sui generis*, primarily independent of ancient impulses, even if influenced by ancient models.

The psychological contributions of Rome to modern nationalism and the continuity of Roman egotism and jingoism in modern militarism and patriotism have been eloquently stated by a distinguished contemporary historian in the following citation: "The Roman spirit was bequeathed to Europe. Beneath all the art and letters, all the industry and commerce, all the advance in humanity throughout European history, that Roman idea remains. When the old nations speak of patriotism they mean the memory of their glorious wars. War has been their constant occupation and preoccupation. Not a generation that has passed since Virgil, but has paid its terrible toll on the field of carnage to the ideal of pacifying the world by arms. It is not alone Germany, with the celebration of its men of blood and iron from Otto the Great to Otto von Bismarck. The French too, rejoice in the Napoleonic legend. They have their glorious wars of the *Grand Monarque*. They bow before the white plume of Henry of Navarre, and thrill to the echo of Roland's horn at Roncesvalles. The English have their proud memories of Agincourt and Blenheim and Crecy and Waterloo and celebrate their Napiers and Nelsons and little "Bobs." All these nations of old Europe have their glorious traditions of war, and each one can find enough victories in the uninterrupted course of slaughter through the Christian Ages to justify its belief in its own invincible prowess—nay, even in its divine mission to rule the rest. The Roman ideal still lives in them all. Great Cæsar's ghost still walks as at Philippi. He stalks, gaunt and terrifying, before the chancelleries at London and Berlin, at Vienna, Paris and Rome."

4. *The Middle Ages.*

The political, social, economic and cultural conditions of the "Middle Ages" were no better adapted to the production of the national state than was imperial antiquity. The unit of political organization and administration was the domain of the feudal lord, which varied greatly in extent, but never in any way approximated identity with any cultural or national entity. Usually the domain was but a small isolated element in the feudal hierarchy, and it made for political decentralization and local immunity rather than for national unity. The centre of social life was

the infinite number of isolated and minute medieval manors and the few small and scattered medieval towns. The units of agrarian and urban industry, the manors and the towns, respectively, were isolated, self-sufficient and narrowly selfish and provincial, and were wholly unadapted to providing any firm economic foundations for national unity. The pivotal points in medieval cultural activity were the towns, but they were too few, too poorly connected with others by the way of communication and too much governed by the spirit of localism and jealous isolation to be able to bring into being any degree of that general cultural homogeneity, so all-essential to the existence of any degree of national unity.

Not only were these local units of the medieval period ill-adapted to the creation of nations and national states, but there operated from the other extreme powerful forces and institutions making for a continuance of that universalism which had characterized the Roman Empire. Indeed, it has usually been held that universalism and cosmopolitanism were the dominant ideals of the "Middle Ages"—a sentiment best summed up in Dante's *De Monarchia*, with its vision of a church and empire universal. Set off against the actual political diversity and localism of the feudal system was the political symbol of unity and cosmopolitanism—the Holy Roman Empire. Whatever its actual weaknesses, its symbolic power over the mind of Europeans was sufficient to cause so ardent a nationalist and so blasé an advocate of *Realpolitik* as Frederick the Great to bow before it, even in the days of its declining strength. A universal moral and religious control over medieval life was provided by the Roman Catholic Church, whose growth has been described by an eminent authority as "the rise of the new Rome." With its control over the religious, and to a large extent the mental, life of the medieval period through its elaborate hierarchies for administration and for the control of the sacraments, the medieval church, with the aid of the inquisition against heresy, brought about a degree of psychic unity throughout Europe never before equalled. Under its greatest popes, such as Innocent III, the Church also exercised a degree of control over European politics never matched by any emperor of the period. The three leading crowned heads of Europe were in turn disciplined by Innocent. The learning of Europe was no less markedly universal. The Church prescribed a single theology for all western Europe, which was embodied in the *Book of Sen-*

tences of Peter Lombard and the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas. As theology was regarded throughout the medieval period as the "queen of the sciences," and education was chiefly in the hands of the churchmen, the realm of learning was no less unified than that of the spiritual world.

Again, there was a striking unity of language and literature during the period. While the vernacular languages and literatures began to appear in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Latin was, during the greater part of the medieval age, the language of politics, business and learning throughout western Europe. The literature read by the vast majority of those who were able to read was not less uniform than the language; the Bible, the works of the leading "Fathers," the few theological manuals extracted from them, and the crude Latin encyclopedic compilations by Isidore and Rhabanus Maurus and their like, were almost the only books read until the prose and verse of the vernacular languages began to appear at the height of the medieval period. Lord Bryce in the following brilliant passage characterizes the remarkable unity which was at least symbolically brought to the medieval period by the church and empire universal: "It is on the religious life that nations repose. Because divinity was divided, humanity had been divided likewise; the doctrine of the unity of God now enforced the unity of man, who had been created in his image. The first lesson of Christianity was love, a love that was to join in one body those whom suspicion and prejudice and pride of race had hitherto kept apart. There was thus formed by the new religion a community of the faithful, a Holy Empire, designed to gather all men into its bosom, and standing opposed to the manifold polytheisms of the older world, exactly as the universal sway of the Cæsars was contrasted with the innumerable kingdoms and republics that had gone before it. The analogy of the two made them appear parts of one great world-movement toward unity; the coincidence of their boundaries, which had begun before Constantine, lasted long enough for him to associate them indissolubly together, and make the names of Roman and Christian convertible. Ecumenical councils, where the whole spiritual body gathered itself from every part of the temporal realm under the presidency of the temporal head, presented the most visible and impressive examples of their connection. The language of civil government was, throughout the West, that of the sacred writings and of worship; the greatest mind of his generation consoled the faithful for

the fall of their earthly commonwealth, Rome, by describing to them its successor and representative, the 'City which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God.'"

In spite of this unique prevalence of the universal and the uniform in fact and symbol during the medieval period, however, forces were working beneath the surface that were to rend asunder this century-old artificial unity. As early as the Strassburg Oaths of 842 there could be detected the first beginnings in the differentiation of those vernacular languages which were to lay the literary basis for national diversity and rivalry. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in a curiously indirect and obscure, but nevertheless real, manner the medieval period furnished a psychological impulse to the growth of nationalism by its influence on the "Romanticists" many centuries later. It was in part from an imperfect understanding of the medieval age that this school obtained its sentimental impulse, which operated powerfully in the creation of the new nationalism during the French Revolution, and its notion of the unique and indigenous nature of national character, which formed the basis of much of nineteenth century nationalistic philosophy and historical literature. The revival of Roman law in western Europe in the twelfth and following centuries became a powerful instrument making for royal supremacy and the rise of the dynastic state. The new commerce with the east, which had been built up by the Italian cities in the period of the Crusades, was to produce the Italian city-states, which first successfully defied the principle of imperial unity and were the harbingers of the repetition of that process on a vastly greater scale in northern Europe, when the opening of the new trade routes with the east and west should usher in the "Commercial Revolution" and with it the dawn of the Modern Age.

III. THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION AND THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN DYNASTIC NATIONAL STATES

In October, 1492, Columbus landed on San Salvador in the Bahamas and in May six years later Vasco de Gama reached Calicut on the coast of India, and the two most significant steps had been taken in bringing about that great revolution in commerce, thought and politics, which, in the totality of its dynamic reactions on European civilization, was to produce the modern world and to initiate that process of national development, differentiation and

rivalry which has since persisted without abatement and is not likely to be suspended until a supernational organization shall have been erected with power to curb aggressive nationalism and vested with a function for mutual service which will attract the loyalty of the several component parts of the general world organization.

The older generation of historians, under the spell of the exaggerations and incomplete knowledge of Burckhardt and Symonds, were wont to regard the origin of the national state system as the product of the so-called "Renaissance," or, guided by the enthusiasm of Ranke and Schaff for the Lutheran revolt, conventionally dated the emergence of nationality from the Protestant revolt and its resulting political adjustments in the Peace of Augsburg and the Treaty of Westphalia. A more profound study of modern history by such writers as Brandi, Cunningham, Shepherd, Cheyney, Robinson, Abbott, Sombart, and Hayes has revealed the fact that both "Renaissance" and "Reformation," in their broadest aspects, were but phases or results of that great transformation which marks the origin of the modern world and the national-state system—the "Commercial Revolution." By this is meant not only the discoveries, the revival of trade and the "intervention of capital," but also the reactions of these innovations upon the whole basis of European civilization. The permanent intellectual progress which followed the so-called "revival" of the fifteenth century was not so much the result of the resurrection of an antique culture as it was the product of the new psychic reactions which came from the contact of cultures and the intellectual curiosity stimulated by the discoveries. The modern intellectual world grew out of the work of Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Boyle and Lavoisier, and not out of that of Petrarch, Bruni, Poggio and Boccaccio. Not less disruptive of older doctrines has been the result of more critical research upon the deeper significance of the "Reformation." After three centuries of befogging the real issues at stake under the mask of theological controversy, scholars have at last come generally to accept the doctrines of Sleidan, the greatest of contemporary authorities, that the Protestant revolt was primarily the result of the political and nationalistic ambitions of the North German princes, who found Luther's theological rebellion a timely "moral and religious issue" under which to hide their secular ambition to secure political independence from the Holy Roman Empire. The successful impulse to the religious wars that won the day for Protestantism came not from the zeal

of the German princes for the triumph of "justification by faith," but from the eagerness to attain unto the "*cuius regio eius religio*" clause of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the recognition of their full political sovereignty by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).

The chief impulse that the Commercial Revolution brought to the growth of national states came from the rise of the middle class and their alliance with the monarchs in the attempts to destroy the anarchy and decentralization of the feudal system. Hitherto the kings had been compelled to depend upon the feudal lords for the administration of law, the provision of royal funds and the military protection of the realm. It could scarcely be supposed that the feudal lords would render effective aid to any policy designed to limit their powers or terminate the political order to which they owed their existence. There was, therefore, no possibility of bringing about that all-essential step in political progress, the destruction of medieval feudalism, until a new class had arisen with sufficient strength to furnish the kings with the loyal aid necessary to cope with the recalcitrant upholders of the old order, and until a source of royal income had been provided which would enable the kings to hire loyal officials and armies without relying for their financial support upon feudal taxes. Both of these all-important prerequisites for the growth of administrative centralization, political concentration and the rise of the dynastic national state were supplied by the Commercial Revolution. A loyal officialdom, opposed to the feudal aristocracy, appeared in the new "*noblesse de la robe*"—the middle class merchants and lawyers that filled the royal offices; and, through the "intervention of capital" coming into the royal treasuries from the national share in the profits of the new commercial and industrial enterprises, the kings were provided with the indispensable financial power to hire their own administrators and to support a national army independent of the feudal lords.

Then began that relentless war of the national monarchs against their old feudal rivals which extended from the accession of Henry VII of England in 1485 to the close of the last century. While this process involved a great development of royal absolutism and tyranny, as an inevitable accompaniment of the growth of national and dynastic centralization, the movement as a whole was one of the most important in the history of the political development of humanity. All the horrors of the domestic tyranny and foreign wars which have accompanied the rise of national

states since 1500 have been the price which mankind has paid through the wasteful economy of nature in attaining to that stage of national independence and self-government which had to precede the ultimate goal of internal democracy and international concert, alliance or federation. Expensive as the process has been, students of the history of civilization unanimously recognize that the evolution of the national state and of large political aggregates had to be brought about before the basis could be provided for an intelligent, amicable, just and practicable arrangement between the states of the world. An international order arising directly out of the feudal system is inconceivable.

The emergence of the national dynastic state in modern times was first manifested in the case of England, due to the appearance in 1485 of a shrewd and vigorous monarch in the person of Henry VII, and to the fact that in England alone had the feudal nobility been gracious and self-effacing enough to prepare their destruction by a war of self-extermination—the War of the Roses (1455–85). Henry VII filled the royal coffers by taxing the feudal nobles through the use of “Morton’s Fork” and other ingenious devices, haled recalcitrant and rebellious feudal lords before the Court of the Star Chamber, and encouraged the new commerce by treaties such as the “*Intercursus Magnus*” and by subsidizing such explorers as the Cabots. His son, Henry VIII, broke with Rome and gave a religious basis to the growing English nationalism. Elizabeth profited by the labors of her father and grandfather, and her reign witnessed the first great cultural expressions of English nationalism, as well as the emergence of England as a leading naval and colonizing nation. By the close of the Tudor period (1603) England had become a highly centralized dynastic national state. Feudalism in its political aspects had passed, and the middle class had so developed its political strength that a half century later it was able to demonstrate its superiority over the Crown. After a brief but brilliant development of Portuguese nationalism (1498–1580), Spain was next in the order of national development. Charles V had been an imperialist rather than a nationalist and had hoped to revive the Medieval Empire, but his son and heir in Spain, Philip II (1555–98), was a true Spanish nationalist and proceeded to attempt to bring unity not only to Spain but to the Spanish possessions in the Netherlands. His over-ardent nationalism, however, brought disruption rather than centralization, and in 1567 the Dutch, led by William the

Silent, broke into active revolt. The new Dutch national state declared its independence in 1581 and secured the European confirmation of its action at Westphalia in 1648.

A century after England had emerged from civil war with a strong national monarch at the head of the state, Henry IV, the founder of the French Bourbon dynasty, came forth victorious over his opponents in the civil wars and was crowned king in 1589. Capturing not only Paris but France by a "mass," he began with his great minister, Sully, the building of the dynastic national state in France. His work was cut short by his untimely death at the hand of the assassin, Ravaillac, but his work and plan were carried on with vigor and determination by the great ecclesiastics and statesmen, Richelieu and Mazarin, until, by the time of the suppression of the Fronde in 1651, the feudal system as a dominating political power in France had passed away. The fruit of the work of Henry, Sully, Richelieu and Mazarin was appropriated by Louis XIV, in whose reign France reached not only the height of her dynastic centralization, but attained to the cultural primacy of Europe. The Thirty Years' War (1618-48) brought with it a multitude of nationalistic movements and demonstrated the fundamental political nature of the Protestant revolt. The stirrings of national ambitions in Bohemia (1618-20) and in Denmark (1625-29) were speedily repressed, but Sweden forged to the front as a great national state (1630-32) and maintained her position until it was lost through the insane ambitions of her warrior king, Charles XII (1697-1718).

The Treaty of Westphalia first gave general European recognition to the growing national state system and to the existence of independent national sovereignty. It brought diversity rather than unity, however, to Germany and necessitated the postponement of German unification until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when this anachronistic and belated process disturbed the peace of the world. But if a unified national German state was not the product of this general period of the development of dynastic national states, there appeared the dynasty and the state which were ultimately to bring centralization and unity to Germany-Prussia under the Hohenzollerns. After having developed from robber barons into wealthy city magnates of Nuremberg in southern Germany, the Hohenzollerns appeared upon the north European stage through the purchase of the mark of Brandenburg by Frederick Hohenzollern from the bankrupt Emperor Sigismund

in 1415. Through fortunate marriage arrangements they secured the possession of Prussia in 1618. The basis of the Prussian bureaucracy and military system was laid by Frederick William the Great Elector (1640-88) and the process was carried to completion by Frederick William I (1713-40). Starting with these contributions of his ancestors, Frederick the Great (1740-85) was able by diplomatic duplicity and military genius to raise Prussia to the rank of a first-rate European power and to create that German political dualism which erected a final barrier to German national unification until Austria had been humiliated and finally ousted in 1866.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century Poland attained to a degree of power which enabled her to save Christendom from the Turk in 1683, but unfavorable geographical situation, ethnic, religious and social diversity, and unrestrained feudal anarchy prevented Poland from securing permanent national unity and condemned her to a steady decline and then to a century and a half of dismemberment and servitude. Even semi-Asiatic Russia did not remain immune in this general European process of national differentiation and centralization. Under her barbarous and brutal, but able, Tsar, Peter the Great (1696-1725), political power was centralized, a national royal army was established, European manners and customs introduced and Russian foreign policy given a westward orientation. By 1721 the Baltic provinces had been taken from Sweden and the all-important "window to the west" secured. While neither Prussia nor Russia were seriously affected directly by the Commercial Revolution, the growth of nationalism in these states during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was indirectly almost wholly a result of the political reactions of this great economic movement. In both states the nationalistic policies were adopted as a direct and obvious imitation of the administrative and military methods of the monarchs of the new order of national states. The Great Elector aped the policies, methods and measures of Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV, and Frederick I took as his model William III of England. Peter the Great learned from England and Holland the secrets of the new industry and commerce, while from Louis XIV he obtained his pattern for political centralization and military reorganization. By the middle of the eighteenth century, then, national states had been created in most of Europe. Only in Germany, Italy and

the Balkans was this process postponed until the next century, with results so disastrous to humanity at large.

The growth of nationalism during the period of the Commercial Revolution was forwarded by other forces than political centralization. The narrow and selfish nationalistic commercial policy, known as "Mercantilism," which developed more or less universally after 1500 as the general body of economic and commercial doctrines which governed European trade and industry until the middle of the nineteenth century, operated strongly in the way of increasing national consciousness, self-interest and jealousy, and was a potent stimulant to international friction. Commerce during this period became little better than collective or national piracy, in which the "rights" of other nations were ignored or denied. In addition to this powerful economic impulse to nationalistic and militaristic policies, a strong intellectual influence arose in the remarkable development of vernacular literature after the spell of the classical revival, known as "Humanism," had passed. Italy produced Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Ariosto and Tasso; France, Rabelais, Montaigne, Corneille, Molière and Racine; Spain, Cervantes, Lope de Vega and Calderon; Portugal, Camoëns, Miranda and Ferreira; England, More, Spenser, Shakespeare, Jonson, Marlowe, Bacon and Milton; Germany, Sachs, Ayser, Opitz and Fleming. Even Holy Scripture was no longer a unifying force in literature, but in the translations of Luther and the King James Version became a powerful vehicle in the development, popularization and improvement of the vernacular language and a subtle and effective force making for nationalistic divisions. The vernacular literature not only gave literary expression to the growing differentiation of national cultures, but constituted a national possession of first-rate importance, which served as a patriotic inspiration for the generations to come. When the religious divisions created by the Reformation coincided with national boundaries they constituted a formidable psychic force making for national cohesion and self-satisfaction. Before the end of the eighteenth century, then, Europe had ceased to be either feudal or imperial and had come to be primarily national in political organization, economic policy and intellectual tastes and expression. What was further needed to perfect the nationalistic system was the psychological thrill furnished by the French Revolution and its results, and the provision of a real nervous system for the new

nationalism in the improved or revolutionized methods of communication and transportation which came in as a phase of the Industrial Revolution.

IV. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD AND THE POPULARIZATION OF NATIONAL SENTIMENT IN EUROPE

The Commercial Revolution was not only the most potent force leading to the creation of the dynastic national state, but, curiously enough, it also contributed more than anything else before the Industrial Revolution to its ultimate downfall. The middle class, which it created and advanced in power and prestige, in time turned against the kings in the more progressive countries of western Europe, destroyed the dynastic state and brought into being that control by the middle class which was to prepare the way for the growth of nineteenth-century democracy. The nature and significance of this all-important revolt of the middle class against the dynastic state is effectively set forth by Professor Hayes in the following illuminating citation: "Driven on by insatiable ambition, not content to be lords of the world of business, with ships and warehouses for castles and with clerks for retainers, the bourgeoisie placed their lawyers in the royal service, their learned men in the academies, their economists at the king's elbow, and with restless energy pushed on to shape state and society to their own ends. In England by the close of the seventeenth century they had helped to dethrone kings and had secured some hold on Parliament, but on the Continent their power and place was less advanced. For the eighteenth century was still the grand age of monarchs, who took Louis XIV as the pattern of princely power and pomp. 'Benevolent despots' they were, these monarchs meaning well to govern their people with fatherly kindness. But their plans went wrong and their reforms fell flat, while the bourgeoisie became self-conscious and self-reliant, and rose up against the throne of the sixteenth Louis in France. It was the bourgeoisie that started the revolutionary cry of 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,' and it was this cry in the throats of the masses which sent terror to the hearts of nobles and kings. Desperately the old order—the old régime—defended itself. First France, then all Europe was affected. Revolutionary wars convulsed the Continent. Never had the world witnessed wars so disastrous, so bloody." Along with the destruction of the dynastic aspect of the early national state,

there came an intensification and popularization of national sentiment quite unknown in the earlier autocratic form of political organization.

As in England there was witnessed the first emergence of the dynastic national state, there also the middle class first came into power, due primarily to the more complete influence of the Commercial Revolution there than elsewhere. In 1649 the English middle class beheaded a would-be autocratic king and forty years later they completed the process of putting the middle class into political control by driving his son into exile when he attempted to ignore the constitutional barriers to the exercise of unlimited royal power. In France the "bourgeoisie" did not triumph until a century later. In 1614 they had been too weak to defy the monarch and the feudal nobility, but in 1789 and the following years they gave objective evidence of their increase of power during the previous century and three-quarters by crushing both royalty and nobility and establishing themselves as the supreme power in the state. Threatened by the exiled French aristocracy and their foreign sympathizers, the Revolutionists, held together by the new shibboleth of *fraternité*, arose as a "nation in arms" to defend their freshly won liberty against the champions of the old régime. A vast change took place in the nature of national sentiment as a result of this popularizing force of fraternity. At the close of the seventeenth century Louis XIV held that the state and the monarch were one and the same; at the close of the eighteenth bourgeois officials were declaring that the *nation* had a glorious existence quite independent of the king. Professor Hayes has well expressed the importance of this new Revolutionary watchword of "Fraternity" in the process of popularizing the sentiment of nationalism: "Of all the political and spiritual elements in the 'old régime' of the nineteenth century, one of the most stubborn and impressive was the growth of nationalism. Taking definite form in the days of the French Revolution, under the fair name of fraternity, it appeared as a revolt of a self-conscious people in behalf of their individual liberty and equality against the tyranny or inefficiency of contemporaneous divine-right institutions. By the French idea of fraternity every European country was soon affected, so that formerly latent sympathies were galvanized into a most lively sentiment, and theorists from the domains of history or philosophy or even of economics could find popular approval for their solemn pronouncements that people speaking

the same language and sharing the same general customs should be politically united as nations."

As a result of the twenty-three years of general European war following 1792, the national sentiment of well-nigh every European country was transformed from the autocratic and dynastic type to a popular form, generally diffused through the whole body politic. This came about either directly, where Napoleon conquered and carried the French reforms, or indirectly, as a defense reaction against the great military genius of the time by the other states which found it necessary to arouse a similar patriotism in their citizens in order to cope with Napoleon. The French Revolutionary patriotism was carried directly from France into the Rhine provinces, Italy and Poland and appeared as a defense reaction in the Germanies, particularly Prussia, in Spain and her colonies and, to a lesser degree, even in England and Russia. No state in Europe wholly escaped the wave of patriotic enthusiasm that swept over Europe from 1792 to 1815.

The remarkable contribution of Napoleon to the growth of nationalism in modern European history, through giving a widespread dissemination to the forces and tendencies of his time, is thus stated by Professor Robinson: "So long as states were composed of *subjects* rather than of *citizens*, the modern emotions of nationality could scarcely develop. Nationality, in our meaning of the term, is a concomitant of another mystical entity, democracy. The French Revolution began, it is true, in a period of philosophic cosmopolitanism, since that was the tradition of the *philosophes*,—and the French armies undertook to liberate other peoples from their tyrants in the name of the rights of *man*, not of *nations*. But Napoleon, in a somewhat incidental and left-handed fashion, did so much to promote the progress of both democratic institutions and of nationality in western Europe that he may, in a sense, be regarded as the putative father of them both. His plebiscites were empty things in practice, but they loudly acknowledged the rights of peoples to decide on vital matters. He was a friend of constitutions—so long as he himself made them. Then his attempt to seat brother Joseph on the Spanish throne produced a really national revolt, and led to the Spanish constitution of 1812 and all its later revivals and imitations. In Italy he stirred a desire for national unity and the expulsion of the foreigner which had been dormant since the days of Machiavelli's hopeless appeal. He is the founder of modern Germany. He

succeeded in a task which had baffled German emperors from the days of Otto the Great; for in 1803 he so far consolidated her disrupted territories that the remaining states, enlarged and strengthened, could in time form a strong union and become a great international power. His restrictions on the size of the Prussian army after his victory at Jena suggested to Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyne a subterfuge which made Prussia the military school-master of Europe, and cost the millions of lives since offered up in the cause of nationality." To these European effects of the influence of the Napoleonic period upon the growth of nationalism should be added the contagion of this process which extended to America. The rise of national independence in Latin America was immediately related to the influence of Napoleon upon Spain. As Mr. Fisher has said: "If the South American democracies value their independence, statues of Napoleon might with propriety be raised in the squares of Valparaiso and Buenos Ayres."

The naval and commercial aspects of the struggle between England and France greatly stimulated that development of national unity in the United States which was involved in the preparation to meet the insults to this country and the ravages on its trade. Finally, the purchase of Louisiana, made possible by Napoleon, was the greatest nationalistic event in the first half century of our history as an independent state. So great was the momentum which the popularized sentiment of nationality gained that not even Metternich, the most astute statesman of the first half of the nineteenth century, could check it. In spite of his temporarily successful efforts to leave Italy and Germany mere "geographical expressions" in 1815, the arrangement he produced was cast to the winds by those great nationalistic statesmen Cavour and Bismarck in the unification of Italy and Germany, while the national sentiment surged violently, if with less success in gaining full political expression, in Greece, the Balkans, Bohemia, Poland and Hungary. But the French Revolution, as the final political and nationalistic expression of the Commercial Revolution, only gave the initial impulse to this new or democratic phase in the development of nationality. A much more profound revolution was already in process of development in the factories and mines of England, and the greatest transformation in the history of the race was there being prepared, which could not fail to have a far-reaching reaction upon the growth of national sentiment and the activities and attitudes of the national states.

V. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, NATIONAL IMPERIALISM AND THE LATEST STAGE IN THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONALISM

The term "Industrial Revolution" was given by W. S. Jevons and Arnold Toynbee to the great series of mechanical inventions that followed the introduction of John Kay's "flying shuttle" in 1733 and have completely transformed the economic, political and social, as well as most of the intellectual, foundations of civilization. The general significance of the Industrial Revolution has been eloquently set forth by Professor Shotwell in the following quotation: "It has brought into existence a vast working population, embodied in iron and steel, drawn from mines and forests, from steam, gas and electricity by the mysterious genius of the human brain. It has transformed the face of nature and the life of the whole world. These are not mere economic facts. They form the largest and most wonderful chapter in the history of mankind. What is the Renaissance or Reformation, the empire of Charlemagne or of Cæsar, compared with this empire of mind and industry, which has penetrated the whole world, planting its cities, as it goes, binding the whole together by railroad and telegraph, until the thing we call civilization has drawn the isolated communities of the old régime into a great world organism, with its afferent and efferent nerves of news and capital reaching to its finger tips in the markets of the frontier? A nickel spent for thread in Uganda sets the spindles going in Manchester. Fellaheen by the Nile may be starving because the cigarette factories are building marble palaces for their owners on the banks of the Hudson."

Following as a result of the industrial conditions necessitated by the mechanical inventions came the "factory system" and the growth of the modern industrial cities, with all of their attendant social and economic problems. This meant not only a concentration of the industrial population in the newly created manufacturing cities, but also the completion of the process of separating capital from labor and the creation of the interrelation between them that has colored the social and economic history of the last century. Socially and politically the most important results of this sweeping transformation were the great increase in the number and strength of the middle or capitalistic class and the creation of the industrial proletariat. The struggle between these classes and of both of them against the landed aristocracy has

been the centre of the political history of the last hundred years and the chief dynamic force in the growth of political democracy.

The development of means for the communication of information, through the railroad, telegraph, telephone and cheap newspapers, made possible a real psychological unity within each nation, broke up local isolation and completed the process of popularizing national sentiment and perfecting national self-consciousness. It made the various national manifestations of "herd-instinct" more communicable, more responsive and more liable to sudden and hysterical explosions. So fundamentally primitive was the general level of thought and interests on the eve of the Industrial Revolution that the sudden development of the means of communicating these throughout the modern national state tended to give to national thought and emotion the same narrowness and self-satisfied provincialism that had earlier prevailed on a smaller or local scale. Therefore, it is not surprising that Professor Robinson finds that "Our ancient tribal instinct evidently retains its blind and unreasoning characteristics despite the fact that we are able nowadays, by means of newspapers, periodicals, railroads and telegraphs, to spread it over vast areas, such as are comprised in modern states like Germany, France, Russia and the United States." The world-wide extension of the new mechanism of communication also rendered jingoistic expressions in foreign countries better known and more likely to arouse national antagonisms. Finally, as will be evident from the following discussion, the Industrial Revolution was the most influential force impelling the great modern national states to undertake the building up of new colonial empires in the era of modern imperialism since 1870.

The European revolutions of 1848 seemed to bring to a focus the two great principles of the first half of the nineteenth century—nationality and democracy—which had been produced by the combined action of the French and Industrial Revolutions, and for the moment gave promise of making possible the dream of the European liberals that a political order might be created which would give full recognition to both of these aspirations. The enthusiasm thus stirred among the nationalists and democrats in Europe during these momentous years has been eloquently set forth by Lord Bryce: "So the sympathy, both of America and of Britain, or at least of British Liberals (among whom was then to be found a great majority of the men of light and leading),

went out when, in 1848, the crash of the Orleans Monarchy in France had shaken most European thrones, to the Italian revolutionaries, to the Polish revolutionaries, to the Czechs in Bohemia, to the Magyars in Hungary, who, under the illustrious Kossuth, were fighting in 1849 for their national rights against Hapsburg tyranny, to the German patriots who were trying to liberalize Prussia and the smaller kingdoms, and bring all Germans under one free constitutional Government. Men hoped that so soon as each people, delivered from a foreign yoke, became masters of their own destinies, all would go well for the world. The two sacred principles of Liberty and Nationality would, like twin guardian-angels, lead it into the paths of tranquil happiness, a Mazzinian paradise of moral dignity and liberty, a Cobdenian paradise of commercial prosperity and international peace." But the tragic sequence of events in 1848-49 proved that nationality and democracy could then scarcely coöperate in harmony; national jealousy and particularism weakened the cause of democracy and ultimately led to the temporary downfall of both before political reactionaries and anti-national imperialists.

The liberals of 1848 believed that when tempered with democracy nationality would be divested of its chauvinistic and aggressive qualities and would insure the coming of perpetual peace, but, as Professor Blakeslee has made clear, neither history nor theory can justify this view:

During the past century the great democracies have been making war, threatening war, and preparing for war, much of the time against each other. Their history shows clearly enough that if their neighbors had also been democratic this change alone would not have prevented wars. Nor is the outlook for the future encouraging. Democratic nations are still willing to fight to defend their national interests and policies; they demand their due share of over-sea trade, concessions and colonies—if they are a commercial or expansionist people—no less insistently because they are democratic. But the interests and policies of one nation conflict with those of another; what one democracy regards as a due share of over-sea trade, concessions, and colonies is an undue share to its rival. Each democracy becomes an excited partisan of its own view, ready to back it by force of arms; and the natural result is, as it always has been, wars and rumors of wars. There are enough conflicts in national policies to-day to lead to a dozen future conflicts, even if all the world should be democratic. There is Japan's insistence upon controlling China; our own Monroe Doctrine, when interpreted in a domineering or selfish spirit;

England's Persian Gulf policy; the anti-oriental policy of the United States and the British self-governing colonies; the expansionist policy of all the Balkan states; and the Entente policy, formulated at the Paris Conference, of discriminating against the trade of the Central Powers after the present war shall be over. Unless present conditions are changed, the democratic nations of the world, with their conflicting interests, would find it difficult to maintain world peace, for the next century, even if they wished to maintain it. History, present conditions, and the logic of the situation show that democracy alone will never make the world safe. It is only by a definite concert of states that we may secure a reasonable promise of obtaining a permanent international peace and of becoming a non-militaristic world.

The following discussion will show that the more perfect recognition and realization of nationality has as yet achieved even less than democracy to produce the political millennium; rather it has seemingly merited Lord Acton's indictment that "there is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable which is more comprehensive, more subversive, more arbitrary than nationality. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind."

The nineteenth century witnessed the belated completion of national unification in two major European states—Germany and Italy—through the efforts of Bismarck and Cavour in the decade and a half following 1855. These statesmen, in deep sympathy with the national aspirations of their countrymen, gathered together under their leadership the various forces working in this direction and succeeded in giving concrete and effective expression to the generally diffused impulse to political unification. In a very real sense they may be regarded as having carried to completion the forces and tendencies first aroused in their respective states by the reactions to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests and statesmanship. Not only were the patriotic tendencies, at the head of which they put themselves, originally set in action by the Revolution and Napoleon, but also the main obstacle to national unification which had to be overcome in both states was the antagonism of that inveterate and implacable enemy of Napoleon and the "French Ideas"—the anachronistic empire of the Hapsburgs and Metternich. The work of Cavour and Bismarck marked a significant stage in that incessant warfare against the mediæval imperial concepts and practices which had begun

at Westphalia in 1648, was carried on at Utrecht and in the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, and finally ended in the utter collapse of that obsolete and oppressive political structure in the autumn of 1918, as a result of the growth of national sentiment among its subject peoples and the blow to its military prestige by the collapse which marked the close of the "War of the Nations." Force, chicanery, duplicity and intrigue were employed about equally by both Cavour and Bismarck in achieving their justifiable ambitions, but the resulting political systems created were widely different. "Blood and iron" and *Realpolitik* were used by Cavour merely as a means to the end of creating a liberal and pacific state and a parliamentary government, while with Bismarck they became ends in themselves and were used to repel the very liberalism and democracy which Cavour had successfully established.

In addition to these larger national states which have appeared upon the European map since 1815, a number of smaller nations have attained in part, at least, to statehood. Greece attained independence in 1829; Belgium gained its independence in 1830 and its neutralization in 1839; Luxemburg became an independent neutralized state in 1867; Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro were recognized as states in 1878; Norway separated from Sweden in 1905; Bulgaria took advantage of the European confusion and tension of 1908 to declare her complete freedom from Turkey; and in 1913 Austria perversely created the independent Albanian state to block Serbia from an outlet to the sea. But in spite of this considerable addition to the "family of nations" in Europe, national aspirations were by no means satisfied by 1914. Not only did the political map fail to coincide with the national boundaries in the case of every one of the European national states created during the nineteenth century, but there were great historic nations like the Poles, the Irish, the Czechs of Bohemia and the Finns which were denied any independent political existence.

Had the psychology of peoples been the same in 1914 that it was a century and a half before, this condition of incomplete national independence would have produced no very great problem, for potential nations as distinct in race, language and historical traditions as they were at the beginning of the twentieth century had long lived without complaint when subjected to the oppression of alien peoples. But the perfection of the dynastic national state, the psychological contagion generated by the French Revolution,

the defense-reactions produced by the Napoleonic conquests, the effect of the democracy brought into being by the Industrial Revolution, and their net result in arousing the quiescent "herd-instinct" and in giving it a nation-wide field of operation made any attempt to deny national aspirations a forlorn hope. A boisterous and intolerant chauvinism had developed in the greater states of Europe which inevitably reacted upon the "repressed nations" and aroused similar sentiments and ambitions there. This tendency was powerfully forwarded by the attempt of the great national states to crush out by persecution the national aspirations of the subject nations within their boundaries. Germany oppressed the Poles; Russia the Finns, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles and Ruthenians; Austria the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Serbs; Hungary the Rumanians, the Ruthenians and the Croats; and Turkey portions of most Balkan nations and the embryonic nations of Asia Minor. Further, these lesser or "oppressed" nations followed the example of the greater states in arousing an interest in national history and literature and thereby stimulated their hopes for independence by centering attention upon the past glory of their peoples, be it as remote as classical times or the early Middle Ages. Nothing could thwart this force—not even the oldest monarchy in Europe nor the mightiest military state which the world has yet seen.

The general nature of the friction and dissatisfaction felt in the Europe of 1914 over the failure of the political divisions to coincide with the national groupings has been admirably summarized by Professor Hazen in the following synoptic outline:

1. Dissatisfaction in Germany on the part of
 - a. The people of Alsace-Lorraine;
 - b. The Poles of Eastern Prussia;
 - c. The Danes of Northern Schleswig.
2. Dissatisfaction in Denmark over
 - a. The position of the Danes in Northern Schleswig.
3. Dissatisfaction in Austria-Hungary on the part of
 - a. The Czecho-Slovaks;
 - b. The Rumanians of Eastern Hungary;
 - c. The South- or Jugo-Slavs;
 - d. The Italians of the Trentino, Istria, and Trieste.
4. Dissatisfaction in France over
 - a. Alsace-Lorraine.
5. Dissatisfaction in Italy over
 - a. Italian Irredenta—Trentino, Istria, Trieste.

6. Dissatisfaction in Serbia over
 - a. The oppression of millions of Serbs by Austro-Hungary.
 - b. Lack of outlet to the sea.
7. Dissatisfaction in Rumania over
 - a. The oppression by Hungary of millions of Rumanians.
8. Dissatisfaction in Bulgaria over
 - a. The boundaries laid down by the Treaty of Bucharest, 10 Aug., 1913.
9. Dissatisfaction in Greece over
 - a. Turkish rule of millions of Greeks.
10. Dissatisfaction of the Poles over the fact
 - a. That Poland does not appear upon the map of Europe, but has been divided among and incorporated with the three partitioning powers of the 18th century, Russia, Prussia and Austria.
11. Dissatisfaction in Russia on the part
 - a. Of the Poles;
 - b. Of the people of Finland, etc.

To these, obviously, should be added the dissatisfaction felt by the Irish nationalists, who, in spite of the eloquent appeals of O'Connell and Redmond and the sympathy they aroused in Gladstone and the English Liberals, were denied their aspiration for "home rule." Joined to these sources of friction and unrest produced by the imperfect realization of patriotic aspirations among oppressed national groups, were the deep-seated and ominous rivalries among the great national states of Europe over purely European national problems. From 1870 to 1914 France was mourning over her "lost provinces," draping the Strassburg Statue and perpetuating the ceremonials of "revanche," while Bismarck alleged that Germany was maintaining and increasing her great armament solely as a protection against the contemplated French war of revenge, so fiercely urged by Déroulède and his fellow patriots. In spite of a formal alliance, Austria and Italy were fundamentally at odds over the solution of the problem of "Italia Irredenta." The "Mittel-Europa" plan of Germany and Austria was diametrically opposed to the Pan-Slavic scheme of Russia as well as to the national aspirations of the Balkan states. Finally, England's jealousy over Russian longing for Constantinople, which had led her into an aggressive and costly war in 1854-55, was never removed until the mutual looting and partition of Persia was consummated in 1907.

But ominous and troublesome as were the rivalries of national

states in Europe over continental problems, these were no more important than those which arose from the struggle over the opening up of backward countries for investment and the planting of colonies in lands beyond the sea. From the period of the close of the Napoleonic wars to 1870 there had been a decided decline in imperialistic enterprises. Under the reign of "economic liberalism" European countries even went so far as to discuss the very desirability of colonies, and Richard Cobden and his followers believed that the British Empire was quite as much an English liability as an asset. But the results of the Industrial Revolution put an end to this amiable "cosmopolitan dream" of the Cobdenites and produced the revival of the old Mercantilistic policy in the shape of a new scramble for the remaining unappropriated parts of the earth, which could be utilized as colonies and markets for the greatly increased volume of manufactured products. The relation between the great increase of production, caused by the various phases of the Industrial Revolution, and the new national imperialism has been admirably stated by Professor Schapiro in the following passage:

Toward the end of the 19th century there took place a new Industrial Revolution, the results of which were almost as startling as those of its predecessor a century before. The application of science to industry through the extraordinary development of the chemical and physical sciences, the better organization of business enterprise through combination, the larger use of capital and the opening up of new sources of raw material in Asia and Africa increased many fold the production of goods. Gigantic plants, equipped with scientific laboratories, worked by armies of laborers, and capitalized by millions of dollars, brought together in syndicates and "trusts," displaced the small factories, or "mills," as they were still called. It is estimated that the average increase in the commerce of all the countries of Europe during the 19th century was over 1,200 per cent. . . . The Industrial Revolution at the beginning of the 19th century transformed the economic life of Western Europe only; the new Industrial Revolution at the end of the century caused Europe to burst her industrial bonds and to encompass the entire world in its influences. The new industrialism multiplied production so enormously that markets had to be sought outside the limits of the home country. As competition for the home market within the leading industrial countries became very keen, the eyes of the captains of industry were naturally turned to the many regions that were at the same time densely populated and industrially undeveloped. The vast populations of

Asia and Africa were so many potential customers for the business men of Europe. What fabulous profits awaited those who got the opportunity of clothing and shoeing the teeming millions of Chinese and Hindus!

This process of national expansion overseas, in its second or recent phase, set in about 1870, when the effects of the Industrial Revolution had been felt in England and France and were beginning to be experienced to an ever greater degree by Germany. France turned to Africa and Asia, and in Tunis, north central Africa, Morocco and Indo-China sought compensation for the territorial loss of Alsace-Lorraine and investment opportunities for her growing body of capitalists. To obtain a more complete control over the routes leading to India, Disraeli bought the large block of Suez Canal stock in 1875 and started Great Britain on her second experiment in empire building, which added to her already extensive territorial possessions, Egypt, the Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, southern Persia and Tibet. Russia extended her sphere of political and economic control in the Far East in the region of Manchuria, and also in the district about the Caspian Sea, including the northern half of Persia. Germany sought her "place in the imperialistic sun" by colonization in Africa and in the islands of Oceania and the Pacific, and by an attempt at the economic control of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia through her Berlin-Bagdad railroad project. Italy, after an unsuccessful attempt to get control of Abyssinia, was compelled to remain content with Somaliland and Eritrea until she was able, fifteen years later, to wrest Tripoli and Cyrenaica from Turkey. Finally, nearly all of the above-mentioned states participated in the economic, if not the political, partition of China.

The conflict of ambitions in this process of European expansion created many centres of international friction. Germany and England clashed over the distribution of territory in South Africa and over the control of the Persian Gulf. France and Germany precipitated two European crises over their disputes concerning Morocco. France and England nearly went to war over the territory surrounding the source of the Nile. Russia went to war with Japan over Manchuria and Port Arthur, and came to an agreement with England concerning Persia only by a mutual division of spoil in the arrangement of 1907. In addition, this new imperialism served to stimulate national pride and aggressiveness

on the part of the great national states of Europe through the development of the "mapitis" psychosis, namely, the enthusiasm or chagrin felt by the citizens over the success or failure of their respective states in covering the map of the world with the brilliant colors designating their colonial possessions. Finally, the struggle for markets and the desire to protect national trade and economic interests led to the practical institution of a neo-Mercantilistic era of protective tariffs. Beginning with the Bismarckian tariff bill of 1879 there ensued a general European movement toward nationalistic protective tariffs so high that they would have caused even Frederick List to gasp with astonishment if not with dismay. Only England escaped from this tendency to introduce what practically meant a perpetual economic war between the various continental European states.

In this manner were economic and political events in and out of Europe contributing to the stimulation of jingoism and international distrust and suspicion in the generation preceding the coming of the calamity of 1914. The writings or speeches of Peters, Reventlow, Rohrbach, Tannenberg, Delcassé, Barrès, Rhodes, Kipling, Maxse, Lea, d'Annunzio, Crispi, Sonnino, Pobiedonostsev, von Plehve, Berchtold and Tisza presented to the world evidence of the various grandiose programs of national expansion and served to stir up mutual suspicion and antagonism.

The diplomacy of the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth was very poorly adapted to meeting this difficult task of reaching a peaceful adjustment of conflicting international claims. While there can be no doubt that diplomatic theory and practice made great strides in advance during the last century, it is equally certain that it was still essentially Machiavellian, and, as Mr. Weyl has well expressed it, was still controlled by "the approved diplomatic type, the aged, bemedaled, chilly, narrow and conservative, Excellency, very gentlemanly, very astute, fundamentally stupid."

The prospect of a peaceful settlement of the disputes between the European states over European and imperialistic problems was greatly diminished by the vast armaments which were created and increased, ostensibly in the interest of preserving peace, but actually, as subsequent events have proved, to encourage an aggressive nationalistic policy of expansion and annexation. In its origin this militaristic movement dates back to the French Revolution. In 1793 France first introduced the policy of conscription

on a general scale and confirmed this practice by law five years later. To prepare for the War of Liberation and to evade Napoleon's arbitrary limitation of the Prussian army to 42,000 men, the Prussian military leaders, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyne, Grolmann and Clausewitz, introduced into Prussia the system of universal liability to military service in the years following 1808. Austria, in the attempt to cope with Napoleon, tended in the same direction under Archduke Charles and Count Stadion. After 1815 there was a decided slump in military sentiment and activity, associated to some degree with the prevalence of "economic liberalism" and its cosmopolitan tenets. The first military revival was the work of Napoleon III, who assured France and Europe that "the empire meant peace," but gave practical proof that it meant a restoration of the military traditions of his illustrious uncle. But the Napoleonic restoration of the militarism of a half century earlier was no more consequential for the world than the contemporaneous developments across the Rhine. To avenge Olmütz and humble Austria, King William I of Prussia planned to reorganize the Prussian army as it had been in the great struggle against the first Napoleon. Calling to his aid, in 1862, the most astute figure in the history of modern politics, Otto von Bismarck, he was able to carry out not only his army plans, but also his fond ambition to defeat Austria. Extending the new system to the North German Confederation, Bismarck was able to crush France and bring about the long desired unification of Germany. Having "vindicated" the policy of "blood and iron" by three victorious wars Bismarck fastened militarism upon Germany with a deadly grip by a series of laws passed between 1873 and 1887, and the military octopus grew until it culminated in the act of 1913. France had adopted a similar system in 1872, and most of the other great powers, as well as the lesser Balkan states, did the same in the decade of the "seventies." Even Turkey, in 1883, invited von der Goltz to reorganize the army of the Sultan on the German plan.

Nor was the increase in armament limited to land forces; the great extension of the new colonial enterprises and the development of a larger merchant marine seemed to demand new and larger navies. In view of Great Britain's greater colonial possessions and trade it was but natural that she should begin the movement for larger sea forces. In 1889, Great Britain passed an act providing for a vast increase in her fleet and initiated that policy

of keeping her naval strength far in advance of any rival state. Not until 1898 did Germany's interest in *Weltpolitik* lead her to attempt to rival Britain on the seas, but in that year there was passed the first great German naval act, which was supplemented by other more pretentious increases in acts of 1900, 1906 and 1912, thus serving to arouse British alarm and enmity and to make an Anglo-German concord extremely improbable. Nor were England and Germany alone in this process. All the leading powers, but especially France and Russia, followed their lead. With these great war machines at hand, the European states were little inclined to submit their conflicts and disputes to what were regarded by the jingoistic patriots and imperialists as the pusillanimous and ignoble methods of conferences and arbitration.

Accompanying these political and economic forces making for a greater prevalence of jingoism in the last generation of European history, there were psychological causes operating which were not less effective in promoting national aggressiveness and mutual hatred, suspicion and contempt. Anthropological fallacies, growing out of Gobineau's grotesque *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races* (1854) and Max Müller's hasty generalizations in his *Lectures on the Science of Language* (1861) led to an inflation of racial egotism, the intensification of racial misconceptions and the fatal if fruitless search for the original "Aryan" bearers of civilization among the nations of Europe. That writers more patriotic than scientific could find certain and irrefutable evidence for the original habitat of the primordial "Aryan" in France, Germany, Italy and Russia is sufficient evidence not only of the hopeless scientific confusion, but also of the disastrous patriotic ardor that invited the search. Pseudo-Darwinian sociology represented war as the supreme principle making for social progress, as the struggle for existence had advanced biological evolution. This distortion of half-truth by Gumpłowicz and his school was eagerly seized upon by the military and ultra-patriotic writers, such as Moltke, Bernhardt and von der Goltz in Germany, Déroulède and Barrès in France, Lord Roberts, Wyatt, Cramb and Maude in England, and Lea, Maxim, Mahan and Gardner in America to give a semi-scientific cloak for their class and clique interests and ambitions.

Super-patriotic history, literature and philosophy magnified the past glory and the future heritage of each nation and proportionately disparaged the past and future of their rivals. The emo-

tional impulse from "Romanticism" led to a greatly increased interest in the study of national history. This was augmented by the patriotic enthusiasm accompanying the growth of nationalism following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era. Every country began the compilation of gigantic collections of the sources of national history, of which the *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica*, the *Documents inédits* and the *Rolls Series* were only the most notable among many similar enterprises. National narrative histories breathing forth a fiery and defiant patriotic ardor were produced by Giesebrecht, Droysen, Treitschke and Sybel; Michaud, Raynouard, Mignet, Lamartine, Guizot, Thiers, Michelet and Martin; and Freeman, Stubbs, Froude, Carlyle, Macaulay and Napier. Literature became even more chauvinistic. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, building on the risky foundations of the anthropological fallacies of Gobineau, Pöschke and Penka, was able to discover that almost without exception every important figure in history since the beginning of the Christian era had been a German. Even Saint Paul, Dante, Giotto, Michael Angelo and Raphael were included by this undaunted exponent of "Kultur" under the caption of "We Teutons!" Nisard detected the very essence of Reason herself, in the spirit of French literature. Maurice Barrès found that French culture was a precious and indigenous product of Celtic blood, to which neither Roman nor Teuton had contributed in the slightest degree, and he advocated its preservation by making it the centre of a near oriental cult of ancestor-worship. Léon Daudet found that nations other than the French exhibited undoubted stigmata of mental and moral decline or deficiency. Rudyard Kipling, the poet of "Saxondom" and British imperialism, indulged in frenzied exhortations to his countrymen urging a greater assumption of the "white man's burden" throughout the non-European world. Carducci made the heroes of Italian unification the theme of the greatest of modern Italian poetry, while d'Annunzio wrought himself up into a neoplatonic ecstasy over the necessity of reclaiming Italia Irredenta. Patriotic state education taught unquestioning loyalty to state or dynasty as the first principle of moral conduct, carefully obscured any questionable occurrences or policies in the national past and frowned on criticism and progressive reform proposals.

Slowly, but surely and wilfully, Europe was preparing for the cataclysm of August, 1914. As Professor Sumner long before predicted, the vast armaments that had been prepared with the

avowed purpose of defense alone invited the transformation of nationalistic and military philosophy from the advocacy of a purely "defensive war" into an exposition of the virtues and necessity of a "preventive war." That this process of the cumulative growth of national egotism and aggressive militarism was perhaps most marked in Germany must not obscure the fact that she was separated from the other European national states in this respect by a difference in degree rather than in kind, and that she was able to bow the necks of her citizens under the burden of the military octopus primarily because of the welcome evidence that her neighbors gave to the German military class that they were not unwilling to submit the "rectitude" of their cause to the "test of arms." Nationalistic and ultra-patriotic intoxication rather than unique Teutonic perversity "applied the match to the European powder-house" in 1914. The per capita preparation was much greater in France by 1914 than it was in Germany.

While the rise of modern nationalism has been most conspicuous in Europe, this should not obscure the fact that similar forces have produced analogous developments elsewhere, most notably in America and Japan. To an astonishing degree the growth of national unity and of national sentiment in both of these more recent cases of the rise of nationalism has been the product of the same general circumstances and conditions which promoted the development of nationalism in Europe, though in most respects these influences did not have a wholly indigenous origin and expansion, as in Europe, but were introduced from abroad.

Of the American examples of the rise and growth of nationalism that of the United States has, of course, been the most significant. As Professor Cheyney has so convincingly pointed out, the settlement of the United States was quite as much connected with the economic impulses arising from the Commercial Revolution in Europe as it was with the religious revolt from Catholicism and the Established Church in England. Even more consequential were these new commercial forces in promoting unity among the colonists. A century of mutual ignoring of British commercial restrictions had given the thirteen colonies a strong common motive for unified action in opposing the proposed enforcement of these long dormant Mercantilistic restrictions—a motive which Professor Schlesinger has recently shown to have been far more powerful than any theoretical or legal abstractions involved in the colonial movement of resistance to British imperial

power. In addition to these economic foundations of the shaping of American national sentiment there was a fundamental sociological process in operation which has been aptly termed by Professor Becker "the beginnings of the American people." A widely different geographical, social, political and economic environment acting upon a population originally psychologically variant from the great mass of Englishmen, tended inevitably to create in the colonies a people who became, generation after generation, more and more divergent from their kinsmen across the Atlantic. Not only were these environmental influences working to produce an essential dissimilarity between Englishmen and Americans, but through the fundamental uniformity of the American social environment there was being created a homogeneous and united American people and the beginnings of a national self-consciousness.

The American Revolution, initiated by the enterprising and recalcitrant merchants and debtor landlords and carried to success by their courage and audacity and by the not disinterested aid of the French, furnished a unifying force of very great potency for a temporary period, but the reaction in the period of the Confederation for the time being threatened a lapse into anarchy and dismemberment. Thanks, however, to their desire for financial stability and security, the vigorous capitalistic class, led by that great constructive statesman of early nationalism, Alexander Hamilton, turned the tide of political opinion and practice from separatism and provincialism to nationalism and unity. Their work was carried on by the strongly nationalistic decisions of the great judicial figure in the growth of American nationalism, John Marshall whom not even Jefferson's enmity could remove. Indeed, the Jeffersonian Republicans, when they came into power in 1800, ceased their negativism and accepted most of the nationalistic program which they had criticized with such vigor and acrimony when carried into operation by Hamilton and Adams. Jefferson could purchase Louisiana, Madison could be won for war with Great Britain, and Monroe could formulate a nationalistic foreign policy.

Nationalism in America thus took its origin from the reactions of the Commercial Revolution on the western world; as in Europe, it was completed by the Industrial Revolution. The new factories in the north created an industrial interdependence between the various sections of the country and attracted an immigrant population with no sectional sentiments. The new canals and

railroads led to the initiation of that great nationalistic enterprise of the nineteenth century in America—the conquest of the West, studied with such fruitfulness by Professor Turner and his disciples. While the territorial additions of the middle of the century were temporarily a cause of sectional dispute and friction, they ultimately became a matter of national pride and common interest. Though negro-slavery and the accompanying states-rights movement threatened to disrupt the embryonic nation, the success of the North in the Civil War demonstrated by the verdict of physical force that Webster, rather than Calhoun or Hayne, was right in his interpretation of the nature of the federal union. A permanent political sanction for nationalism was provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. Events and tendencies since the Civil War have been even more conducive to the development of national unity than those of the preceding half century. An Industrial Revolution, like that which affected New England in the first half of the nineteenth century, has come to the South and the sharp sectional division of economic characteristics and interests has now been greatly lessened. The further development of railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, and other means of rapid transportation and almost instantaneous communication of information have made this extensive country a national economic and psychological unity to a degree unknown in 1789 even in the meagre territory along the Atlantic seaboard with which the United States started its political existence. The intersectional investment of capital has produced a real financial unity.

A national literature has been provided by such writers as Irving, Bryant, Cooper, Longfellow, Lowell, Whitman, Thoreau, Emerson, Hawthorne, Poe, Clemens, Howells and Riley. A collection of the sources of national history was planned and partially executed by Peter Force, and a national historical epic, eulogizing the American past, was created by the writings of Bancroft, Palfrey, Fiske, Holst and Burgess. A “glorious” foreign war at the close of the century gave a great stimulus to the completion of national development, and elaborate national expositions and public projects, such as the Panama Canal, furnish a successive series of impulses to unity. Many pessimistic publicists believed that the great influx of foreigners in the last fifty years threatened national disruption as seriously as the sectional divisions of the middle of the last century, but the experience of the United States in the World War has definitely disproved their forebodings and

demonstrated that whatever the general results of immigration, they have not brought national disintegration. The participation of the United States in the late "War of the Nations" produced a welling-up of exuberant national sentiment and intolerant patriotism which caused even the older allied and enemy European nations to gasp with astonishment. But while national development in the United States has been the most notable exemplification of this process in the western hemisphere, it has not been the only one. Canada, in spite of a titular connection with Great Britain, has developed a very marked spirit of national self-consciousness, while a century of independent political existence has created a strong feeling of national pride and unity in the various states of Central and South America. Nationalism, then, seems as well established in America as in Europe.

There can be no doubt that the most spectacular rise of nationalism in a nineteenth-century state was witnessed in the case of Japan. After having welcomed European adventurers and missionaries in the middle of the sixteenth century, Japan suddenly turned against the newcomers, murdered them or drove them from her shores and returned to immobility and isolation for three centuries. This artificial aloofness was broken down following 1853 by commercial concessions obtained first by the United States and then by European states. At first, the feudal princes opposed the entry of foreigners and their civilization, but the more farsighted among them recognized that Japan could hope to compete with the states of Europe and America only by adopting at least the superior mechanical features of their advanced civilization. By the Revolution of 1867-68 and its immediate results, this reforming element abolished the Shogunate, brought the Mikado out of an inactive retirement, terminated feudalism, reorganized the army along European lines, and accepted the industrial methods and processes which had been produced by a century of economic development in Europe and America. Within a period of less than forty years Japan passed from a medieval feudal state to a modern industrial nation. In no modern state is there such an intense devotion to national ideals as is to be found in Japan. The veneration for the past practically reaches a condition of ancestor worship, while patriotism is in a real sense the official religion in Japan. By successful wars against China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-05) Japan has become the great world power of the Pacific, has acquired important territory on the

mainland of Asia and has endeavored to erect and maintain a Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" in China and the Far East. The present-day exponents of internationalism seem likely to find Japan the most tenacious adherent to the old order of aggressive nationalism and imperialism, but it must be frankly admitted that Japan's contact with the diplomacy of the western world could scarcely have taught her that the day of candor, honesty and generosity has yet arrived in the field of international relations.

The rise of the new Japan stimulated the great inert mass of China. Stung by the defeat of their country by the microscopic Island Kingdom, the progressive Chinese patriots attempted to guard against another humiliation at the hands of the Japanese by imitating the Japanese adoption of western civilization. While this movement was temporarily obstructed by the reactionary element in the country led by the Dowager Empress, the liberals overthrew the obstructionists by the Revolution of 1911-12, established a Chinese republic and welcomed western industry and culture. While this remarkable transformation was too rapidly consummated to remain secure and unchallenged, it has persisted to a remarkable degree in spite of temporary setbacks, and China seems to be on her way toward development into a modernized national state. In conclusion, it should be noted that no observations on the rise of nationalism in the Far East can ignore the remarkable evidences of national self-consciousness in Australia and New Zealand which were brought out by the recent World War.

The disastrous "War of the Nations," which has just ceased, was not only a product of obsessed nationalism, but also brought with it an unprecedented inflation of national egotism and intolerant patriotism. Never before had a general war occurred when the mechanism for disseminating both information and propaganda was so highly developed or so ruthlessly utilized. The slavish eulogy of national culture and history and the obscuring of national faults and mistakes, which had been so prevalent in the half century before the war, were as nothing compared with the tyrannical censorship and unabashed organized propaganda of every state immediately engaged in the conflict. Each of the opposing groups of powers represented the gigantic conflict as a sort of Persian eschatology—a struggle between the forces of light and darkness, a clash of the powers of righteousness and iniquity. Within each state an attempt was

made to sustain morale by a curbing of all criticism of the "war aims" of the government or its allies and by a carefully planned presentation and reiteration of the past and present criminal record of the opposing states. So powerful and all-embracing was this tidal wave of patriotic defense-reactions that it engulfed not only the "man on the street," but even the most eminent scholars and publicists, some of whom in the past had seen great virtue in the cultural complex of the enemy. This disheartening spectacle doubtless reached its climax in the "manifesto" of the German professors, but in no state were the intellectual classes immune from the contagion of fervid patriotism, while those who maintained their poise were contemptuously derided as "flabby high-brows" by their over-excited colleagues and critics.

The astonishing effect of the wartime patriotism upon the public mind and its stimulating influence in creating a super-nationalism has been brilliantly and accurately set forth by Professor Hankins in the following citation:

Patriotism, like nationality, is not readily definable. It signifies loyalty to one's nation and implies the obligation to serve and defend it. It is thus a passion which all normal men feel, and which in time of our country's peril commands our instant loyalty. Of all the emotions that move men to action it is the most capacious. When it is aroused there is no other social force comparable to it in the completeness with which it dominates all other springs of action in all sorts and conditions of men. It lifts the average man up out of the concerns of a work-a-day world into the noblest spirit of devotion; it quickens the pulse of the sluggard, reforms the wayward, forces generosity from the stingy, arouses the plodder to dreams of heroic deeds, gives courage to the cowardly, and makes the hearts of the shrewd and crafty wolves of society swell with an ostensible love of country. In its face local feuds are forgotten; the bitter struggles of parties and classes are submerged; differences of creed, of social status, and even of race are obliterated. Under these circumstances only the group leaders may speak. The citizen must offer himself in silence as a willing sacrifice on the altar of his country in whatever manner those in authority may dictate. Even honest criticism is anathema; the conscientious objector, who in times of peace is praised as a courageous man who dares to stand against the world for what he believes right, is denounced as a sneaking coward and herded into prison. The individual rights of free speech, press, and assembly so essential to democratic government, so zealously guarded during peace, and so boastfully displayed to an admiring world on the

national holidays, not only cease to exist but are even denounced and proscribed as inimical to the public safety. The noble sentiments of toleration are fiercely denounced, as is also individual variation from type which is vigorously defended during peace under the ideals of individual liberty and initiative. Every social institution is brought into line; all organs of public opinion send forth a constant stream of uniform suggestions; the appeal is made through church and lodge and every customary association, until the members of the social group coalesce into a solid sociality that surpasses the fondest imaginings of the utopian Socialist. It is not unnatural that such a titanic social force should stir men's emotional nature to its depths; and especially during war, for war hallows every cause. At such times patriotism, like a resistless and mysterious genius, fills the entire fabric of society with its magical power. Few individuals escape its enchantment, and almost no one dares brook its hostility. While it ennobles the soul with the sublime spirit of self-sacrifice, it compels men to dilute the honesty of their thoughts; makes cowards of all but the most stalwart souls by forcing them to substitute the worse for the better reason and the lower ideal for one they feel to be higher. Under its guise every sort of sinister human purpose thrives, for anything which can be made to appear patriotic is instantly and deeply approved. Any counsel of moderation is pounced upon as enemy propaganda, while the advocates of internationalism are accused of silly sentimentalism and treason. To encounter a suspicion of lack of patriotism creates a greater defilement than the violation of an ancient taboo. As in the days of witchcraft, suspects are whipped, tarred and feathered or hanged, or like the distinguished list in "Who's Who in Pacifism and Radicalism" are immolated on the altar of militarism amid the shouts of the mob and the secret glee of the patriots who find the established social system the best of all possible systems. In other words, patriotism gives full sway to fear, unbridles the lusts and brutalities of savage man, intensifies our innate suggestibility, and subordinates the mind to every sort of delusion and deceit. Unfortunately there is no printed guide for the proper conduct of human affairs, and so deep is the mystery of social processes that only the ignorant and the simple have complete confidence in their solution of social problems. In times of stress therefore the social mind finds refuge in those torrents of instinctive emotion which arise from the deepest recesses of human nature and which propel the social group like a rudderless vessel before the ocean winds. Patriotism makes of national thought "not a cerebation but a contagion, not an activity but an epidemic."

When one reflects that it was in the midst of such a psychological setting that the Peace Conference had to carry on its work

it need cause little surprise that many of the liberal and generous sentiments expressed by the allied leaders have vanished in thin air and that the result of their work bears very evident traces of revenge, a lust for spoil, and rampagious nationalism. These defects, together with the crop of newly emancipated nations, will furnish enough problems to tax the ingenuity of the statesmen of future generations.

VI. NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

While one cannot be blinded to the fact that the untold misery of the wars of the last four centuries has been caused primarily by unrestrained nationalism, dynastic, middle class and democratic, it would be equally futile to deny that the growth of national states has been a necessary step in the development of a permanent and peaceful adjustment of international relations. Expensive as the process has been, national wars seem to have been but the price paid in the wasteful natural economy of political evolution for the all-important growth of national and political aggregates which must always precede the ultimate alliance, federation, partnership or leaguings together of nations. Further, the very evils and excesses of national aggression have, in the past, forced upon the world's attention well-meant schemes for ending war and providing for peaceful methods of adjusting national claims. The destructive Thirty Years' War produced the proposals of Emeric Crucé (1623), Hugo Grotius (1625), and Sully (1638). The dynastic wars of Louis XIV stimulated the growth of international law and invited the pacific plans of William Penn (1693) and the Abbé de St. Pierre (1712). The reaction against the Seven Years' War, as exemplified in the cosmopolitanism and rationalism of the eighteenth century, brought forth the discussions by Voltaire, Rousseau and Bentham. The French Revolutionary wars stimulated Kant's proposal for a federation of republics, and the Napoleonic baptism of blood led to Alexander's theological proposition for the assurance of international peace and to Castlereagh's more practicable, if less noble, scheme for periodic European congresses of nations when questions should arise which threatened the peace of Europe. The "concert of powers," which thus originated, proved unequal to coping with the aggressive nationalism of the last forty years, the promising beginnings in international organization provided at the Hague

Conferences proved ineffective, and it has required the most expensive and deadly war in human history to drive statesmen into even a half-hearted determination to take effective steps to prevent the recurrence of such a disaster in the future. When an adequate and workable international organization arises designed to curb aggressive and unscrupulous nationalism and to diminish the opportunities for future wars, the most complicated and perplexing problem in the history of political organization will have been solved and the authors of the enterprise will take their place on the level of the greatest statesmen of all time.

The history of modern Europe, however, from the passage of the "Statutes of Laborers" in the later fourteenth century to the present day is strewn with the wreckage of political attempts to resist, restrain or control great economic, social or psychological tendencies, forces and movements. A permanent and enduring partnership of nations must anticipate and forward economic fair dealing, social democracy and cultural assimilation. An abiding and effective international organization has to-day a much better prospect of success than ever before in human history, not only because it has as a psychological stimulus the fresh memory of the horrors of the most frightful military cataclysm in the record of human development, but also because there now exists for the first time in such a crisis a real physical, economic and intellectual internationalism which can serve as the foundation for an international political organization. Paradoxical as it may seem, that same Industrial Revolution which, in its immediate effects, greatly forwarded national development at home and imperialism abroad, also laid the basis for a practical internationalism. The growth of world trade and financial and commercial interdependence have furnished a set of economic motives for pacific adjustments, while the improvement of means of transportation and the communication of information, and the internationalization of science and culture have prepared the way for that growth of intellectual unity and harmony and that development of likemindedness and sympathy which Professor Tenney rightly regards as the all-essential antecedents of any enduring and effectual world organization.

But it would, nevertheless, be futile to hope that mankind is far enough advanced in its development to trust merely to the natural course of political evolution for the speedy attainment of world order and permanent peace. Only by the exercise of the utmost thoughtfulness, candor, tolerance and conciliation will it be

possible to bring into existence an international spirit and political organization which will possess any assurance of terminating physical conflict among nations. Exuberant nationalism, political and economic, will have to be curbed before international order can exist. Mr. Morrow has well presented the political adjustment which must be made between nationalism and internationalism :

We must not, however, deceive ourselves. It is most important clearly to recognize that we are trying to get two things. If we want world peace at whatever price, we can take our eyes away from liberty and think only of order, and the principle of nationality will go by the board. If we want unrestricted liberty at whatever cost, we can think only of the separate national states and the price will be the abandonment of a League of Nations. The reconciliation of these two aims—world order and national independence—is the problem of the Peace Conference. We must go at our task with open eyes. We must start by admitting that we cannot get something for nothing, that if national states are vital to the orderly development of the world, we must sacrifice some world order for the sake of the development of national characteristics; that if world order is so vitally essential that we must have it, then we must sacrifice some of the power and rights of national states in order to insure a greater measure of world order. This is the reconciliation which the Peace Conference must try to make.

Political relations have, however, tended normally to be but the reflection of the deeper economic conditions and forces, and, just as economic unity has always proved the most effective impulse towards political harmony, so economic separatism and suspicion will threaten the dissolution of any political entity. Therefore, it seems clear that any permanent and effective international political or juridical organization must rest upon a basis of economic trust and fair dealing. This phase of the problem has been forcibly set forth by Professor Hankins :

The great stumbling block to internationalism is to-day the outworn tradition of Mercantilism. This familiar doctrine holds that the nation is the trading unit, that consequently it profits most when it sells much and buys little, and that consequently each nation ought to shut itself up behind trade barriers and, like a hermit empire, prevent the intrusion of the cheap goods of other nations. With the overthrow of the dynastic state nothing now seems to have so firm a hold in popular tradition and hence so close a connection to the galvanic batteries of patriotism as this hoary tradition. . . . If we are to have

a lasting peace, then this illusion also must pass into the limbo of outworn creeds; and the peoples of the earth, freed from local fears under the protecting security of a superstate, can become rivals in exploiting the earth rather than each other and mutually enrich each other by a free exchange of their products. Far more certain than the proposed super-alliance of nations as a guarantee of future peace as well as prosperity among men would be a *zollverein* of all industrial nations. Likewise the most prolific source of international jealousy and suspicion in the future seems likely to be trade discriminations, differential tariffs, unfair control and distribution of raw materials and shipping facilities, and other efforts to maintain the economically self-sufficient national state.

The immediate problem is the formation of a League of Nations as the means of allaying fear. The problem of the future is the removal of trade barriers and the establishment of an international economic organization of the world. Only thus will the supra-rational sanction of nationalistic patriotism be transmuted into a supreme loyalty to humanity.

When these necessary cultural, political and economic prerequisites of a permanent peace have been secured, and then only, can one hope for a just and effective world order, for, as Professor Giddings has well said: "A league to enforce peace must be composed of nations that will both keep faith with one another and practically act in coöperation with one another against the law-breaker. Practically these requirements can only be met, and will be met, only if the component nations of the league share a common civilization and hold a common attitude towards questions of right, liberty, law and polity."

SELECTED REFERENCES

Bryce, J., *Essays and Addresses in Wartime* (Chap. VII); Dalberg-Acton, J. E. D., *History of Freedom*; S. P. Duggan, *The League of Nations*; Garner, J. W., *Introduction to Political Science* (Chap. II); Giddings, F. H., *The Responsible State*; Hankins, F. H., *Patriotism and Peace*; Herbert, S., *Nationality and Its Problems*; Krehbiel, E. B., *Nationalism, War and Society* (Parts I-II); Lieber, F., *Fragments on Nationalism and Internationalism*; Matthews, S., *Religion and Patriotism*; Muir, R., *Nationalism and Internationalism* (pp. 37-57); Perla, L., *What is National Honor?*; Playne, C. E., *The Neuroses of the Nations*; Robinson, J. H., "What is National Spirit?" *Century Magazine*, 1916; Rose, J. H., *Nationality in Modern History* (Lecture VIII); Russell, Bertrand, *Why Men Fight*; Ruysen, T., "The Prin-

ciple of Nationality," *Publications of American Association for International Conciliation*, 1916-17; Seton-Watson, R. W., et al., *The War and Democracy* (Chaps. I-II); Trotter, W., *The Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*; Zangwill, I., *The Principle of Nationalities*.

CHAPTER V

NATIONALISM AND HISTORICAL WRITING¹

I. THE FOUNDATIONS

THE Commercial Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries not only was the main factor in arousing historical interest in non-European peoples and a powerful impulse in the development of the new natural science and its accompanying sceptical philosophy, but was also the chief force in bringing to completion the process of shaping the modern national states out of the great feudal monarchies of the later Middle Ages. By its contributions to the increase of the capital and resources at the disposal of the monarch, and its creation of a loyal middle class, it enabled the kings to provide a hired officialdom and military force, by means of which they could crush the opposition of the feudal nobility and bring to perfection the modern national state.

The psychological impulses arising from the welling-up of national pride in the newly fashioned states led to the production of narratives glorifying the national past and to feverish activity in collecting the sources of information which preserved the priceless records of the achievements of the nation from the most remote period. While this movement, in early phases, goes back to the sixteenth century it took on its modern form after the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the regeneration of Prussia had contributed so greatly to the creation of an ardent national self-consciousness in most of the European states. Coming at this time, it was reinforced by the then popular tenets of Romanticism emphasizing the importance of national character and the imperishable "genius of a people."

The nationalistic impulse was refreshed from another source in the middle of the nineteenth century by the vicious influence of the notorious *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*, published

¹ From the *Encyclopedia Americana*

by Count Joseph Arthur of Gobineau in 1854. It proclaimed the determining influence of racial differences on the course of historical development, asserted the inherent superiority of the "Aryan" race, and held that racial degeneration was the inevitable result of its mixture with inferior races. His now utterly discredited doctrines gained great vogue among French, English, and especially among nationalistic German, historians and publicists, culminating in the Teutonic rhapsody of Charles Kingsley and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the Gallic ecstasy of Maurice Barrès and the Anglo-Saxon pæans of Kipling and Homer Lea. Not only was this doctrine effective in developing a still greater degree of chauvinism upon the part of the governing "races," but it also led to the persecution of minority "races," and the consequent stimulation of their nationalistic sentiments.

II. GERMANY

Perhaps the earliest state to begin a national history was Germany in the days of Humanism and the old empire. The cultured Emperor Maximilian I (1493-1519) followed the example of Charlemagne in gathering to his court at Vienna some of the leading historical scholars of German Humanism. Conrad Celtis revived an interest in the *Germania* of Tacitus. Johannes Spiessheimer (1473-1529), better known as Cuspinian, made a critical study of the historical works of Jordanes and Otto of Freising. Irenicus, Peutinger and Beatus Rhenanus (1486-1547) exhibited the spirit of Blondus in their researches into German antiquities. Their activity was soon smothered, however, in the controversies of the Reformation, and interest in secular and national history waned. A century later Melchior Goldast (1578-1635) produced his famous collection of documents dealing with early and medieval German history and public law, known as the *Monarchia romani imperii*, which was the standard German collection until the *Monumenta* had covered the same period and material in a more thorough fashion. The distinguished philosopher G. W. Leibnitz (1646-1716) was ambitious to provide a collection of the sources of German history which would rival those on French history which had been gathered by Duchesne. He was not, however, able to obtain the necessary imperial support and the project had to be abandoned. He merely produced a collection on the history of the Guelfs as a by-product of his history of the dynasty of Bruns-

wick. The great modern collection of the sources of German history, the justly famous *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica*, was a product of the spirit of the War of Liberation and was begun by that greatest of all the German statesmen of his time, Baron von Stein. Discouraged by the reactionary tendencies of the period following the Congress of Vienna, Stein devoted his energies to the stimulation of popular interest in German history. Failing to obtain government support for a collection of the sources of German history, he raised the funds from the resources of himself and his friends, and with rare good fortune secured an editor of great scholarship and energy in the Hanoverian archivist, G. H. Pertz. Pertz carried the burden of the editorship for a half century, aided by the best of German scholars, most prominent of his colleagues being the constitutional historian, Georg Waitz. This magnificent and colossal compilation includes all the important sources of information regarding German history from the time of the Roman writers on the invasions to the close of the Middle Ages, and is still in process of execution. It was, perhaps, one of the greatest landmarks in the development of scientific historical writing, as it alone made possible the productivity and accuracy of the succeeding generations of historians.

National history in Germany was not limited to the collection of sources, but received expression in glowing narratives which usually found their theme in the glories of the German imperial past of the medieval period or in laudatory accounts of the Hohenzollern achievements, which served as the basis of enthusiastic proposals for a Prussian revival of the glories of the empire. Schmidt had written a history of Germany from the rationalist standpoint, but his cosmopolitan outlook made his work quite unsatisfactory to the patriots. Wilken initiated the nationalistic narrative by an account of German prowess in the period of the Crusades. Luden, under the spell of Johannes Müller's views of the medieval period, produced a *History of the German People*, in which he aimed to arouse national enthusiasm for the magnificence of medieval Germany. Voigt contributed an epic dealing with the conversion and conquest of Prussia by the Teutonic knights. Raumer pictured the achievements of the Hohenstaufens, and Stenzel portrayed the deeds of the Franconian emperors with critical skill as well as patriotic edification. Giesebrecht analyzed the formation of the medieval empire with a display of scholarship not less remarkable than his Teutonic fervor. Though

his history of the Reformation was a powerful influence in making Luther the great German national hero, it must be admitted that Ranke and his immediate disciples shared something of the universal outlook of the rationalists, but with the rise of the "Prussian School" nationalistic history became even more chauvinistic and dynastic. Häusser contributed a voluminous epic on the War of the Liberation in his *History of Germany, 1786-1815*. Duncker, the historian of antiquity, from his work in editing the state papers of the great Hohenzollerns, developed a fervid admiration for the dynasty which convinced him of its fitness to revive the imperial glories of old Germany.

The first massive panegyric of Prussianism was the work of Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-84), who deserted his early liberalism to become an almost sycophantic eulogist of the Hohenzollerns. His monumental *History of Prussian Policy* was marred not only by its grave prejudices in favor of the "mission" of the dynasty he admired, but also by the fact that it was almost wholly limited to the superficial field of Prussian foreign politics with little attention even to domestic policy, to say nothing of its total omission of the deeper social conditions and economic forces. The story was picked up where Droysen had left it by Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-96). His *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* ranks with the histories of Michelet and Macaulay as one of the literary masterpieces of modern historiography. While it was charged with all of the vivid enthusiasm for Prussian leadership which marred the work of Droysen, Treitschke's work at least had the merit of devoting adequate attention to the fundamental cultural forces in national development. Heinrich von Sybel (1817-95), the third of the three leaders of the Prussian school, began his work as a disciple of Ranke by a brilliant work on the First Crusade and by a profound study of the origins of the German kingship, but the stirring political situation after the middle of the century led him away from the poise of his master and he became a thorough advocate of German unity through Prussian military leadership. His *History of the French Revolution* was a massive polemic against the whole movement, and its central theme was the old romanticist dogma of the political incapacity of the French. From this spectacle of alleged political ineptitude Sybel turned to an account of the events which demonstrated the supreme capacity of his nation in political affairs—the foundation of the German Empire by Bismarck. His

voluminous work on *The Foundation of the German Empire by William I* showed wonderful power in the clear presentation of a mass of political and diplomatic detail, but was fatally disfigured by downright dishonesty in its exposition of Bismarck's foreign policy, from which all the diplomatic duplicity was carefully excluded. By the time Sybel had finished his work, history in Germany had become too weak a vehicle to serve as a leading instrument for advancing national aspirations. Its place was taken by the literary products of Peters, Tannenberg and the Pan-German expressionists; of Bernhardi and the ultra-militarists; and of Chamberlain and the blatant Teutonists. The complete complicity of the Prussian historians in the production of this state of national exaltation has been clearly revealed by Guillaud.

III. FRANCE

Nearly a century after the beginnings of German national historiography at the court of Maximilian the French began to turn their attention to the analysis and collection of the sources of their national history. This movement may conveniently be dated from the publication of the *Franco-Gallia* of François Hotman in 1574. Other early examples of this tendency were the *Antiquités gauloises et françoises* of Claude Fauchet (1579); the *Annales Francorum* of Pierre Pithou (1588); the *Recherches de la France* of Etienne Pasquier (1611), and the material on the Crusades in the *Gesta Dei per Francos* of Jacques Bongars (1611-17). The true beginning of the critical collection of sources was marked by the work of André Duchesne (1584-1640) in compiling the *Historiæ Normannorum scriptores antiqui* (1619) and the *Historiæ Francorum scriptores coactanci* (1636f.); the "genealogies" and the *Gallia Christiana* of the brothers Sainte-Marthe (1572-1650, 1655); the critical editions of Villehardouin and Joinville by Charles du Fresne du Cange (1610-88); and the *Capitularia regum Francorum* of Etienne Baluze (1630-1718). During the last half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth this collecting of sources was carried on almost entirely by the Benedictine monks of the Congregation of Saint Maur at Saint-Germain-des-Prés in Paris, which was founded between 1618 and 1630 by Doms Martin Tesnière and Grégoire Tarrisé, and whose leader in historical scholarship was the great Jean Mabillon (1632-1707). Only a few of their more notable collec-

tions can be mentioned here. Dom Thierry Ruinart (1657-1709) prepared critical editions of Gregory of Tours and Fredegarius; Dom Edmond Martène (1654-1739) the *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum seu collectio* and the *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum amplissima collectio*; Dom Bernard Montfaucon (1655-1741) *Les Monuments de la monarchie française*; Dom Martin Bouquet (1685-1754) the famous *Rerum Gallicarum et Francicarum scriptores*, which is still being continued by modern scholars under the title of the *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*; and Dom Antoine Rivet de la Grange (1683-1749), aided by Duclou, Poncet and Colomb, began that unique *Histoire littéraire de la France* which was continued by the French Institute to the very close of the last century. The Maurists also turned their attention to the history of the French provinces and gathered many valuable collections, the most famous of which was the *Histoire générale de Languedoc* of Doms Vaisette and Vic (1730-49), recently revised by Molinier. In the latter part of the eighteenth century the laymen again came to the front, the notable center of their activity being the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres*, which had been founded by Colbert in 1663. The most valuable product of their labors was the great collection of *Ordonnances des rois de France* by J. de Laurière, Denis Secousse and L. G. de Brequigny (1714-1794). They also continued the *Histoire littéraire* and the *Gallia Christiana*. A further stimulus came when P. C. F. Daunou was appointed national archivist by Napoleon. He brought many foreign archives to Paris and also continued the work on the *Histoire littéraire* and the other great Benedictine collections.

The first monumental collection of sources in the nineteenth century was the voluminous *Collection de mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France* by Petitot and Monmerqué in one hundred and thirty volumes (1819-29). What Germany owes to Stein for the gathering of the sources of German national history, France owes to Guizot, and more, for the latter not only organized the movement for the scientific work in collecting and editing the sources, but also was a historical scholar of the first order who contributed most valuable works from his own pen. Before he left historical writing for the field of political activity he had published a collection of thirty volumes bearing the same title as that of Petitot. In 1834 he organized the *Société de l'histoire de France*, which was first presided over by Barante and has since

included in its membership the most famous historians of France. The *Ouvrages publiés* of this society have amounted to over three hundred and fifty well edited volumes of source material. Even more important was Guizot's initiative in inducing Louis Philippe to appoint a sub-committee of the ministry of public education which was to devote itself to publishing the hitherto unpublished source material of French history. In the next year their work began to appear in the monumental series of the *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France*, of which about three hundred and thirty volumes have thus far been published. The early editorial associates of Guizot in this enterprise were Mignet, Thierry, Guérard and Raynouard. With the foundation of the *Société de l'École des Chartes* in 1829 the provision of competent editors was henceforth assured through the establishment of the world's greatest historical institute for the training of students in the use of documents—*L'École des Chartes*. The *Documents inédits* are the official French counterpart of the German *Monumenta* and are even more valuable in that they are confined entirely to the presentation of material never before published. The elaborate collection of the *Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études* also deserves mention. The French have also advanced a step beyond any other nation in providing great collections of sources for a study of their history in modern times. This has been due primarily to the fact that no other European state has possessed a national event or movement in modern times at all comparable in picturesque or romantic interest to the French Revolution. In 1903 the socialist historian and statesman, Jaurès, succeeded in inducing the government to establish a committee of the ministry of public instruction to supervise the publication of the unpublished documents dealing with the economic history of the French Revolution. This work has been carried on by the leading French historians, and the *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire économique de la Révolution Française* has been appearing in successive volumes since 1905. The municipal government of Paris has been publishing the *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution Française* since 1888. In addition to these public collections, many collections of sources dealing with special phases of the Revolution have been made by enterprising scholars, among whom Aulard and his pupils have been most active.

The French also vied with the Germans in the production of

nationalistic historical narrative. The publication of Chateaubriand's *Genius of Christianity* in 1802 gave a lustre and romantic touch to the French past in the Middle Ages comparable to the effect produced in Germany by Spittler and Johannes Müller. Fauriel anticipated Coulanges and Jullian in his history of Gaul by contending for the superiority of Celtic to Frankish culture in the formation of medieval civilization. Michaud described the glories of the French in the period of the Crusades. Raynouard drew a vivid picture of the *troubadours* and proclaimed the supremacy of French among the Romance languages. Hanotaux, Fagniez and Chéruef analyzed with both critical erudition and patriotic pride the centralization of the French monarchy by the statesmen of the seventeenth century. Lamartine, in a work which rivalled Carlyle in the field of literature and was equally unscientific as history, set forth with fervid admiration the glories of the French Revolution, and especially the exploits of the Girondists. Mignet, the most scholarly French historian in the first half of the nineteenth century, attacked the Bourbon Restoration by representing the French Revolution as the necessary and inevitable outgrowth of the tendencies of the age and as the dawn of a new and better era in the history of the world. Thiers, while critical of the empire, praised the First Consul as the saviour of France and of European civilization. Napoleon was defended in his imperial splendor by Masson, Vandal and Lévy; Vandal representing him as peace-loving and goaded to war by English jealousy, and Lévy presenting a superhuman and faultless personality. Thureau-Dangin, while deploring its popular origin, appeared as the historical apologist of the "July Monarchy." La Gorce dealt with the "Second Empire" as an apologist of monarchy and clericalism, if not of the personality of Napoleon III. Ollivier dwelt with pride upon the liberal tendencies of the last decade of the empire, and Hanotaux, in one of the finest products of national historiography in France, has described and defended the establishment of the "Third Republic."

Nor was France lacking in general histories written from the national point of view. Early in the nineteenth century Sismondi produced the first detailed general history of France. It was written from the standpoint of an ardent liberal who castigated kings and bishops and lauded the liberal tendencies in the communes. But Sismondi was a Genevan and to some extent a representative of the mild rationalism of Rousseau, and his work was

not calculated to arouse intense patriotic enthusiasm. Much different, except in its liberalism, was the brilliant work of Michelet, which was not only a great contribution to French literature but to the stimulation of patriotic pride, especially on the part of liberal Frenchmen. Henri Martin's history of France was less brilliantly written than Michelet's, but rested on sounder scholarship and for a half century has remained the popular national history of France on account of its logical arrangement, its lucid presentation and its central theme of the progressive growth of French national unity. The great coöperative work edited by Lavissee belongs to the field of erudite and critical rather than nationalistic historiography. French nationalism was greatly stimulated by the sting of the defeat and humiliation of 1870. While the scholarly French historians, such as Gorce and Sorel, maintained an impartiality in treating of the war of 1870, which put to shame the fawning apology of Sybel, there was a great outburst of nationalistic ardor on the part of the "super-patriots" among their countrymen. These tendencies found expression, above all, in the fiery speeches, poetry and pamphlets of Paul Déroulède, the chief of the "Revanchards," and in the brilliant polemics and eulogies of his admirer, that ardent Gallican and head of the League of Patriots, Maurice Barrès, whose study of French history has convinced him that "the French make war as a religious duty. They were the first to formulate the idea of a Holy War. It is not in France that wars are entered upon for the sake of spoil, but as the champion in the cause of God, as a knight upholding justice."

IV. ENGLAND

England did not begin any systematic collection of the sources of its national history until the dawn of the nineteenth century. In the year 1800 the Record Commission was created, but no real historian was connected with its labors until Sir James Mackintosh was appointed in 1825. In 1830 Harris Nicolas called attention to the deplorable condition of the "sources" in England and his criticism led to the creation of a new and more active and critical committee of the Record Commission. A product of this improvement was the edition of the Parliamentary Writs by Palgrave. No systematic activity in the collection of sources began until after the middle of the century. At this time, William Stubbs, the greatest of English medievalists before Maitland and

the Anglicized Russian, Vinogradoff, vigorously criticized the work of the Record Commission. Shortly afterwards, in 1857, Lord Romilly, the Keeper of the Rolls, was able to secure an appropriation from the government to publish the sources of English medieval history and the general oversight of the project was conferred upon Duffus Hardy, a careful, if not brilliant, scholar. The work of editing these sources has been carried on by a number of English medievalists, among them Brewer, Gairdner, Canon Robertson, Giles and Dimock, but far the greatest figure was the English Waitz, Bishop William Stubbs (1825-1901). For more than a quarter of a century after 1863 he gave much of his time to this work. This collection, which was finished in 1896 in two hundred and forty-four volumes, is known as the *Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages* (*Rerum Britannicarum medii ævi scriptores*) or, more briefly, as the *Rolls Series* from the fact of its publication by the Master of the Rolls. It is the official British analogue of the *Monumenta* and the *Documents inédits*. Less pretentious collections have been provided by the Camden Society and the Early English Texts Society. There should also be mentioned the great collection of the sources of English legal history provided by the Selden Society, and the publication of the manuscript records of important voyages and explorations by the Hakluyt Society.

The historiography of nationalism has not been less vigorous in England than in Germany or France. Its most conspicuous feature has been the exploitation of the *Myth Teutonicus* regarding the political superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, which was so popular a tenet of romanticism and had been so fervidly expounded by Edmund Burke. It rested primarily upon the assumption that the Teutonic invaders of England had made a clean sweep of the Briton and Celtic inhabitants and had created a purely Germanic England in culture if not in race. The most vigorous and the earliest statement of this view appeared in Kemble's *The Saxons in England*, which was published in 1849. It not only taught this notion to Englishmen, but was widely read in Germany and served to furnish the German nationalists with a further basis for their convictions regarding the Germanic "mission," which had been drawn from their own medieval sources. Freeman carried the argument still further in his *History of the Norman Conquest*, in which he not only accepted the Saxon theory, but, being an ardent lover of liberty like Michelet, espied the real foundations of politi-

cal liberty in the Germanic folk-moot, and particularly in its English manifestation. This myth, dating back to Thoyras and Montesquieu, but punctured by Brünner and Coulanges, has been one of the most persistent and pernicious sources of error which has come down from a pre-anthropological stage in historical studies. Even the calm and cautious Bishop Stubbs and the charming John Richard Green were also seduced by this fiction of a Teutonic England, which was to be challenged by Seebohm and modified by Maitland and Vinogradoff. The greatest popular emotional impulse toward this Teutonic interpretation came from the notorious work of the poet-historian, Charles Kingsley, on *The Roman and the Teuton*, which was first published in 1864. Highly entertaining but almost wholly unscientific and non-historical, it did more to pervert the interpretation of early medieval history than any other book of its time. He idealized the "young and virile" Teutonic "Forest Children" with the ardor of a Las Casas, and set them in marked and flattering contrast with the morally and physically decadent Romans of the "Dying Empire," and rejoiced in the destruction of the latter by the "Human Deluge" from the north. It is a sufficient commentary upon the accuracy of his work to note that the labors of scholarly medievalists for the last generation have chiefly centered about the rejection of every one of his main theses. The book, however, gained a great popular vogue and no Englishman could read it without desiring to trace his ancestry back to Arminius and Alaric.

Passing from the Middle Ages, where the national grandeur of Britain had been laid by the Teuton, the most intensely nationalistic of English historians, James Anthony Froude, described the glories of the English revolt from Rome. Carlyle lauded the virtues of Cromwell and his associates of the Commonwealth period. The Whig apologists, Mackintosh, Hallam, and above all, Macaulay, described the salvation of the world's liberties by the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688. Macaulay's *History* is the English counterpart of Treitschke and Michelet, and marks the most brilliant of English contributions to historical literature, as well as a valuable, though prejudiced body of historical knowledge. Lecky's study of eighteenth-century England cannot be called nationalistic on account of its impartiality, but Napier praised English prowess in the Peninsular War in a work which was as frank an adulation of war as a process in human society as was Bernhardt's work a half century later. Finally, Seeley, an example of both national-

ism and erudition, wrote with restrained pride on the development of the British Empire in his *Expansion of England and Growth of British Policy*. Not only was Seeley a nationalist, but along with Freeman he was chiefly responsible for turning English historiography into the narrow and unnatural channels of political history. The growth of English imperial enthusiasm, which accompanied the work of Cecil Rhodes and the Boer War, did not fail to produce its nationalistic literature, which was as far removed from the scholarly grasp of Seeley as was the attitude of Bernhardi from that of Ranke. Bernhardi found his English counterpart in Prof. J. A. Cramb, who detected in England's past wars the governing principle "of that higher power of heroism which transcends reason." Curiously enough, as it had fallen to a renegade Englishman, H. S. Chamberlain, to arrange the apotheosis of *Germania*, so it required an American, Homer Lea, to link up the future salvation of the world with the necessity of the universal triumph of *Britannia*, through the strengthening and preservation of "the scarlet circle of power that the Saxon has marked around the earth as has no other race before him."

V. MINOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE JEWS

Italy shares the double honor of having been the first nation to provide a complete collection of its sources of national history and of having produced the most indefatigable of all editors in Lodovico Antonio Muratori (1672-1750). From 1723 until his death in 1750 he brought together in the 25 folio volumes of the *Rerum italicarum scriptores* nearly all of the extant sources of Italian history. So thorough was his work that it has only been deemed necessary in recent years to undertake a new edition of his collection, which has been in progress since 1900 under the supervision of Giosu  Carducci and Vitorio Fiorini. It is scarcely to be doubted that the new edition is quite as much a sublimation of patriotic impulses as an enterprise entered upon in the interests of historical scholarship.

While the national narrative history, like the collection of sources, dates back to a more remote period in Italy than in the other states of Europe, it began in its modern phase with Botta's *History of Italy during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars*, which breathed forth the ardent liberalism which found expression in the politics of the period in the activities of the *Carbonari*.

Coletta condemned the corruption and incapacity of Bourbon absolutism in Naples. Troya and Tosti surveyed the history of medieval Italy for evidence to support their plea for papal leadership in Italian unity, while D'Azeglio turned to contemporary Italy to prove papal incapacity and to call attention to the promise of leadership in the House of Savoy. More recently Luzio, De-Cæsare and Chiala have dealt with the period of the "Risorgimento" and establishment of national unity, but the Italian enthusiasm over their attainment of national independence and unity has scarcely cooled sufficiently to find history an effective method of expression; up to the present time it has been recounted chiefly in the patriotic poetry of Giosué Carducci and Gabriele d'Annunzio. The best work on this period has been done by G. M. Trevelyan, an Englishman, and W. R. Thayer, an American.

The first collection of Spanish sources was not the work of Spaniards, but of the itinerant English scholar, Robert Beal (d. 1601), who published his *Rerum hispanicarum scriptores* in 1579-81. Nearly two centuries later J. A. C. Bertodano produced his extensive collection of sources on diplomatic history (1740-52). The great national collection of sources was not begun until the middle of the nineteenth century when Pidal, Salvá and others started the *Coleccion de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, which was completed in 112 volumes (1842-95). In addition, the Royal Academy of History at Madrid has been publishing source material since 1851 in the collection entitled *Memorial histórica español*. Spain found her great national historian in Modesto Lafuente (1806-66). His monumental *Historia general de España*, which was intended to be a continuation of Mariana, appeared in 30 volumes from 1850-67, and was continued after his death by J. Valera.

The sources of Austrian history were not only collected in the German *Monumenta*, where the great scholar, Theodor Sickel, rendered valuable editorial assistance, but also in separate national collections, the *Fontes rerum Austriacarum*, published since 1849 by the Vienna Academy, and the new edition of Böhmer's *Regesta imperii*, edited by Ficker since 1877 at Innsbruck. The great national narrative history of Austria was Arneth's monumental work on the times of Maria Theresa, while Klopp has recalled the imperial heroes of the Thirty Years' War and conducted an attack on Frederick the Great.

In Bohemia, Czech nationalism did not initiate interest in his-

tory as in other European states, but rather history aroused nationalism in the first instance. To the vigorous patriotism of F. Palacky's *History of Bohemia*, more than to any other source, the modern Czech national spirit owes its origin. The sources of Bohemian history have been collected by the greatest of Bohemian historical scholars, Anton Gindley, and are entitled *Monumenta Historiæ Bohemica* (1864-90). The Hungarian government has been publishing the *Monumenta Hungariæ historica* at Budapest since 1857, and Hungary has found in Fessler and his continuators its national historians. Poland has published two large collections of sources, and Lelewel and Szajnoch have reminded the Poles of their ancient splendor and power. The obscurantism of Tsardom has obstructed the development of historical scholarship in Russia, a loss to Russia which can be appreciated by a survey of the great work of the exile, Vinogradoff. Karamsin's antiquated history presents an apology for the absolutism and Oriental culture of the early tsars, while the more recent and scholarly work of Soloviev defends the introduction of western culture by Peter the Great.

Further, it should not be forgotten that both Belgium and Holland are represented by extensive collections of sources and able national historians. Belgian enthusiasm for the collection of sources of national history began with the attainment of independence in 1830. The great national collection is the *Collection de chroniques Belges inédites*, published in 111 volumes at Brussels since 1836. The *Société d'émulation de Bruges*, published between 1839 and 1864 the 56 volumes of the *Recueil de chroniques, chartes, et autres documents concernant l'histoire et les antiquités de la Flandre occidentale*. In addition Wauters has edited the great collection of communal charters and Gachard has edited the archives of the period since the fifteenth century. The great Catholic and Belgian counter-blast to Motley's work, as well as to that of Prinsterer, is found in the work of Lettenhove on the sixteenth century. He condemned William the Silent and his Protestant supporters and defended the position of Spain and the Catholic party. His somewhat chauvinistic and obscurantist work has been superseded by the admirable critical works of Frédéricq and Pirenne. While Holland has not provided as complete a collection of national sources as Belgium, the Historical Society of Utrecht has been publishing important sources since 1863—the

Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht—and Prinsterer has edited the voluminous archives of the House of Orange. In 1902 a royal commission of the most eminent Dutch historians was appointed to arrange for the systematic publication of the manuscript sources of the history of Holland. The most enthusiastic Dutch nationalistic narrative history was that by Prinsterer in which Protestantism and the House of Orange received their vindication and eulogy. This has now been rendered obsolete by the scholarly monographs of Fruin, the greatest of Dutch historians, and by the accurate and well-balanced general history of Blok.

The Scandinavian nations have not been unproductive in the field of national historiography. The sources have been collected in the following series: the *Scriptores rerum Danicarum mediæ ævi*, edited by Langebek and his successors; the *Diplomatarium Norvegicum*, edited by Lange; and the *Scriptores rerum Suecicarum*, edited by Geijer and his associates. The nationalistic historical narrative was introduced in Denmark by Worsaae; in Norway by Keyser and Munch; and in Sweden by Geijer, Carlson and Fryxell. These works have been succeeded by the more recent and scholarly national histories of Steenstrup on Denmark; Sars on Norway; and Hjärne on Sweden. If there were available space it would be easy to demonstrate the very great, if not determining, influence of the study of the glories of their national past upon the rise of the national aspirations of the Balkan peoples since 1820. The well-known influence of Alexandru Xénopol's *Histoire des Roumains de la Dacie Trajane* upon Roumanian nationalism is but a typical illustration of the fertility of such an investigation.

Surely, no account of the interrelation of nationality and historiography in modern times would be complete without some reference to the national historiography of Judaism and Zionism. The rise of Jewish nationalism in the last century was intimately related to the general development of nationality in Europe during that period. This stimulated Jewish national spirit, both by the direct influence of imitation and through the persecution of the Jews, as a result of the growing chauvinism throughout continental Europe after 1870. The relation of this growth of Jewish national sentiment to the remarkable development of the interest of the Jews in their national history is readily apparent.

Historical societies were formed in all the leading modern states—the “Société des études juives,” founded in 1880; the Historical Commission of the “Union of German Jewish Congregations,” appointed in 1885; “The American Jewish Historical Society,” created in 1892; and “The English Jewish Historical Society,” founded in 1895. These societies have done valuable work in compiling sources of Jewish history and in arousing interest in its study. Especially to be noted is the *Regesten zur Geschichte der Juden im fränkischen und deutschen Reiche bis zum Jahre 1273*, published by the German Jewish Historical Commission since 1887. Including an account of the Jewish persecutions in the medieval period, it has tended to arouse their national resentment at past, as well as present, oppression. The Jews have also been stirred by the work of a great national historian, Heinrich Graetz (1817–91). Isaac M. Jost (1793–1860), in his *History of the Israelites*, and his *History of Judaism*, had surveyed the history of the Jews, but he was too liberal, rationalistic and impartial a writer to serve as a truly national historian. Widely different was the work of Graetz, sometimes called the Jewish Treitschke. Conservative and generally orthodox, and fired with a warm enthusiasm for the past and future of his people, Graetz traced in an eloquent manner the history of the Jews from their origins to 1848, laying special stress upon their literary and spiritual development, in other words, upon the elements which contributed the most to the development and persistence of their national culture. Graetz’s work was especially in line with the development of “Zionism,” for he insisted that the true Messiah was the national spirit of the Jewish people and he discouraged further delay through awaiting the coming of a personal Messiah. In addition to the general history of Graetz, there should be mentioned the many histories dealing in a comprehensive fashion with the history of the Jews in the different European states.

VI. ARCHIVAL MATERIALS

In connection with this brief summary of the reaction of nationalism upon historiography in Europe some passing reference should be made to the growth and accumulation of archival material and its accessibility to students. The development of the

national states and their administrative bureaucracies led to a great amount of administrative "red tape" and to the growth of fixed diplomatic correspondence. From these sources a rich storehouse of historical material had accumulated in the national, ecclesiastical and private archives by 1800. Before they could be generally useful to historians, however, the sources in the archives had to be classified and centralized and made public to creditable historians. In the matter of centralization and classification of archival material France has taken the lead, due chiefly to the large number of highly trained archivists provided by *L'École des Chartes*. At the present time only England is exceedingly backward among the European states in providing for a systematic arrangement and classification of its archival material. In the same way that national pride and competition led to the compilation of the great source collections of national history, it forced the several European states at various dates during the nineteenth century to open the archives to historical scholars. In addition, the liberal-minded Pope, Leo XIII, opened the Vatican archives in 1881 and secular scholars for the first time had the privilege of examining the treasures that Baronius had made use of. Even at the present time, however, complete freedom is not accorded anywhere in the use of archival material, scholars being excluded from the more recent documents. For instance, the Vatican archives are accessible only to 1815, those of France to 1830, and those of England to 1867. In America, scholars like Gaillard Hunt are laboring to put the archival material of the United States upon the same high plane that it has reached in most European countries.

The attitude towards opening archives has been revolutionized since the World War. The new governments in Germany, Austria and Russia, desirous of discrediting the old régimes, threw open the foreign office material on the period since 1908 and have thereby completely altered the war-time views of responsibility for the War. England has now followed suit and promises a scholarly and uncensored edition of such documents. But the greatest achievement has been the German publication of all the important documents in the Foreign Office since 1870 in the great set, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, in a series of about fifty volumes under the careful editorship of Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich

Thimme. The highly incomplete and strictly censored French *Livres Jaunes* in no way compare with this magnificent achievement.

VII. THE UNITED STATES

The United States has never provided a great official collection of the sources of its national history comparable to those prepared by the European countries. This has been due in part to the particularism inherent in the American Federal system and in part to the fact that the American central government has been too much absorbed in the details of routine legislation to be able to concentrate its attention on the furthering of intellectual interests. The true American counterpart of the movement of collecting sources of national history, which was associated in Europe with the names of Pertz, Guizot, Nicolas, Hardy and Stubbs, is to be found in the rather pathetic attempt of Peter Force (1790-1868) to obtain adequate government support for his *American Archives*, which were designed to constitute a complete collection of the sources of the history of the United States from the period of discovery to the formation of the Constitution. Its psychological and historical affinity with the European movement is clearly indicated by Force's statement of his aims. "The undertaking in which we have embarked is, emphatically, a national one; national in its scope and object, its end and aim." After a painful process of protracted importuning, Force received a Federal appropriation which allowed him to begin publishing his *Archives* in 1837, but the government aid was soon withdrawn and the published material was but an insignificant fraction of what it had been planned to include. Owing to the fact that American historical scholarship was then a generation behind that of Europe, Force was primarily a hard-working antiquarian compiler rather than a scholarly editor like Pertz, Waitz, Mignet, Guérard, Hardy or Stubbs, and the national loss from the cessation of his work was infinitely less than would have been occasioned by a discontinuance of the *Rolls Series*, the *Monumenta* or the *Documents Inédits*.

The collections which have been made have been primarily the result of the enterprise of individuals, publishing companies and the historical societies of the several commonwealths. The process began with the publication of Jared Sparks' writings of Washing-

ton between 1834 and 1838. The most ambitious attempt to make a thorough collection was the work of Mr. Hubert Howe Bancroft in the last half of the nineteenth century, in gathering the sources of the history of the Pacific states. Unfortunately, he did not follow the example of Stein and secure the aid of a Pertz, but trusted to his own untrained hand in the execution of the project, with the result that the work lacked in critical scholarship and careful editing. An incomparably more scholarly work was the coöperative history of the colonization of America, edited by Justin Winsor, but, though this contained much source material, it was primarily a narrative work giving a critical review of the sources rather than including them. Parallel with this movement went the publication of source material by the various commonwealths in the vast collections of colonial records and archives, but in the great majority of cases these collections were prepared by erudite antiquarians rather than by men trained as critical historical editors, and there was no uniformity in the methods employed. Some of these state collections have, however, been of a very high order, the most notable being, perhaps, the extensive series dealing with the exploration and settlement of the Middle West by Reuben G. Thwaites of Wisconsin.

Another mode of collecting sources was exhibited in the editions of the messages and papers of the presidents and the writings of the chief statesmen by numerous scholars, which have varied widely in quality, reaching the highest level in W. C. Ford's *Writings of Washington*; Gaillard Hunt's *Writings of James Madison*; and J. B. Moore's *Works of James Buchanan*. The United States has not been lacking in editorial ability of the highest order, for in Worthington C. Ford, John Franklin Jameson, Paul Leicester Ford and Gaillard Hunt are to be found the equals of Pertz, Waitz, Guizot or Stubbs. The great defect has been the lack of concerted planning and continued and adequate government aid. Promising beginnings in the right direction are to be seen in W. C. Ford's edition of the *Journals of the Continental Congress* and the scholarly products of the Carnegie Institution under Dr. Jameson's direction. John Bassett Moore has labored with almost Benedictine patience and productivity in the preparation of his monumental series dealing with the documentary history of diplomacy. There also should be mentioned the remarkable collection of sources dealing with the history of labor in America which has been prepared by Professor Commons and his associates. Miss

Adelaide Hasse has begun an invaluable series of volumes describing and classifying the sources for American economic and social history which are available in the public documents of the various commonwealths. On the whole, however, the United States has been incomparably delinquent in the thorough and scholarly collection of the sources of its national history, and it cannot seek refuge behind any assertion that this has been due to a lack of rabid nationalistic emotions.

If this country has not kept abreast of European developments in the editorial aspect of national historiography, it can lay claim to having produced historians enthused with as ardent a patriotism as fired a Treitschke, a Michelet or a Froude. Nationalism in American historiography has, naturally, centered mainly about the romantic period of colonization and the struggle for American independence, and American historians have surrounded this period with the halo given to the early national history of Germany and France by Johannes Müller and Chateaubriand. The chief figure in the creation of this national epic of migration and deliverance was George Bancroft, whose early years fell in that period of national bumptiousness and florid democracy of the "thirties" and "forties." To Bancroft, the history of the formation of the American Republic was no modest secular achievement of ordinary mortals, but a veritable *Æneid* in which Augustus was replaced by Washington and which exhibited in its succession of scenes "the movement of the divine power which gives unity to the universe, and order and connection to events." His history of the United States through the period of the Federal Constitutional Convention represented the process of colonization as the flight of brave spirits from oppression, characterized the American Revolution as a crusade of wholly virtuous and disinterested patriots in behalf of the liberties of civilized humanity, described the American constitution as the creation of a group of unique mental giants, never before equalled and not to be matched at any later epoch, and regarded their work as even more notable than its makers. The pathetic inaccuracy of all of his major premises can only be appreciated by a careful perusal of the scholarly treatment of the same topics by Beer, Van Tyne, M. C. Tyler, Osgood, Alvord, Andrews, Fisher, Farrand and Beard, and the damage done to proper perspective in American history by his works has been almost incalculable and irreparable.

The myth was perpetuated in Palfrey's long Puritan apology

and was repeated in a less vigorous form in Mr. Lodge's discussion of the English colonies in America. From his pride in American exploits in behalf of liberty and democracy, Motley was encouraged to study the analogous movement among the Dutch, when they rebelled against Spanish tyranny and established a republic. Francis Parkman, turning from the Anglo-Saxon phobia of Bancroft, first gave full credit to the work of France in colonizing the New World. He found that the record of heroism had not been wholly monopolized by the English and German colonists. While Parkman had turned his attention to the French in the north and west, William H. Prescott found his theme in the conquest and colonization of Central and South America by the Spanish, and in a brilliant description of the splendor of the native American civilizations of Mexico and Peru. Mahan, enthused by the exploits of the small American navy in the wars of the Revolution and 1812, was encouraged to make a study of the influence of naval supremacy upon the history of the past. Few works have been more influential in stimulating the disastrous growth of modern armaments. The period of cementing the national union through the efforts of the Federalists was glorified in the works of Hildreth and John Church Hamilton, and the blessings of the "pure" democracy of the Jacksonian epoch were set forth in the essays and addresses of Bancroft, who believed that he detected the very "voice of God" in the acclaim of Jackson's followers. Roosevelt described the process of American expansion westward with the buoyant and ill-concealed pride of an admirer of the west and an ardent patriot and national imperialist. Von Holst beheld in the struggle over slavery one more great episode in that eternal conflict between righteousness and iniquity. Professor Burgess saw in the success of the north in the Civil War, not only a justification of his own nationalistic political philosophy, but also a sure manifestation of Teutonic genius in the field of political unification and organization. On the whole, however, by the time that the achievements of the Civil War and Reconstruction periods had come to be subjects for historical analysis the objective scholarship of the critical and erudite school had begun to prevail and the "American epic" passed, to be preserved only in the school texts of succeeding generations.

The task of rationalizing the "Bancroftian epic" and adapting it to the tendencies of the latter part of the nineteenth century fell to the philosopher-historian, John Fiske (1842-1901). By

his amiable Spencerian rationalism and his eulogy of the rise of the middle class he best summed up the prevailing spirit of the educated Americans of his time, and by his lively and attractive style and his primary concern with the period of discovery, colonization and revolution he attracted a following which probably entitles him to the position of the popular national historian of the last generation. He was the prophet of the new era in the interpretation of Anglo-American relations which replaced the Puritan and American epic of Bancroft by an account of the rise and triumph of the middle class in both England and America—"an epic of the English-speaking peoples." He was as fully convinced as Burgess of the supreme political capacity of the Teutonic branch of the "Aryans." He held that the first instance of self-government in recorded history was to be seen in the Teutonic village-community, which was an "inheritance from pre-historic Aryan antiquity," and he believed that "American history descends in unbroken continuity from the days when stout Arminius in the forests of northern Germany successfully defied the might of imperial Rome." Fiske, however, stressed the element of liberty as the surest criterion of political capacity rather than the aspect of order and authority which found favor with Burgess. England under Gladstone seemed far better adapted than Germany under Bismarck for furnishing an edifying example of the attainment of complete political liberty, and the then popular theory of a wholly Teutonic England was an ethnic argument in favor of such an undertaking. Therefore, instead of conducting the muse of liberty directly from the "German forest primeval" to the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, Fiske arranged a detour in her migration to the new world which would guide her to America by the way of the "Glorious Revolution of 1688," in which, as the work of the English "bourgeoisie," freedom both political and religious was established on so firm a foundation as never again to be shaken, never again with impunity to be threatened, so long as the language of Locke and Milton and Sydney shall remain a living speech on the lips of men." Working hand in hand with George Otto Trevelyan, he tried to show how the American Revolution was but the perfect fulfilment of the spirit of 1688. He pictured it as the work of Whigs on both sides of the Atlantic in the heroic effort to check and crush the autocratic tendencies of a Tory squirearchy and the unconstitutional tyranny of a "German king," and to preserve for the world the liberties

embodied in the Bill of Rights. He dwelt with pride upon the establishment of the American Federal Republic and regarded it as the great contribution of the western hemisphere to the solution of political problems, by reconciling the liberty of the New England town-meeting with the existence of large political aggregates. He contemplated with unmixed pleasure the progress of the middle class in its political and economic conquest of the American continent in the nineteenth century, and just before his death at the opening of the twentieth century, he was deeply gratified to see his own country at last assume its part of the white man's burden" by the retention of the Philippines. Not at all a militarist, he looked upon this as a most significant step in the process of bringing the world under the peaceful dominion of "the two great branches of the English race which have the mission of establishing throughout the larger part of the earth a higher civilization and a more permanent political order than any that has gone before."

Even the more progressive Latin American states have begun to produce extensive collections of the sources of their national history. The *Documentos para la Historia Argentina*, which have been edited by L. M. Torres and the faculty of philosophy and letters of the National University of Buenos Aires since 1911, are a typical example of this process.

VIII. THE OUTCOME

The net result of the growth of nationality and of nationalism upon historiography has been greatly varied and a mixed blessing. Its fortunate results have been, above all, the provision of great collections of source material which otherwise would never have been made available and the training of many excellent historians in the process of the compilation and editing of the sources. The deplorable effects have centered about the creation of a dangerous bias of patriotism, which not only prevented a calm, objective and accurate handling of historical facts, even by highly trained historians, but also contributed in no small degree to the great increase in chauvinism which led to the calamity of 1914. The responsibility of the nationalistic historians in this regard has been well stated by Prof. H. Morse Stephens, probably the most thorough student of this particular subject: "Woe unto us! professional historians, professional historical students, professional

teachers of history, if we cannot see written in blood, in the dying civilization of Europe, the dreadful result of exaggerated nationalism as set forth in the patriotic histories of some of the most eloquent historians of the 19th century." It would be fortunate, indeed, if this were all, but for every patriot made by a Treitschke, a Michelet, a Froude or a Bancroft, hundreds have been enthused by the petty chauvinism of the third-rate text-book compilers who have imitated their bias without their literary virtues. The nature and effect of these textbooks upon the past generation has been indicated for this country by Mr. Charles Altschul and Miss B. L. Pierce, and for France and Germany by Dr. J. F. Scott and Prof. D. R. Taft. England has not fallen behind any of these nations in this respect. Some optimism for the future may, however, be discovered in the fact that there is an ever greater tendency for the textbook writing to be handed over to reliable and relatively unbiased professional historians. They continue, however, to be harrassed by the illiterate and by professional patriots.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Altschul, Charles, *The American Revolution as Presented in Our School Text-Books*; Bardoux, A., *Guizot*; Bassett, J. S., *The Middle Group of American Historians*; Beard, C. A., *An Introduction to the English Historians*; Burr, G. L., "European Archives," in *American Historical Review*, 1902; Charmes, X., *La Comité des Travaux historiques*; Clark, J. S., *The Life and Letters of John Fiske*; Cramb, J. A., *Germany and England*; Davis, H. W. C., *The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke*; Droysen, G., *Johann Gustav Droysen*; Dümmler, E., *Über die Entstehung der Monumenta Germaniae*; Farnham, C. H., *Life of Francis Parkman*; Fueter, E., *L'Histoire de l'Historiographie moderne* (Books V-VI); Galley, J. B., *Claude Fauriel*; Gooch, G. P., *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (Chaps. V, VIII-XXII); Guérard, B., *Notice sur Daunou*; Guillard, A., *Modern Germany and Her Historians*; Hausrath, A., *Treitschke*; Hayes, C. J. H., "The War of the Nations" in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1914; Hanotaux, G., *Henri Martin*; Krehbiel, E., *Nationalism, War and Society*; Marcks, E., *Treitschke, ein Gedenkblatt*; *Heidelberger Professoren*; Meinecke, F., "Heinrich von Sybel" in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1895; Merriam, C. E., *A History of American Political Theories* (Chap. VII); Morison, J. C., *Macaulay*; Monod, G., *Renan, Taine, Michelet*; Jameson, J. F., *The History of Historical Writing in America*; "Gaps in the Published Records of

United States History" in *American Historical Review*, 1906; Jullian, C., *Extraits des Historiens français* (Introduction); Peck, H. T., *W. H. Prescott*; Rein, A., *Seeley, eine Studie über den Historiker*; Remusat, P., *Thiers*; Robinson, J. H., "What is National Spirit?" *Century Magazine*, 1916; Rose, J. H., *Nationality in Modern History*; Simon, J., *Quatre Portraits*; Thiers, Guizot, Remusat; Mignet, Michelet, Henri Martin; Sorel, A., *Notes et Portraits*; Springer, A., *F. C. Dahlmann*; Stephens, H. M., "Modern Historians and their Influence on Small Nationalities" in *Contemporary Review*, 1887; "Nationality and History" in *American Historical Review*, 1916; Stephens, W., *The Life and Letters of Freeman*; Trevelyan, G. O., *The Life and Letters of Macaulay*; Varrentropp, C., *Vorträge und Abhandlungen von Heinrich von Sybel*; Vinogradoff, P., *Villainage in England* (Introduction).

CHAPTER VI

THE RACE MYTH¹

More and more we are coming to recognize the fundamental importance of race in human affairs. . . . It is about the liveliest, most practical subject than can engage the attention of thinking men and women to-day. . . .

Especially do we need to regard the racial factor when considering Europe. . . . Whoever begins looking at Europe from the racial angle is astonished at the new light thrown upon its problems, at the apparent mysteries that are explained, at the former riddles that are solved. Europe's seemingly tangled history grows much simpler, while present-day conditions become more understandable.—

Lothrop Stoddard, 1925.

I. RACE THEORY AND HISTORY

IN the light of the fact that the racial phobia of the last three-quarters of a century which has reappeared with a new virulence since 1916 has based much of its dogmatism and interpretation upon an appeal to pseudo-history, it is most curious that the critics of this monstrosity have rarely made a systematic appeal to the facts of substantial history to refute the contentions of writers from Gobineau to Chamberlain and Grant. This is particularly strange because of the fact that of all the possible types of convincing evidence against this position, the historical attack is the most withering and conclusive. It is, if anything, more devastating than the anthropological evidence as to the elusiveness and diversity of physical racial characteristics or the Pearsonian differential biology which calls attention to the primary significance of the demonstrable differences in physical and mental traits exhibited between members of the same so-called race.

In this brief attempt to examine the racial thesis in the light of history, we shall first sketch briefly the development of the race myth, and then examine the degree to which its hypotheses square with the more elementary facts of human history.

¹ From the *New York Nation*, May 6, 1925.

II. ORIGINS OF THE RACE MYTH

The origins of the race myth² must unquestionably be sought in the vestiges from the primitive and tribal aversion complex exhibited toward strangers, symbolized by the old phrases of Jew and Gentile, and Greek and Barbarian. In its modern form it took shape first with the theory of the Romanticists, at the close of the eighteenth century, with respect to the reality and the dominating importance of national character as the basis and matrix of the culture and institutions of any state. It was given a particularly forceful statement by Fichte in his famous lectures to the German people in 1807, where he stated that perhaps the most precious element in the German heritage and culture lay in the unique German language or *Ursprache*. The emphasis of Fichte and others upon the importance of language in national character in large part produced the origins of modern scientific philology, which came to fruition in the notable works of Bopp, the brothers Grimm, Max Müller, Whitney and others. This point of view laid special emphasis upon the close interrelation, if not actual identity, between race and language.

About this time there was developing an interest in the study of the languages and institutions of Europe and Asia. This led to the discovery of certain basic similarities in the root words and word structure of the Eur-Asiatic languages, particularly the similarity between the European languages and the Sanskrit of ancient India. The establishment of this similarity in the Eur-Asiatic languages was the work of William Jones, and of Bopp, who published his *Comparative Grammar* in 1835. During the next generation much important work was done in the way of describing the origins, migration and affinities of these so-called Aryan languages. It came to be rather commonly maintained that there were not only Aryan languages, but that a primordial Aryan race lay back of these linguistic similarities and identities. By the '50s of the last century this had become a rather usual assumption on the part of essayists and not a few distinguished philologists and anthropologists. In fact, Max Müller, himself, though he later repudiated this position, confirmed this popular impression by holding that the Aryan languages were spoken by an Aryan

² See the remarkable history of this whole subject in T. Simar, *The Race Myth*; and F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of History*.

race, hence supporting the view of the identity of language and race.

This false assumption of linguistic and racial identity would not, however, have furnished the basis for a racial psychosis if taken by itself alone. What was needed was a vigorous statement of the cultural and historic importance or mission of particular races. This indispensable impetus was supplied in the famous *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races* by Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, published in 1854. He contended that nearly all of the worthwhile cultures of the human past had been the product of the white race, and that most of these significant civilizations had been specifically created by the Aryan branch of this superior white race. In general he also maintained that race mixture was a distinctly degenerating process. From Gobineau's time it came to be regarded as a matter of great significance to prove that one's nation was made up predominantly of Aryans. At first this gave rise to relatively little nationalistic chauvinism in Europe because it was assumed that the broad similarities of the European languages, with the exception of Basque and certain of the Turanian dialects, meant that the overwhelming majority of all Europeans, within whatever national boundary, were good Aryans. This benign illusion was demolished by a number of Germanic writers, particularly J. G. Cuno (1871), Theodor Pöschke (1878), and Carl Penka (1883). These writers proved convincingly that the assumption of the identity between race and language was highly fallacious. A fairly well unified race like the American Indians has more than a hundred distinct stock languages, to say nothing of the enormously greater number and variety of dialects, while obviously different races may, due to cultural pressure and historic association, speak the same language. Hence, it was apparent that not all Europeans were Aryans, and, from the '80's onward, there was a feverish effort on the part of writers in every state to prove themselves the only true Aryans and their neighbors of inferior non-Aryan clay.

It has frequently been held that Teutonic writers were the only ones who succumbed to this fanaticism, but this view is largely a product of modern propaganda which has flourished since 1914. As an actual matter of fact, every state had its group of writers who interpreted national culture on the basis of racial superiority due to the Aryan heritage, England and France quite matching the Teutons in this respect. These views not only found ex-

pression in the obsessed writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Maurice Barrès, Rudyard Kipling and other essayists, but also in the nationalistic historical literature which held a supreme place in historical writing until nearly the close of the nineteenth century, and was represented by such works as those of Droysen, Treitschke, von Sybel, Michelet, Martin, Kemble, Stubbs, Freeman, and others only slightly less distinguished and widely read.

III. THE CRITIQUE OF THE RACE MYTH

While this very racial obsession was taking its most vigorous form, scientists were patiently assembling the data which were to reveal with pitiless thoroughness the fundamental inaccuracy of all of the assumptions which underlay the racial interpretation. An American scholar, W. Z. Ripley, based upon the researches of European scholars a comprehensive work upon the *Races of Europe*, which thoroughly demolished the theory that there ever was any such thing as an Aryan race. The term Aryan was shown to be applicable, if at all, only to certain linguistic products common to certain peoples of Europe and Asia. It was also proved to be highly dubious as to whether the term Aryan could be accurately used to describe the social and cultural institutions which had developed among peoples who spoke the so-called Aryan languages. Above all, Ripley, Sergi and others demonstrated beyond any possible doubt that the Teutonic peoples certainly could not have been of Asiatic derivation and could not have been the original bearers of the Aryan language and culture. If there is any such thing as a definite Aryan language and typical Aryan institutions, it is the consensus of the best anthropological opinion that they must have been brought into Europe by the round-headed Alpine or Eur-Asiatic race. Hence, the term "Indo-Germanic," used as descriptive of a unified race or culture, is a scientific and historical monstrosity, in spite of the fact that it crops out in so recent an historical work as the third volume of the *Cambridge Medieval History*. Indeed, it is still in common use among many conventional historians, particularly English historians. It may be regarded as in general accurate to use the term "Indo-European" as broadly descriptive of the Alpine race, but it certainly cannot be used in any sense as referring to either the Mediterranean or the Nordic groups, and, hence, not as descriptive of all the races or cultures of ancient India and modern

Europe. As Professors Boas, Pearson, Hankins and others have so well revealed the biological and anthropological fallacies underlying the Aryan and Nordic myths, we may pass these over with no further comment. Professor Boas' articles in the *American Mercury* for October, 1924, and the *Forum* for October, 1925, furnish a good summary of the critical position.

When one turns to examine the thesis that all worth-while culture and civilization have been a product of the Nordics, in the light of the most rudimentary and self-evident facts of human history, the whole structure of racialism immediately falls to the ground. We shall not here attempt to analyze the racial basis of the leading periods and phases of culture, but will refer readers for this subject to the convincing article of Professor J. J. Smertenko in the New York Times *Current History Magazine* for April, 1924. We shall content ourselves with passing in review the great historic civilizations and indicating the essentially non-Nordic basis of almost every one of them. All of the great civilizations of oriental antiquity were, for all practical purposes, one hundred per cent. non-Nordic. This is especially apparent as soon as one accepts the modern scientific view that the Nordics are in no sense related to the peoples of ancient India or the Eur-Asiatic Alpines who came from this region to Europe following the close of the Paleolithic age. All of the great European heritage that came in from Egypt, which has recently been so forcibly and clearly described by Professor Breasted, was absolutely devoid of any Nordic foundations. Further, we must revise the ordinary notion that human civilization has been limited to the area between the Tigris and the Thames. As an actual matter of fact, in most respects aside from science and material culture, the civilizations of China and India may be well held to be more advanced and mature than those of the Occident. That they are of non-Nordic derivation would scarcely need to be pointed out even to Dr. Stoddard and Mr. Grant.

The high civilizations of the ancient Ægean were likewise a purely Mediterranean culture without any significant Nordic admixture whatever. To pass on to classical times, there was only the merest sprinkling of Nordics in the ancient composition of Greece and Italy, as Peake, Sergi and Guiffrida-Ruggeri have amply demonstrated. Certainly, the Nordic element in classical culture, if present at all, was so slight as to be almost entirely negligible. The highest culture of the Middle Ages was not to be

found in western Europe but in the Eastern or Greek Empire and among the Muslims of northern Africa and Spain. The contrary view has become popular solely because of the grotesquely misleading nature of our conventional textbooks on medieval history, which concentrate their attention and concepts, almost without exception, on the Christian culture of northwestern Europe during the medieval period. The Muslim culture was, of course, entirely non-Nordic, and there was but a small Nordic minority among the peoples that maintained the Byzantine culture to the final conquest by the Turks in the middle of the fifteenth century. Even the civilization and institutions of western Europe, as Jullian, Fustel and others have proved during the last generation, took their departure, not from the crude and primitive Teutonic institutions of the Franks, but rather from the Germanic appropriation and assimilation of the Gallo-Romanic culture of Italy and Roman Gaul. Even in a political and military sense no convincing case can be made for Nordic supremacy during the medieval period. The strongest national monarchies of the Middle Ages were those of France and England, while the Holy Roman Empire remained throughout the medieval age a loose and weak organization. We now know that medieval France was predominantly non-Nordic, and that the non-Nordic element was certainly as large as the Nordic even in medieval England.

The most striking political organizations of early modern Europe were the despotisms of Spain and Bourbon France, while the central European states continued politically backward and loosely organized. The Germanic states remained the "weak sister" in the political family of Europe down to the period of Bismarck's statesmanship following 1860. If one were to accept for a minute the thesis of racial causation in politics, European history since the fall of the Roman Empire would constitute about as effective a case as one could expect to erect for the relative *political incapacity* of these very Nordics whose unique political force and subtlety have been upheld by the whole school of writers from Droysen and the Maurers to Stubbs, Freeman, Fiske, Herbert Baxter Adams and Burgess. The facts of history certainly constitute much more of an indictment of the political ability of the Nordics than a demonstration of their unusual capacity in this field. Of course, the sane historian will disregard the racial interpretation of political history as a whole and understand that, in all probability, the political backwardness of Germany was

caused by certain specific historical situations of an ecclesiastical, geographic and economic type.

In the case of England and our own country the cogent race myth has been that variant of the Nordic obsession known as the "Anglo-Saxon Myth," which was so effectively exploded by Henry Jones Ford in the *American Mercury* for September, 1924. It was based essentially upon the contention that most of the unique virtue of the Nordics migrated from Germany along with the Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Danes, and Normans and took up its abode among the Nordic immigrants to the British Isles, who were supposed to have swept this area clean of the fickle and decadent Celts. The American version of the Anglo-Saxon Myth, developed by writers like John Fiske, contended that the best in the Anglo-Saxon political genius left the British Isles during the period of the colonization of America, and came to fruition in the township government of New England and, on a larger scale, in the Federal Republic established by the Constitution of 1787.

The researches of physical anthropologists and cultural historians have demonstrated both the racial and institutional fallacies in the Anglo-Saxon Myth. England, after the Germanic conquests, remained certainly as much non-Nordic as Nordic. The United States has been from the colonial period a most mixed population. Finally, most of the institutions which are looked upon as primarily Anglo-Saxon were in few cases derived from Germany at all, but have been the result of the interaction of various historic forces and situations more or less uniquely English or American, and in some cases wholly modern in origin.

It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the manner in which the demonstrable racial mixture in the history of Europe rules out as utterly impossible the racial interpretation of European history. Even if we were to grant, for example, that the culture of Germany or the culture of France is both unique and the product of a definite racial basis, shall we assign this culture in the case of France to the Nordics of the northeast, the Celts of the central portion, or the Mediterraneans of the south? Or, in the case of Germany, is her culture primarily the product of the Nordics in the north or the Alpines in the south? Even if we could feel sure, which we certainly cannot, that there is any important relationship between race and culture, the hopeless mixture of European races since the Neolithic period would most assuredly rule out as nonsense any attempt at a racial interpretation of the his-

tory of the various European states. This fact can probably best be driven home by a concrete illustration. There is no better one than the following summary by Karl Pearson of the racial heredity of Charles Darwin, long pointed to as physically and mentally a typical English Nordic:

He is descended in four different lines from Irish kinglets; he is descended in as many lines from Scottish and Pictish kings. He has Manx blood. He claims descent in at least three lines from Alfred the Great, and so links up with Anglo-Saxon blood, but he links up also in several lines with Charlemagne and the Carolingians. He sprang also from the Saxon emperors of Germany, as well as from Barbarossa and the Hohenstaufens. He had Norwegian blood and much Norman blood. He had descent from the dukes of Bavaria, of Saxony, of Flanders, the princes of Savoy, and the kings of Italy. He had the blood in his veins of Franks, Alamans, Merovingians, Burgundians, and Longobards. He sprang in direct descent from the Hun rulers of Hungary and the Greek emperors of Constantinople. If I recollect rightly, Ivan the Terrible provides a Russian link. There is probably not one of the races of Europe concerned in folk-wanderings which has not had a share in the ancestry of Charles Darwin. If it has been possible in the case of one Englishman of this kind to show in a considerable number of lines how impure is his race, can we venture to assert that if the like knowledge were possible of attainment, we could expect greater purity of blood in any of his countrymen?

SELECTED REFERENCES

Boas, F., *The Mind of Primitive Man*; Boas, F., "The Question of Racial Purity," in *American Mercury*, October, 1924; Dixon, R. B., *The Racial History of Man*; Goldenweiser, A. A., "Race and Civilization in the Modern World," in *Journal of Social Forces*, November, 1924; Grant, M., *The Passing of the Great Race*; Hankins, F. H., "Race as a Factor in Political Theory," in C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes (Eds.), *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, Chap. XIII; Hankins, F. H., *The Racial Basis of History*; Ripley, W. Z., *The Races of Europe*; Simar, T., *The Race Myth*; Smertenko, J. J., "The Myth of Nordic Race Superiority," in *New York Times Current History*, April, 1924; Stoddard, L., *Racial Realities in Europe*; Taylor, I., *The Origin of the Aryans*.

CHAPTER VII

WORLD WAR GUILT.¹

I. THE NEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

SECTION VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, begins as follows:

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

On the basis of this assertion the Allied Powers specifically and concretely erected their claim to reparations from Germany, and by implication the general nature of the entire treaty. Some have supposed that Germany, by apparently acquiescing in this charge of full and complete guilt in regard to the outbreak of the war, finally and for all time clinched the argument of the Allied Powers in regard to her sole responsibility. Such a position could hardly be held, however, by any one familiar with the methods of the Allies during the Peace Conference. Germany occupied the situation of a prisoner at the bar, where the prosecuting attorney is given full leeway as to time and presentation of evidence, while the defendant is denied counsel or the opportunity to produce either evidence or witnesses. It was, indeed, a case where the prosecution simply contented itself with the assumption of the guilt of the defendant and was not required to furnish proof. Germany was confronted with the alternative of signing the confession at once or having her territory invaded and occupied, with every probability that such an admission would be ultimately extorted from her in any event. In the light of these obvious facts it is plain that the question of the responsibility for the outbreak of the World War must rest for its solution upon the indisput-

¹ From the New York Times *Current History*, May, 1924.

able documentary evidence which is available in the premises.²

Under the circumstances which ordinarily follow a great war, we should still be as ignorant of the real causes of the World War as we were in 1914. It has been a general rule that the archives, or repositories of the public documents of the states involved, have been closed to non-official readers until from forty to eighty years after the events and negotiations which these documents describe. Hence we should normally have been required to wait until about 1975 for as great a volume of documentary evidence as we now possess, and two generations of students would have passed away without progressing beyond dubious guesses and intuitive approximations to the truth. The explanation of our unprecedented good fortune in this regard is to be found in the revolutionary overturns in Germany, Austria and Russia before the close of the World War. The new governments were socialistic in character and hypothetically opposed to war and militarism, despite the fact that the Socialists had for the most part remained loyal to their capitalistic or landlord governments in the World War. Desiring to make their tenure more secure by discrediting the acts and policies of the preceding régimes, the leaders of the new governments perceived one method of achieving this end by throwing open the national archives in the hope that historical editors might discover therein evidence of responsibility on the part of the former governing groups for the inundation of blood, misery and sorrow which swept over Europe after 1914. In addition to these voluntarily opened archives, the Germans seized the Belgian archives during

² Not the slightest pretension is made in this chapter to any discovery of facts not already well known to all historians interested in the history of contemporary European diplomacy. The aim of the author is solely to set forth in a clear fashion the conclusions to which we are inevitably forced by the authentic documents which have been published since 1914, and mainly since 1919. Full and complete indebtedness is acknowledged to such experts in the field as S. B. Fay, G. P. Gooch, B. E. Schmitt, A. C. Coolidge, R. J. Kerner, C. A. Beard, W. L. Langer, A. F. Pribram, M. Montgelas, M. Morhardt, A. Fabre-Luce, J. S. Ewart, P. Renouvin, G. Frantz, and the authors of the special treatises which will be mentioned in the course of the article. In particular, I am indebted to Professors Bernadotte E. Schmitt and William L. Langer for a critical reading of this chapter, which has added much to the general interpretation and saved me from many slips in matters of detail. Professor Schmitt has rendered the special courtesy of allowing me to read in manuscript his important article on "The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente," published in the *American Historical Review* for April, 1924.

the war and published collections of extracts. Then B. de Siebert, Secretary to the Russian Embassy at London in the period before the war, secretly made copies of the important diplomatic exchanges between London and St. Petersburg from 1908 to 1914, and later gave or sold them to the Germans.

The nature of the European diplomatic and military alignments in 1914 accounts for the fact that these revelations are reasonably adequate to settle the problems concerning the declarations of war in 1914, despite the further fact that England, France and Italy at first refused to make their archives accessible to scholars. Inasmuch as Italy was technically allied with Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance, the nature of much of her foreign policy and many of her diplomatic engagements may be gleaned from the German and Austrian archives. But she was at the same time secretly negotiating with France, and, after 1914, with the members of the Triple Entente. This material is, in some part, available in the documents in the Russian archives. England and France having been the other members of the Triple Entente, the secret diplomacy of this group is reasonably covered in the Russian archives and the Siebert documents, which are now duplicated in part in the publications from the Russian archives, though it would be desirable to know more of any possible secret Franco-British exchanges not revealed to Russia. The French have, of course, published some of their documents in the various *Livres Jaunes*—the most important of which is that on the Balkan policy (1922), but they are officially edited and the incriminating documents are, naturally, suppressed. England is allowing Gooch and Temperley to edit two volumes of pre-war material in the English archives.

Although a vast number of documents in the archives of Germany, Austria and Russia have not yet been published, the collections thus far available are impressive. The diplomatic documents covering the broad historical background of the Austrian crisis of 1914 are presented in the admirable collection of Professor A. F. Pribram.⁸ The documents in the Austrian archives dealing with the month preceding the outbreak of the World War

⁸ *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*. The American edition was supervised by Professor A. C. Coolidge and published by the Harvard University Press, 1920. It should be pointed out that Pribram's work is not yet finished. He is waiting for the complete publication of the German documents.

have been edited by the publicist and scholarly journalist, Roderich Gooss, in the three volumes of the Austrian *Red Book*.⁴ In Germany an even more voluminous collection on the diplomacy of Germany and related countries from 1871 to 1914 is in process of publication under the editorship of J. Lepsius, A. M. Bartholdy and F. Thimme. This embraces all the important diplomatic documents in the German Foreign Office; some twenty-four volumes have already appeared. It is the most extensive publication of this sort yet undertaken in any country.⁵ The documents dealing with the antecedents of August, 1914, were extracted from the German archives by the German Socialist, Karl Kautsky, and published in four volumes under the editorship of the eminent scholars, W. Schücking, M. Montgelas and A. M. Bartholdy.⁶ A supplementary collection has been more recently published which embodies: (1) The testimony of leading Germans in military, diplomatic and business life before a committee appointed by the German post-war government to investigate the responsibility for the war; (2) the records of the reaction of Germany to Mr. Wilson's peace note of December, 1916, and (3) the negotiations between Germany and her allies, and Germany and the United States concerning submarine warfare and the policies which produced the entry of the United States into the World War.⁷

No Russian documents have been made available as yet which cover so ample an historical background as the work of Pribram and the published volumes of the Lepsius-Bartholdy-Thimme collection. The Siebert Documents⁸ deal only with the period from 1908-1914. The *Livre Noir* (Black Book) is another important publication of the Russian documents. It was collected by René Marchand, a scholarly French Socialist and journalist thoroughly

⁴ *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, 1914, three volumes, Vienna, 1919. These are now available in English translation.

⁵ *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*. Berlin, 1923-5.

⁶ *Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsbruch*, four volumes, Charlottenburg, 1919. They are now available in English translation.

⁷ *Official German Documents Relating to the World War*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Two volumes, New York: Oxford University Press, 1923.

⁸ *Entente Diplomacy and the World, 1909-1914*. New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1922. It is asserted in some quarters that Siebert has held out the documents most incriminating to the Entente and is still holding them for a higher price than has been offered. It is as yet impossible to prove or disprove this allegation.

familiar with the Russian language and with Russian public life and politics. It presents in detail the Russian diplomatic documents of the years 1910-1914, particularly stressing Franco-Russian relations and policies. This was once the most important published collection of Russian source material.⁹ Professor Friedrich Stieve has since produced a far better and more complete edition of the Russian documents in four volumes, *Die diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911-1914*. The newly accessible archival material has enabled scholars to check up on the collections of apologetic or extenuating documents published by the Great Powers in the early days of the war. A step in this direction has been taken by G. von Romberg, who has brought out a publication of the actual exchanges between Paris and St. Petersburg following the submission of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914. This lays bare the serious and important suppressions in the original Russian *Orange Book*, which eliminated all the damaging evidence regarding conciliatory German proposals or aggressive Franco-Russian aims and policies.¹⁰ Also from the Russian archives has come the recently published collection revealing Italy's dickerings with the Entente for territorial cessions from 1914 to the time of her entry into the World War in May, 1915.¹¹ The Belgian documents published by Germany embrace chiefly the dispatches and opinions of the Belgian ambassadors in the major European capitals following 1886, playing up especially those which express fear of Entente collusion and alliance. Highly selected and one-sided, the collection is yet of real value as proving that the Belgians were alarmed at the policies of states other than Germany and incidentally vindicating beyond any doubt the neutrality of official Belgian opinion as a whole before 1914.¹² Fi-

⁹ *Un Livre Noir: Diplomatie d'Avant-Guerre d'après les Documents Russes, Novembre, 1910, à Juillet, 1914*. Two volumes, Paris, 1922-23. A brief collection of these Russian documents was published in Paris as early as 1919 under the editorship of Emile Laloy. In his foreword to Baron Schilling's diary Sazonov has admitted the authenticity of the Russian documents as edited by Marchand and Stieve.

¹⁰ *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*. New York: Huebsch, 1923.

¹¹ *L'Intervento dell' Italia nei Documenti Segreti dell' Intesa*. Rome, 1923.

¹² *Belgische Aktenstücke 1905-1914*. Berlin, 1915. *Zur Europäischen Politik, 1886-1893, 1897-1914*. Five volumes, Berlin, 1919-22. These collections are edited by H. B. Schwertfeger. Some of them (1905-14) have appeared in English translation.

nally, we have the depressing Secret Treaties of the Entente, which eliminate once and for all any basis for the hypothesis of idealism underlying the military activities of either side in the World War, and convict the Allies of aggressive aims as thoroughly as Grumbach's *Das Annexionistische Deutschland* proves Germany and Austria guilty of similar ambitions.¹³

These collections of documents have been supplemented by a vast number of apologetic and controversial memoirs, reminiscences and autobiographies which possess highly varied value and relevance, and by infinitely more important scholarly monographs analyzing in detail one or another of the many diplomatic and political problems and situations lying back of the World War.¹⁴ It is upon such material as this that we are able to construct a relatively objective and definite estimate of the causes of and responsibility for the great calamity of 1914-18 and its aftermath. It is quite evident that if any account written prior to 1919 possesses any validity whatever or any approximation to the true picture of events, this is due solely to superior guessing power or good luck on the part of the writer, and in no sense to the possession of reliable or pertinent documentary evidence.

II. THE PRE-WAR INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

The causes of the World War involve the greatest multitude of factors, ranging from the most general and cosmic to the most detailed and personal; from the persistence of the tribal hunting-pack ferocity in mankind and the pressure of growing popula-

¹³ These treaties were printed in the New York *Evening Post* early in 1918 as a result of their revelation by the Bolsheviki. Their publication was due to the energy and courage of Oswald Garrison Villard. They are analyzed by R. S. Baker in his work, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*. Mr. Baker defends the almost unbelievable assertion that Mr. Wilson left for the Peace Conference nearly a year later with no knowledge of their nature or contents.

¹⁴ The best summary of this literature is contained in G. P. Gooch's "Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy," *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, January, 1923. All the important literature on the subject is brought together in a serviceable bibliography, *Die Kriegsschuldfrage: ein Verzeichnis der Literatur des In-und-Auslandes*, published by the Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte. The present writer has outlined the significance of much of this material in his review article on "The Literature of War Guilt," in the *Christian Century* for December 10 and 17, 1925.

tions upon limited habitats and natural resources to the foolhardy conduct of the Austrian Archduke on the day of his assassination, the psychic state of the Kaiser on July 5, 1914, and the intimidation of the Tsar by militaristic advisers late in July, 1914. Though no reputable historian would doubt that the World War grew out of the economic and nationalistic situation from 1870 to 1914, there seems little of the inevitable in the alignments or historic circumstances that produced the war. States which were allied in 1914 clashed seriously in the preceding generation—England with France and Russia with England. Russia was on fairly friendly terms with Germany until the retirement of Bismarck. Germany was cordial to England in the early nineties, alienated her after 1895, and then adjusted satisfactorily to both parties the outstanding diplomatic difficulties of two decades two weeks before the assassination of the Archduke. Russia several times indicated a willingness to sacrifice other Slavic peoples to gain her own imperialistic and territorial ends. There were strong groups in both France and Germany that desired a *rapprochement* between these states.

The gradual shaping of European diplomatic behavior creating the crisis of 1914 seems to rest primarily upon three major elements or inciting factors. One was the imperialistic and Pan-Slavic ambitions of Russia, who desired to dominate the Near East, to control the Straits leading from the Black Sea to the Ægean, and to draw under her diplomatic ægis the lesser Slavic peoples of Europe. These aspirations, however, cut directly across the major ambitions and policies of the polyglot Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, whose very existence depended upon repressing or abating the Slavic nationalism of a large portion of her population. In these policies she was naturally encouraged by her ally, Germany, who desired to have as strong an associate as possible and who had, herself, a definite reason for wishing to realize an Austro-German hegemony in the Balkans as the first link in the "Berlin-to-Bagdad" railroad scheme.¹⁵ Then there was the underlying

¹⁵ Important surveys of these diplomatic and political problems are to be found in R. W. Seton-Watson *et al.*, *The War and Democracy*, Chaps. iv.-v.; Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy*; F. Schevill, *A History of the Balkan Peninsula*; E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*; H. Friedjung, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*; E. Durham, *Twenty Years of the Balkan Tangle*; S. A. Korff, *Russia's Foreign Relations in the Last Half Century*; Pribram, *op. cit.*; A. D. Fischel, *Der Panславismus*; L. Südland,

hatred of Germany cherished by the French military group and "Revanchards" (the group committed to the project of a war of revenge) growing out of the sting of the unexpected defeat in 1870-71. Not even Caillaux was able to overcome this. Nothing short of a voluntary cession of at least Lorraine would have satisfied France, and there were important historical and economic reasons why Germany would not consent to any such proposal.¹⁶ To these three major factors in the background might be added the remarkable economic and commercial development of Germany, leading to the growth of the volume and scope of German commerce, the rise of German naval ambitions, and a resulting rivalry with Great Britain in trade and maritime armament. There might also be mentioned the specific diplomatic clashes of Germany and England over the Boer War and the Bagdad railroad.¹⁷

On these foundations the familiar alignments of 1914 began slowly to take form. Austria and Germany were gradually isolated, and France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy began to draw together. Italy was ostensibly a member of the Triple Alliance until 1914, but we now know that she was not a loyal member at any time during the present century, and that, by 1902, she had an understanding with France that she would not join any other state in a war upon the French nation.¹⁸ As Professor Schmitt

Die Südslawische Frage und die Weltkrieg; L. Mandl, *Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien*; H. Wendel, *Die Hapsburger und die Südslawische Frage*; and J. S. Ewart, *The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918*.

¹⁶ See G. P. Gooch, *Franco-German Relations, 1871-1914*; H. A. L. Fisher, *Studies in History and Politics*, pp. 146-61, and E. R. G. Curtius, *Maurice Barrès und die Geistigen Grundlagen des Französischen Nationalismus*. This work is very critical.

¹⁷ G. P. Gooch, *Modern Europe*, Chap. xiii.; B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany, 1740-1914*; A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III., pp. 263-86, 294-301, 385-94, 456-85; and J. S. Ewart, *The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918*.

¹⁸ There are many important works on European diplomacy since 1870, but those written before 1921 were not based upon the new and indispensable documents and must therefore be disregarded by the general reader. The only thorough and reliable book utilizing the new evidence is G. P. Gooch's *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*, which is the unrivalled diplomatic history of the period since 1870 and supplants all earlier works. Other more special works based on the recently published documents and of high value and impartiality are A. F. Pribram, *Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-1918*; J. V. Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, and the already cited works, G. P. Gooch, *Franco-German Relations, 1871-1914*; E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the*

has pointed out (*loc. cit.*, references in footnotes 25-30), however, it is to be borne in mind that the Italian Foreign Minister from 1910 to 1914, the Marquis of San Giuliano, took a renewed interest in the part of Italy in the Triple Alliance, and that Italy was on better terms with her old allies than at any previous time after 1902. Moltke, in 1914, counted definitely on Italian military aid in the World War.

Along with the diplomatic arrangements and entanglements went an ominous and expensive armament race. Americans have been accustomed to regard the increase of land and sea armament from 1890 onward as primarily a German phenomenon, initiated by her, and reluctantly, lamely and ineffectively imitated as a defensive policy by Russia, France and Great Britain. This has been due partly to the fact that the Kaiser's vocal exuberance on military matters made good newspaper copy, and partly to the further fact that the great majority of our own news concerning Germany came to us through the Harmsworth and other English papers which were strongly anti-German in tone. If possible, there has been an even more mistaken impression on this point than with respect to the view that Germany was solely responsible for the World War. The sober facts indicate that Germany and Austria were together maintaining an armament establishment on land and sea only a little more than half as extensive or expensive as that of England, France and Russia combined. France, usually represented as pacific, unprepared and defenseless, was in 1913-14, planning an army two-thirds larger per capita than that contemplated by Germany in her latest military bill before the World War. In July, 1914, the active French army was actually larger and better equipped than the German army.¹⁹

Stress has been laid upon the peculiar and unique danger of the linking of autocracy and militarism in Germany and Austria. Such a combination is doubtless dangerous and deplorable, but it was not more noticeable in Germany and Austria than in Russia. We shall probably have to go further, however, and admit that it is the military attitude and the war spirit which is a menace, and

Bagdad Railway; E. Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege*; and F. Rachfahl, *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik, 1870-1914*.

¹⁹ See A. J. Nock, *The Myth of a Guilty Nation*, pp. 23-6; M. Montgelas, *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, pp. 81-5; Ewart, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, chaps. xvi-xvii; and the judicious analysis of the whole problem in A. G. Enock, *The Problem of Armaments*.

that this will exist, if unchecked, in a democracy as well as in an autocracy. The old notion that democracy and militarism and war are mutually irreconcilable must be put aside as a groundless illusion. The war spirit in the British navy and in the militaristic group in France was about as virulent and aggressive as that of Potsdam or Vienna from 1912-14. If war is to be obstructed and ultimately eliminated, it is militarism and nationalism which must be directly attacked; little will be achieved by merely altering political institutions.²⁰

In addition to these menacing general alignments and diplomatic antagonisms, it is essential to understand that there was especially high tension in the spring of 1914. It has usually been believed by the average intelligent citizen in America that the World War broke like a storm out of a clear sky; that Europe had settled down rather peacefully after the last Morocco crisis and was calm and unperturbed until June 28, 1914. Nothing could be further from the facts in the case. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand was merely the culmination of a veritable fear-neurosis on the part of the European governments. In 1913 Germany and France provided for great increases in their land armament, and England began what almost might be called war measures in her navy organization and procedure. In the spring of 1914 Austria could scarcely refrain from attacking Serbia, in spite of German opposition in the previous year. Germany was frightened by the cumulative progress of the Franco-Russian *rapprochement* and the substitution of a more chauvinistic French ambassador at St. Petersburg, and even more by the Russo-British naval conversations of 1914. German soldiers, statesmen and publicists openly declared that, though pacific in intent, Germany was prepared for a vigorous defense against a wanton attack. Russia was controlled by the militaristic group, who were encouraged by Poincaré and his followers in France. The Russians boasted that they, too, were ready for the test of arms and contended that France should also be found thoroughly prepared. By the middle of June this feverish excitement and mutual suspicion had become alarmingly apparent alike to domestic observers and to foreign visitors. A crisis in such a state of affairs was likely to precipitate a panic and make it difficult to obstruct and control headstrong and arbi-

²⁰ See the interesting article by Professor George H. Blakeslee, "Will Democracy Alone Make the World Safe?" in *Journal of Race Development*, April, 1918. Cf. A. Fabre-Luce, *La Victoire*.

trary action. Such was the European situation when Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, was slain in Serajevo on June 28, 1914.²¹

The only light relieving the darkness of the situation was the successful culmination of the Anglo-German negotiations concerning the Near East, and certain African territory, but before this could effect any readjustment of the European diplomatic situation, the continent was plunged into universal carnage.²² It is believed by some that if sufficient publicity could have been given to the Anglo-German settlement, it would have had a sufficiently sobering effect upon the Franco-Russian imperialists to have postponed or avoided the World War, but it must be remembered that at the same time when England was negotiating successfully with Germany over the Near East she was negotiating secret naval agreements with France and Russia against Germany. Further, it would seem that France and Russia were actually incited to immediate action by the knowledge of the possible Anglo-German accord which might detach England from the Triple Entente.

While this article is devoted chiefly to an analysis of the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities, the writer is tolerant of the view of Professor B. E. Schmitt, expressed in the *American Historical Review* for April, 1924, that the real cause of the World War must be sought in this general diplomatic background which made the conflict almost inevitable, once an important and crucial issue arose between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente:

The causes of the great war have been analyzed from many points of view. The explanation usually offered is the vaulting ambition of this or that great power, Germany being most often selected as the offender. Persons internationally minded insist that rabid nationalism was a universal disease and draw vivid pictures of the European anarchy. The pacifist points to the bloated armaments, and the Socialist can see only the conflict of rival imperialisms. Facts galore can be cited in support of each thesis. Yet no one of these explanations is entirely satisfactory, or the lot of them taken together. Why should the different kinds of dynamite explode simultaneously in August, 1914? Why, for instance, should a war break out be-

²¹ G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*, Chap. xv; C. A. Beard, *Cross-Currents in Europe Today*, Chaps. i-iii; W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1914* (on war plans of British navy from 1912-1914).

²² Earle, op. cit., pp. 258-65.

tween Great Britain and Germany at a moment when their disputes were seemingly on the verge of adjustment? There must have been some connecting link which acted as a chain of powder between the various accumulations of explosive material. And so there was; as one peruses the innumerable memoirs by politicians, soldiers and sailors, from the German Emperor to obscure diplomatists, or tries to digest the thousands of documents published since 1918 from the German, Austrian, Serbian, Russian, French, Belgian and British archives, the conviction grows that it was the schism of Europe in Triple Alliance and Triple Entente which fused the various quarrels and forces into one gigantic struggle for the balance of power; and the war came in 1914 because then, for the first time, the lines were sharply drawn between the two rival groups, and neither could yield on the Serbian issue without seeing the balance pass definitely to the other side.

III. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

I. *Austria.*

Before discussing the policies and conduct of Austria, it is desirable to understand clearly the nature of the Austro-Serbian situation. Serbia, like the majority of the Balkan States, was a backward political society, in which intrigue, murder and wholesale assassinations had not yet been transformed into orderly party government. It was also inflamed by an intense nationalism, fed by the sufferings and aspirations of centuries of repression. In June, 1903, the reigning royal family, their ministers and over fifty prominent sympathizers and supporters were murdered and a new dynasty under King Peter established. The new dynasty was the rallying point of the Yugoslav nationalism, which looked to Russia for protection and encouragement. But the integrity of the Dual Monarchy depended upon holding in leash Slavic nationalism and the Pan-Slav program. The stage was thus set for continual and serious friction.²³

This first came to a head in 1908, when Izvolski, then the Russian Foreign Minister, proposed to the Austrian Minister, Count Aehrenthal, that Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Serb districts near the Adriatic, then under the nominal control of Tur-

²³ Schevill, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-61; Seton-Watson, *as above*; A Moussett, *Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovenes*. Mandl, *op. cit.* It is interesting to note that from 1903 to 1908 Edward VII was the most consistent of the European monarchs in boycotting the new Serb dynasty.

key. This had after 1903 been a secret Austrian ambition, but no Austrian statesman had dared to think of it as a practical step, for it had been supposed by the Austrians that Russia would make a vigorous protest against any such proposal. Izvolski intimated, however, that Russia would be placated by Austro-German pressure on Turkey to open the straits to the Russian navy.²⁴

Once Aehrenthal discovered that Russia would not be likely to object, he planned and carried through the annexation with a gusto that surprised and annoyed Izvolski and led him to deny some of his earlier suggestions and assertions. The annexation was made feasible by the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which weakened Turkish resistance. Serbia protested sharply, but as she found herself deserted by Russia, in the end had to accede. We have entertained an altogether false notion as to the part of Germany in this transaction. The pressure which she applied to Russia was very slight. One of Izvolski's assistants has gone so far as to hold that Germany's conduct in the circumstances was, in reality, a great favor to Russia. The "shining armor" statement of the Kaiser was merely a picturesque and bombastic mode of giving public notice of the firmness of the Austro-German understanding, not unlike Lloyd George's speech at the time of the second Morocco crisis.

The annexation, however, created bitter feeling. Serbia never ceased from that time to plot against Austria, and Russian statesmen, not always fully informed as to how the annexation program was initiated, felt that Russia had been humiliated and discredited as the leader of the Pan-Slavic movement and "big brother" to the lesser Slavic States.²⁵ Even more resentment was generated in official Russian circles over the failure to secure the opening of the Straits, this proposal having actually been blocked by Great Britain.²⁶ Not even the treaty of 1910 with Germany over the Bagdad railway was adequate to restore good relations. This Russian antipathy toward Germany was speedily recognized and eagerly exploited by the French nationalists and

²⁴ Gooch, *Modern Europe*, pp. 410-26. The great authority on the Bosnian crisis is Friedjung, op. cit., Vol. II.; see also E. Molden, *Graf Aehrenthal*; and O. Hoiyer, *Le Comte Aehrenthal et la Politique de Violence*.

²⁵ Gooch, *Modern Europe*, pp. 417-26; see list of authorities, page 410, footnote 2.

²⁶ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III., pp. 404-5.

Militarists, who were just then being united under the leadership of Poincaré.²⁷

Another crisis was precipitated in 1912-13 by the Balkan wars, and Austria was prevented from making war on Serbia only by the firm opposition of Germany.²⁸ As it was, Austria was able to block Serbia's attempt to gain access to the Adriatic by inducing the Great Powers to erect the abortive state of Albania. Serbia knew of the aggressive Austrian plans and was greatly incensed by the denial of a port on the Adriatic. Anti-Austrian plots increased in number with the growth of hatred for that state. Austria further incited Serbia by the "Pig War" and other such episodes.

In the spring of 1914 a plot for the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne was instigated and planned by one Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievitch, Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Serbian General Staff, and a notorious plotter and assassin. He apparently lost courage at the last moment and tried to call off the execution of the plan when it was too late. We now know, further, that the Serbian Cabinet was fully aware of the assassination plot at least three weeks in advance of its execution, but took no adequate steps to frustrate it or to warn Austria.²⁹

This is a fact not known to Austria in 1914, though she suspected a Serbian plot and did her best to uncover it. She had no success, however, at the time. On July 13, 1914, Berchtold's private agent, Wiesner, reported after a thorough investigation at Serajevo that "There is nothing to prove, or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian government's cognizance of steps leading to the crime or of its preparing it or of its supplying the weapons.

²⁷ The best presentation of the case against French militarism under Poincaré is contained in five books which need to be used cautiously, but have never been adequately refuted by Poincaré and his apologists. They are F. Gouttenoire de Toury, *La Politique Russe de Poincaré*; and by the same author, *Jaurès et le Parti de la Guerre*; F. Bausman, *Let France Explain*; A. H. Pevet, *Les Responsables de la Guerre*; and M. Morhardt, *Les Preuves*. The documentary evidence on this point is assembled in Marchand, *Un Livre Noir*, particularly Vol. II.; and the Siebert Documents (*Entente Diplomacy*).

²⁸ This matter is most adequately analyzed in M. Montgelas's *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, pp. 36-68, especially pp. 62-65.

²⁹ S. Stanojević, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand*. See the articles by S. B. Fay, in *New York Times Current History Magazine*, October and November, 1925.

On the contrary, there are indications that this is to be regarded as out of the question." Hence, our present knowledge of complicity on the part of Serbian officials is in no sense a justification of the action of the Austrian government in July, 1914. In fact, it was a knowledge of the apparent falsity of his specific charges against Serbia that made Berchtold determined to keep the matter from a European congress of investigation and mediation. On the other hand, there was ample evidence of dangerous and continuous Serbian intrigue against Austria. The assassins of Franz Ferdinand were members of one of these anti-Austrian secret societies.³⁰ Their act was also glorified in the Serbian press.

In briefly summarizing the Austrian action and policy from June 28 to August 1, it is necessary to keep clearly in mind that though Berchtold, as Foreign Secretary, was formally responsible for the negotiations, he was but a figurehead. Szilassy, Kanner and Hötendorf have made it most evident that he was but a vain, lazy, weak-willed, vacillating tool, generally dominated by the war party led by Hötendorf, the chief-of-staff, aided and abetted by Forgách, Hoyos, Bilinski, Stürgkh, and by sympathetic or docile subordinate officials in the Foreign Office.³¹ It was at one time believed that Berchtold was urged on by Tschirschky,³² the German Ambassador at Vienna, but though, Tschirschy was more belligerent, after July 5, than the Kaiser or Bethmann-Hollweg, he was so much more moderate than Hötendorf and his group as to seem a pacifist by comparison.³³ Thoroughly at the mercy of the

³⁰ Sidney B. Fay, "New Light on the Origins of the World War," in *American Historical Review*, July and October, 1920, and January, 1921; July, 1920, pp. 634-5; Gooch, *Modern Europe*, p. 555; Friedjung, *op. cit.*, Vol. III. Cf. Morhardt, *Les Preuves*.

³¹ J. von Szilassy, *Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie*; H. Kanner, *Kaiserliche Katastrophen-Politik*; C. von Hötendorf, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918*. Szilassy's book is much the most important as demonstrating Berchtold's nominal responsibility for Austria's policy in July, 1914, and the real responsibility of the Hötendorf-Forgách crowd. Professor Fay, however, believes that the crisis of July, 1914, stiffened up Berchtold and made him more of an active and responsible person than was normally the case.

³² See the violent diatribe against Tschirschky by A. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna from 1912-14, in his *La Dernière Ambassade de France en Autriche*. B. W. von Bülow, *Die Krisis*, pp. 55-6, gives ample evidence of Tschirschky's relative caution and timidity.

³³ Fay, *loc. cit.* (July, 1920), *passim*, especially pp. 631-2 and p. 639, footnote 83.

war party, and not reluctantly so, Berchtold drew up a letter to the Kaiser signed by the aged Austrian emperor, Franz Josef, stressing the fact that unless vigorous action was taken against Serbia there was little hope that the Austrian Empire could be kept intact. This was delivered on July 5.

The Kaiser expressed sympathy with, and approval of, the Austrian position as stated in the letter, gave assurance of German support, and declared it to be his opinion that it was improbable that Russia would take up arms in defense of Serbia. In the evening he talked over the matter with Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, and Dr. Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. On July 6, as the Kaiser was leaving on his annual northern cruise, von Bethmann-Hollweg communicated to Szögyény, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, the ominous decision as to Germany's position. It was as follows: "Austria may judge what is to be done to clear up her relation with Serbia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and friend."³⁴ This crucial blank warrant was to prove the undoing of the Dual Monarchy and the German Empire. When it was too late, the Kaiser recognized the folly of such a commitment, and on July 30 exclaimed in desperation that he and Bethmann-Hollweg had been stupid enough to put their necks into a noose,³⁵ an expression of regret which was not duplicated by Poincaré or Grey when they found themselves involved by giving Russia a free hand in the Balkans.

These talks of the Kaiser with Szögyény, Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann and an unimportant brief conference with Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister of War, on July 5, constitute all there actually was of a "Potsdam Conference," which, starting as a bit of wild gossip on the part of a waiter in a Berlin restaurant, developed into the luxuriant and voluptuous legend with which Ambassador Henry Morgenthau regaled the English-speaking world in 1918. Before leaving, early on the morning of July 6, for his cruise, the Kaiser talked with army and navy officials to inform them of the possibility of war, but asserted that he did not think it sufficiently probable to warrant cutting short the furloughs of army and navy chiefs who were away on their vaca-

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 625-7; Gooch *Modern Europe*, pp. 532-4.

³⁵ Fay, Ibid., p. 628, and footnote 38.

tions. Nor did he consider the situation serious enough to remain until the return of his Secretary for Foreign Affairs.³⁶

The delay of the Austrians from July 6 to July 23 in sending the ultimatum to Serbia, originally attributed to the necessity, made clear at the "Potsdam Conference," of having a couple of weeks to arrange the German financial and military situation for imminent and deliberate war, was actually due to the desire to get the report of Wiesner as to Serbian complicity in the assassination, the necessity of winning over Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, to the war policy, and the decision to wait until President Poincaré of France had terminated his visit to Russia. There can be no doubt, however, that the Hötendorf group, with Berchtold as their mouthpiece, had determined upon war long before the delivery of the ultimatum of July 23 and irrespective of any reply which Serbia might make. The Austrian army was promptly mobilized on the Serbian boundary on July 25, in the determination to forestall any attempt of intervention and arbitration. On July 28, in spite of the Serbian reply, which satisfied the Kaiser, von Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow, Austria declared war on Serbia. There seems little probability, even if Germany and Russia had delayed their hostilities, that Austria could have been coerced into peace unless Germany had been willing to stand aside and let Russia make war upon her unaided ally.³⁷ "The readiness of Austria," says Gooch, "for an eleventh-hour compromise, of which we heard so much at the beginning of the war, proves to be a legend."³⁸ Yet we must bear in mind the fact that Austria at no time desired a general European war, but merely a punitive expedition into Serbia.

³⁶ Fay, *Ibid.*, pp. 628-32; Kanner, Montgelas and V. Valentin, *Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, 1890-1918*, demonstrate at even greater length the myth of the Potsdam Conference. See also S. B. Fay, in *Kriegsschuldfrage*, May, 1925, pp. 309-15.

³⁷ Fay, *loc. cit.* (July and October, 1920), especially pp. 632-38. The most detailed and reliable treatment of Austrian diplomacy in July, 1914, is contained in the works of Szilassy, Kanner and Valentin, and R. Gooss, *Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*, the most voluminous analysis. Though German and Austrian writers, all four were noted critics of Macht-und-Realpolitik in their respective countries and their works are in no sense apologetic for those responsible for the Austro-German policy of 1914.

³⁸ Gooch, *Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy*, *loc. cit.*, p. 18. For full details of Austrian duplicity see Fay, *loc. cit.* (October, 1920), pp. 45-49.

Though we must recognize the perverse, determined and arbitrary action of Austria in this crisis, the historian must also point out that it was a life-or-death proposition on the part of Austria to crush the Serbian plots, however natural and just these may have seemed to Serbia.³⁹ And, further, arbitrary and peremptory as the ultimatum to Serbia was, it certainly was not more so than our demands upon Mexico at the time of the invasion by the Pershing expedition, with no more justification. The Serbian reply refused the most crucial Austrian demand; the Serbian press praised the assassins; and the Serbian army was ordered mobilized several hours before the Serbian reply was sent to the Austrian ultimatum. As Gooch has well put the matter: ⁴⁰

It was natural that Austria should defend herself against the openly proclaimed ambition to rob her of provinces which she had held for centuries. After the Bosnian crisis Serbia had promised to be a good neighbor; but she had not kept her word, and her intrigues with Russia were notorious. To stand with folded arms and wait till her enemies felt strong enough to carry out their program of dismemberment was to invite disaster; and the murder of Francis Ferdinand by Yugoslav assassins appeared to demand some striking vindication of the authority of the State. The ultimatum to Serbia was a gambler's throw; but to the statesmen of Vienna and Budapest it appeared to offer the best chance of escape from a terrible danger which was certain to increase and which challenged the existence of Austria as a great power.

2. Germany.

In regard to Germany, the first point to be kept in mind is the military tradition which she inherited from the Bismarckian era. The conventional notions in this matter are usually quite correct as to the absolute degree of German militarism, but they are, for the most part, grotesquely exaggerated as to its uniqueness and relative extent and aggressiveness. No doubt Bismarck did bully France somewhat during his chancellorship, but the French "Revenge" group was irreconcilable, and Paul Déroulède preached the crusade of revenge not only in France but throughout the continent. There were as many in Germany who would have welcomed the conciliatory program of Caillaux as there

³⁹ Friedjung, *op. cit.*, Vol. III.

⁴⁰ Gooch, *op. cit.*, p. 555. For an indictment of Serbia see Morhardt, *Les Preuves*; and Fay in *Current History*, October and November, 1925.

were Frenchmen who gave him loyal support. Germany was well aware of the strength of the revenge motive in the Franco-Russian alliance.⁴¹ The Pan-German League, so much denounced during the war in fantastic books like those by André Chéradame and R. G. Usher, appears to have been little more than a small but noisy group of fanatical patriots and imperialists of little standing or influence in Germany.⁴² Germany did not force France into the military increases of 1913-14, as the French military bill was introduced before the German. Both grew out of uneasiness over the Balkan situation.

Germany's attitude toward Russia was determined primarily by the fact that Russia was the chief ally of Germany's inveterate enemy and the enemy of her main ally. There was some further mutual enmity based upon discriminatory tariffs and Russian opposition to German plans in the way of imperialism in the Near East.⁴³ Germany understood that her future security depended primarily upon maintaining the strength and integrity of the Dual Monarchy. Otherwise she would be wholly isolated and surrounded by hostile and powerful states. The ascendancy of Austria in the Balkans was also essential to the plans of Germany for developing the Near East. Germany thus had a definite and direct interest in the suppression of so evident a menace to the permanence of Austria-Hungary as the rapid growth of Yugoslav nationalism. It should be pointed out, however, that up to 1914, in spite of opposition of interests, there was surprisingly little hostility on the part of Germany toward Serbia. As late as July 1, 1914, Tisza complained of the Kaiser's partiality for Serbia. In order properly to under-

⁴¹ A good description and criticism of militaristic Germany is contained in the book by the German pacifist, F. Foerster, *Mes Combats a l'Assaut du Militarisme et de l'Imperialisme Allemand*. On Franco-German relations see Gooch, *Franco-German Relations, 1871-1914*; J. Caillaux, *Agadir. Ma Politique Extérieure*; and P. Albin, *L'Allemagne et la France*. The most thorough study of German foreign policy is that by F. Rachfahl, *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik, 1871-1914*. For the pacific group in Germany see H. Wehberg, *Die Führer der Deutschen Friedensbewegung*.

⁴² For this statement I am indebted to the conclusions of the most thorough and scholarly study yet made of the Pan-German League in a doctoral dissertation published by Miss Mildred S. Wertheimer at Columbia University.

⁴³ Gooch *Modern Europe*, pp. 501-25; Korff, *op. cit.*; A. Hedenstrom, *Geschichte Russlands von 1878 bis 1918*; R. Pohle, *Russland und das Deutsche Reich*.

stand the Kaiser's reaction to the murder of the Archduke, one has to combine with this general background his friendship with Franz Ferdinand, his recent visit with him, and, above all, the shock caused by the assassination of a member of a royal family, particularly one so close to the Hohenzollerns as the Hapsburgs. He had even been profoundly moved by the assassination of President Sadi Carnot of France in 1894 and of King Humbert of Italy in 1900.⁴⁴

Whether he was right or wrong, it is, therefore, easy enough to see why the Kaiser should have been in a state of mind to regard the Sarajevo incident as a just basis for strong Austrian action against Serbia, even though it might lead to some possibility of a general European war. He had, however, the best of reasons for believing that the conflict might be localized to one between Austria and Serbia. He felt that the Tsar should be as much startled and repelled as he over the murder of Franz Ferdinand, and he had been assured by the Russian Military Attaché at Berlin that Russia had not been seriously disturbed over the aggressive attitude of Austria toward Serbia in 1913. In the face of these facts it is not difficult to understand why the Kaiser should have been impressed with the letter of Franz Josef and, while still in a highly emotional state, should have given Austria a free hand with Serbia on July 5. It is equally clear, in the light of a full knowledge of the circumstances and consequences which we now possess, that it was a most foolhardy policy, which the Kaiser himself bitterly regretted before the month was over.⁴⁵ It must not be forgotten that in 1912 Poincaré deliberately, and with no justification in the way of a crisis, urged Russia to take a firm hand in the Balkans and assured her of French support to the full, and on his visit to Russia in July, 1914, gave Russia a free hand in dealing with the Austro-Serbian matter.

⁴⁴ The most detailed and accurate sketch of the Kaiser in relation to German foreign policy is contained in the five works by Otto Hammann, chief of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office. *Der Neue Kurs; Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges; Um den Kaiser; Der Missverständnis Bismarck; and Bilder aus der Letzten Kaiserzeit*. These are summarized in his *Deutsche Weltpolitik 1890-1912*.

⁴⁵ Fay, loc. cit. (July, 1920), pp. 628-9; Beard, op. cit., pp. 22-27. Valentin and Montgelas have explained in the most detail why the Kaiser did not continue his 1913 policy of restraining Austria. The most vigorous assault upon the Kaiser and his policy in 1914 has been made by K. Kautsky, *Wie die Weltkrieg Enstand*; and R. Grelling, *J'Accuse*.

Though the general terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia were agreed upon by the Austrian leaders on July 14, Berchtold deliberately withheld a copy from Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow, so that they did not obtain it until the evening of July 22, rather late to protest against its delivery. Both pronounced it too harsh and severe. Berchtold likewise held up the conciliatory Serbian reply to the ultimatum, and the German Foreign Office first learned of its nature and contents through the Serbian Minister in Berlin. The Kaiser, von Bethman-Hollweg and von Jagow were all satisfied with it, and felt that it removed all cause for war between Austria and Serbia.⁴⁶ The Kaiser commented upon the Serbian concessions as a great diplomatic victory for Austria. "A brilliant result for a time-limit of only forty-eight hours. That is more than one might have expected! A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it, every ground for war disappeared, and Giesl ought to have remained quiet in Belgrade. In such circumstances I should never have ordered mobilization."⁴⁷ The Kaiser, from July 27-29, endeavored to mediate between Russia and Austria, both on his own initiative and in coöperation with Sir Edward Grey, but the Austrian government deliberately refused to answer his telegrams containing the suggestion and offer of mediation. The real earnestness of von Bethmann-Hollweg in his effort to restrain Austria is well brought out in the following telegram sent to Vienna on the early morning of July 30:⁴⁸

If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a conflagration in which England will be against us, Rumania and Italy according to all indications will not be for us, and we shall stand two against four powers. Through England's opposition the main blow will fall on Germany. Austria's political prestige, the military honor of her army, as well as her just claims against Serbia, can be adequately satisfied by her occupation of Belgrade or other places. Through her humiliation of Serbia, she will make her position in the Balkans as well as in her relation to Russia strong again.

⁴⁶ Fay, *Ibid.*, pp. 632-7. Tschirschky must have known of the contents of the ultimatum before July 23, and the responsibility for the ignorance of von Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow may rest in part with him. See Gooch, *Modern Europe*, p. 543, note. There is little probability that Germany would have publicly protested in any event, because of the *carte blanche* to Austria. Bethmann-Hollweg might still have telegraphed a protest on the evening of the 22d.

⁴⁷ Fay, *loc. cit.* (July, 1920), p. 637, footnote.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* (October, 1920), p. 45.

Under these circumstances we most urgently and emphatically urge upon the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation in accordance with the above honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences which would otherwise follow would be for Austria and for us an uncommonly heavy one.

While Berchtold went through the form of laying this before Franz Josef, Forgách and Hoyos remarked to Tschirschky that any such proposal was a mere joke, in the light of the policy which Austria had determined upon, and in which she was supported by the Austrian people.

As we have seen, the Austrian war party, this time determined not to be obstructed by Germany or any other outside power in their ambition to discipline Serbia, declared war on that country, and then informed Germany that mediation or arbitration was out of the question, as war had already begun and the whole face of the diplomatic situation was changed thereby. The Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg then devoted themselves to an effort to suspend the conflict between Austria and Serbia, but they underestimated the Russian initiative and willingness for war, and their efforts failed.⁴⁹ The victory of the military group at Berlin over the pacific Chancellor was primarily due to the evasive conduct and duplicity of the Vienna authorities. Bethmann-Hollweg's program was discredited because he could report no progress on account of Berchtold's delays and deceit.

Some have held that the German ultimatum to Russia demanding a cessation of mobilization was a rash and hasty move; counter-mobilization and a continuation of negotiations would have been a more moderate and judicious procedure. This is doubtless true from the standpoint of diplomatic negotiations, but from what we now know of the Russian attitude and Franco-Russian exchanges between July 29 and Aug. 1, it seems perfectly clear that this would have had no significant results in avoiding the conflict, and from a military standpoint would have been a fatal strategic error. Russia was determined upon war, and Russian soldiers actually invaded East Prussia before the expiration of the German ultimatum, though there is some evidence that Berlin was not fully informed of this fact.⁵⁰ Once Germany was fully convinced that

⁴⁹ Ibid., Gooch, *Modern Europe*, pp. 538-9, 544-5.

⁵⁰ Gooch, op. cit., pp. 547-9. Cf. B. E. Schmitt in *American Historical Review*, October, 1923, p. 137.

Russia meant war, her only sane procedure was to get into action as soon as possible against a much more powerful, but more ponderous enemy. At this point the control of the situation was taken out of the hands of the civil authorities and given over to the General Staff. It would, then, seem that the worst that can be said for the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg is that they were both stupid, in getting themselves into an inextricable hole by giving Austria a free hand in Serbia, but this is only what they have both admitted. That either had the slightest desire to bring on a general European war is not supported by a shred of evidence. Nothing could be more absurd than the old myth that Austria was about to give in on July 31 when Germany, alarmed at her signs of weakening, rushed in to prevent mediation and make war certain.⁵¹ The Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg worked harder for peace than any other statesmen in Europe in the crisis of 1914.

3. *Russia.*

Russian hostility to Germany actually goes back as far as the eighteenth century, though Bismarck did much to allay it. The Kaiser had turned away from Bismarck's Russian policy, and Russian hostility following 1910 was accentuated by the fact that Germany had all but conquered Russia economically. By 1913, 50 per cent. of Russian imports were from Germany, and 35 per cent. of her exports went to Germany. This amounted to four times England's trade with Russia and seven times the trade of France. Along with this went a tariff war, based on the discriminatory and differential tariff scheme common to European states before 1914.

Russia had been disappointed and humiliated in 1908, as a result of the failure to secure the opening of the Straits as compensation for suggesting and acquiescing in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and because of her inability in the circumstances to stand forth in the rôle of the defender of Slavic nationalism which was more or less implied in her Pan-Slavic program.⁵² Her

⁵¹ Fay, loc. cit. (October, 1920), pp. 51-52; Gooch, op. cit., pp. 555-6. For the opinion of the English Military Attaché at Berlin as to the pacific nature of the Kaiser and his reluctance to sign the final mobilization order see the *New York Times*, March 30, 1924, Book Review Section, p. 26.

⁵² Gooch, op. cit., Chaps. xii., xv. For a competent study of Russian interests in Serbia and Yugoslav expansion see M. Boghitschewitsch, *Kriegsursachen*; cf. G. H. Trubetskoi, *Russland als Grossmacht*. It is worth while pointing out, however, that in the Three Emperors' Alliance of 1881 and 1884 Russia conceded to Austria the right to annex Bosnia and

resentment was most opportunely exploited by President Poincaré of France who worked hand in hand with Izvolski in Paris. As Baron Korff points out in his judicious and moderate review of the second volume of Marchand's *Livre Noir*:⁵³

We find new light thrown upon the pre-war attitude of France, strangely but constantly connected with one big name—Poincaré. Pichon, Barthou and many other familiar names are frequently mentioned, but none seems to have played any such prominent rôle in the building up and strengthening of the Franco-Russian alliance as Poincaré; and besides, with a very evident object—steady preparation for the coming conflict with Germany. The reader will put aside this volume with the inevitable conviction that Poincaré long before 1914 had one idea on his mind, the war with Germany. . . . These documents give a most vivid picture of the French pressure exerted on Russia with that one object in view, a war with Germany. At times the Russians were even losing patience with the French, so little did the latter mind the Russian interests; they were willing to lend the Russians money, but only on condition that Russia would increase her army and build new strategic, but otherwise quite useless, railways.

Most significant is the fact that Poincaré in 1912, through Izvolski, gave Russia a relatively free hand in the Balkans, promising unconditional French support if she was attacked by Austria or Germany. This was two years before the Kaiser's grant of similar freedom to Austria. It is quite apparent, however, from the recent French *Yellow Book on Balkan Affairs* that Poincaré, in spite of his encouragement of a strong Russian policy in the Balkans, insisted upon knowing and approving all the Russian acts and policies, in order that France might not be drawn into any conflict which would not advance her general European interests. Among the more interesting of Izvolski's communications on this point are the following:⁵⁴

The present Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Poincaré) is an exceedingly great personality and his Cabinet shows Herzegovina whenever she saw fit, but the Hungarians were opposed even to occupation at this time.

⁵³ *American Historical Review*, July, 1923, pp. 747-8. Cf. Morhardt, *Les Preuves*.

⁵⁴ Beard, op. cit., pp. 24-27. Also *Entente Diplomacy and the World*, pp. 403-4. The case against Izvolski is best stated in F. Stieve, *Izvolsky and the World War*.

itself as the strongest combination of power that has existed for a long period of years. . . .

M. Poincaré told me that the French Government is first of all considering the question of possible international eventualities. It quite realizes that this or that event, as for instance, the destruction of Bulgaria by Turkey or an attack upon Serbia by Austria, might force Russia to give up its passive attitude and take diplomatic steps, to be followed afterward by military measures against Turkey or Austria. According to assurances received by us from the French Government, we can in such a case count upon the most sincere and most energetic diplomatic support on the part of France. . . . If the conflict with Austria should result in an armed interference on the part of Germany, France would, as a matter of course, look upon this as a *casus foederis* and not hesitate a minute to fulfill its obligation toward Russia. . . . M. Poincaré further told me that, in view of the critical position in the Balkans, the highest authorities of the French military command are studying with increasing attention all possible military eventualities and it was known to him that expert and responsible personages held an extremely optimistic view of the Franco-Russian chances in case of a general collision. . . . It is for Russia, he remarked to me, to take the initiative in a question (the Austro-Serbian affair) in which she is interested above all others; while it is France's task to give her full and active support. All in all this means that if Russia makes war France will also make war, because we know that Germany will stand by Austria in this question.

That Poincaré, aided by Izvolski's bribery of the French press, was successful in getting French opinion behind him is evident from the following telegram from Izvolski to Sazonov: ⁵⁵

While not long ago the French Government and the press were inclined to accuse us of exciting Serbia and the dominant note was "France does not wish to wage war for a Serbian port," now, on the contrary, they look with astonishment and unconcealed apprehension upon our indifference to the fact of mobilization in Austria (against Serbia late in 1912). Not only are these apprehensions expressed by the French Cabinet Ministers; they penetrate also to the general public and into the newspapers of the most diverse political opinions; they are so lively in the French General Staff that the Minister of War felt it necessary to draw M. Poincaré's attention

⁵⁵ From the *Livre Noir*, Vol. I., translated in the *New York Nation*, Oct. 11, 1922, pp. 365-6. See the *New York Nation* and the *New Republic* for Feb. 6, 1924, for revelation of the details of the coöperation between Izvolski and Poincaré in bribing the French press with Russian gold.

to the matter. . . . M. Georges Louis's telegram transmitting the reply of our General Staff to General de la Guiche (of the French General Staff) did not dissipate the astonishment of the French; they showed me the text of this telegram, according to which General de la Guiche was not only told that we considered Austria's arming only a measure of defense, but that in the improbable case that Austria should attack Serbia, Russia would not fight. This reply greatly astonished M. Poincaré and the other French Ministers. . . .

While attempting to maintain a favorable disposition among the members of the Government and in the political world I am also doing everything possible to influence the press. Thanks to careful steps taken in good time considerable results have been obtained. As you know, I do not intervene directly in the distribution of subsidies (to the French press), but this distribution, in which the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance participate, seems to be effective and is attaining its goal. . . . In general the Paris press of to-day is very different from that of 1908-09; I must call particular attention to the attitude of the *Temps*, which distinguished itself four years ago for its Austrophilism, but in the columns of which M. Tardieu is now energetically fighting against the Austrian policy. Count Berchtold and the Austrian Ambassador at Paris have several times complained to M. Poincaré.

In my discussions with French journalists I try particularly to persuade them that if Austria's arming and the demands of Austrian diplomacy bring on a general European conflict despite Russia's conciliatory moderation, war will be waged not for the private interests of Serbia or of Russia, but as a result of Austria's policy and Germany's support of it; these two powers seek to establish their hegemony in Europe and in the Balkan peninsula. God be thanked, this idea is filtering more and more into political, military and social circles, and lately I have not had to combat so much the idea that war might be imposed upon France for interests alien to hers as the fear that we might be too passive in a situation concerning the position and prestige of the Entente.

How well Izvolski, Poincaré and the Russian militarists succeeded between 1912 and 1914, is obvious from the aggressive Franco-Russian attitude in the Serbian crisis in 1914. Poincaré was aided in 1913 by the substitution of the aggressive Théophile Delcassé for the pacific Georges Louis, as French Ambassador to Russia. Delcassé was replaced shortly before the war by Maurice Paléologue, an equally enthusiastic supporter of the Franco-Russian alliance.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ See E. Judet, *Georges Louis*.

An illuminating fact, as bearing upon the Russian attitude in 1914, which has rarely been pointed out, was the meeting of the Russian Crown Council on February 8, 1914, to decide as to the best means of Russia's getting control of the Straits. The conference came to the conclusion that it would not be wise to strike suddenly and unaided against Turkey, but that it would be the best judgment to await a general European war, when the British and French fleets could be relied upon to destroy or hold in port the fleets of Germany and Austria. Such a conflict was not deemed unlikely or undesirable. Izvolski had decided by 1910 that the Russian goal could only be attained by a European war. By December, 1913, Sazonov was converted to the same view and so informed the Tsar.⁵⁷

We have already referred to the tense feeling in both Germany and Russia in the spring of 1914 as a result of this growing suspicion, fear, increase of armament and tightening of encircling policies. The Austro-Serbian crisis in such a setting was extremely likely to prove fatal to the peace of Europe.

The specific circumstances of Austria's conduct toward Serbia were perfectly designed to provoke the eager Russian leaders like Sazonov to strong measures in the attempt to insure Serbia a fair chance to put her case before the Great Powers. Prior assurance of complete French support gave Russia courage in a determined stand.⁵⁸

Russian opinion and attitudes were apparently divided. The Tsar was sincerely desirous of peace, but quite incapable mentally of envisaging the complex European situation and comprehending the full import of his own acts and orders. Sazonov, the Foreign Minister, thoroughly committed to Russian imperialism in the

⁵⁷ F. Stieve, *Izvolsky and the World War*, pp. 187 ff., 230 ff.

⁵⁸ Fay, loc. cit. (July, 1920), pp. 634-5; Gooch, op. cit., pp. 539-40, 546-7, 556-7. It could be held in 1920 that Sazonov, while thoroughly committed to the Russian ambitions in the Balkans and the Near East and to the Franco-Russian military alliance, was desirous of avoiding war and allowing Serbia to submit her case to the European powers. This view must be modified in the light of the suppressed telegrams in the Russian *Orange Book*, which reveal the fact that both Sazonov and Izvolski were thoroughly aware as to what was going on in military circles in both France and Germany. Stieve, in his *Izvolsky and the World War*, demonstrates Sazonov's conversion to the war plan by December, 1913. G. Frantz, in his *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg*, definitely proves that Sazonov was the leader in securing the fatal Russian mobilization in July, 1914.

Near East and the French military alliance, was certainly determined upon war from the moment of the Austrian mobilization against Serbia. Grand Duke Nicholas, the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, and the Chief of Staff, Janushkevitch, with the militaristic and imperialistic group as a whole, were convinced that the Austrian ultimatum palpably and inevitably meant war, and believed that the sooner Russia recognized this and accepted the strategic implications and responsibilities the better.⁵⁹ "They felt," says Professor Fay, "that a war between Austria and Serbia was necessarily a war between Austria and Russia, and they had no doubt that Austria was about to begin an invasion of Serbia as soon as the time limit expired. . . . They were probably convinced that war was 'inevitable,' and that here was Russia's heaven-sent opportunity to have her final reckoning with Germany and to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. Therefore the sooner full mobilization was declared the better."⁶⁰ All important evidence which has come out since this was published in January, 1921, has tended to confirm Professor Fay's generalization. To the Russian military group the European war was really *on* from the moment of the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and probably no amount of restraining and conciliatory efforts by Bethmann-Hollweg would have been of any real avail. The Russian militarists, encouraged by the French, ran away with the situation in Russia in the same way that Hötendorf and his followers were dominating the policy and producing the train of tragic consequences in the realm of the Central Powers.⁶¹ Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg late in July, 1914, greatly strengthened the military party at the Russian court. Izvolski, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, was thoroughly with the military group.

General preparatory military measures to aid Serbia were decided upon the 24th, partial mobilization ordered on the 29th, and general mobilization on the 30th. It has been alleged that a false report of German mobilization published in the Berlin *Lokal-Anzeiger* on July 30, 1914, produced the Russian mobilization order, but this is palpably false. The Russians had determined upon

⁵⁹ Fay, *Ibid.* (January, 1921), pp. 225-51; R. Honiger, *Russlands Vorbereitungen zum Weltkriege*. The best work on this subject is G. Frantz, *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkriege*.

⁶⁰ Fay, *Ibid.*, p. 233.

⁶¹ *Livre Noir*, Vol. II. B. von Romberg (Editor), *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*; also the references in the following footnotes.

and ordered general mobilization before they heard of this publication.⁶² Much has been made of an alleged interception of an order of the Tsar in answer to an appeal from the Kaiser, directing a suspension of mobilization, but it now seems that the charge is inaccurate and that the Russian militarists were as determined to have their way, regardless of the Tsar, as the Austrian war party was to disregard the moderating and restraining influence of Germany after July 27.⁶³ Nor was there any effort of the French to curb Russia. The most that they did was to suggest to Izvolski on July 30 that he telegraph his government to be as secretive as possible in carrying on the mobilization, so that Germany or England could not allege or prove Russian aggression. While the Russians were hypothetically mobilizing to prevent Austrian intervention in Serbia, the French were urging Russia to neglect Austria and concentrate her military activities against Germany. Proof of good faith in the Russian claim to be arming to protect Serbia would have been made if she had mobilized against Austria alone, but this was strategically impracticable. Knowing that Germany and Austria were closely allied, it would have been folly to move against Austria and leave her whole German flank exposed. Further, one must reckon with the fact that Russia was possibly not fully aware of the actually serious efforts of Germany to check Austria, and with the further fact that Russia was being urged by the French to move primarily against Germany.⁶⁴

The German ultimatum and mobilization were inevitably produced by the mobilization of Russia. As Fay says, "German mobilization was directly caused by that of Russia. In fact it came rather surprisingly late."⁶⁵ On this ground Gooch holds that

⁶² Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 178-80.

⁶³ Honiger, op. cit.; S. Dobrorolski, *Die Mobilmachung der Russischen Armee*, 1914, and *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, January-February, 1924, pp. 18-21. I am indebted to Professors Shotwell and Fay for reports of conversations with Dobrorolski in the summer of 1923, in which he frankly stated that the Russian War Office and General Staff accepted the Austrian ultimatum as a declaration of war on Russia, and began steady preparations for war against both Germany and Austria. Nothing but a complete repudiation by Austria of her demands on Serbia could have held the Russians in check.

⁶⁴ *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book* (New York: Huebsch, 1923), pp. 45-61. This had always been a basic phase of French policy, going back as far as the 1892 negotiations preceding the Franco-Russian military convention.

⁶⁵ Fay, loc. cit. (January, 1921), pp. 250-51.

Russia must bear the responsibility for the actual outbreak of hostilities: "The World War was precipitated by the action of Russia at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed, when Bethmann-Hollweg was at length endeavoring to restrain his ally, and when the Czar and the Kaiser were in telegraphic communication."⁶⁶

There has been much discussion as to whether the Russian general mobilization meant war, and whether Germany was justified in issuing her ultimatum ordering Russia to suspend mobilization. There seems no doubt on this point. The British ambassador to St. Petersburg warned Russia as early as July 25 that Russian general mobilization would mean war, and we know that both the French and the Russian military experts had for a generation fully and frankly recognized this. This fact surely disposes of the allegation that from a military standpoint Germany should have contented herself with counter-mobilization. France and Russia both expected her to follow the Russian mobilization with a declaration of war.⁶⁷

The one point in the whole situation here which has been most frequently ignored by historians is that Sazonov was certainly grotesquely exaggerating the actuality when he described the protection of Serbia as a life and death matter for Russia. No informed historian and political scientist could well deny that Austria had far more reason, from the standpoint of the realities in the defense of her national existence, in attacking Serbia than Russia had in the way of protecting her. In 1908 Russia had instigated Austrian aggression of a type nearly as serious as that contemplated in 1914, and the fact that she directed a prominent part of her military action against Germany and not Austria indicates that she was not wholly absorbed in solicitude for Serbia. At most, it was only Russia's not wholly defensible or commendable aspiration for the hegemony of the Balkans which was at stake, while the very future cohesion of the Dual Monarchy depended upon a repression of Yugoslav nationalism. We are not, of course, necessarily arguing that Austria-Hungary should have continued to exist, but we can certainly forgive the Austrian and German au-

⁶⁶ Gooch, *op. cit.*, pp. 546-7. As a matter of fact, Austria had not been persuaded to resume conversations at the time of the Russian general mobilization. She did not consent until late on July 31st.

⁶⁷ Gooch, *op. cit.*, pp. 546-7; *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, pp. 50-76; Montgelas, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-6.

thorities for believing that it should. One should keep in mind, however, Professor Schmitt's thesis that, even if the Serbian matter was not of crucial importance for Russia considered individually, it was of the greatest importance to the prestige of the Triple Entente as a whole.

4. *France.*

In regard to France the analysis of the pre-war situation must begin with a recognition of the Franco-German psychology after 1871. France never forgave Germany for the humiliation of that period or for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Germany recognized the intensity of French resentment and longing for revenge, and reciprocated by an overbearing attitude toward France. We must, however, free our minds of the illusion that France was in 1870 a terror-stricken victim of Prussian aggression. Even the two early French authorities on the diplomacy of the Franco-Prussian War, La Gorce and Sorel, frankly admit that Gramont precipitated the war and thereby played directly into the hands of Bismarck.⁶⁸ We should further dispel the mistaken notion that England and the United States were indignantly repelled by Prussian aggressiveness in 1870. The overwhelming majority of English and American opinion was unreservedly on the side of Prussia, which they believed was being wantonly assaulted by the most militaristic and warlike power in Europe. It is true, however, that the severity of Bismarck's terms alienated some of his British and American supporters.⁶⁹

The spirit of revenge never died out in France, its chief apostles being Paul Déroulède, Maurice Barrès and Léon Daudet, leaders of the League of Patriots and the *Action Française*. After the collapse of the Boulanger movement in 1889, and the discrediting of the militaristic clique in the Dreyfus case, however, the war and revenge fever abated for a decade, and certain French leaders like Joseph Caillaux endeavored to promote greater friendliness

⁶⁸ We must also free ourselves from the myth of the Ems Telegram atrocity. In some ways it was even less insulting in the abridged than in the complete form. A more recent French account of the origins of the War of 1870 is P. Lehautcourt, *Les Origines de la Guerre de 1870*. See also R. H. Lord, *The Origins of the War of 1870*.

⁶⁹ C. E. Schieber, *The Transformation of American Sentiment Toward Germany, 1870-1914*; Chap. i.; D. N. Raymond, *British Policy and Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War*.

between France and Germany. This was made more difficult by the Morocco crises, and about 1911 the party represented by Cail-
laux began to lose its dominating position and was replaced by the
advocates of a "Strong France," prominent among them Poincaré,
Delcassé, Millerand, Joffre, Jonnart and Tardieu. Even Clemenceau,
the original and veteran defeatist and anti-militarist, joined
their group. In the words of the Abbé Dimnet, "France was her-
self again." This group was strengthened by the unquestionable
increase of the power and vocal exuberance of the imperialistic
and military party across the Rhine.⁷⁰

The point of concentration in diplomacy on the part of the Poincaré policy was Russia.⁷¹ The record of its nature is now available in the *Livre Noir*, and no reader of the documents can doubt that after 1912, at least, France was the moving and dominating spirit in the Franco-Russian alliance, and that she constantly worked to accustom Russia to the idea of a coming war with Germany and to its preparation. In this policy Poincaré had the enthusiastic coöperation of Izvolski. Russian sensitiveness concerning Austro-German policies in the Balkans and the Near East was ever stimulated by French warnings and suggestions. When the Russian government, in 1912-13, seemed not to be greatly disturbed over Austria's menacing attitude toward Serbia, the French government informed the Russian that it viewed this attitude with "astonishment and unconcealed apprehension."⁷² In 1913 France passed a bill providing for the largest standing army per head of population maintained by any major European state. From the documents now available it seems perfectly clear that by this time Poincaré, himself a Lorrainer, was willing to accept the first good opportunity for a European war as the means of restoring Alsace-Lorraine to France.⁷³ Probably the most judicious and comprehensive summary of the primary importance of Poincaré

⁷⁰ The works of Fisher, Gooch, Curtis and Albin as above. E. Dimnet, *France Herself Again*, is a sympathetic discussion of the nationalistic party after 1900. An extreme criticism is contained in Gouttenoire de Toury, Pevet and Bausman as cited.

⁷¹ See above, pp. 249 ff.

⁷² *New York Nation*, Oct. 11, 1922, pp. 365-6, Document XVI.; Gooch, *Modern Europe*, pp. 515-20; Montgelas, *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, pp. 72-74.

⁷³ Marchand, *Livre Noir*, Vol. I., pp. 35-9, 128-30, 148-50, 259, 345-7, 393, II, 52, 255, 342-7, 419-37, 457-64, and Stieve, op. cit.

in completing the stiffening of the Franco-Russian alliance is the following by Professor Schmitt:⁷⁴

The credit belongs in the first instance to M. Raymond Poincaré, who became Premier of France in January, 1912. Under his masterly care, Franco-Russian relations, which had become somewhat tenuous, while one ally was absorbed in Morocco and the other in Persia and the Far East, were soon exhibiting the closest harmony. In the liquidation of the Tripolitan war and throughout the Balkan wars, Paris and St. Petersburg devised and applied a common policy, carrying London with them if possible. M. Poincaré repeatedly assured Izvolsky, now Ambassador to France, that the republic would fulfill all the obligations of the alliance; Izvolsky took the Paris press into pay to create a sentiment for Russia and to strengthen the position of the Premier whom he recognized as most useful to Russia. The French statesman urged the Czar to proceed with the construction of strategic railways in Poland and sent Delcassé as his representative at the Russian court; the Russian Ambassador, at least according to some persons, demanded that France revive the three years' military service. The French and Russian General Staffs, in annual conferences, perfected their plans for war, which were based on a joint offensive against Germany. A naval convention was concluded. Finally, M. Poincaré went to Russia, and M. Sazonov, the Foreign Minister, expressed to the Czar his hope that "in the event of a crisis in international relations there would be at the helm in France if not M. Poincaré, at least a personality of the same great power of decision and as free from the fear of taking responsibility." The elevation of M. Poincaré to the Presidency of the republic in no way interrupted the newly developed intimacy. Indeed, from 1912 to the outbreak of the war, the Dual Alliance presented a solid front at every turn to the rival diplomatic group.

It is quite evident, therefore, that we must modify the view which was tenable before publication of the Siebert Documents, the *Livre Noir* and the *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*,

⁷⁴ The most serious accusation is that by Pevet, *Les Responsables de la Guerre*; and Morhardt, *Les Preuves*. Poincaré's defense is contained in his *Origins of the War*, which is rendered far less convincing by the subsequent publication of the *Livre Noir* and the *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*. Poincaré's work is subjected to withering criticism in Lazare's *A l'origine du mensonge*. The authoritative apology for the official French policy is contained in E. Bourgeois and G. Pagès, *Les Origines et Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre*. This is attacked by the Crown Prince in his book, *Ich suche die Wahrheit*.

namely, that the French government was reluctant to contemplate the imminent approach of war in July, 1914. In 1920 Professor Fay could write:

As to France, however much she may have encouraged the Russian militarists, in the months preceding the crisis, by her adoption of the three-year term of military service, by her exchange of military and diplomatic visits, by her naval convention, by her jingo press, and by her close relations with England, and however much by these same measures she may have aroused the suspicions of Germany, there can be no doubt that when the crisis came, she sincerely did her best to avert it.⁷⁵

To-day we know that she did not do her best to avert it. The chief bulwark of the defense of pacific intent upon the part of France is the statement that on July 30 she ordered the withdrawal of her frontier troops to a point ten kilometers (about six miles) back of the boundary in order to prove her lack of aggressive purposes, and then awaited German attack. There are a number of considerations which make it necessary almost entirely to discredit this move as any proof whatever of a purely defensive attitude on the part of France. In the first place, the order was given on July 30 before Germany had taken any steps toward general mobilization, and when she was doing her best to restrain Austria. By the 30th, however, France was fully aware of the fact of the Russian preparatory measures, and her "fear" of Germany must have been based upon her agreeable understanding that Russia proposed to continue her military preparations and that this would mean war with Germany. Further, this order, even if executed, meant no weakening of the French defenses. It was not uniformly obeyed, and had no military importance whatever back of the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers. Officers and soldiers were left in the border posts to watch and report the activities of the German patrols. Most important of all is the generally overlooked fact that, while this withdrawal meant little or no military handicap to the French, even where actually executed, it was in many cases a real military advantage, as it allowed them to bring up to the ten-kilometer line many detachments that had been stationed further back from the

⁷⁵ Fay, loc. cit. (January, 1921), pp. 252-3. The best books yet published (1925) in France on war origins and responsibility are A. Fabre-Luce, *La Victoire*; and P. Renouvin, *Les Origines immédiates de la Guerre*.

frontier, and to carry out preparatory military measures back of this line with apparent innocence of any aggressive intent.⁷⁶ On July 30 Izvolski was telegraphing to Sazonov that the French Minister of War had suggested that Russia might verbally assure the other powers that she was willing to slow up her military preparations, but at the same time might well actually speed them up, provided that she kept her movements sufficiently secret so that the other powers would not discover her extensive preparatory measures.⁷⁷

In the light of this and other suppressed Franco-Russian telegrams during the last three days of July, 1914, the order for the withdrawal of the French troops fits in well with the general picture of the French policy as it emerges from the secret documents, namely, a firm determination on the part of the Poincaré clique to encourage and execute extensive military preparations on the part of Russia and France, and a parallel effort to keep this decision as secret as possible, so as to get military preparations far under way before their discovery by Germany, and also to avoid alienating the opinion of Italy and England. The one fact that stands out of the Franco-Russian exchanges of late July and early August, 1914, more than anything else, is the almost pathological fear of the French authorities that England would discover the aggressive attitude of France and Russia and become lukewarm or alienated from the Entente. As Izvolski telegraphed to Sazonov, "it is very important for France on account of political considerations relative to Italy and most especially England, that the French mobilization should not precede the German one, but form the answer to the latter."⁷⁸ The ordered withdrawal of the French frontier troops, then, would appear unquestionably to have served a dual purpose. It sufficed to dupe Grey and the English, Italian and French people into accepting the fiction of a purely defensive attitude on the part of France, and allowed extensive French military measures to be carried on secretly and effectively behind the ten-kilometer line. Instead of an obstacle to the French military preparations, then, it was a positive gain, while also serving as a diplomatic ruse. We have no means of knowing as yet

⁷⁶ A complete refutation of this withdrawal order as a proof of French defensive humility is contained in Montgelas, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-182, which on this point is absolutely conclusive.

⁷⁷ *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, pp. 50-64.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-5. Cf. *The Diary of Lord Bertie*.

the details of understanding reached by Poincaré and the Russians during the former's visit to St. Petersburg in 1914, but we have unanswerable documentary evidence that, by July 30, France recognized that Russia had determined upon military measures which would lead to war, encouraged her in this decision and gave assurance of complete French support as an ally, while publicly approving Grey's formal attempts at mediation with Germany, Austria and Russia.⁷⁹

More damaging is the testimony as to the enthusiasm and fervor with which the French civil and military chiefs anticipated the approach of war. On July 29 Izvolski telegraphed Sazonov that the army circles in France were in high spirits at the prospect of war, and that the French government was suppressing anti-militaristic meetings. On July 30 he telegraphed that France had given full assurance that she would fulfill all her obligations as an ally of Russia, but suggested that Russian military preparations be sufficiently secretive so that Germany would not also be prematurely frightened into mobilization. On July 31 the German Ambassador in Paris called on Premier Viviani to learn what attitude France would take in the event of war between Russia and Germany. Viviani refused to answer, telling the Ambassador to come around the next day. Just after midnight, however, the French Minister of War told Izvolski that the French government had agreed upon war and hoped that the Russians would neglect the war with Austria and throw all their forces against Germany: "The French Minister of War disclosed to me with hearty high spirits that the French government has firmly decided upon war, and begged me to confirm the hope of the French General Staff that all our (Russian) efforts will be directed against Germany and that Austria will be treated as a negligible quantity."⁸⁰ When to this is added the unbounded enthusiasm for war which the French Ambassador at Petrograd, Paléologue, confesses in his diary, we have to drop entirely the myth of a terrified and reluctant France, however much the pacific group in France may have been repelled by Poincaré, Viviani, Delcassé and their policies.⁸¹ France was

⁷⁹ *Falsifications*, pp. 50-76; Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 94-7, 125-132, 142-4. Though in some cases in this work Montgelas fails to consider evidence damaging to Germany, his presentation of the case for Franco-Russian duplicity in these pages is incontestable. See also Morhardt, *Les Preuves*.

⁸⁰ *Falsifications*, pp. 44-61.

⁸¹ M. Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*. Cf. Morhardt, op. cit.; Lazare op. cit.; and Fabre-Luce, *La Victoire*.

the first country in Europe to declare *for* war in the crisis of 1914—sixteen hours before Germany declared war on Russia, and two and one half days before she declared war on France.

Of course, we must distinguish rather sharply between the attitude of the French people and that of Poincaré and his government. There is no doubt that the French people were pacifically inclined and taken by surprise at the sudden outbreak of hostilities. In fact, it is necessary to go even further, and distinguish between Poincaré and his group and other members of the Cabinet. Several members of the Cabinet were Socialists or socialistically inclined and opposed to war: French foreign policy on crucial points in the critical period of July, 1914, was arbitrarily and in some cases secretly handled by Poincaré, Viviani and Messimy, in the government, in coöperation with Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to England (who made a semi-secret trip to Paris late in July), and with Delcassé and Berthelot. Upon Poincaré himself must fall the major responsibility for the determination of French policy from June to August, 1914, as well as for the control of Franco-Russian relations from 1912 to 1914. In order to whip the citizenry of the Republic into line, the government, by means of censorship and propaganda, carried on a vigorous campaign to convince the French people that they were being asked to support their government in a purely defensive war in which the very existence of France was at stake.⁸²

That France was not caught napping in the way of military preparations is proved by the fact that, though she officially took action toward mobilization on August 1, the five army corps on the frontier were announced as fully prepared for war on the same day. Further, Poincaré frankly admitted to Izvolski that he hesitated to declare war on Germany because to do so would involve calling Parliament and a public debate, which he feared. Poincaré, under the circumstances, was not bound by the terms of the Franco-Russian agreement to intervene on behalf of Russia, as Russia, rather than Germany or Austria, had mobilized first. He also delayed in order to complete French mobilization, and quite obviously, not to alarm England and lose her support. Satisfaction was expressed when the Germans actually invaded France and eliminated the necessity for a debate on war.⁸³

⁸² G. Demartial, *La Guerre de 1914. Comment on mobilisa les consciences.*

⁸³ *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, pp. 58, 62-3, 68-76.

5. *Great Britain.*

England's foreign policy underwent notable changes between 1870 and 1914. Down to 1890 she had pursued a policy of isolation, except for a brief joint action with France in Egypt, and the Mediterranean agreement of 1887. The new German Kaiser turned toward England and away from Russia about 1890, and Germany and England were on good terms until the famous Kruger telegram of the Kaiser at the time of the Jameson raid. This, together with German commercial development and naval plans, and her Bagdad railway scheme, alienated England, and good feeling was not restored until June, 1914. The failure of efforts to achieve amicable Anglo-German relations earlier than this, as Hammann and Valentin freely admit, was due chiefly to Germany, and particularly to Bülow and his anti-English *bête noir*, Baron von Holstein, whom even the Kaiser denounces in his memoirs. They discouraged the well-meaning English advances. Further, it was Bülow's and Tirpitz's foolhardy naval policy that did more than anything else to arouse English suspicion and throw Grey into relations of a more friendly sort with France and Russia. England had clashed with France in the Sudan in 1898, but astute French diplomacy had brought out of this impasse an understanding with England which ripened into an agreement in 1904 and was practically a defensive alliance by 1911. England and Russia had been traditional rivals over the Near East until they settled their differences by partitioning Persia in 1907, thereby paving the way for the consummation of the Triple Entente.⁸⁴ There is no doubt that Sir Edward Grey, in spite of his engagements with Russia and France, was really desirous of better relations with Germany.

In dealing with the problem of England's position and procedure in the crisis of July, 1914, it should be pointed out that Sir Edward Grey occupied a position singularly like that of the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg. Perhaps sincerely desirous of preserv-

⁸⁴ The latest authoritative history of British diplomacy after 1870, based on the new documents and relatively impartial, is contained in the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III. It should be supplemented by such critical works as those by E. D. Morel and W. S. Blunt. The best book yet written in England on war origins is that by Lord Loreburn, *How the War Came*. It should be compared with the official apology in the work of H. H. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War*. See also J. S. Ewart, *The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918*.

ing the peace of Europe, he had, nevertheless, actually arranged to aid France in case of her being attacked by Germany, and had a less definite agreement with Russia concerning concerted naval action. There is no doubt that the Anglo-French agreement was less literally definite than Germany's *carte blanche* to Austria of July 5, 1914, but it was morally as definite and binding. It brought Grey into the same desperate situation as Germany, when he found himself, from Aug. 1-2, 1914, the victim of warlike aims and activities on the part of Russia and France. So firmly were the French convinced of the binding character of the English understanding that Joffre tells us that the French military plans were based in detail upon the assumption of English aid. Professor Schmitt further points out that the language of the Anglo-French understanding is practically identical with the comparable clauses of the Franco-Russian alliance. The Anglo-French agreement had never been revealed to Parliament nor to some members of the Cabinet. Its very existence had been denied by both Grey and Asquith in 1913-14. It was first confessed by Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 3, 1914, when he was compelled to go before Parliament and plead for the support of France.⁸⁵ Professor Beard thus describes the situation:

When on Aug. 3, 1914, the great decision had to be taken, Sir Edward Grey, in his memorable plea for the support of France, revealed for the first time the nature of the conversations and understandings that had been drawing the two countries together during the previous ten years. He explained how the French Admiralty had concentrated its fleet in the Mediterranean and left the Atlantic coast of France undefended and how, the day before, he had assured France that, if the German fleet came out, England would protect the defenseless ports across the Channel. He explained how naval conversations extending over many years had prepared for the immediate and effective coöperation of the two powers in case of war.⁸⁶

This announcement created considerable consternation in England and led Charles P. Trevelyan, John Morley and John Burns to resign from the Ministry in protest. England also gave Russia

⁸⁵ See the indictment of Grey on these points in *Loreburn*, op. cit.; and E. Henderson, *The Verdict of History*. Grey's weak apology is contained in his *Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916*.

⁸⁶ C. A. Beard, *Cross Currents in Europe Today*, pp. 30-31; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III., pp. 466-70, 500-508.

a favorable impression of her attitude in the event of a European war. Sazonov reported to the Tsar in 1912 that, on his visit to England, Grey, the King and Bonar Law assured him that coöperation with France and Russia in the event of war with Germany was the one point upon which all major parties in England were enthusiastically agreed. Of George V he said: "With visible emotion his Majesty mentioned Germany's aspirations toward naval equality with Great Britain, and explained that in case of a conflict it would have dangerous consequences not only for the German fleet, but also for German commerce, as the English 'would sink every single German merchant ship they got hold of.'"⁸⁷ Definite arrangements for a triangular naval coöperation in the event of war were secretly initiated between England, France and Russia in May and June, 1914, a rumor of which greatly disturbed and alarmed German official circles.⁸⁸ Even more serious, on the 25th of July Grey told Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, that he believed that the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia would justify Russian mobilization.

Not only had England thus prepared for naval participation against Germany; she had also worked out in minute detail the plans for sending troops to the continent. Lord Haldane, who had been Secretary of State for War from 1905-12, testified in 1919 that he had made every plan during those years for the transfer of troops across the Channel. Like the Prussians in 1870, when war was declared the English officials had but to sign orders prepared nearly a decade earlier. Captured Belgian documents further reveal the fact that England had even discussed with Belgium the possibility of landing troops on Belgian soil in the event of a German invasion, but this proposal received little encouragement from Belgium.⁸⁹ Finally Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, has told how, after 1912, when diplomatic relations between England and Germany were steadily improving, he became convinced that war with Germany was inevitable, and began in every way active preparations for it.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Beard, *Ibid.*, pp. 41-3; Korff in *American Historical Review*, July, 1922, p. 797.

⁸⁸ Beard, *Ibid.*, pp. 45-50, 72-75; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, pp. 484-6; *New York Nation*, Oct. 11, 1922, pp. 365-70, Documents XXI-XXV.

⁸⁹ Beard, *Ibid.*, 50-55.

⁹⁰ W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1914*.

Probably the chief criticism which can be made of Grey's procedure after July 25 is that he did not warn Germany quickly and sharply enough as to what England's position would be in the event of an attack upon France. It would now seem that such a warning might have forced Germany into even stronger measures against Austria and, perhaps, have averted the conflict. But we must remember that Grey would have faced a Cabinet which might not have supported him in any such positive action. He was deceived by France and Russia, who had resolved upon war and were making military preparations at the very time when Grey was carrying on negotiations in good faith for delay and mediation. He was "double-crossed" by Grand Duke Nicholas, Sazonov and Poincaré in the same way that Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser were by Hötendorf, Forgách and Berchtold.⁹¹ Grey was also strongly influenced in the crisis by his under-secretary, Sir Arthur Nicolson, a violently pro-Slavic, unscrupulous and conventional diplomat. The telegrams in the *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book* reveal Poincaré highly fearful of offending England or allowing her to discover in any way the aggressive French decisions. He was equally eager to discover and play up any apparently aggressive German aims and acts. It is doubtful if Grey was thoroughly disillusioned about his deception until the publication of the secret Franco-Russian dispatches in 1922-23, and Mr. Asquith still seems to share the illusion of 1914 about the good faith of his allies.⁹² Even Grey still maintains that he would have resigned if he had not been able to bring England into the war.

Once Germany declared war on France, Grey was relieved from his embarrassment by the invasion of Belgium, but there is little doubt that England would have come into the conflict irrespective of this act, and there is equal reason to believe that Germany would not have invaded Belgium if England had given assurance of abstinence from hostilities on this condition. The millions of

⁹¹ *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, pp. 44-76; Gooch, *Modern Europe*, pp. 545-6; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, pp. 486-504. For proof that Grey was not willing, however, to limit his ability to fulfill his obligations to the Triple Entente in the interest of peace see p. 501.

⁹² H. H. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War*, 1923. From Grey's recent memoirs it would seem that the best which can be said for him is that he is a less open and direct liar than Asquith.

English and Dominion citizens who fell in the World War were the price paid for Grey's folly in allowing himself to be dragged into the service of Franco-Russian imperialism.⁹³

6. *Italy.*

Much has been made by some of Italy's unwillingness to join with Germany and Austria in 1914 as a proof of her conviction of their perfidy, aggression and war guilt. This argument possesses no validity whatever. Italy's joining of the Triple Alliance in 1882 had been an accident, due to temporary Italian pique over the French annexation of Tunis.⁹⁴ Austria was Italy's traditional enemy, and in due time the old enmity reasserted itself. Italian nationalism and imperialism embraced as a part of its program the recovery of Italian Irredenta from Austria, if not, indeed, the making of an "Italian Lake" out of the Adriatic. Such aspirations could, of course, only be realized as the result of a war with Austria. By this time the anti-French feeling had cooled considerably, and in November, 1902, Italy and France made an agreement not to make war upon each other, even if one took the initiative in declaring war upon a state allied with the other. This meant that the Triple Alliance was, unknown to Germany and Austria, but a hollow shell, so far as Italy was concerned, for a dozen years before the crisis of 1914.⁹⁵ Italy's participation in the war on the side of the Allies was purchased only by promising her the territorial cessions contemplated in the Italian Nationalist program, and it was this dickering, more than anything else, which produced the notorious Secret Treaties of the Entente.⁹⁶

⁹³ Recognition of Grey's pacific intent in 1914 does not carry with it, of course, a whitewash of British imperialism, but the problems of British rule in Egypt, India, South Africa and Ireland are not a legitimate part of the chapter of history dealing with the war guilt of 1914.

⁹⁴ A. C. Coolidge, the *Origins of the Triple Alliance*; Pribram, op. cit.; Fuller, op. cit. It might also be pointed out that fear dominated Italian policy in 1882, as Italy actually expected a French attack at this time. Pribram suggests that an important factor was King Humbert's fear of socialism.

⁹⁵ Gooch, *Modern Europe*, pp. 58-69, 145-9, 346-7, 416-17; G. Gallavresi, *Italia e Austria, 1859-1914*; Mayr, *Der Italienische Irredentismus*.

⁹⁶ *L'Intervento dell'Italia nei Documenti Segreti dell'Intesa*. Cf. Ewart, op. cit.

7. *Belgium.*

Belgium comes out of the test of full documentary evidence as to her pre-war activities with a complete clean bill of health. The most that can be made out of her archives is that she feared an invasion by France more than by Germany in the event of war, and that England had actually discussed the possibility of landing troops on Belgian soil, though she had not been able to secure Belgian consent to such a proposal.⁹⁷ As to whether France or England would have ultimately invaded Belgium as a mode of getting at Germany if Germany had not anticipated them is another fruitless hypothesis, but any one who doubts that their morality was above such action should remember their willingness to sacrifice their ally, Serbia, to protect whom the war was originally started, in making Italy concessions in the secret treaties. If they had abstained, it would have been on grounds of expediency and the consequences of alienating neutral opinion, for which the Allies certainly had more fear, if not more respect, than the Central Powers. The British treatment of Greece is comparable to the German actions in Belgium. The fact that there is no explicit evidence that France actually intended to invade Belgium in 1914 is no proof whatever that such plans did not exist in the secret files of the General Staff. Indeed, we know that the French as well as the German General Staff had considered the desirability of invading Belgium. The French authorities well recognized the opposition of England to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by any country other than herself, and the inevitable loss of a powerful ally by even suggesting such action clearly outweighed any strategic value in anticipating German occupation of Belgium.

IV. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

It should be apparent to any one who has followed the analysis of the evidence of war guilt up to the present point that the scape-goat theory of complete, sole and unique guilt on the part of Germany or any other single state can no longer be supported. Fabre-Luce's view that "the acts of Germany and Austria made the war possible; those of the Triple Entente made it inevitable" is a brilliant and accurate statement of the case. Probably the

⁹⁷ This material is contained in the Schwertfeger collection.

majority of competent students would assign the relative responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities in about this order: Russia, France, Austria, Germany and England. But who will say that any of the other states, if placed in Austria's position, would not have done as much as she did? The United States took military measures against Spain and Mexico on infinitely slighter pretext, without any question of our national integrity being at stake. Our own diplomatic conduct with Spain in 1898 will as little bear close scrutiny as that of Austria with Serbia in 1914. And none of the Entente States can make too much capital out of the free hand given to Austria by Germany. This was exactly what France really extended to Russia in 1912, and what all members of the Entente insisted Russia should have in the Balkan and Serbian crisis of 1914. Neither France nor England made as vigorous efforts to restrain Russia in 1914 as Germany did to curb Austria.

The basis for a valid assessment of responsibility for the World War must be a careful differentiation between the type of war foreseen and desired by France and Russia, on the one hand, and by Germany and Austria, on the other. The aims of France and Russia—the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and the seizure of the Straits—could only be realized by a general European war. The objectives of Austria, in which she was encouraged by Germany—the punishment of Serbia and the discouragement of nationalistic revolts in the Dual Monarchy—not only did not require a World War for their success but were bound to be frustrated by the outbreak of a general European war. Up to the time of the Russian general mobilization and the refusal of Russia to suspend her mobilization, Germany was consistently opposed to any general conflict. She merely encouraged Austria to undertake a program which *might* lead to a local punitive war, though under the conditions which developed—the nature of the Serbian answer to the Austrian ultimatum—Germany was opposed to Austria's entry into even this local punitive contest. When it seemed probable that the Austrian punitive policy would involve Europe in war, Germany applied strong pressure to Austria to suspend military activities and negotiate with Russia. Russia, not in any sense threatened by the action of Austria against Serbia, insisted on proceeding to the general mobilization which all knew inevitably meant a European war. France made no effort to restrain Russia in this program, but secretly encouraged her to even more rapid preparatory measures. Russia was the first country to order general mobili-

zation, and Fance was the first to declare her determination upon war in the general diplomatic crisis. One may, then, go even further than to put Russia and France in first place as to war guilt; it is accurate to state that France and Russia are the *only* countries, excepting Serbia, that have any direct and immediate responsibility for the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

Deeper than any national guilt is the responsibility of the wrong-headed and savage European system of nationalism, imperialism, secret diplomacy and militarism which sprang into full bloom from 1870-1914. And there can be no hope of permanent peace in Europe until it is freely and clearly recognized that it is this system which must be resolutely attacked through various forms of international coöperation and organization.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Barbagallo, C., *Come si scatend la Guerra monodiale*; Bausman, F., *Let France Explain*; E. Bourgeois and G. Pagès, *Les Origines et les responsabilites de la grande guerre*; Ewart, J. S., *The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918*; Fabre-Luce, A., *La Victoire*; Fay, S. B., "New Light on the Origins of the World War," in *American Historical Review*, 1920-21; "Serbia's Responsibility for the World War," in *New York Times Current History Magazine*, October, 1925; "The Black Hand Plot that Led to the World War," *Ibid.*, November, 1925; Frantz, G., *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg*; Gooch, G. P., *A History of Europe, 1878-1920*; Henderson, E. F., *The Verdict of History: the Case of Sir Edward Grey*; Judet, E., *Georges Louis*; Lazare, A., *l'Origine du mensonge*; Montgelas, M., *The Case for the Central Powers*; Morhardt, M., *Les Preuves*; Poincaré, R., *The Origins of the War*; Renouvin, P., *Les Origines immédiates de la guerre*; Stieve, F., *Isvolsky and the World War*; Wertheimer, M., *The Pan-German League*; Wilhelm, Kronprinz, *Ich Suche die Wahrheit*.

•

CHAPTER VIII

HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE¹

I. THE ORIENTATION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW HISTORY

THE great majority of historical works down to the present time have been filled with a mass of meaningless details with respect to the origins, succession, and changes of dynasties, or have dealt almost exclusively with battles, diplomatic intrigues, and personal anecdotes and episodes which have little or no significance in explaining how our present institutions and culture came about, in indicating their excellence and defects, or in aiding us to plan a better and more effective future. It has been a recognition of these fatal deficiencies in older history which has led progressive scholars and popularizers, from Riehl, Green, and Lamprecht to Robinson, Breasted, Fueter, Turner, Shotwell, Dodd, Beard, Wells, Van Loon and others to attempt so to transform historical writing and teaching that it will possess some practical value to the intelligent citizen, thus fashioning the so-called "New History."

One of the chief innovations comprised in the methods of the newer history is the insistence upon a basic preparation in the utilization of psychology and sociology, in order more scientifically to comprehend and analyze the laws and processes governing human thought and behavior. The type of historian mentioned above urges that special attention should be given to the history of the ideas, opinions, and attitudes of mind on the part of the educated classes in western society from oriental to modern times, as the key to the chief unifying and causative factors in the development of civilization. Begun by Draper, Leckey, and White, this field has been most accurately defined and most fruitfully exploited by James Harvey Robinson and his disciples. Even a preliminary cultivation of this phase of human development has revealed

¹ This chapter is a revision of several brief articles published in *Progressive Education*; the *New York Nation*; *Humanity and Its Problems*; and the *New Student*.

the well-nigh hopeless anachronisms in our present cultural heritage, which distort and obstruct our social vision and prevent us from an efficient utilization of our unparalleled technology and material culture.

The alert historian of civilization recognizes at once that the great need of the present is to bring our attitudes, reactions, and interpretations in the field of the social sciences up to something like the same level of objectivity and scientific candor which now pervades natural science and technology. While the scientific and industrial revolutions of the last century have served to modify our material culture so thoroughly as to make George Washington's age more akin to that of Tut-Ankh-Amen than to that of Henry Ford and Thomas Edison, yet our ideas on economics, politics, social life, and morals have altered amazingly little since Washington delivered his Farewell Address. While admitting the enormous indebtedness of the modern world to the natural scientist and the technician, the historian well understands that we cannot rely upon the scientist alone to apply his knowledge and ideas to social problems. The tendency towards narrow specialism in the natural sciences has normally prevented the development of a humanized, well integrated, and comprehensive scientific attitude, so that we often find a chemist whose chemistry is based upon that of Renssen and Fischer, but whose political science was derived from his Republican grandfather, or a physicist whose physics is that of Michelson and Einstein, but whose ethical and theological notions were imparted by his Methodist grandmother. We must develop departments of social science adequately equipped with the best scientific knowledge requisite for their various lines of endeavor, and manned by those who will be fearless in their efforts to apply such methods and information to their analysis of social problems.

The historian of civilization can aid in this process by emphasizing how contemporary waste, inefficiency, exploitation, and war are ruining western civilization, and by exposing the utter inadequacy of our present appropriation of the contributions of the social sciences in coping with these all-important problems. While all candid social scientists of whatever department will admit the great need of more scientific methods of measuring and analyzing contemporary social forces and problems, the most distressing situation is to be found in the contempt of society at large for such scientific information as is already available in the field of sociol-

ogy, and its fatal willingness to rely upon the so-called "wisdom of the past." It is only in regard to these matters that we find such a futile and dangerous attitude persisting. The prosperous citizen who openly boasts of holding tenaciously to a political or economic opinion more archaic than Elijah's chariot would be likely to be enormously embarrassed if discovered in a last year's model Rolls-Royce. The high esteem placed upon antiques in opinions is no less marked than the zeal for their collection in household equipment, but the indulgence is more dangerous. History teaches us, from the records of the failure of every earlier civilization, that the "Wisdom of the Fathers" has almost invariably fallen down rather badly in meeting the much simpler social, economic, and political situations of bygone days—that, in fact, there has really been no such thing as "wisdom" in the past; and there is precious little of it in evidence to-day.

Yet, even if there ever had been wisdom adequate for the needs of the earlier days, this would not constitute any guaranty of its sufficiency for to-day. Not even the most pious Fundamentalist or Ku Kluxer would think of taking his Ford car to Moses or George Washington to have the carburetor adjusted or the valves ground, but he insists upon solving our infinitely more complicated and difficult moral and social problems upon a basis of monstrous anachronisms, which in some cases date back earlier than either Washington or Moses. An ape may get along fairly well on a velocipede, but he is likely to get hopelessly involved if entrusted with an *aéroplane*. The effort of our contemporary statesmen to solve the problems of to-day on the basis of the "wisdom" of the past is highly comparable to the attempt of an ape to manage an *aéroplane* on the grounds of his previous mastery of the tricycle. We need to understand that rhetoric will ultimately solve nothing, and that we must substitute scientific facts and methods for "air-driven politics."

The historian can, perhaps, render his best service in this movement by acting as a therapeutic agent, in revealing the antiquity, savagery, and futility in much of our heritage of opinion and behavior, and in this way raising slightly the paralyzing influence of the "dead hand" from the backs of those striving to bring humanity to a future which will not only be more happy and prosperous, but also more absorbed in and devoted to the higher ranges of cultural achievement. Professor Shotwell has well expressed the need for a more intelligent and realistic type of historical writing.

When history is seen to be more than a succession of dramatic events, of wars and crises, an embodiment, rather, of the long life-story of social and political adjustment to ideals through changing environment, a process affecting every generation and linking the common things of daily life to the great purposes of national development, then the story of our achievement will be seen to have a different content and a more practical bearing than the epic which time and the careless memory of men have offered as its substitute.

In as much as it seems quite apparent that the greatest menace which faces the human race at present is the recurrence of another world conflict, we shall in this chapter show the bearing of historical writing and teaching upon the important problem of the causes and cure of war, with particular reference to the lessons of the late World War.

II. WAR GUILT AND THE INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

The Dawes Report, and the discussion which it has promoted, in common with most of the analyses of the reparation problem, rests upon altogether fallacious premises which alike invalidate the content of the proposal and the machinery of enforcement. The whole logical and juristic foundation of the notion of reparations from Germany, in so far as it differs from the age-old policy of punitive levies on conquered peoples, is the assumption of the complete and unique responsibility of Germany for the origin of the World War and the misery, suffering and economic losses which it entailed. This fact is fully embodied in the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles relating to reparations, and even Poincaré was once incautious enough to admit that proof of divided responsibility for the outbreak of the great conflict carried with it a disappearance of the case for German reparations.

The view well-nigh universally entertained in this country prior to 1920 concerning the sole and entire responsibility of Germany for the coming of the European conflict in 1914 is no longer subscribed to by any intelligent, honest and informed person. The mass of archival and other documentary material, memoirs and monographic researches published since 1919 has given us quite a different picture of war origins from that which was current several years ago. It has made it clear that the general responsibility for the war was due to the development of Europe into an armed

camp between 1870 and 1914—divided into two great alliances, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. The causes of this situation rest upon a multiplicity of deep-seated factors which can be laid at the door of no single state. Bismarck's diplomacy and French threats against Italy merged the Triple Alliance. Germany's overbearing attitude towards France, the activity of the French Revanchards, and the Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's Russian policy produced the Dual Alliance of France and Russia. The rejection by Bülow and Holstein of British overtures to Germany, and the aggressive diplomacy of Poincaré and Delcassé brought into being the Triple Entente. The development of the Russian Pan-slavic policy in the Balkans, encouraged and carefully supervised by Poincaré after 1912; and the Austrian fear of Yugoslav propaganda and the potential disruption of the Dual Monarchy had by 1914 created a diplomatic situation of such a sort that the Serbian crisis almost inevitably meant war unless either the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente was willing to back down and henceforth accept a subordinate and inferior place in the councils of Europe. The crisis of 1914 is the final proof, if any had been needed at that late date, of the futility and danger of the balance of power as a solution of international relations and a guaranty of world peace.

The immediate accountability for the actual beginning of hostilities is certainly divided and distributed. The first move was made by Austria, but any other major European state with its politics based upon the prevailing standards and methods would probably have done much as Austria did. And Austria did not desire any general European war. The Serbian government, civil and military, was clearly involved in the plot to assassinate the Archduke. Germany foolishly encouraged the punitive policy of Austria towards Serbia, though hoping and expecting that it would not involve a general European conflict. Russia in 1914 refused to allow her prestige as the leader of the Pan-slavic forces in Europe to be impaired as it had been in 1908-9 and 1912-13. Fully conscious of the fact that general mobilization would precipitate a European war, Russia went ahead with this policy before Germany had made any direct warlike moves. France secretly encouraged Russia in this fatal decision, suggesting that the Russians might well observe the greatest secrecy while actually hastening their military preparations. Germany declared war on Russia to

take advantage of the element of time and superior mobility against overwhelming odds as to numbers, something which both the French and the Russians had expected.

France indulged in a clever but nowise risky gesture by withdrawing her troops about six miles back of the boundaries, but left her guards in the border-posts, and secretly carried on preparatory military activities on an extensive scale back of the ten-kilometer line. But by her gesture of withdrawal she was able to create a favorable impression of defensive fear and humility in England, Italy, and the neutral world, as well as at home, that deceived even scholars until the deadly evidence in the *Livre Noir* and the *Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book* was published in 1922 and 1923. England failed to warn Germany promptly of her attitude in the event of an attack on France, which might have averted the conflict. Sir Edward Grey as early as July 25th led the Russians to believe that he favored Russian mobilization. Italy withdrew from the Triple Alliance and waited until she had secured adequate promises of annexations from France, Russia and England, and then threw her weight on the side of the Triple Entente. The war guilt, as far as it can be proportionately assessed and distributed in any graded, serial or fractional manner rests, then, upon Russia, France, Austria, Germany and England in the order named.

The really important aspect of the above material is not, of course, the satisfaction of our curiosity as to the historical facts regarding war origins, but the specific bearing which these facts have on public and international policy at the present time. As the whole European international policy is still based upon the assumption of unique German responsibility for the war, it is evident that these facts require the repudiation of this program and the adoption of a more fair and constructive policy. The Dawes Plan, and any current American and European agreements as to its enforcement, while immensely better than the Poincaré policy, are comparable to efforts to reduce the living expenses of the wife of a man, known by all to be innocent, whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment. What we need to do is to adopt a broad, constructive and far-sighted policy. The guilt for the World War having been distributed, the expense of indemnifying the sufferers should likewise be distributed. The United States might well use its financial power to compel France and England (the latter would probably gladly welcome the pro-

posal) to forego all notion of any reparations from Germany, and to adopt the program of a mutual sharing of the burdens of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The United States could with great propriety indicate its good will and intentions in the circumstances by cancelling the debts of the European powers on the above conditions. Once England and France gave some such evidence of international honesty and decency one of the chief obstacles and objections would be removed to our joining the League of Nations. We may agree with Fabre-Luce that, though the wartime slogan that America and the Entente entered into the war solely for the purpose of ending all war was at the time pure hypocrisy, yet we shall have lost both the war and the peace if we do not now take steps to make this constructive slogan an achieved reality. The beginning of any such move must be found in an apprehension of the facts concerning the origins of the World War.

The outlook is not promising, and the need for an adequate controlling international organization is as clearly apparent as it is distressingly unlikely of immediate realization. But only a reality-fleeing idealist could expect an international organization to be possessed of a state of mind and administrative machinery in advance of those prevailing in the constituent units. Any effective League of Nations must have its genesis and development paralleled by a campaign of education directed against the savage hunting-pack ferocity of human groups as organized in modern national states, controlled and directed for the most part by incompetent, sightless and self-centered demagogues or the even more dangerous scoundrels who are possessed of superior ability but place their personal ambition or party interests above the welfare of mankind. And much as such education is needed, its leaders face a public far less receptive than in 1914. Indeed, it may even be necessary to breed a superior race before much can be achieved for humanity, if in the meantime the whole matter is not solved by collective human suicide through a few more world wars. But important as may be the program of the eugenist and differential psychologist, man has in him, even at present, vast potential reserves of energy and intelligence which are paralyzed through the influence of custom, tradition, habit, superstition and other specific traits and practices which collectively make up what is conventionally dignified and designed as the conservative or "right-thinking" position. These can only be released by a persistent but intelligent and well considered assault upon reaction through the

humanization and dissemination of already available knowledge. What we most need at the present time is a new theology which will follow the suggestion of Francis Bacon and create a pragmatically useful conception of the Devil in the form of the traditional view of the world and its problems.

III. WORLD WAR "BUNK" AND SOME INTERNATIONAL REALITIES

In the preceding pages the writer has pointed out how important it is for an adequate outlook upon contemporary problems of war and peace to assimilate in an intelligent and discriminating fashion what we now know about the actual causes of the late World War. Nothing could constitute a more complete exposure of the dishonesty and unreliability of diplomats and statesmen, who are, if anything, even more potent in the creation of wars than general staffs and war departments. We now know that practically the entire body of Entente "war aims," including even the melodious rhetoric of the late Mr. Wilson, was totally false and misleading, setting up a verbal barrage behind which were hidden the most sordid and selfish plans of unscrupulous diplomats and foreign ministers. The acceptance of this view about the Entente position of course in no way carries with it any enthusiastic support of the diplomacy or viewpoint of the Central Powers, but we do not need debunking of German propaganda in the United States. If we can but understand how totally and terribly we were "taken in" by the salesmen of this most holy and idealistic world conflict, we shall be the better prepared to be on our guard against the seductive lies and deceptions which will be put forward by similar groups when urging the necessity of another world catastrophe in order to "crush militarism," "make the world safe for democracy," "put an end to all future wars," etc.

We are now pretty fully aware of the actual facts in regard to the bringing on of the recent World War through the plotting of Poincaré, Delcassé, Izvolski and Sazonov, aided and abetted by the Conservatives and Slavophiles in the British government. There are, however, a number of other problems and considerations which require and deserve investigation and elucidation. One of the most significant would be a consideration of who prolonged the war unnecessarily. Here, again, there is no doubt that the chief guilt fastens itself upon the Allied Powers, and particularly upon Lloyd George. It is certain that in 1916 or 1917 a

negotiated peace, embodying principles and adjustments far better adapted to the welfare of man than the Versailles Pact, could have been arranged through the collaboration of Mr. Wilson and the consent of the German government but for the adamant position of Lloyd George, Clemenceau and certain other Allied statesmen who were bent upon the destruction of the Central Powers. In due time it will probably be seen that the wisest utterance of Woodrow Wilson was not his "Fourteen Points," but his conception of "peace without victory." The responsibility for the unnecessary and disastrous prolongation of the terrible holocaust, which involved the expenditure of vast sums of money and the loss of millions of lives in Europe, to say nothing of the debauching of American morale and intelligence through entry into the World War, is almost as heavy as that which rests upon Poincaré, Delcassé, Izvolski and Sazonov for the initiation of the conflict. It will require the most heroic activity and achievements on the part of Lloyd George in denouncing the peace of Versailles and subsequent French policy to offset even partially his primary responsibility for bringing Europe into the condition where the dictated peace and the horrors and disasters of the French policy and the Ruhr were made possible.

Another illuminating line of study and exposition would seem to lie in a contrast between Entente "war aims" and the actual objects and results of the war. We were told that the World War was fought to end all war and to crush German militarism, yet the world was left in 1918 more bellicose in psychology than in 1914. There was a succession of wars in Europe from 1918 to 1921, sometimes as many as a score of separate wars being in progress. Further, a large number of new states were created to constitute so many more causes of nationalistic outbursts, political ambition, and ultimate wars. Patriotic savagery was stimulated to a far greater degree than after the conflicts of 1870 and 1878. While German militarism has been for the time being crushed, it has been replaced by the even more dangerous militarism of France, whose arrogant and aggressive policy since the war has done more to stimulate a revengeful and militaristic psychology in Germany than anything else which has happened to that country since the Napoleonic occupation in 1806. At the same time, France has advanced the cause of militarism not only at home, but also in the new states of Central and Southern Europe, so that at the present time the militaristic psychology, as well as the military equipment, out-

side of Germany, Austria and Russia, is far stronger than at the outbreak of the World War. One of the great objects of ending the war was to make no longer necessary the enormous expenditures for armaments and other wastes. Nevertheless, to insure her military supremacy upon the Continent, France has not only doubled her indebtedness of 1918, but has practically led into bankruptcy a number of European states as her partners in the militaristic system. The increase of debts and armaments since 1918 has been appalling.

We were solemnly informed that the World War was also being fought to make the world "safe for democracy," and particularly to insure the existence, safety and stability of democracy in Germany. The end of the World War saw even the architect of that phrase acquiescent in the sending of American troops to crush out the existence of the Bolshevik government in Russia, which represented the most radical democracy anywhere in the world. Even more serious is the fact that the Entente policy since the war has almost destroyed the strong sentiment and movement for democracy in Germany, which could easily have triumphed in that country but for the effective indirect coöperation of Poincaré with the party of Ludendorff and the militaristic monarchists. There can be no doubt that Poincaré contributed more largely than any other force or influence to the election of von Hindenburg, as well as to the genesis of many other much more serious symptoms of autocracy and reaction in Germany. Since the war, the friends of democracy in Europe and the United States have looked with horror upon Bolshevik Russia, but have coöperated with enthusiasm with Mussolini, undoubtedly the most brazen autocrat that western Europe has known since Napoleon III. Even the United States, which was supposed to be interested far beyond any other country in making the War a great crusade for democracy, has undergone a veritable orgy of reaction since 1917, so that individual liberty and the freedom of expression are to-day in greater jeopardy amongst us than at any other time since the period of the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798.

Another objective of the War was to "right the wrong of 1870," namely, the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine and the billion dollar indemnity levied upon France. This wrong was "righted" by attempting to levy an indemnity of fifty billion dollars on Germany; by wresting from Germany in behalf of Poland territory which was far more an integral and vital part of Germany than Alsace-

Lorraine had ever been of France; by seizing the German colonies in the interests of the British, French and Japanese Empires; by preventing German Austria from executing the natural and desirable juncture with Germany; and by most unfairly and unjustly depriving Bulgaria of territory to recompense Serbia, Greece, and Roumania for their contributions to the Allied cause during the War. Especially notorious was the rewarding of Serbia, the primitive system of murders and intrigues in which had given the Franco-Russian diplomats the desired occasion for precipitating the European war.

Yet a fourth purpose of the Allies was to instil into the peoples of the world the triumph of idealism over selfish imperialism and territorial ambitions. But the Bolsheviks and the Versailles Conference revealed the existence of secret treaties embodying as sordid a program of territorial pilfering as can be found in the history of diplomacy. It appears that the chief actual motives of the Allies were the seizure of Constantinople and the Straits for Russia; not only the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, but the securing of the west bank of the Rhine, which would have involved the seizure of territory historically far longer connected with Germany than Alsace-Lorraine had been with France; the rewarding of Italian entry into the war by extensive territory grabbed away from Austria and Serbia; and the sequestering of the German imperial possessions, the acquisition of the German merchant marine and the destruction of the German navy in the interest of increasing the strength of the British Empire. The officials of the United States have boasted that they did not secure one inch of territory, but we did snatch from the spoils German property of a value approximately equal to the German indemnity levied on France in 1871. To this, of course, must be added the enormous profits of American manufacturers and bankers in supplying the Allies with munitions and credit. We must not forget that some of the most vocal apostles of idealism were among the most notorious of profiteers, and that the intolerant and noisy organizations of "idealists" were subsidized and supported by these same groups, an investigation of the perfidy of which was blocked by Mr. Dawes. We may pass over with the merest mention the Allied idealism since the autumn of 1918, as exemplified in the continuation of the German blockade after the Armistice, the intervention in Russia, and the policy of France in the Ruhr and the occupied regions along the Rhine. No sane person would care to

defend such a thing as the sinking of the *Lusitania*, whatever the status of the act under international law, but it is only fair to point out that the unjustifiable and unnecessary continuation of the blockade of Germany after the Armistice was an offense against humanity and justice exceeding in brutality and death the sinking of a hundred such ships as the *Lusitania*.

But probably the most seductive of all the Allied war aims was the promise that the conflict would emerge with the creation of a world organization, based upon fairness and justice and designed to make impossible, henceforth, the waging of another war. It would be a "league to enforce peace" and to promote sentiments of international brotherhood. By 1920 it was apparent that the United States, the country that had shouted most loudly during the War for such a league, would sullenly and dishonestly refrain from joining this organization, while Germany, Austria, and Russia were arrogantly excluded from the opportunity of securing membership if they had clamored for admittance. What ultimately came out of the movement was essentially an Anglo-French organization, namely, a league of victors rather than a league of nations. The saving factor in the situation was that England gradually became unwilling further to tolerate the French desire utterly to destroy Germany, with the result that the League of Nations has gradually been able to make a number of notable contributions to peace, because France and England could not agree upon the policy of aggression. While every honest friend of peace should desire to see the League of Nations grow not only in strength but also in membership, it is complete folly to expect that the mere union of a number of sordid, selfish and warlike states can in itself create a world organization, entirely divorced from selfish aims, and exuding a sentiment of Christ-like sweetness. It will not be necessary to stress the fact before an intelligent group of readers that the League of Nations will function as an organ and agency of peace only in so far as we bring about a change of heart upon the part of the constituent governments. No league of nations can ever go forward unless a pacific spirit dominates the foreign offices and public opinion of these same nations.

Equally futile is it to talk about disarmament without such a change of international outlook as would naturally involve both the spirit and fact of disarmament. As long as peoples think in terms of arms and have recourse to arms to settle international disputes, even real and thorough-going disarmament would be of

little or no significance. With our modern technical proficiency we could within six months equip armies with a far more formidable set of instruments for destruction than were known to Napoleon or General Grant. We ought to be even less misled by the fake disarmament conference at Washington in 1920 which, however much it may have achieved temporarily in the diplomatic settlement of the problems of the Far East, was a pure burlesque as far as disarmament is concerned. The only equipment about which there could be any agreement as to disarmament and abandonment were those forms of armament which had already become hopelessly obsolete. It was equivalent to a group of sportsmen in 1925 agreeing to dispense with flint-lock muskets in their fall shooting exercises. We must accustom ourselves to referring causes of international dispute to leagues of nations or world courts, or else disarmament will be no more than a meaningless, if not dangerous, rhetorical illusion. We should not, of course, overlook the fact that the mere assembling of a conference on disarmament, however futile its actual achievements, was in itself a gesture of high psychological significance in the field of international relations and diplomatic discussion. It was certainly some advance over the international astronomical conference which Graham Wallas suggested might have to be the first step in the development of world organization.

One of the persistent, and yet one of the most insidious, phases of the Allied propaganda since the war has been the constant reiteration that the security of Europe and the world is identical with the security of France. Our present knowledge of the French part in the war of 1870, the French spirit of revenge following 1871, the French diplomatic intrigues and aggressive aims in the Franco-Russian Alliance, the relatively unparalleled French militarism and military expenditures to 1914, the prominent part played by France in precipitating the World War, and the domination of Europe by French aggression and militarism since 1918 should be sufficient to convince even the most biased Francophile Americans that we cannot found the slightest expectation of European peace upon any plan which gives France either security or ascendancy in Europe at the expense of the other countries. There can be no security for Europe which does not rest upon a general European organization which will insure the safety, as well as hold in restraint the military tendencies of France, Germany or any other country.

We have not here laid stress upon the militarism or secret diplomacy of Germany, primarily because few Americans have harbored any illusions on this subject, unless it be an unfair impression of the relative amount and menace of German militarism as compared with that of France and Russia. The writer is no apologist for German *Politik*, but a fair and candid study of European diplomacy, nationalism and militarism since 1870 has gradually but certainly shown us how impossible it is to maintain the old thesis that Germany was not only primarily responsible for the World War but was also the chief source and stimulus of the savage patriotism and excessive armaments which have cursed Europe in the forty years before the calamity of 1914.

The conclusion of these few, casual, desultory and almost platitudinous remarks on the contrast between myth and fact in connection with the World War and after, is that they prove beyond the possibility of contradiction or doubt the highly relevant fact that war cannot be ended by more war any more than a drowning man can be resuscitated by pouring more water down his throat. The type of mind and intellectual attitudes developed for and by war are those which bring to the fore practically all of the baser traits of human nature and intensify hatred and savagery, while reducing the potency of those mental operations which are conducive to pacific adjustments and mutual toleration. It is only by attacking war head on, and making clear its multifarious contributions to human brutality and waste, as well as by proving the futile and unnecessary nature of every war, that we can make headway, if at all, against modern militarism and the war spirit.

It may have been worth while on this basis to have pointed out with more than usual frankness the imbecilities and the disasters of the late World War, because this is a particularly instructive example for those now alive. It was not only a struggle through which we have all lived, but also the one which was most exploited as an example of a necessary, idealistic and justice-promoting conflict. If we can show how totally we were deluded on all these points, it may help us in the future to guard against being led astray by the same groups when they are interested in provoking another world conflict. It has doubtless been a consideration of the above points which has led a few courageous spirits among us, like Harry Emerson Fosdick and Sherwood Eddy and Kirby Page to express doubt as to whether they would ever again support or sanction another war. But it is necessary to carry this salutary

disillusionment beyond the few to the mass of students of the coming generation who will be those who must take the leading part in opposing the military outlook and in substituting for savage patriotism a broad international point of view. And if we may judge by the symptoms of the last decade, students will primarily need to look for truth and guidance to themselves rather than to their professors, particularly professors of history and diplomacy, who will probably tenaciously continue to remain whole-hearted devotees of the Rip Van Winkle school of historiography.²

IV. THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND GOOD WILL

In view of the amount that has been written upon the subject few will need any extended argument to demonstrate the great influence of the chauvinistic and highly biased historical writing and teaching in the last century in creating the state of mind which invited the crisis of 1914. This important factor has been analyzed in such works as A. Guillard's *Modern Germany and Her Historians*; J. F. Scott's *Patriots in the Making*; J. H. Rose's *Nationality in Modern History*; John Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*; and H. Morse Stephen's presidential address on "Nationality and History" published in the *American Historical Review*, January, 1916. It requires nothing beyond a reference to these incisive indictments of ultra-patriotic history writing and teaching to convince the scientifically-minded reader of the disastrous results which may flow from the construction of a national epic in historical literature.

The two chief defects in historical writing which have been revealed by the above surveys have been an excessive emphasis on national political, and military history, excluding social, economic and intellectual factors, and an inaccurate and partisan statement of the unduly stressed political and military history. The writers and teachers have tended to represent a nation's greatness as due primarily to war and military prowess and have ignored the peaceful achievements through science, industry, and commerce by which alone man has been raised from the level of savagery. Beyond the perversion of history through this exclusion of the more

² See, for example, the remarks of Professor A. L. P. Dennis at the luncheon of the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, March 14, 1925.

significant type of subject-matter the nationalistic historical literature has been singularly and unfortunately lacking in objectivity in its exposition of political, diplomatic and military events and achievements. The writers have tended to find that in all controversies and conflicts their country has been uniformly and strictly correct, while its rivals have been wrong and motivated by envy and jealousy. Further, they have pictured their racial characteristics and national institutions as the most perfect, while other peoples are represented as an inferior lot incapable of producing an advanced type of culture.

While, as Stephens, Scott, Altschul, Taft and others have shown beyond any possible doubt, this type of historical writing and teaching was not limited to Germany, it may be safely held that Germany exhibited these defects as clearly and voluminously as any other major western nation. In describing the situation in Germany it is only fair to say that the analysis applies most directly to Prussia, but it should be remembered that Prussia was in well-nigh complete control of German policy before 1914. The great majority of historical works produced by Germans have been centered on political, diplomatic and military events. The Maurers, Waitz, and others accepted Tacitus' estimate of the unique morality and virility of the primitive Germans and contended that medieval culture was primarily a product of Germanic genius. Raumer, Stenzel, and Giesebrecht pictured the glories of what was alleged to be the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, Ranke eulogized the Reformation and did much to make Luther a national hero rivalled only by the leading Hohenzollerns. Duncker and Droysen, glorified the origins of the Hohenzollern dynasty. The notion of the Hohenzollern mission to unify and extend Germanic power was carried on in the brilliant work of Treitschke, and the first phase of the consummation of that mission was described by von Sybel in his account of the founding of the German Empire in 1870. The eulogy of Prussianized Germany under Hohenzollern leadership since 1870 has been kept up by historians of distinction and by blatant publicists, such as Karl Peters, Tannenberg, Bernhardt and H. S. Chamberlain. The attempt of Lamprecht and his followers to introduce a synthetic *Kulturgeschichte* into German historiography was attacked in a savage manner by the great majority of the eminent and respectable historians of Germany.⁸

⁸ See G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 134 ff.; see also Guillard, *op. cit. passim*.

In the popular instruction in history in the schools the same distribution of emphasis might be observed. The chief stress was put on the wars and the great military heroes. In explaining the origin of those wars care was taken to emphasize the fact that Germany was never the aggressor, and was always fighting on the defensive for the preservation of the Fatherland and Germanic culture. The superhuman bravery of the Germans was pointed out and hatred instilled for the French and Russians and, above all, for the British. In the treatment of political history monarchical institutions were praised as the best of all forms of government, and loyalty to the Hohenzollern dynasty was inculcated in every conceivable way, flagrant or subtle. The paternalistic legislation of the empire was emphasized and the perfidy of the socialistic aspirations was properly stressed.⁴ The superiority of the Teutonic branch of the "Aryans," which had been postulated from Fichte, to Gobineau, Pencka, and H. S. Chamberlain, was maintained. The German race was the originator and carrier of all culture which was worth while. All the great cultural figures of European history, not even excepting Dante, were claimed as Germans. Not only had the Germans civilized Europe, it was their mission to carry this culture to other lands and to keep German emigrants culturally, if not politically, united to the Fatherland. The tragic results of this type of history and pedagogy are only too well known to those who have lived through the last ten years.⁵

The American public has been sufficiently repelled by the excesses of Germanic historiography and political theory and has been wholly capable of detecting with alacrity the presence of the cloven hoof in the doctrines and practices described above, but we have certainly failed to be on our guard against the development of similar defects in our own teaching and writing of the history of this country. We have failed to appreciate the fact that some of our greatest literary historians, such as Bancroft, have been as buoyantly patriotic and partisan as Droysen or Sybel; that our so-called "popular" historians have been even more blatantly nationalistic and partial; and that, with a few recent and worthy exceptions, our history textbooks in the schools have exhibited about those same tendencies which have been shown to

⁴ This is well described in J. F. Scott, *Patriots in the Making*, Chap. vi.

⁵ See J. H. Robinson, "What is National Spirit?" *Century*, Nov., 1916. The worst example of this type of writing was Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*.

exist in the German texts. These unfortunate shortcomings have been all the more influential because the distorted political, military, and diplomatic history has been given most emphasis and brought out into the foreground, instead of being properly subordinated to the more vital and significant material describing our cultural, economic and social development.

The grievous distortion of proper historical proportion can best be gathered from a prospectus of the subject-matter of nearly all of the conventional American history down to very recent times and of far too much of it at the present day. In the colonial period the chief emphasis has been placed on the wars between England and France, while the colonial period as a whole has been looked upon as significant chiefly as a prelude to the Revolution. The Revolution has assumed something of a central or pivotal position in the American epic, and its prominent figures have quite overshadowed most of those who have followed them. Once the results of the Revolution had been studied, and the formation of the Constitution was usually included within its consequences, the next subject of importance was the impressment of seamen, the embargo and the War of 1812. The period from 1815 to 1844 seemed rather sterile, for about all that could be found of any interest in this era were the Indian wars of Jackson and William Henry Harrison. The Mexican War and its consequences in the slavery controversy served to carry the writer or teacher down to the Dred Scott decision and the preliminaries of the Civil War.

The Civil War usually exhausted the historian, and courses and textbooks "petered out" with the period of Reconstruction, though, as a matter of fact, the events of the period from 1865 to 1900 have more bearing upon our present society than those of the period of 1492 to 1865. When a few pages were grudgingly allowed to the period since 1865, they found little place for anything save the Indian wars and Custer's Massacre, and the Spanish-American War. Upon this skeleton of wars was engrafted the history of quadrennial political campaigns, and the body of respectable historical material stood complete. It is beside the point to urge that in the last decade a great change has come over American history writing and teaching and that the better class of textbooks is beginning to subordinate military episodes and political scandals and to assign more space to social, economic and intellectual history. Most of the present generation have had

their historical views furnished by the older type of work, and the newer and better textbooks are still studied by far fewer than peruse the military epic. Moreover, a campaign of unprecedented virulence is just now being launched by various religious and patriotic organizations against the more truthful, realistic and dynamic textbooks.⁶

The contrast between the arrangement and assignment of space in the conventional textbooks, and that which would be demanded in any adequate account of the development of American society can best be comprehended by summarizing the improved outline of the history of the country, such as, for example, one could find in Max Farrand's admirable sketch of *The Development of the United States*. A rational survey of American history should attempt to make clear the dominant forces in each period of our development and should further indicate the relation of these forces and tendencies to the history of the modern world. The foundations of our institutions, as Professor Cheney has well maintained, appears as a phase of that great movement which ushered in modern times—the expansion of Europe and the Commercial Revolution. The American Revolution no longer appears as an epic of deliverance, but as the American aspect of the struggle which was going on in western society between despotism and mercantilism on the one hand and the exponents of *bourgeois* parliamentary rule and the removal of commercial restrictions on the other. It was a civil war within the British Empire in which English and American conservatives aligned themselves against English and American liberals.

The development of national unity and our constitutional system is inseparably linked with the ascendancy of the commercial classes and the origins of the Industrial Revolution in the cotton branch of the textile industry in New England, the latter of which also laid the basis for economic sectionalism and the struggle over the tariff. At the same time there was a beginning of that "rise of the new west" which Mr. Roosevelt has so vividly and Professor Turner so profoundly described. This was to bring into power the pioneer democracy of Jackson with its fear of the eastern capitalists, its intelligible, if not intelligent doctrine of the actual equality of men in political capacity, and its exploitation by the eastern politicians in the interest of the "spoils system." But, for

⁶ See B. L. Pierce, *The Control of History Teaching; and Public Opinion and the Teaching of History*.

the time being, both eastern industrial expansion and Jacksonian democracy were submerged by the clash of the sections over slavery, the rise of the "Slavocracy" and its struggle for new areas in the southwest to secure fertile lands for the cotton culture and to preserve its equality in the United States Senate. These sectional disputes developed into active conflict in the sixties, and the Civil War proved by the logic of fact if not of history that Webster's theory of national supremacy was correct rather than Calhoun's doctrine of state-sovereignty.

Following the Civil War came new developments of unprecedented importance, which may be summarily described as the coming of the Industrial Revolution in its more advanced stages, the rise of big business, the expansion to the Pacific and ending of the frontier, and the turning to the West Indies and the Caribbean as an area for oversea expansion and investment.⁷ The rise of large scale industry and railroad expansion, 1860-1895, was far more important for American history and government than the winning of the Civil War and the consummation of reconstruction. With the rise of big business came the consequent development of the modern "boss" as the political representative of the industrial and banking potentate. Finding it, as Jay Gould expressed it, too slow and awkward a process to deal with individual legislators, the magnate made an agreement with a political specialist to deliver a majority of votes for desired concessions and legislation, and against laws and policies looking toward the limitation of corporate interests. This "boss," so little studied in school courses in civics, has become the most important factor in American political life, much more active and significant than any of our formal departments of government.

The settlement of the Far West and the exhaustion of the frontier have created a new sectionalism. Just as Jackson warred against the plutocrats, real and imaginary, of his day, so the westerners in the Greenback, Granger, and Populist movements, in the Bryan democracy and Roosevelt progressivism, and in the Non-Partisan League have fought against corporate activity in railroad graft, land steals, timber and mineral grabs, grain

⁷ An excellent analysis of the leading trends in this period with suggestions as to how they should be taught is contained in the article "Teaching Recent American History" by A. M. Schlesinger, in *The Historical Outlook*, December, 1920.

monopolies, and financial oppression. Finally, one observes the United States, after having absorbed its expansive energy for a century in conquering the American continent, follow the general world movement of national imperialism after 1898 and seek investment opportunities and political control in outlying districts, particularly in the West Indies and the Caribbean district. The contrast between this summary of the newer orientation in American history and that which has generally prevailed in school and popular circles is a fair measure of the progress of historical science and of the change of historical interest and perspective in the last decade. In this dynamic and synthetic view the old military epic finds little place.

Nor has American history writing and teaching been at all free from the second defect noted in German historiography—the biased and partisan treatment of our foreign relations. The German discussion of Franco-German relations can be fully matched for virus and lack of objectivity by our analysis of Anglo-American relations. It has been remarked that in most parts of the country no textbook, however excellent in other respects, could be published with profit if it told the truth about the real nature of the Boston Tea Party. One might go further and say that no textbook would be a financial success if it told the essential truth regarding any important phase of Anglo-American relations. Should a textbook state that the colonial governors were controlled and intimidated by the colonists' power over the purse-strings; that the perpetuation of smuggling was a major issue with the Patriots; that the Loyalists were as numerous as the Patriots and came from a distinctly higher social stratum; that the Revolution was won by the victory of the Whig friends of America in the British Parliament; that the American view of the right of an Englishman to change his citizenship was shared by no other country in the period preceding the War of 1812; that the chief reasons for the failure of England to effect an early repeal of restrictions on American trade in this period was the treachery of Timothy Pickering; that the United States gave out the Monroe Doctrine at British suggestion and was able to make it good only through British threats against the European reactionaries; that England's attitude in recognizing the belligerency of the southern states in the Civil War was admitted as the only correct version of the situation by the Supreme Court; or that in the

Spanish-American War Great Britain was our only European sympathizer, the chance of that textbook running the gauntlet of the diligence of competing textbook firms would be slight indeed.

Or, again, what would happen to a textbook which told the truth about the motives for the French Alliance of 1778; that made it clear that France was one of the aggressors against whom the Monroe Doctrine was issued; that showed how the French government did its best to secure armed resistance to the American occupation of Texas and the territory conquered from Mexico; that emphasized French treachery in the Civil War and the occupation of Mexico; that made it clear that the sympathy of the United States was overwhelmingly with Germany in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870; that brought out the attitude of American statesmen toward the French Canal Company and indicated the attempt of that company to corrupt American legislators; or that revealed the violent propaganda of denunciation of the United States which characterized the statements of the French press during the Spanish-American War? Least of all would a book survive at present if it stressed the contributions of the Germans of 1848 to American liberalism; enumerated the prominent Germans on the northern side in the Civil War; showed the American sympathy with Germany in 1870; or detailed the German-mania which characterized many college presidents as late as 1914.

We cannot devote an adequate amount of space to other types of bias in American history writing. There is the bias of partisan zeal which made it impossible for Hildreth and John Church Hamilton to write fairly of the Jeffersonian Republicans or for Bancroft to estimate calmly the policies and doctrines of the aristocratic Federalists. Then there is that sectionalism that only a few writers like James Ford Rhodes and Professor Dunning have overcome. This has perverted most northern accounts of the history of the south and, perhaps to an even greater degree, all southern estimates of northern policies. Further, there is the practical impossibility of relying on the newspapers for a fair and adequate account of current history.

It would appear from even this brief summary of the characteristics of the traditional type of history writing and teaching that we have in many ways the same problems in reconstructing our approach to history which we hold that the Germans should immediately solve. We have exalted our wars and military heroes to nearly the same degree as Germany and have been quite as

guilty as she in distorting the history of our foreign relations with both ancient rivals and traditional allies. The degree to which our obstructive politicians were able to play with success upon popular prejudices in the campaign against the League of Nations and in the presidential campaign of 1920 is a tragic proof of the disastrous results which still persist from these causes, to say nothing of the strife and friction which have been thereby generated in the past.

The first and most direct manner of correcting the errors in American historical writing, which are due to a patriotic bias, is to tell the truth in regard to controverted periods and problems. This much needed step has already been taken by the critical students of American history, who have practically completed the task of telling the truth as regards military, political and diplomatic relations with Great Britain and other countries, though the facts and interpretations brought together in such a work as the *American Nation* have not greatly affected textbooks or popular opinion. The other method of correcting these errors is to reconstruct our whole conception of the scope of history and the relative emphasis which is to be put upon different events and forces, so that the vital factors and institutions in our national development will receive due consideration, and the controverted episodes will thereby lose their distorting influences by their very subsidence into that subordinate position where they belong. This phase of the twofold task has hardly been adequately planned as yet, much less executed.

Until one understands that, however important Washington, Hamilton, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Winfield Scott, Abraham Lincoln, U. S. Grant, James G. Blaine, Elihu Root, or Theodore Roosevelt may have been in American history, they have done less to shape its chief tendencies than such men as Franklin, Eli Whitney, Fulton, Morse, McCormick, Kelley, Field, Bell, J. J. Hill, Edison, Good-year and Henry Ford, there will be little hope of any serious approach to a vital grasp of the nature of the development of American society. The signing of the Emancipation Proclamation by Abraham Lincoln was a great and noble deed, but the unheralded Boston dentist who nearly twenty years earlier had first made practicable anæsthetic surgery performed a far more significant act in lessening human pain and misery.

One may raise the humble query as to whether the flaunted

ideals of manifest destiny, nationality, and democracy would have originated, much less have had any meaning without the fundamental social and economic development which gave them reality. What would any of these have been in the United States without the railroad, the steamship, the telephone, the telegraph and the other great industrial and scientific innovations which have made possible our industrial democracy and the expansion of our country from a narrow strip along the Atlantic seaboard to the occupancy of the whole vast central belt of the North American continent?

Not only has our industrial history been neglected, but practically every phase of American history has failed to receive the benefit of that fundamental economic, sociological and psychological analysis which goes below the surface and reveals the vital forces upon which all institutions rest.

The vast majority of the writing on American history has been concerned with its political and legal phases, yet these have been so superficial that when a certain daring scholar attempted to show the basic forces underlying political and constitutional development of our early national history, he was charged with near treason and sacrilege. Again, while religious histories have appeared in great numbers, they have been conceived under the influence of outgrown theological misconceptions, or have been written as apologies for special creeds, and there is as yet no adequate analysis of the place of ecclesiastical institutions and religious beliefs in the development of American society.

Though much still remains to be done in the way of reconstructing the writing and teaching of history, so that it will promote both the cause of peace and the better understanding of the development of civilization, honest and progressive historians are now able at least to sense the issues before them and to realize what must be achieved. And an even smaller group have some insight into how these essential advances may be executed. Yet it will require much persistent effort to succeed, as the development of scholarship, insight and profundity on the part of historians has been paralleled, if not outdistanced, by the growth of intolerance and bigotry on the part of the American population. Never before have there been so many powerful organizations on the alert to see to it that not what is *true* but what is *proper* goes into our school texts.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Altschul, C., *The American Revolution in Our School Textbooks*; Barnes, H. E., *The New History and the Social Studies*; *The Genesis of the World War*; Bausman, F., *Let France Explain*; Buell, R. L., *The Washington Disarmament Conference*; Duggan, S. P. (Ed.) *The League of Nations*; Dunning, W. A., *The British Empire and the United States*; Ewart, J. S., *The Causes and Roots of the Wars, 1914-1918*; Fabre-Luce, A., *La Victoire*; Gooch, G. P., *Modern Europe, 1878-1920*; Hayes, C. J. H., "Nationalism and the Social Studies," in *Historical Outlook*, October, 1923; Montgelas, M., *The Case for the Central Powers*; Morhardt, M., *Les Preuves*; Morrow, D. W., *The Society of Free States*; Ravage, M., *The Malady of Europe*; Robinson, J. H., *The Mind in the Making*; Rose, J. H., *Nationality in Modern History*; Scott, J. F., *Patriots in the Making*; Schieber, C. E., *The Transformation of American Sentiment Towards Germany*; Schlesinger, A. M., *New Viewpoints in American History*; Turner, J. K., *Shall It Be Again?* Wallas, G., *Our Social Heritage*; White, E. B., *American Opinion of France*.

.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION¹

I. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS

IN any attempt, however modest, to reconsider historically any phase of Anglo-American relations it is necessary to assume at the outset a broad standpoint of interpretation. The essential futility of episodical history in general has been sufficiently demonstrated by such historians as Lamprecht in Germany; Seignobos in France; Green, Maitland and Vinogradoff in England; and McMaster, Turner, Shotwell, Robinson and Hayes in America. No time need be wasted in pointing out the fact that this type of history has been equally disastrous in interpreting the development of the relations between Great Britain and the United States. The general misinformation and misunderstanding which exist on this subject to-day are as much due to the fact that Anglo-American relations have been studied in terms of the Stamp Act, the Boston Tea Party, the Wyoming massacre, the Chesapeake-Leopard episode, the Trent affair, and the Venezuela boundary dispute, instead of being approached as a part of the broad problems of imperial administration and the expansion of the Industrial Revolution as they are to the inaccuracies in the analysis and interpretation of these episodes in the popular textbooks and literary histories of the past.

In the present essay a consistent attempt will be made to keep the discussion on the level of a broad interpretation of fundamental questions, and also to keep the statements of fact and all interpretations well within the boundary of the generally accepted positions of the great majority of the leading American historians of the present day.

II. EXPANSION OF EUROPE AND THE COLONIAL MOVEMENT

Any review of the newer interpretation of the history of Anglo-American relations must necessarily begin with the era of coloni-

¹ From the *North American Review*, May, 1918.

zation and the establishment of an Anglo-American civilization. A leading American historian has aptly remarked that any attempt correctly to interpret the American Revolution is bound to fail unless one grasps the fact that in the most fundamental sense the American Revolution was brought to this country by the colonists. From the standpoint of social and political psychology there is undoubtedly a large amount of important truth in this statement. Those who emigrate from their native country are invariably the radicals and dissenters at home—the energetic, progressive and adventurous element which is jealous of external interference from any source. The settlers of the American colonies were more than religious dissenters; they were those who were dissatisfied with existing social, political and economic institutions in England in the seventeenth century. The religious situation in England was but an incident in a more general and fundamental movement. If these classes were dissatisfied with British institutions in 1650 it does not seem particularly strange that their descendants resented the attempt made after 1760 to establish many of the more restrictive features of British institutions and practices in America.

Not only were the original American colonists the most radical, restless and progressive element in the countries from which they migrated, but also the circumstances of their life in their new environment tended to make them and their descendants more radical and more variant from the general type of the citizens of the mother country. The political circumstances of the greatest significance in the period of colonial history which bear upon Anglo-American relations, were the problems connected with the colonial control of the royal governors and with the nature and enforcement of the British colonial commercial policy.

The textbook historians, as well as many of the literary historians, have taken great delight in exposing in relentless detail the instances of tyranny on the part of a few royal governors. One hears much of such men as Berkeley and Andros and but little of the "ninety-and-nine" governors whose generally satisfactory rule gave their terms of service no cause for special attention on the part of the colonists or later historians. Moreover, the authoritative students of the régime of the colonial governors, such as Professor Greene, have demonstrated that the powers of the royal governors were in general very greatly curtailed by the control of the colonial assemblies over their salaries. In this way the colonists were able to exact concessions and to secure a very con-

siderable degree of local freedom and self-government. That the colonists were very well satisfied with this arrangement is apparent from the fact that one of the most hated features of the new imperial system which George III and his ministers attempted to establish in America in 1763 was the proposal to alter the colonial administration in such a manner as to remove the colonial governors in large degree from the control of the colonists. The significant fact about the colonial administrative system is that for a century the colonists were becoming familiar with and attached to a system of local political institutions which enabled them to curb and often to control the representatives of British authority.

Even more definite and portentous were the traditions of colonial freedom from active British restraint which were built up in the same period in the field of the commercial relations between Great Britain and her colonies. The regulation of the commerce of Great Britain and her dependencies from 1600 to 1760, like that of all other countries of that time, was governed by the body of politico-economic theory and practice known as *Mercantilism*. This doctrine proceeded upon the unquestioned assumption that colonies were commercial and financial ventures planned and executed for the benefit of the mother country and her citizens. It was essential, therefore, that colonial trade be carefully regulated solely in the interests of the colonizing nation. Such was the theoretical foundation of the British laws which governed the trade of the American colonies. They were not an ingenious British invention for the oppression of the British colonies, but were for two centuries as much the universally accepted foundations of the economic order as a protective tariff has been an integral part of the platform of the Republican party since 1860. Moreover, as Mr. George Louis Beer has convincingly pointed out in his authoritative volumes, the trade restrictions in theory imposed by Great Britain upon her American colonies were far more liberal than the similar regulations enacted by the other European nations. Even more significant is the fact that these relatively liberal trade restrictions were very laxly enforced by Great Britain and remained practically a dead letter down to 1763.

Smuggling was not only common if not well-nigh universal, but it carried with it practically no moral or social stigma. While one cannot, for instance, regard John Hancock, the leader of New England smugglers, in the same light as one would view a present-

day violator of the American customs regulations, the very fact that the "prince of smugglers" in 1760 could be regarded by his fellow-citizens as an honored and respected member of the community, is in itself a fact of the utmost significance in illustrating the contemporary attitude of Englishmen and Americans toward Great Britain's commercial regulations down to the period when it was proposed to adopt a more stringent policy of enforcement.

Equally cogent is the fact pointed out by Professor Osgood that in Anglo-American controversies between 1763 and 1775 the old trade laws played little or no part. But if the trade laws, through laxity of enforcement, in themselves had little direct influence in bringing on the American Revolution, they were indirectly of the greatest importance in creating the general situation of which the American Revolution was a natural and almost inevitable product. The fact that for a century strongly restrictive laws existed on the British statute books but were not consistently enforced and could be ignored and defied with practical impunity by the colonists, was an influence scarcely to be exaggerated in building up an attitude of independence and of contempt for British authority by 1763. This created a situation which practically assured the failure of Great Britain when, after 1763, the attempt was made really to enforce these long ignored and dormant laws.

Finally, along with political and economic influences which were operating between 1650 and 1760 to produce a fundamental separation, in fact if not in theory, between Great Britain and her American colonies, there was also working a sociological process which has been very accurately described by Professor Becker "the beginnings of an American people." A widely different geographic, social, political and economic environment acting upon a population originally psychologically variant from the great mass of Englishmen, tended inevitably to create in the colonies a people who became generation after generation more and more divergent from their kinsmen across the Atlantic. Not only were these environmental influences operating to produce an essential dissimilarity between Englishmen and Americans, but through the fundamental similarity of the American social environment there was being created a homogeneous and united American people and the beginnings of a national self-consciousness. The creation of a distinct American people made it impossible for them to think or feel as many Englishmen did, greatly intensified the potentialities

for discord and misunderstanding, and equally lessened the possibility for harmony, coöperation, compromise and mutual understanding.

This then was the setting for the new British imperial policy projected in 1763: a new people divided by an original radicalism and a century of widely different experiences from the inhabitants of their mother country, becoming gradually united among themselves by the operation of the very forces which were separating them from their British kinsmen, and trained by a century of disregard of British laws to feel an essential independence of British authority, were suddenly and abruptly brought face to face with a necessity on the part of Great Britain, after the Peace of Paris in 1763, to reorganize her system of colonial administration if she hoped to maintain any permanent and effective control of the vast region which had just been ceded to her by France. When one grasps this situation it can readily be recognized that it is not necessary to resort to an exaggeration and misinterpretation of controverted episodes between 1763 and 1775 to account for the coming of the Revolution. The existing conditions were such that only great adroitness could have averted the conflict.

Attention may now be turned to a brief consideration of the nature and occasion of the institution of the new British imperial policy in the period following 1763, which, operating in connection with the historical antecedents of a century, produced the culminating incident of the process—the American Revolution. It has been the fashion in the past to represent the origin of the new British system of vigorous imperial administration as the result of the fatuous arrogance and tyranny of George III with a view to oppressing and exasperating the citizens of the American colonies and in particular the inhabitants of the city of Boston. A series of scholarly investigations, most notable among them being the solid work of Professor Alvord, have, however, forever discredited this venerable interpretation of the American Revolution in terms of the personality of George III and the succession of events in Boston in the period between 1763 and 1775. As Professor Alvord has expressed the new point of view:

If historians would interpret rightly the causes of the American Revolution and the birth of the new nation, they must not let their vision be circumscribed by the sequence of events in the East. Rather let their eyes seek the wider horizon that will bring also within their

view the occurrences beyond the mountains, where the British ministers experimented in imperialism and sought a basis for their future colonial policy in the administration of the West.

It is now generally agreed among scholars that the new imperial policy, in which such measures as the Stamp Act, Townsend Acts, and the "Intolerable Acts," were but subordinate incidents, was necessitated on the part of Great Britain by the greatly increased burden of imperial administration which had been thrust upon her by the additions of the vast district in Canada and in the Mississippi Valley acquired from France in 1763. If Great Britain desired to retain an effective control over this territory which had been gained as a result of a half century of intermittent conflict with France, it was indispensable that the slipshod and haphazard methods of the previous century of colonial administration be abandoned and that a systematic and efficient reorganization of the imperial system be effected. Of the desirability and necessity of this reform there can be no doubt, but neither can there be any uncertainty that the colonial policy of the previous century which has been outlined above, had made the possibility of the peaceful execution of this new plan highly unlikely. Great Britain had postponed until too late the attempt to establish a strong system of imperial administration in America. To hope that those Americans who had profited thereby would yield up without a struggle the gains of a century in ignoring British authority, or would surrender peacefully the illicit but extensive sources of income enjoyed therefrom, would be to expect the impossible. How little part the personality of George III played in the initiation of this new imperial policy is evident from the fact that all constructive British statesmen of the period of all political affiliations agreed upon the necessity of establishing a new imperial system; it was only later that Englishmen split over the question of the advisability of carrying out the project in spite of colonial resistance. In fact, Professor MacIlwain has shown that the Patriots frequently alleged that they were struggling to maintain their rights before the Crown as against parliamentary intrusion and usurpation.

The entire legality of the measures passed by Great Britain as a means of putting her new policy into execution is well sustained. As Professor Osgood, the leading authority on the subject, has clearly pointed out, "the theory of the English parliamentary

control over the colonies was as fully established and as firmly supported by precedents as any system could be." ² The theory of direct territorial representation in Parliament to give validity to a law was foreign to the English constitutional system down to 1832. Moreover, the whole moral issue involved in the colonial claims to representation for taxation falls to the ground when one understands that Grenville offered to withdraw the British schemes for taxation and to allow the protesting colonies to devise a system of taxation through their own representatives in the colonial assemblies. Benjamin Franklin, the informal American representative at the court of St. James, was, however, compelled sadly to admit in answer to Grenville's proposition, that the colonists would neither consent to taxation by England to meet the expenses of colonial administration, nor agree upon any general system of self-determined and self-imposed taxation. The agent of the colonists, then, as a matter of fact practically refused the offer of representation to determine and impose taxation.

III. THE EVE OF THE CONFLICT

Having now sketched briefly the two great and fundamental sets of influences which made the clash between Great Britain and America inevitable: the growth of a distinct and partially united American people, strongly imbued with a sense of independence of British authority, and the too long deferred provision of a strong British imperial administrative system, the more immediate causes of the conflict may now be considered. Here again it is necessary to avoid confusing the analysis by descending to a discussion of episodes and personalities which at best simply retarded or hastened the action of the deeper forces.

The fundamental explanation of why the conflict, implicit in the nature of things in 1765, should have been brought to a crisis in the following decade, is to be found in the differences in attitude and in psychology between those Englishmen who supported the execution of the new and vigorous imperial policy in spite of co-

² But cf. C. H. McIlwain, *The American Revolution*, who argues that though Parliament had become supreme in England, the colonists were correct in maintaining that they enjoyed their rights through royal grants prior to the rise of Parliamentary ascendancy. One should consult the effective criticism of McIlwain's thesis by F. H. Hodder in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* for September, 1924.

lonial opposition, and those colonists who led the opposition to the new British imperialism. In the first place there was a striking difference between the British Tory and the American Patriot in the line of approach to the conflicting issues. The English statesmen who supported and directed the new plan were chiefly interested in the practical, legal and administrative aspects of the controversy and from this standpoint it seemed to them that there was little foundation or justification for the American position.³ The Patriots, on the other hand, were in reality most concerned with the economic phases of the new system, but in public utterances stressed the abstract moral and theoretical aspects of the questions at issue. There was, therefore, no common meeting ground for the Tory and the Patriot. Equally significant was the wide diversity between the psychology of the Tory ministry and that of the Patriot agitators. It was as impossible for the arrogant and inflexible Tories who constituted the "King's friends," to understand the position and arguments of the radical Patriot, "rep'iete with sentiments of general liberty," as it is for the present-day Hundred Percent American to interpret the highly comparable psychology of the leaders of the Bolsheviks.

It is, therefore, of prime importance to keep in mind the fact that the political circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic from 1763 to 1773, which led to the outbreak of the American Revolution, were guided by those classes in the two countries who were most divergent in character and viewpoint. Those who were most determined to carry out Britain's new imperial policy at any cost had to deal with those in America who, for diverse reasons, mainly economic, most keenly resented British interference and were most attracted by the thought of ultimate independence from Great Britain. Thus the broad gulf between the leaders in Britain and America in the decade before 1775 is quite as important in explaining the occasion of the conflict as in furnishing the basis for interpreting the more fundamental historical issues. By their repressive measures, the Tory ministry "played into the hands" of the radical Patriot minority in America and enabled the latter to gather a sufficient following to hazard a war with the mother country.

While the most vital and significant facts related to the causes of the American Revolution are those mentioned above as inherent

³ Professor McIlwain has recently argued for the technical legality of the colonial position.

in the general situation and policies in England and America, it is necessary to examine briefly the attitudes and aspirations of the more important groups in the Patriot party and to indicate why they clashed with the British program as developed after 1763.

The merchants, for the most part, were chiefly interested in opposing the new and more vigorous efforts to enforce the navigation laws and collect the customs duties. They desired the old freedom which they had enjoyed through smuggling in the previous century. In general, they did not desire an open war with England, but favored such a show of resistance as would induce England to modify her program. To secure this exhibition of resentment against the new British imperial policy they stirred up the proletarian mobs in the coast towns, specific results of which activity were the well-known Boston Massacre and the Boston Tea Party. Ultimately, the opposition they had thus created got out of control and they found it necessary to support the war party as the most probable means of realizing their objectivities. With the merchants were associated many of the professional classes, chiefly the lawyers whose business came in large part from their relations with the commercial classes, and many shopkeepers who profited by the trade in goods smuggled in from abroad. The proletariat, which was incited by the merchants, desired a revolution, not only because of this type of encouragement, but also through resentment and envy over the oppression and the wealth of the aristocratic and official classes, who were mainly Loyalists sympathetic with England. In one sense the American Revolution was a social and economic rebellion of the lower classes against the domination of the colonial aristocracy.

Most of the great landlords among the colonists were Loyalists, but there was a class of landlords, chiefly in Virginia and adjacent colonies, who were chronically in debt to English agents and merchants and looked to independence as about the only promising mode of attaining solvency and freedom from indebtedness.

The English policy as to the settlement of the newly secured lands west of the Alleghenies, which had been ceded by France, also did much to strengthen the revolutionary party. Land speculators, like George Washington, had hoped to profit by the opening of this area to immediate purchase and settlement by the colonial pioneers. They were surprised and enraged when in 1765 the English put a ban on the settlement of this land for a period of ten years, during which the English hoped to get the district

properly garrisoned and policed so as to protect it from recapture or harassing by the French and Indians. The resentment of the land speculators over this British determination to exclude Americans from the Ohio valley and the neighboring country was shared by the pioneers and the border residents who had aspired to find new homes in the promising, if dangerous, wilderness area. Patrick Henry was a representative spokesman of this group.

Finally, the religious element was not entirely absent from the factors precipitating the struggle for independence. For the most part the rank and file of the Patriots were drawn from the dissenting and evangelical groups, while the aristocratic and governing classes were mainly members of the established church of England.

IV. CONCILIATION AND INDEPENDENCE

In April, 1775, owing to the inflexible determination of the Tory imperialists to carry the new colonial administrative policy into execution and the uncompromising assertion by the radical Patriot leaders of colonial autonomy from imperial control, the Revolution, latent in the general conditions of the period, broke out into active conflict. It has been conventional to picture the American Revolution as the attempt of a united imperial Britain to coerce a group of highly unified resisting colonists. The researches, however, of such men as Trevelyan and Fiske which have revealed the sympathy of the English Whigs with the American cause, and of such writers as Van Tyne, Fisher, Flick, and Siebert, which have for the first time presented an appreciation of the strength and nature of the Loyalist party in America, have made it clear that the American Revolution cannot be understood in its broadest aspects unless it is regarded as in essence a civil war within the British Empire along class and party lines, rather than along mere territorial or geographical divisions. It was the struggle of British and American Liberals and Radicals against the policies of British Conservatives and Imperialists, supported by the American Loyalists.⁴

In 1763 there was general unanimity among British statesmen as to the necessity of instituting a vigorous and systematic imperial administrative program. It was only when it became apparent that the execution of this plan would involve an open conflict with the

⁴ Professor McIlwain attacks this view, and claims that by 1774 the Americans abandoned the Whig theory of empire.

American colonies, and when the imperial policy became primarily identified with the program of the Tory party after 1765, that the English Whigs gradually split off from the supporters of the new imperialism and became sympathetic with the colonial cause. The remarkable prevalence of Whig sympathy with the colonial cause in the Revolution is well stated in the following quotation from Professor Van Tyne's authoritative volume on the Revolution:

In and out of Parliament the Whigs rejoiced openly over American victories. In the House of Commons it was not unusual to speak of the American troops as "our armies," and Franklin and Henry Laurens, the President of Congress, were extravagantly praised. Newspapers constantly handled Washington with respect. One said, "There is not a King in Europe but would look like a *valet de chambre* by his side." Benedict Arnold, too, before his treason, was a favorite hero and his picture was everywhere, though after his treason he was bitterly attacked. Parallels were drawn repeatedly between Hampden and Montgomery and their causes were said to be the same. The English Whig journals openly denounced Lord North for having begun an unjust war which he was incompetent to conduct. Yet the government, which before the war had muzzled the press ruthlessly, now allowed America to be praised, and endured violent attacks upon itself. When so many people approved such language the administration saw the danger of prosecution. The support of the nation was given to the defenders of political liberty.

Ample evidence exists that the Whig sympathies remained with the Patriots throughout the conflict, especially significant in this respect being the attitude of the Whig ministry which came into power after the fall of Lord North following Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown. In their conduct of the peace negotiations with the colonists, their attitude was so lenient that no less an authority than Professor John Bassett Moore describes the Treaty of 1783 as the one by which England gave the most and took the least of any treaty ever negotiated by Great Britain.

That Americans were similarly divided over the issues of the Revolution has long been understood by historical students. American society was divided by the Revolution into three approximately equal parties. The Patriots who furnished the whole initiative and direction in the Revolutionary movement, were made up mainly of merchants like John Hancock, who were interested in resisting the enforcement of the trade laws, together with a few radical Whig aristocrats such as Jefferson and the Lees, and such

agitators and revolutionary agents as Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams. The Patriots were thus chiefly composed of those classes who were most directly affected by the operation of the new British imperial system. The Loyalists, who constituted the party of active opposition to the Revolution, were made up of British officials, honest merchants who were injured by smuggling, most of the large landholders of the middle colonies, some distinguished professional men and scholars, and the clergy of the Anglican church. Between these two extremes and about equal to either of the above parties were those, mainly middle class farmers, who were generally indifferent to the whole controversy and who never took as a class any united action in resisting Great Britain.

As the Patriots were the group who controlled the policy of the colonists from 1765 to 1783, it is most important to examine their dominating purpose as the party of resistance to England, namely, whether their party program aimed primarily at compromise and conciliation or at ultimate independence from Great Britain. Recent scholars have in general come to accept the position much earlier stated by others, but most systematically and comprehensively presented in Mr. Sydney Fisher's volumes. Fisher produces practically incontrovertible evidence that the real core of the program of the radical leaders of the Patriot party from the beginning was independence of British control. In other words, the Declaration of Independence was not the result of a sudden inspiration but was the statement at a well chosen time of the underlying principles that had inspired the Revolutionary leaders from the beginning of the controversy. Of course there is always opposed to this view the ostentatious documents and letters of the Patriot leaders from 1763 to 1776, which if literally accepted at their face value would indicate that the nearer the Patriot leaders approached to July 4, 1776, the more deeply attached they became to Great Britain.

The whole force of the general situation at the time, together with the evidence presented by the activities and attitude of the Patriots themselves, is opposed to the old interpretation which unquestioningly accepted as entirely valid the public statements of the Patriot leaders. In the first place, if the revolutionary leaders had from the first been bent upon independence they would not have dared to take this position openly before 1776, for even at that time there were many who were strongly opposed to the British policy since 1763 and who favored resistance to it,

but who were unwilling to go as far as separation and independence. From 1763 to 1776 it was incomparably easier to win support for the revolutionary party by stressing the alleged British tyranny than it would have been if emphasis had been placed on the desirability of independence. When it was agreed among the revolutionary leaders in the summer of 1776 that the time was ripe for a declaration of separation and independence, they were under the very urgent necessity of maintaining with great emphasis their previous loyalty to Great Britain in order to allay the suspicions and gain the support of those in the anti-British party who were not yet willing to go as far as separation, and who had hoped for a reconciliation with Great Britain. The prospect of French aid was also likely to be forwarded by a declaration of independence from England. Finally, one might ask why, if the aim of the Patriots was not independence, they did not in 1776 accept Great Britain's conciliatory approaches instead of declaring their independence and effectively terminating thereafter any real hope of conciliation and compromise? The fact seems to be that the Patriot leaders not only desired independence but feared greatly that they would be punished if the English campaign for reconciliation succeeded. By declaring independence of England they could destroy the English plan of compromise and conciliation, and incidentally hope to save their own necks if the independence movement succeeded. The Declaration of Independence, then, appears to have been a daring and desperate gamble promoted by the rising shadow of the scaffold.

Though there still may be some room for controversy as to the historical antecedents and development of the Declaration of Independence, there is almost entire unanimity among historical scholars as to the nature of the document.⁵ With all that literary power which few Americans have been able to equal, Jefferson gave an elegant form to the political principles of Locke and a few earlier but less important English political theorists. He himself admitted that he made no pretension to originality of doctrine, but gave to the already extant radical political theory a trenchant and compelling statement which it had entirely lacked in the monotonous and tortuous phraseology of John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*. The Declaration of Independence, then, in its doctrinal aspect was not an original product of colonial thought, but was a most brilliant and effective statement of the

⁵ See Carl Becker's profound study, *The Declaration of Independence*.

Whig political theory then current in England. Whig political theory, as well as the Whig agitation in England, came to the aid of the colonial cause. As an analysis of contemporary politics, the only intelligent manner in which to view the Declaration of Independence is to regard it as the party platform of a radical minority party which was in danger of summary punishment for treason if they were not able to make this platform sufficiently effective so that it would attract enough of a following to make its policy an assured success. Jefferson naturally tried to make out the best possible case to establish the tyranny of the King, since upon the success of his demonstration depended to a large degree the sanction which would be given to the policy of separation and independence by the more moderate members of the anti-British party, whose aid was sorely needed by the radicals.

When one turns to consider the purposes of Great Britain in the American Revolution, nothing could be more remote from the truth than the conventional picture of the British conduct of the war which represents Great Britain as stubbornly determined upon a ruthless and relentless program of repression, to the execution of which she bent all her energies under the direction of the greatest military genius at her command. In reality Great Britain never made any serious attempts to conquer the colonists until the summer of 1778, and up to that time had been constantly in hope of being able to effect a reconciliation. The Howes, who were in command of the British forces in America from 1775 to 1778, were ardent Whigs who had publicly opposed the coercion of America and were consciously appointed so that a program of conciliation might be carried on in conjunction with a show of arms. It was about as though George Sylvester Viereck had been appointed to lead the American expeditionary forces in 1917. General Howe's whole course in his campaigns was ridiculously dilatory and lethargic. He practically converted his military commission into a commercial enterprise and a season of social festivities. At any time between 1776 and 1778 a vigorous and determined policy on his part could have completely crushed the colonial resistance, or could have converted it into a hopeless and desultory guerilla warfare. The Declaration of Independence was in reality a Patriot *coup* to defeat the British program of conciliation which was being conducted by Howe. The investigation of the charges of incompetence made against Howe in 1779, after his recall, was a mere travesty upon a true and effective inquiry, and furnishes an ad-

mirable illustration of the division of English opinion in regard to the American Revolution. All in all, the British campaigns in America from 1775 to 1781 were grotesque examples of incompetence, lack of vigor and purpose, and vacillation, which contrasted most unfavorably with the conduct of the English troops shortly afterwards in the Napoleonic wars as well as with their prowess previously exhibited in the French and Indian War.

Finally, the capture of Cornwallis did not exhaust the British resources and compel an unwilling acquiescence in American independence. There were enough well equipped British soldiers in America, aside from the forces of Cornwallis, to have crushed the combined French and American armies if they had been intelligently and vigorously employed. The defeat of Cornwallis actually did terminate the Revolutionary War, but in an indirect political manner rather than by its direct military effect. It furnished an effective blow to the party of George III and brought into power the Whig friends of America who welcomed the opportunity to grant independence to the United States. The extreme liberality of the terms of the Treaty of 1783, in which the American commissioners got practically everything they asked for, is a good reflection of the contemporary Whig sentiment towards America. Indeed, it may almost be said that the treaty was negotiated by the English and Americans against the French opposition.

V. SOME CONCLUSIONS

If the foregoing analysis has been correct, the following conclusions seem justified:

(1) The settlers of the American colonies were chiefly the radical and progressive element in the mother country and thus brought the spirit of dissent into the new world.

(2) This original radicalism was intensified by the experience of subjugating a new environment, and this process not only separated the colonists more and more psychologically and culturally from the normal type in the British Isles, but also tended to unify the colonists and to create the beginnings of a national self-consciousness.

(3) This process of natural separation from Great Britain, through the operation of fundamental psychological forces, was intensified by the political and economic aspects of Great Britain's colonial system from 1650 to 1763, which invited and forwarded

the growth of a general disregard of British authority and a corresponding development of colonial self-confidence and independence.

(4) When such forces had been operating for a century and had made it practically impossible for Great Britain to assume a real and systematic administrative control over the American colonies, it so happened that circumstances forced her into a belated attempt to do so or to relinquish the hard-won fruits of three-quarters of a century of conflict for colonial dominion.

(5) Any remote possibility which might have existed that this delicate problem could be adjusted in a peaceful manner, was definitely removed when it became certain that England's policy was to be executed by aristocratic Tories and that the American attitude was to be directed by radical Patriots—the two parties which were least able to understand and appreciate the position of the other.

(6) The inevitable conflict which broke out in 1775 was as much a civil war within both Great Britain and the American colonies as it was a war of secession on the part of the American colonies.

(7) The Patriot leaders of the American Revolutionary party—the most advanced product of the historical antecedents of the previous century—were dominated from the beginning by a desire to separate from Great Britain and to establish a separate nation. As a consequence, Great Britain's conciliatory policy during the first three years of the war was ineffective and availed nothing.

(8) Whatever opinion one may hold as to whether the American Revolution was a fortunate or unfortunate affair for America, no intelligent student of the period can regard it as other than the product of fundamental historical conditions which were beyond the power of any single nation to control and for which no nation or group of statesmen can be held primarily responsible.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Adams, J. T., *Revolutionary New England*; Altschul, C., *The American Revolution in Our School Textbooks*; Alvord, C. A., *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics*; Andrews, C. M., *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution*; Becker, Carl, *The Beginnings of the American People*; *The Eve of the Revolution*; *The Declaration of Independence*; Beer, G. L., *The Commercial Policy of England towards the American Colonies*; Fisher, S. G., *The Struggle for American Independence*; Greene, E. B., *The Provincial Governor*;

McIlwain, C. M., *The American Revolution*; Morison, S. M., *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution*; Osgood, H. L., *The English Colonies in the Eighteenth Century*; Schlesinger, A. M., *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*; Van Tyne, C. H., *The American Revolution; The Causes of the War of Independence*.

CHAPTER X

THE FATHERS AT WORK, WORSHIP AND PLAY

In our Constitutional Convention were assembled the greatest body of men, from the standpoint of physical vigor, mental acumen and moral courage, that ever met together for human achievement. . . . The writing and adoption of our Constitution was unquestionably the greatest and most important human achievement since the Creation, and as an event it ranks in history second only to the Birth of Christ. . . . The proudest heritage of this country is that all through its history there has run, like a golden thread, a deeply religious strain. It would seem that our great leaders in the past have sensed the sublime truth which Dr. Frank W. Gunsaulus phrased so strikingly when he said: "Statesmanship is seeing where almighty God is going and then getting things out of his way."

Harry F. Atwood, in his immortal work, entitled, *Keep God in American History*.

I. THE PATRISTIC INSPIRATION

THE above quotation is representative of the views of right-thinking men concerning the unique piety, conservatism, solemnity and cautiousness of the generation which brought into existence our nation. The writings of the Fathers are earnestly commended to the youth of the land in order that they may obtain proper protection against subversive and radical doctrines, and may be adequately grounded in the fundamental principles of safety, sanity, piety and loyalty.

In the few pages which follow we shall briefly examine in a candid fashion some views actually entertained by these same Fathers. On the basis of such realism we may discover valid grounds for reconsidering the advisability of exposing the impressionable youth of the land to the views entertained by the most heroic figures of the Patristic age. We may, indeed, find here doctrines and acts thoroughly subversive of everything now solemnly upheld by the Klan, Rotary clubs, the League for Edu-

cation in the Constitution, and all other organizations of right-thinking men. It may be found necessary carefully to guard our children against such sources of incendiary opinion.

II. THE PATRISTIC ENTHUSIASM FOR REVOLUTION

The revolutionary tradition and technique, once so respectable and potent in this country, have fallen into both disrepute and disuse. We have only recently witnessed a decision of the august Supreme Court in which it upheld the conviction of Socialist Gitlow for alleged incitement of his fellow-citizens to violent action in the effort to overthrow the present form of government and society in America. Even the advocacy of revolution has thus become a felony in this country. Let us now examine the views of some of the more distinguished Fathers with respect to this subject of revolution and the advocacy of violent and extra-legal methods of altering the existing form of political organization.

Samuel Adams, in the following excerpt, takes vigorous exception to the doctrine of moderation, and pours contempt upon those who fear to be charged with being revolutionists and radicals. His philosophy scarcely accords with our present-day exhortation to "keep cool with Coolidge":¹

If the liberties of America are ever compleatly ruined, of which in my opinion there is now the utmost danger, it will in all probability be the consequence of a mistaken notion of prudence, which leads men to acquiesce in measures of the most destructive tendency for the sake of present ease. When designs are formed to raze the very foundation of a free government, those few who are to erect their grandeur and fortunes upon the general ruin, will employ every art to sooth the devoted people into a state of indolence, inattention and security, which is forever the fore-runner of slavery—They are alarmed at nothing so much, as attempts to awaken the people to *jealousy* and *watchfulness*; and it has been an old game played over and over again, to hold up the men who would rouse their fellow citizens and countrymen to a sense of their *real* danger, and spirit them to the most zealous activity in the use of all proper means for the preservation of the public liberty, as "pretended patriots," "*intemperate politicians*," *rash, hot-headed men*, Incendiaries, wretched *desperadoes*, who, as was said of the best of men, would

¹ *The Writings of Samuel Adams* (Edited by Cushing), Vol. II, pp. 287-8.

turn the world upside down, or have done it already—But he must have a small share of *fortitude* indeed, who is put out of countenance by hard speeches without sense and meaning, or affrighted from the path of duty by the rude language of Billingsgate—For my own part, I smile contemptuously at such unmanly efforts; I would be glad to hear the *reasoning* of *Chronus*, if he had a capacity for it; but I disregard his *railing* as I would the barking of a “Cur dog.”

Jefferson's views on the desirability of frequent and thorough-going revolutions are well known to every competent student of American history. According to Jefferson the tree of liberty can only thrive when watered by the blood of tyrants. A revolution is to the political weather what a thunder storm is in relation to our normal meteorological circumstances. There should be a revolution at least once in every nineteen and a half years, so that no one generation can bind its successors to what may prove a very unwise body of political theory and practice. The following citations will adequately illustrate Jefferson's fitness to act as an instructor of our tender-minded youth in the principles of sound conservatism: ²

I hold that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical. Unsuccessful rebellions indeed generally establish the encroachments on the rights of the people which have produced them. An observation of this truth should render honest republican governors so mild in their punishment of rebellions as not to discourage them too much. It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government.

The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions, that I wish it to be always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong but better so than not to be exercised at all. I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the atmosphere.

God forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion. The people cannot be all, and always, informed. The part which is wrong will be discontented in proportion to the importance of the facts they misconceive. If they remain quiet under such misconceptions, it is a lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty. . . .

What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned from time to time that the people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The tree of liberty must be refreshed from

² *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Edited by Ford), Vol. IV, pp. 362, 370, 467, 479.

time to time with the blood of tyrants. It is its natural manure.

The late rebellion in Massachusetts has given more alarm than I think it should have done. Calculate that one rebellion in thirteen states in the course of eleven years is but one for each state in a century and a half. No country should be so long without one.

Jefferson's "sympathy" with the views of the majority of the Supreme Court in the *Gitlow* decision is apparent from the following paragraph:³

To suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all liberty because he being, of course, judge of that tendency, will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square with or differ from his own. It is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.

How well the Jeffersonian philosophy agrees with that of the Tennessee Legislature, Mr. Bryan, Judge Raulston and others in the *Scopes* trial, as well as with the heresy-baiting of the present time, is clear from what follows:⁴

I am for freedom of religion against all manœuvres to bring about a legal ascendancy of one sect over another; for freedom of the press, and against all violations of the Constitution to silence by force and not by reason the complaints or criticisms, just or unjust, of our citizens against the conduct of their agents.

And I am for encouraging the progress of science in all its branches; and not for raising a hue and cry against the sacred name of philosophy; for awing the human mind by stories of rawhead and bloody-bones to a distrust of its own vision and to repose implicitly on that of others; to go backward instead of forward to look for improvement; to believe that government, religion, morality and every other science were in the highest perfection in ages of darkest ignorance; and that nothing can ever be devised more perfect than was established by our forefathers.

Our right-thinking friends might object that Samuel Adams and Thomas Jefferson were numbered among the extreme radicals of

³ Cited in J. L. Bennett, *The Essential American Tradition*, p. 188.

⁴ In Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 190-91.

the Revolutionary period, and that it is unfair to cite them as representatives of Patristic opinion on revolution and violence. This is by no means true, as Adams and Jefferson were learned philosophers who formulated upon European precedents the revolutionary political philosophy of the late Colonial period. They are certainly among the most notable of the leaders who made possible our movement for independence. Moreover, we discover equally subversive views in the writings of the leaders of the Conservative group in the period of the formation of our nation, namely, Alexander Hamilton and John Adams. John Adams, who was believed by Jefferson to be so reactionary as to desire to establish a monarchy in this country, contended ten years after the Declaration of Independence that the execution of a successful revolution was the best possible test of the good sense and political capacity of the citizens of any state; and that revolutionary principles are the corner-stone of the American republic: ⁵

It is an observation of one of the profoundest inquirers into human affairs, that a revolution of government successfully conducted and completed is the strongest proof that can be given by a people of their virtue and good sense. An enterprise of so much difficulty can never be planned and carried out without abilities; and a people without principle cannot have confidence enough in each other. . . .

These are what are called revolutionary principles. They are the principles of Aristotle and Plato, of Livy and Cicero, and Sidney, Harrington, and Locke; the principles of nature and eternal reason; the principles on which the whole government over us now stands. It is therefore astonishing, if anything can be so, that writers, who call themselves friends of government, should in this age and country be so inconsistent with themselves, so indiscreet, so immodest, as to insinuate a doubt concerning them.

Equally decisive are the views of Alexander Hamilton, the other great Conservative leader at the outset of our national existence. He brands as traitors those who are not willing to resort to violent methods when circumstances demand such action: ⁶

When the political salvation of any community is depending, it is incumbent upon those who are set up as its guardians to embrace

⁵ *The Works of John Adams* (Edited by C. F. Adams), Vol. III, pp. 399-400; Vol. IV, p. 15.

⁶ *The Works of Alexander Hamilton* (Edited by Lodge), Vol. I, p. 8.

such measures as have justice, vigor, and a probability of success to recommend. If, instead of this, they take those methods which are in themselves feeble and little likely to succeed, and may, through a defect in vigor, involve the community in a still greater danger, they may be justly considered its betrayers. It is not enough, in times of imminent peril, to use only possible means of preservation. Justice and sound policy dictate the use of probable means.

He also contends, somewhat in the spirit of Seward later, that there are some principles and necessities beyond the realm of law, which demand extra-legal and perhaps violent measures. Mr. Gitlow may here discover spiritual communion if not the road to freedom:⁷

You, sir, triumph in the supposed *illegality* of this body: but granting your supposition were true, it would be a matter of no real importance. When the first principles of civil society are violated; and the rights of a whole people are invaded, the common forms of municipal law are not to be regarded. Men may then betake themselves to the law of nature; and, if they but conform their actions to that standard, all cavils against them betray either ignorance or dishonesty. There are some events in society, to which human laws cannot extend, but when applied to them, lose all their force and efficacy. In short, when human laws contradict or discountenance the means which are necessary to preserve the essential rights of any society, they defeat the proper end of all laws, and so become null and void.

Finally, Hamilton attacks head on the typical legalistic position that human rights and social principles are to be discovered primarily in charters, constitutions, laws and legal decisions. This passage cries out for exegesis from James M. Beck:⁸

It is true, that New York has no charter. But if it could support its claim to liberty in no other way, it might, with justice, plead the common principles of colonization: for it would be unreasonable to exclude one colony from the enjoyment of the most important privileges of the rest. There is no need, however, of this plea. The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 134-5.

⁸ Ibid., p. 113.

III. THE FATHERS AS FORE-RUNNERS OF KARL MARX

From the point of view of our Hundred Percent right-thinkers one of the most damnable doctrines ever seriously formulated and disseminated is the hideous suggestion that there is or ever has been such a thing as economic considerations in the determination of political life and policies. When, a little over a decade ago, Professor Charles Austin Beard made extensive researches in the documents in the Treasury Department and elsewhere to demonstrate that George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Fisher Ames and John Marshall told the truth when they asserted that the struggles between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the ratification of the Constitution were essentially the strife of the propertied and creditor versus the propertyless and debtor classes, this distinguished historian was set upon by a storm of abuse comparable to that which usually attaches to treason or some other major crime against the public honor and safety. Even Mr. William Howard Taft launched an anathema against this dissolute work, and Professor Beard was subjected to an inquisition at the hands of the Columbia University Trustees. Professor E. D. Adams hastened to rebuke Dr. Beard in a book designed to demonstrate the sovereignty of transcendental ideals in our national development. American political life is conventionally represented as something wholly spiritual and metaphysical, totally detached from material considerations, though occasional episodes, like the *crédit mobilier* incident, the pension scandals, the Spanish-American War "beef," the Alaska coal lands steal, war profiteering, the recent oil revelations, and the Veteran's Bureau wastes crop up from time to time, indicating slight deviations from pure spirituality on the part of our estimable and devoted public servants. The road seems at times not to have been perfectly cleared for the serene travels of "Almighty God" in our political life.

We shall find that the Fathers took no stock in this pious and respectable doctrine of pure spiritual essence in politics but contended from the beginning that the primary function of government consisted in the protection of the superior classes in their economic advantages. They were in essential agreement with that chief source of Colonial political inspiration, John Locke, who wrote :⁹

⁹ F. W. Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, p. 403.

The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.

One of the most lucid and thorough statements of the economic basis of political parties and programs was set forth by John Adams, who once remarked that the first thing a man thinks of is his dinner, and the second his girl:¹⁰

Mr. Hillhouse says, "the United States do not possess the materials for forming an aristocracy." But we do possess one material which actually constitutes an aristocracy that governs the nation. That material is wealth. Talents, birth, virtues, services, sacrifices are of little consideration with us. The greatest talents, the highest virtues, the most important services are thrown aside as useless, unless they are supported by riches or parties, and the object of both parties is chiefly wealth. When the rich observe a young man and see he has talents to serve their party, they court and employ him; but if he deviates from their line, let him have a care. He will soon be discarded. In the Roman history we see a constant struggle between the rich and the poor, from Romulus to Caesar. The great division was not so much between patricians and plebeians, as between debtor and creditor. Speculation and usury kept the state in perpetual broils. The patricians usurped the lands and the plebeians demanded agrarian laws. The patricians lent money at exorbitant interest, and the plebeians were sometimes unable and always unwilling to pay it. These were the causes of dividing the people into two parties, as distinct and jealous, and almost as hostile to each other, as two nations. Let Mr. Hillhouse say, whether we have not two parties in this country springing from the same sources? Whether a spirit for speculation in land has not always existed in this country, from the days of William Penn, and even long before? Whether this spirit has not become a rage from Georgia to New Hampshire within the last thirty years? Whether foundations have not been laid for immense fortunes in a few families, for their posterity? Whether the variations of a fluctuating medium and an unsteady public faith have not raised vast fortunes in personal property, in banks, in commerce, in roads, bridges etc.? Whether there are not distinctions arising from corporations and societies of all kinds, even those of religion, science, and literature, and whether the professions of law, physic, and divinity are not distinctions? Whether all these are not materials for forming an aristocracy? Whether they do not in fact constitute an aristocracy that governs the country?

¹⁰ *Works of John Adams*, Vol. VI, pp. 530-31.

On the other side, the common people, by which appellation I designate the farmers, tradesmen, and laborers, many of the smaller merchants and shopkeepers, and even the unfortunate and necessitous who are obliged to fly into the wilderness for subsistence, and all the debtors cannot see these inequalities without grief, and jealousy and resentment. A farmer or a tradesman, who cannot by his utmost industry and frugality, in a life of twenty years, do more than support a moderate family and lay up four or five thousand dollars, must think it very hard when he sees these vast fortunes made per saltum, these mushrooms growing up in a night; and they throw themselves naturally into the arms of a party whose professed object is to oppose the other party.

Two such parties, therefore, always will exist, as they always have existed, in all nations, especially in such as have property, and most of all in commercial countries. Each of these parties must be represented in the legislature and the two must be checks on each other. But, without a mediator between them, they will oppose each other in all things, and go to war until one subjugates the other. The executive authority is the only mediator that can maintain peace between them.

Thomas Jefferson, while the great political rival of John Adams, stood squarely with him upon the matter of the economic determination of political and social institutions. Jefferson was particularly insistent that the continuance of the American system of government was contingent upon the persistence of the domination of agriculturists in our society:¹¹

I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they are chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become as corrupt as in Europe. . . .

Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those, who not looking up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for their subsistence, depend for it on casualties and caprice of customers. Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition. This, the natural progress and consequence of the arts, has sometimes perhaps been retarded by accidental circumstances; but, generally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any state to

¹¹ *Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. III, pp. 268-9, Vol. IV, 479-83.

that of its husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption. While we have land to labour then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work-bench, or twirling a distaff. Carpenters, masons, smiths, are wanting in husbandry: but, for the general operations of manufacture, let our work-shops remain in Europe.

Hamilton was not less candid in his acceptance of the thesis of the "economic basis of politics":¹²

Sir, if the people have it in their option, to elect their most meritorious men, is this to be considered as an objection? Shall the Constitution oppose their wishes, and abridge their most invaluable privilege? While property continues to be pretty equally divided, and a considerable share of information pervades the community, the tendency of the people's suffrages, will be to elevate merit even from obscurity—as riches increase and accumulate in a few hands;—as luxury prevails in society, virtue will be in a greater degree considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and the tendency of things will be to depart from the republican standard. This is the real disposition of human nature: it is what neither the honorable member nor myself can correct—it is a common misfortune, that awaits our State Constitution, as well as all others. . . .

All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any advantage by the change, they therefore will ever maintain good government.

Unquestionably the most famous and lucid statement of the economic basis of political life and activity is that contained in Number Ten of the *Federalist*, written by James Madison:

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. . . .

¹² Cited by Bennett, op. cit., pp. 278-9; cf. *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 73-4, 88-90.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. . . .

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which our party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

Finally, we may cite the view of Noah Webster that political power and domination depend entirely upon the possession of economic power:¹³

In what then does real power consist? The answer is short and plain—in property. Could we want any proofs of this, which are not exhibited in this country, the uniform testimony of history will furnish us with multitudes. . . . Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that *property* is the basis of *power*; and this, being established as a cardinal point, directs us to the means of preserving our freedom. Make laws, irrevocable laws in every state, destroying and barring entailments; leave real estates to revolve from hand to hand, as time and accident may direct; and no family influence can be acquired and established for a series of generations—no man can obtain dominion over a large territory—the laborious and saving, who are generally the best citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it is, in the body of the people. *A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed property is the whole basis of national freedom.* The system of the great Montesquieu will ever be erroneous, till the words *property or lands in fee simple* are substituted for virtue, throughout his *Spirit of Laws*.

IV. THE FATHERS INSPIRE PROFESSOR BEARD

Not only were the fathers convinced of the basic importance of economic considerations in government; still more scandalous and incredible is the fact that even the most distinguished of them were perfectly frank in admitting that economic considerations were fundamental in initiating the movement for the Federal Constitution of 1787, in determining the nature of the document, and in securing its ratification. They appear to have been convinced that the path of the Almighty lay in the direction of the creditor interests. Professor Beard has gathered for us the following representative statements from leading statesmen of the time testifying to this fact. Washington held that the provisions for the payment of creditors constituted the only conspicuous advance over the Articles of Confederation:¹⁴

¹³ *Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States* (edited by P. L. Ford), pp. 57-9; cf. *Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster*, Vol. I, pp. 214-15.

¹⁴ C. A. Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, p. 4.

I had indulged the expectation that the New Government would enable those entrusted with its administration to do justice to the public creditors and retrieve the National character. But if no means are to be employed but requisitions, that expectation will be in vain and we may well recur to the old Confederation.

Alexander Hamilton thus describes the importance of creditors and the propertied classes in supporting the movement for the Constitution: ¹⁵

The public creditors, who consisted of various descriptions of men, a large proportion of them very meritorious and very influential, had had a considerable agency in promoting the adoption of the new Constitution, for this peculiar reason, among the many weighty reasons which were common to them as citizens and proprietors, that it exhibited the prospect of a government able to do justice to their claims. Their disappointment and disgust quickened by the sensibility of private interest, could not but have been extreme (if the debt had not been properly funded). There was also another class of men, and a very weighty one, who had had great share in the establishment of the Constitution, who, though not personally interested in the debt, considered maxims of public credit as of the essence of good government, *as intimately connected by the analogy and sympathy of principles with the security of property in general*, and as forming an inseparable portion of the great system of political order. These men, from sentiment, would have regarded their labors in supporting the Constitution as in a great measure lost; they would have seen the disappointment of their hopes in the unwillingness of the government to do what they esteemed justice, and to pursue what they called an honorable policy; and they would have regarded this failure as an augury of the continuance of the fatal system which had for some time prostrated the national honor, interest, and happiness. The disaffection of a part of these classes of men might have carried a considerable reinforcement to the enemies of the government.

Fisher Ames, one of the most distinguished of the Federalist leaders, contends that economic advantages were the most important influence in obtaining support for the new Constitution: ¹⁶

I conceive, sir, that the present Constitution was dictated by commercial necessity more than any other cause. The want of an effi-

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

cient government to secure the manufacturing interests and to advance our commerce, was long seen by men of judgment and pointed out by patriots solicitous to promote our general welfare.

John Marshall, revered possibly beyond all other Fathers by the metaphysically and legally-minded historians and publicists, thus describes the economic basis of the two great parties which arrayed themselves for and against the Constitution in the struggles following 1785:¹⁷

At length two great parties were formed in every state which were distinctly marked and which pursued distinct objects with systematic arrangement. The one struggled with unabated zeal for the exact observance of public and private engagements. By those belonging to it, the faith of a nation or of a private man was deemed a sacred pledge, the violation of which was equally forbidden by the principles of moral justice and of sound policy. The distresses of individuals were, they thought, to be alleviated only by industry and frugality, not by a relaxation of the laws or by a sacrifice of the rights of others. They were consequently the uniform friends of a regular administration of justice, and of a vigorous course of taxation which would enable the state to comply with its engagements. By a natural association of ideas, they were also, with very few exceptions, in favor of enlarging the powers of the federal government. . . .

The other party marked out for themselves a more indulgent course. Viewing with extreme tenderness the case of the debtor, their efforts were unceasingly directed to his relief. To exact a faithful compliance with contracts was, in their opinion, a harsh measure which the people would not bear. They were uniformly in favor of relaxing the administration of justice, of affording facilities for the payment of debts, or of suspending their collection, and of remitting taxes. The same course of opinion led them to resist every attempt to transfer from their own hands into those of congress powers which by others were deemed essential to the preservation of the union. In many of these states, the party last mentioned constituted a decided majority of the people, and in all of them it was very powerful. The emission of paper money, the delay of legal proceedings, and the suspension of the collection of taxes were the fruits of their rule wherever they were completely predominant. . . . Throughout the union, a contest between these parties was periodically revived; and the public mind was perpetually agitated with

¹⁷ C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, pp. 297-9.

hopes and fears on subjects which essentially affected the fortunes of a considerable proportion of society.

We have indicated above the views of John Adams as to the economic basis of political parties in general. Charles Francis Adams thus describes the views of his grandfather with respect to the party alignments in the Constitutional Convention and after :¹⁸

The Constitutional Convention itself was the work of commercial people in the seaport towns, of the planters of the slave-holding states, of the officers of the revolutionary army, and the property holders everywhere. . . . That among the opponents of the Constitution are to be ranked a great majority of those who had most strenuously fought the battle of independence of Great Britain is certain. . . . Among the federalists, it is true, were to be found a large body of the patriots of the Revolution, almost all the general officers who survived the war, and a great number of the substantial citizens along the line of the seaboard towns and populous regions, all of whom had heartily sympathized in the policy of resistance. But these could never have succeeded in effecting the establishment of the Constitution, had they not received the active and steady co-operation of all that was left in America of attachment to the mother country, as well as of the moneyed interest, which ever points to strong government as surely as the needle to the pole.

That these views concerning the economic basis of the Constitution and of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist parties are not the product of the bias of Professor Beard, or statements by the Fathers in their dotage or in moments of intoxication may be seen by citing the opinion of two men as far removed in their political philosophy as Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. Wilson, probably the most metaphysical, spiritual and non-economic historian who has ever written on the period, says of the new government created by the Constitution :¹⁹

The government had been originated and organized upon the initiative and primarily in the interest of the mercantile and wealthy classes. Originally conceived as an effort to accommodate commercial disputes between the states, it had been urged to adoption by a minority, under the concerted leadership of able men representing a ruling class.

¹⁸ *Works of John Adams*, Vol. I, p. 441.

¹⁹ *Division and Reunion*, p. 12.

The late Theodore's comment is even more forceful: ²⁰—

This acquiescence in wrong-doing as the necessary means of preventing popular action is not a new position. It was the position of many upright and well-meaning Tories who antagonized the Declaration of Independence and the movement which made us a nation. It was the position of a portion of the very useful Federalist party, which at the close of the eighteenth century insisted upon the vital need of national union and governmental efficiency, but which was exceedingly anxious to devise methods for making believe to give the people full power while really putting them under the control of a propertied political oligarchy.

Of course, there is nothing dishonorable in the fact that the Constitution was dictated by economic factors. We are not endeavoring to establish evil motives or wicked acts. What is evident from the above is that the Constitution had its basis in something far different from the abstract metaphysical communion with God, which is represented by the conventional and respectable historians as having been the atmosphere which pervaded the labors of the "Fathers" over the Constitution and its ratification. Professor Farrand has well phrased these essential facts: ²¹—

A serious criticism has often been made and more effectively in recent years than at the time when the question of adoption was before the country, to the effect that the Constitution was framed by men who were interested in protecting property and especially in maintaining the value of government securities. This is undoubtedly true; the error lies in the motives that are usually ascribed. The Constitution was framed and its adoption secured by the upper, ruling class, whose members were in general men of property and wealth and so were the holders of government securities. Self-protection and their own interests undoubtedly influenced them but the responsibility lay upon them to act as leaders, and it cannot be too strongly emphasized that, with the opportunities existing in the United States where practically every man could become a land-owner, the people in general wished to have property rights protected.

V. THE FATHERS AS GOD'S STEWARDS

Not only were the Fathers convinced of the importance of economic factors in politics, in general, and in the Constitution

²⁰ *The Progressive Party*, p. 12.

²¹ *The Development of the United States*, p. 75.

and early national party history, in particular; they were also in many cases economically minded to a marked degree. George Washington, for example, though a relatively poor boy by birth died one of the richest men in North America. As Prussing and others have shown he was probably greater as a business man and engineer than as a general or statesman. There is nothing discreditable to be found in this, but it does present Washington in quite a different light from that of the detached transcendental Jove gazing blankly into the empyrean, as he is usually depicted in the paintings which are reproduced in our school texts. Equal devotion to economic endeavor, and similar evidence of commercial sagacity can be discovered in the lives of the shrewd and distinguished lawyers and merchants who were prominent in the Constitutional Convention and the early history of the Federalist party.

But there were other forms of economic activity prevalent in this age which were scarcely as creditable as Washington's agricultural achievements, and his engineering enterprises on the Potomac. The distinguished economist, the late David A. Wells, thus describes the economic activities and interests of John Hancock and others among the Fathers of the Revolution:²²

Nine-tenths of their merchants were smugglers. One quarter of all the signers of the Declaration of Independence were bred to commerce, the command of ships, and the contraband trade. Hancock, Trumbull (Brother Jonathan), and Hamilton were all known to be cognizant of contraband transactions, and approved of them. Hancock was the prince of contraband traders, and, with John Adams as his counsel, was appointed for trial before the admiralty court of Boston, at the exact hour of the shedding of blood at Lexington, in a suit for \$500,000 penalties alleged to have been incurred by him as a smuggler.

It is of course a well-known fact that the ancestors of those New Englanders who, a half-century later, were violently fighting against Negro slavery in the south had built up their fortunes in the rum and slave trade with the West Indies prior to 1820.

Not only did the Constitution promote the interests of creditors; it also furnished in the first few months of its operation the occasion for one of the most sordid and disreputable examples of

²² Article "American Merchant Marine" in Lalor's *Encyclopedia of Political and Social Science*.

dishonest speculation in the history of the country. The certificates of indebtedness had little prospect of redemption unless this was provided for in the policies of a new and strong central government. Hence they could be bought for a very small percentage of their face value. The absence of railroads and telegraphs prevented a knowledge of the new redemption policy provided for by Hamilton from spreading rapidly over the country. Speculators quickly took advantage of this ignorance on the part of holders of these certificates in remote parts of the country. They hastened to buy them up for a few cents on the dollar from those who had originally loaned money to the government, and then presented them for payment at par. Jefferson thus describes this atrocious procedure, though he is doubtless wrong in ascribing any personal guilt or profit to Hamilton: ²³

After the expedient of paper money had exhausted itself, certificates of debt were given to the individual creditors, with assurance of payment, as soon as the United States should be able. But the distress of these people often obliged them to part with these for the half, the fifth, or even a tenth of their value; and the speculators had made a trade of cozening them from the holders by the most fraudulent practices, and persuasions that they would never be paid. In the bill for funding and paying these, Hamilton made no difference between the original holders and the fraudulent purchasers of this paper. Great and just repugnance arose at putting these two classes of creditors on the same footing, and great exertions were used to pay to the former their full value, and to the latter the price only which had been paid with interest. But this would have prevented the game which was to be played, and for which the minds of the greedy members were already tutored and prepared. When a trial of strength on these several efforts had indicated the form in which the bill would finally pass, this being known within doors sooner than without, and especially than to those who were in distant parts of the Union, the base scramble began. Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift-sailing pilot boats by sea, were flying in all directions. Active partners and agents were associated and employed in every state, town, and country neighborhood and this paper was bought up at 5/ and even as low as 2/ in the pound, before the holder knew that Congress had already provided for its redemption at par. Immense sums were thus filched from the poor and ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those who had been poor enough before. Men thus enriched by the dexterity of a leader, would follow, of

²³ *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 160-61.

course, the chief who was thus leading them to fortune, and become the zealous instruments of all his enterprises.

After the Revolutionary War land speculation, in many cases of a most sordid and dubious type, became as prevalent as smuggling had been in the period just before the Revolution. Good old Robert Morris took part in such enterprises, and spent a couple of years in prison because of the dishonesty of a defaulting partner. Even the famous Northwest Ordinance, regarded by most historians as next to the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution the most notable and important of our public documents, was inseparably involved in a scheme of colossal land graft and speculation and a corruption of Congress as notorious as the later *crédit mobilier* scandal connected with the building of the Union Pacific railroad. Professor Farrand thus describes the alliance between legislation and graft involved in this famous governmental plan:²⁴

In the summer of 1787 representatives of the Ohio Company, composed largely of New England Revolutionary veterans, came to Congress and proposed to purchase a million acres of Western land. In view of the size of the purchase, the price was reduced to two thirds of a dollar an acre. Part of this, at least, could be paid in Federal certificates of indebtedness, which were worth about twelve cents on the dollar, so that the actual price was reduced to eight or nine cents an acre. It seems to have been a part of the bargain that an ordinance of government satisfactory to the company should be adopted. Before the bargain could be completed the land sale was enlarged so as to grant a share in it to certain influential financial interests in New York, where Congress was sitting, and certain concessions were made to members of Congress. The additional land sale was for five million acres, on practically the same terms. Such was the sordid origin of the Ordinance of 1787, which "has been perhaps the most notable instance of legislation that was ever enacted by the representatives of the American people."

Paralleling and following close upon the period of land speculation came the development of the Industrial Revolution in New England, which brought the factory system and the origins of the cotton textile industry to this country. It is in connection with the rise of this "cotton aristocracy" that we hear for the first

²⁴ Op. cit., p. 63.

time of the Abbots, the Lawrences, the Lowells and the Cabots whose descendants have since figured in American statesmanship, education and letters.

VI. CONTEMPORARY APPRECIATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

The right-thinkers of our generation are accustomed to appreciations of the Federal Constitution such as the following intoned by Henry D. Estabrook, Esquire, before the Missouri Bar Association at Kansas City on September 26th, 1913: ²⁵

And so, on this great continent, which God had kept hidden in a little world—here, with a new heaven and a new earth, where former things had passed away, the people of many nations, of various needs and creeds, but united in heart and soul and mind for the single purpose, builded an altar to Liberty, the first ever built, or that ever could be built, and called it the Constitution of the United States. . . .

O marvelous Constitution! Magic parchment, transforming word, maker, monitor, guardian of mankind! Thou hast gathered to thy impartial bosom the peoples of the earth, Columbia, and called them equal. Thou hast conferred upon them imperial sovereignty, revoking all titles but that of man. Native and exotic, rich and poor, good and bad, old and young, the lazy and the industrious, those who love and those who hate, the mean and lowly, the high and mighty, the wise and the foolish, the prudent and the imprudent, the cautious and the hasty, the honest and the dishonest, those who pray and those who curse—these are "We, the people of the United States"—these are God's children—these are thy rulers, O Columbia. Into our hands thou hast committed the destinies of the human race, even to the omega of thine own destruction. And all thou requirest of us before we o'erstep boundaries blazed for guidance is what is required of us at every railroad crossing in the country: "Stop. Look. Listen." Stop and think. Look before and after and to the right and left. Listen to the voice of reason and to the small, still voice of conscience. . . .

Hundred Percenters, as appreciative of the Constitution as Mr. Estabrook and as ignorant as he of its actual history and nature, often rashly advise the younger generation to read widely in the literature of the period of the framing and ratification of the Constitution in order that they may have their

²⁵ Cited by H. F. Atwood, *Back to the Republic*, pp. 66-7.

dithyrambic ecstasy on the subject still further inflated. They assume that the generation which made the Constitution must of necessity have been even more appreciative of its merits than Mr. Estabrook or James M. Beck. As an actual matter of fact we find that even the warm supporters of the Constitution, like Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, Jay and Madison, indulged in no exuberant language about the unique and superior nature of the Constitution. One will seek in vain in books like the *Federalist* for any such eulogistic estimate as that of Gladstone when he said that the Constitution of the United States was "the greatest piece of work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." The friends of the Constitution were the first to recognize its defects and to describe it as the product of a series of irritating and obstructive compromises. Their view was simply that the Constitution provided the best framework of government which it was possible to achieve under the circumstances. They believed that it would eliminate many of the more flagrant evils which existed under the Articles of Confederation, and they hoped that with subsequent experience, and opportunities for amendment, the document could be notably improved. The following estimate of Hamilton is representative of the views of the ardent supporters of the new Constitution: ²⁶

It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation?

That Hamilton had no notion that God had personally participated in making the Constitution or had revealed any of its clauses is apparent from his statement in Number Seventy-eight of the *Federalist* that "the people have the right to alter or abolish the es-

²⁶ *Works*, Vol. XI, p. 304.

tablished Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness."

The attitude of those friendly to the Constitution, but not active participants in its framing or ratification, is admirably illustrated by the following opinion of Thomas Jefferson: ²⁷

Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the Ark of the Covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human and suppose that what they did was beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it and labored with it; it deserved well of its country. It was very much like the present, but without the experience of the present, and forty years' experience in government is worth a century of book reading; and they would say this were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with, because when once known we accommodate ourselves to them and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I also know that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened; as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep pace with the times. . . . Let us provide for its (the Constitution's) revision at stated times. (Jefferson considered that this interval should be about nineteen years.) If this avenue be shut off to the call of sufferance, it will make itself heard through the voice of force and we shall go on, as other nations are doing, in the endless circle of oppression, rebellion, reformation, oppression, rebellion, and reformation again, and so on forever.

When we come to the actual opponents of the new Constitution we discover that they entertained towards it fears of resulting oppression, injustice, extortion, and corruption such as have rarely been aroused by any proposed political change in the history of mankind. There runs through all of this literature of opposition what seemed to the writers the well grounded belief that if the Constitution should be ratified the United States would lose all the victories for liberty and freedom which had been won by the Revolution, and the country would sink back into a type of political and economic despotism worse than any which had been threatened by the British policies following 1760. The most not-

²⁷ *Works*, Vol. X, pp. 42-4.

able of the attacks upon the Constitution was that contained in the famous letters of "Centinel," probably Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania. The "Centinel Letters" occupy the same place in Anti-Federalist literature that the *Federalist* possesses in the material favoring the ratification of the Constitution. The following are some of the more characteristic criticisms of the Constitution and its authors which are presented by "Centinel":²⁸

The wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow creatures, have availed themselves very successfully of this favorable disposition; for the people thus unsettled in their sentiments, have been prepared to accede to any extreme of government. All the distresses and difficulties they experience, proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of government; and in the other event, immediate ruin and annihilation as a nation. These characters flatter themselves that they have lulled all distrust and jealousy of their new plan, by gaining the concurrence of the two men in whom America has the highest confidence, and now triumphantly exult in the completion of their long meditated schemes of power and aggrandizement. I would be very far from insinuating that the two illustrious personages alluded to, have not the welfare of their country at heart; but that the unsuspecting goodness and zeal of the one (Washington) has been imposed on, in a subject of which he must be necessarily inexperienced, from his other arduous engagements; and that the weakness and indecision attendant on old age, has been practiced on in the other (Franklin) . . .

For the sake of my dear country, for the honor of human nature, I hope and am persuaded that the good sense of the people will enable them to rise superior to the most formidable conspiracy against the liberties of a free and enlightened nation, that the world has ever witnessed. How glorious would be the triumph! How it would immortalize the present generation in the annals of freedom! . . .

The people, who exhibited so lately a spectacle that commanded the admiration, and drew the plaudits of the most distant nations, are now reversing the picture, are now lost to every noble principle, are about to sacrifice that inestimable jewel, liberty, to the genius of despotism. A *golden phantom* held out to them by the crafty and aspiring despots among themselves, is alluring them into the fangs of arbitrary power; and so great is their infatuation, that it seems

²⁸ *Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution* (Edited by J. B. McMaster and F. D. Stone), pp. 567, 592, 615-16, 619-20, 624, 657, 658, 660, 662, 673.

as if nothing short of the reality of misery necessarily attendant on slavery, will rouse them from their false confidence, or convince them of the direful deception—but then alas! it will be too late, the chains of despotism will be fast rivetted and all escape precluded. . . .

The admiring world lately beheld the sun of liberty risen to meridian splendor in this western hemisphere, whose cheering rays began to dispel the glooms of even trans-atlantic despotism; the patriotic mind, enraptured with the glowing scene, fondly anticipated an universal and eternal day to the orb of freedom; but the horizon is already darkened and the glooms of slavery threaten to fix their empire. How transitory are the blessings of this life! Scarcely have four years elapsed since these United States, rescued from the domination of foreign despots by the unexampled heroism and perseverance of its citizens at such great expense of blood and treasure, when they are about to fall a prey to the machinations of a profligate *junto* at home, who seizing the favorable moment when the temporary and extraordinary difficulties of the people have thrown them off their guard and lulled that jealousy of power so essential to the preservation of freedom, have been too successful in the sacrilegious attempt; however I am confident that this formidable conspiracy will end in the confusion and infamy of its authors; that if necessary, the avenging sword of an abused people will humble these aspiring despots to the dust, and that their fate, like that of Charles the First of England, will deter such attempts in future, and prove the confirmation of the liberties of America until time shall be no more. . . .

So flagrant, so audacious a conspiracy against the liberties of a free people is without precedent. Mankind in the darkest ages have never been so insulted; even then, tyrants found it necessary to pay some respect to the habits and feelings of the people, and nothing but the name of a Washington could have occasioned a moment's hesitation about the nature of the new plan, or saved its authors from the execration and vengeance of the people, which eventually will prove an aggravation of their treason; for America will resent the imposition practiced upon the unsuspecting zeal of her illustrious deliverer, and vindicate her character from the aspersions of these enemies of her happiness and fame. . . .

The new constitution, instead of being the panacea or cure of every grievance so delusively represented by its advocates, will be found upon examination like Pandora's box, replete with every evil. The most specious clauses of this system of ambition and iniquity contain latent mischief, and premeditated villainy. . . .

The immaculate convention that is said to have possessed the fullness of patriotism, wisdom and virtue, contained a number of the principal public defaulters; and these were the most influential mem-

bers and chiefly instrumental in the framing of the new constitution. There were several of this description in the deputation from the state of Pennsylvania, who have long standing and immense accounts to settle, and MILLIONS perhaps to refund. . . .

In my last number I exposed the villainous intention of the framers of the new constitution, to defraud the public out of the millions lying in the hands of individuals by the construction of this system, which would, if established, cancel all debts now due to the United States. . . .

For the honor of human nature, I wish to draw a veil over the situation and conduct of another weighty character, whose name has given a false lustre to the new constitution, and been the occasion of sullyng the laurels of a Washington, by inducing him to acquiesce in a system of despotism and villainy, at which enlightened patriotism shudders. . . .

When I consider the nature of power and ambition, when I view the numerous swarm of hungry office-hunters, and their splendid expectations, anticipation exhibits such a scene of rapacity and oppression, such burthensome establishments to pamper the pride and luxury of a useless herd of officers, such dissipation and profusion of the public treasure, such consequent impoverishment and misery of the people that I tremble for my country. . . .

Samuel Adams, one of the most ardent patriots bringing on the American Revolution, thus expresses his fears for American liberty if the new Constitution should be adopted: ²⁰

I confess, as I enter the Building, I stumble at the Threshold. I meet with a National Government, instead of a Federal Union of Sovereign States. I am not able to conceive why the Wisdom of the Convention led them to give the Preference to the former before the latter. If the several States in the Union are to become one entire Nation, under one Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost. Indeed I think, upon such a Supposition, those Sovereignties ought to be eradicated from the Mind; for they would be *Imperia in Imperio* justly deemed a Solecism in Politicks, & they would be highly dangerous, and destructive of the Peace, Union and Safety of the Nation. And can this National Legislature be competent to make Laws for the *free* internal Government of one People, living in Climates so remote and whose "Habits & particular Interests" are and probably always will be so different? Is it to be expected that General Laws can be adapted to the Feelings of the more Eastern

²⁰ Cited by Bennett, pp. 244-5.

and the More Southern Parts of so extensive a Nation? It appears to me difficult if practicable. Hence then may we not look for Discontent, Mistrust, Disaffection to Government and frequent Insurrections, which will require standing Armies to suppress them in one Place & another where they may happen to arise? Or if Laws could be made, adapted to the local Habits, Feelings, Views & Interests of those distant Parts, would they not cause Jealousies of Partiality in Government which would excite Envy and other malignant Passions productive of Wars and fighting? But should we continue distinct sovereign States, confederated for the Purposes of mutual Safety and Happiness, each contributing to the federal Head such a Part of its Sovereignty as would render the Government fully adequate to those Purposes and *no more*, the People would govern themselves more easily, the laws of each State being well adapted to its own Genius & Circumstances, and the Liberties of the United States would be more secure than they can be, as I humbly conceive, under the proposed new Constitution. You are sensible, Sir, that the Seeds of Aristocracy began to spring even before the Conclusion of our Struggle for the natural Rights of Men, Seeds which like a Canker Worm lie at the Root of free Governments. So great is the wickedness of some Men, & the stupid Servility of others, that one would be almost inclined to conclude that Communities cannot be free. The few haughty Families, think *They* must govern. The Body of the People tamely consent & submit to be their Slaves. This unravels the Mystery of Millions being enslaved by the few. . . .

That other ardent patriot of Revolutionary times, Patrick Henry, was so convinced of the unjust and oppressive nature of the Constitution that he declared that he would oppose it even if all the rest of the world were for it:⁸⁰—

This proposal of altering our federal government is of a most alarming nature: make the best of this new government—say it is composed of anything but inspiration—you ought to be extremely cautious, watchful, jealous of your liberty; for, instead of securing your rights, you may lose them forever. If a wrong step be now made, the republic may be lost forever. If this new government will not come up to the expectation of the people, and they should be disappointed, their liberty will be lost, and tyranny must and will arise. I repeat it again, and I beg you, gentlemen, to consider that a wrong step, made now, will plunge us into misery, and our republic will be lost. . . . The rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your immunities and franchises, all pretensions to hu-

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 252-3.

man rights and privileges, are rendered insecure, if not lost, by this change so loudly talked of by some, and inconsiderately by others. Is this tame relinquishment of rights worthy of freemen? Is it worthy of that manly fortitude that ought to characterize republicans? It is said eight States have adopted this plan. I declare that if twelve and a half had adopted it, I would, with manly firmness, and in spite of an erring world, reject it. That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my mind, very striking. I have the highest veneration for those gentlemen; but, sir, give me leave to demand, what right had they to say, "We, the People"? My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, who authorized them to speak the language of, "We, the People," instead of We, the States? States are the characteristics, and the soul of a confederation. If the States be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great consolidated national government of the people of all the States. . . . I wish to hear the real, actual, existing danger, which should lead us to take those steps so dangerous in my conception. Disorders have arisen in other parts of America, but here, sir, no dangers, no insurrection or tumult, has happened; everything has been calm and tranquil. But notwithstanding this, we are wandering on the great ocean of human affairs. I see no landmark to guide us. We are running we know not whither. Difference in opinion has gone to a degree of inflammatory resentment, in different parts of the country, which has been occasioned by this perilous innovation. . . .

Amos Singletary, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, looked upon the Constitution as an obvious effort of the "rich and well born" to get a strangle-hold upon the common people: ³¹

These lawyers, and men of learning, and monied men, that talk so smoothly, to make us, poor illiterate people, swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress themselves; they expect to be the managers of this constitution, and get all the power and all the money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the great Leviathan, Mr. President; yes, just as the whale swallowed up Jonah. This is what I am afraid of; but I won't say any more at present, but reserve the rest to another opportunity.

Luther Martin, Attorney-General of Maryland, thus informs the citizens of Maryland concerning the weaknesses of the Constitution and the sources of its defects: ³²—

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

³² M. Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention*, Vol. III, pp. 295-6.

Those who would wish you to believe that the faults in the system proposed are wholly or principally owing to the difference of state interests, and proceed from that cause, are either imposed upon themselves, or mean to impose upon you. The principal questions, in which the state interests had any material effect, were those which related to representation, and the number in each branch of the legislature, whose concurrence should be necessary for passing navigation acts, or making commercial regulations. But what state is there in the union whose interest would prompt it to give the general government the extensive and unlimited powers it possesses in the executive, legislative and judicial departments, together with the powers over the militia, and the liberty of establishing a standing army without any restriction? What state in the union considers it advantageous to its interest that the President should be re-eligible—the members of both houses appointable to offices—the judges capable of holding other offices at the will and pleasure of the government, and that there should be no real responsibility either in the President or in the members of either branch of the Legislature. Or what state is there that would have been averse to a bill of rights, or that would have wished for the destruction of jury trial in a great variety of cases, and in a particular manner in every case without exception where the government itself is interested? These parts of the system, so far from promoting the interest of any state, or states, have an immediate tendency to annihilate all the state governments indiscriminately, and to subvert their rights and the rights of their citizens. To oppose these, and to procure their alteration, is equally the interest of every state in the union. The introduction of these parts of the system must not be attributed to the jarring interests of states, but to a very different source, the pride, the ambition and the interest of individuals.

The distinguished Virginian statesman, George Mason, thus formulated his leading objections to the Constitution:

There is no declaration of rights: and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitutions of the several states, the declaration of rights in the separate states are no security. . . .

In the House of Representatives there is not the substance, but the shadow only of representation. . . . The laws will, therefore, be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with their effects and consequences

(The powers of the Senate) will destroy any balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpations they please upon the rights and liberties of the people. . . .

The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as unattainable by a great part of the community, as in England; and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor. . . .

The President of the United States has no constitutional council, a thing unknown in any safe and regular government. He will, therefore, be unsupported by proper information and advice; and will generally be directed by minions and favorites—or he will become a tool of the Senate. . . . From this fatal defect of a constitutional council, has arisen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connexion between that branch of the legislature and the supreme executive. Hence, also, sprung that unnecessary officer, the Vice-President, who, for want of other employment, is made President of the Senate; thereby dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers. . . .

The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardon for treason; which may be sometimes exercised to screen from punishment those whom he has secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt. . . .

By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation laws, the five southern states will be ruined. . . .

There is no declaration of any kind for preserving the liberty of the press, the trial by jury in civil cases, nor against the danger of standing armies in the time of peace. . . .

This government will commence in a moderate aristocracy; it is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other.

Not only is unsuspecting American youth exposed to unnecessary dangers in examining the contemporary literature about the Constitution; they will also find unedifying material dealing with the political methods and processes in connection with securing the ratification of the Constitution. It is naturally assumed by those unacquainted with the facts that anything so obviously God-given in origin and perfect in content must necessarily have been accepted by the eager and unanimous acclamation of every last man, woman and child in the Thirteen States. When we actually examine the nature of the process of securing the ratification of the Constitution and the methods related thereto we discover quite a different situation. The Constitution was not rati-

fied by means of a general plebiscite or of special plebiscites in the Thirteen States. It was ratified by state constitutional conventions elected for the purpose by the legally enfranchised voters. These voters were not all the adult males of the country, but a highly selected group possessed of property and other severe qualifications common to the times. It is estimated that not over 160,000 out of the 4,000,000 in the country at the time voted to elect delegates, namely, about one out of every twenty-five among the inhabitants. Even under these circumstances it was extremely difficult to secure ratification by the requisite number of states, and two states refused to ratify at all. The methods employed in getting a bare majority for the Constitution in some of the state conventions approached dangerously close to bulldozing, intimidation and corruption. Competent historians of this period are almost unanimously agreed that if the Constitution had been submitted to a plebiscite of the qualified group of voters at the time it would have been overwhelmingly rejected. Had it been submitted for ratification to a plebiscite of all the adult males in the country in 1787 the Constitution would have been completely snowed under by an avalanche of disapproving votes, as its most vigorous enemies were to be found among the propertyless classes who were debarred from the exercise of suffrage in this period. Not over 100,000 voters in 1788-9 favored the adoption of the Constitution. Therefore, whatever the merits of the Constitution, its framing and its ratification were autocratic acts, the first unauthorized by law and procedure, and the second unquestionably contrary to the wishes of a great majority of the citizens of the country at the time.

VII. THE FATHERS AND PURE POLITICS

The venality, corruption and oligarchy of present-day party politics would scarcely be denied by the most ethereal publicist, but it is normally assumed that this is a phase of human debasement and obscenity which has come to us as a penalty of national decay in the period since the golden age of the Fathers. The Fathers are conventionally held not only to have been above party, but even to have been ignorant of the very fact of party life. To substantiate this view such simple-minded folk refer to the establishment of the Electoral College by the Constitutional Convention as proof of the assumption of the Fathers that the new government would

be free from the bias and influence of parties. Further evidence is frequently drawn from such statements as those of Jefferson that he would rather go to hell without a party than to go to heaven bound down with party obligations, or the opinion of Marshall that "nothing more debases or pollutes the human mind than party." It is often contended that the Fathers believed that there would be no degrading intervention of factions, and that all political life would be based upon pure rationality, unselfishness and personal disinterestedness.

This beautiful idyll is quickly punctured once we come to consult the actual facts in the age of the Fathers. We find that there were well developed party divisions in the Colonial period. Before the close of the eighteenth century party machinery exhibited an elaborate development, and party leaders had perfected a control over the technique of organization methods which would put to shame Tom Platt or Matthew Quay. As to the issue of the non-existence of parties in this country in the age of the Fathers John Adams has expressed himself in the following fashion: ³³

You say our divisions began with federalism and anti-federalism? Alas! They began with human nature; they have existed in America from its first plantation. In every colony, divisions always prevailed. In New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and all the rest, a court and country party has always contended.

Adams also describes the highly spiritual and sanctified atmosphere pervading the disinterested political activities and methods of the pre-Revolutionary saints and patriots of Boston: ³⁴

Boston, February. This day learned that the Caucus Club meets, at certain times, in the garret of Tom Dawes, the Adjutant of the Boston Regulars. He has a large house, and he has a movable partition in his garret which he takes down, and the whole club meets in one room. There they smoke tobacco till you cannot see from one end of the garret to the other. There they drink flip, I suppose, and there they choose a moderator, who puts questions to the vote regularly; and selectmen, assessors, collectors, wardens, firewards, and representatives, are regularly chosen before they are chosen in the town. Uncle Fairfield, Story, Ruddock, Adams, Cooper and a *rudis indigestaque moles* of others are members. They send committees to wait on the merchant's club, and to propose and join in the choice

³³ *Works*, Vol. X, p. 23.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 144.

of men and measures. Captain Cunningham says, they have often solicited him to go to those caucuses, they have assured him benefits in his business, etc.

The seductiveness and effectiveness of party methods before the Revolution are admirably illustrated by the liquor bill of one George Washington as a candidate for the Virginia House of Burgesses in Frederick County in 1758:⁸⁵

40 gallons of Rum Punch @ 3/6 pr. galn	7 0 0
15 gallons of Wine @ 10/ pr. galn	7 10 0
Dinner for your Friends	3 0 0
13½ gallons of Wine @ 10/	6 15
3½ pts. of Brandy @ 1/3	4 4½
13 galls Beer @ 1/3	16 3
8 qts. Cyder Royal @ 1/6	0 12 0
Punch	3 9
30 gallns. of strong beer @ 8d pr. gall	1 0
1 hhd & 1 Barrell of Punch, consisting of 26 gals. best Barbadoes rum, @ 5/	6 10 0
12 lbs. S. Refd. Sugar @ 1/6	18 9
3 galls. and 3 quarts of Beer @ 1/ pr. gall	3 9
10 Bowls of Punch @ 2/6 each	1 5 0
9 half pints of rum @ 7½ d. each	5 7½
1 pint of wine	1 6

It is obvious that if the spirit of Mr. Andrew Volstead and Mr. Wayne B. Wheeler had been prevailing in the land in 1758 Virginia would have been denied the illustrious services of the Father of His Country. Washington won by a vote of 310 to 45 over his opponent. He wrote to his "bootlegger" that he hoped everybody had had enough to drink and that nobody had been refused.

It is unquestionably true, however, that the first extensive development of party life in this country came at the time of the struggles over the ratification of the Constitution. The party alignments which then appeared were still more clearly demarcated and the technique of party machinery much extended during the conflicts over the policies of Alexander Hamilton in Washington's first administration, over the policy of Washington with respect to the French Revolution, and over the Alien and Sedition Laws. By 1800 the Republican party under Mr. Jefferson had been developed with a thoroughness and astuteness not surpassed by any

⁸⁵ P. L. Ford, *The True George Washington*, p. 297.

other political leader in the history of American politics, when we take into consideration the difficulties of the time with respect to travel and communication. Parallel with this development of national politics went the growth of political parties and methods in the several states, where the intricacy of organization and the sordidness of methods far excelled these characteristics in the national political system. The methods associated with the names of Clinton, Burr, Giles, Gerry and others is sufficient to indicate the truth of this latter assertion. And it is further illuminating to remember that these examples of political depravity and corruption were not the product of democracy. They were rather the outgrowth of the activities of about as narrow and select a political aristocracy as has ever attempted to operate party government. Professor McMaster in the following paragraphs admirably summarizes these distressing facts: ⁸⁶

In times like the present, when the boss is everywhere, and when the high places of many State and municipal governments are filled by men who have secured them by methods greatly to be condemned, it may afford the honest citizen some consolation to know that these evils have always existed. Whoever reads the magazines and newspapers, whoever listens to the oratory of the pulpit and the after-dinner speeches of political reformers, is well aware of the existence of a widespread belief that politicians and legislators and public men are more corrupt to-day than they were in the time of our ancestors three generations ago, and that the cause of our political debasement is a free and unrestricted ballot. This, most happily, is a pure delusion. A very little study of long-forgotten politics will suffice to show that in filibustering and gerrymandering, in stealing governorships and legislatures, in using force at the polls, in colonising and in distributing patronage to whom patronage is due, in all the frauds and tricks that go to make up the worst form of practical politics, the men who founded our State and national governments were always our equals, and often our masters. Yet they lived in times when universal suffrage did not exist, and when the franchise was everywhere guarded by property and religious qualifications of the strictest kind. In New England, ninety years ago, a voter must have an annual income of three pounds, or a freehold estate worth sixty pounds. In New York he must be possessed of an estate worth twenty pounds York money, or rent a house for which he paid forty shillings annually. In New Jersey the qualification was real estate to the value of fifty pounds, in Maryland and South Carolina fifty acres of land,

⁸⁶ J. B. McMaster, *With the Fathers*, pp. 71-73.

and in Georgia ten pounds of taxable property. But many a man who could vote was hopelessly debarred from ever holding office. No citizen could be a Governor in Massachusetts who did not own a thousand pounds of real estate, nor be a senator unless he had a freehold worth three hundred. In North Carolina senators must own three hundred acres of land, and a Governor lands and tenements to the value of a thousand pounds. Here the qualification for a representative was one hundred pounds of real property; there it was one hundred acres of land; elsewhere it was two hundred and fifty acres of land, and open profession of the Protestant religion.

Religious restrictions were almost universal. In New Hampshire, in New Jersey, in North Carolina, in South Carolina and Georgia, the Governors, the members of legislatures, and the chief officers of State must all be Protestants. In Massachusetts and Maryland they must be Christians. In North Carolina and Pennsylvania they must believe in the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments, in South Carolina in a future state of rewards and punishments, and in Delaware in the doctrine of the Trinity.

From the standpoint of those who, in our day, disapprove of universal suffrage, this ought to have been a time of great political purity. The voters were taxpayers, Christians, and owners of property. The office-holders were men of substance, while the qualifications for holding office increased with the dignity of the place. Yet it was, in truth, a period of great political depravity. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether, in all our annals, there can be found a finer example of filibustering than that afforded by the Assembly of Pennsylvania in 1787.

McMaster in this chapter, significantly entitled, "The Political Depravity of the Fathers," from his book *With the Fathers*, goes on to give numerous examples of typical party technique and methods at the close of the eighteenth century, including such well-known devices as filibustering, gerrymandering, the steam-roller, and the throwing out of legitimate votes through the influence of the dominant party. Even scandal-mongering was not infrequent, a notorious example being the spreading of news about Hamilton's affair with Mrs. Reynolds by James Monroe, later President of the United States, of whom it was asserted in the high school text on American history used by the writer that if "his soul had been turned wrong-side out not a single spot could have been discovered upon it." Thus, if aspiring youth or trusting femininity is to seek political purity in our annals, they must go back to a period before the settlement of America by the white man.

VIII. BRYANISM AND THE FATHERS

In the noble brochure by Mr. Atwood quoted at the outset of this chapter, entitled, *Keep God in American History*, we are given the impression that the matchless generation which brought into being the Constitution were as peerless in their piety as in their political acumen. Indeed, it is the prevailing view that the Fathers, if they were living to-day, would be found locking arms with John Roach Straton, and would have clamored in droves for permission to line up with Mr. Bryan in the prosecution of the infidel, Scopes.

It is however, a lamentable and disheartening fact that the majority of distinguished Americans in the generation of the Fathers were not even professing Christians. Their generation was distinctly less religious than that of Ingersoll which came a century later. Indeed, the views of Ingersoll would have caused no disturbance whatever among the intellectual classes in the days of George Washington. The distinguished Unitarian clergyman, the Reverend Doctor Minot J. Savage, said in a sermon on Ingersoll that "His ideas were very largely those of Voltaire, of Gibbon, of Hume, of Thomas Paine, of Thomas Jefferson, of Benjamin Franklin, and of a good many other of our prominent Revolutionary heroes." The Reverend Doctor Wilson, in a sermon published in the *Albany Daily Advertiser* for 1831, pointed in dismay to the fact that most of the founders of our country were "infidels," and that of the first seven presidents not one of them had professed his belief in Christianity. The good Doctor protested that it almost seemed as though God had been deliberately excluded from the origins of our government.³⁷

When the war was over and the victory over our enemies won, and the blessings and happiness of liberty and peace were secured, the Constitution was framed and God was neglected. He was not merely forgotten. He was absolutely voted out of the Constitution. The proceedings, as published by Thompson, the secretary, and the history of the day, show that the question was gravely debated whether God should be in the Constitution or not, and after a solemn debate he was deliberately voted out of it. . . . There is not only in the theory of our government no recognition of God's laws and sovereignty, but its practical operation, its administration, has been conformable to

³⁷ Cited in J. E. Remsburg, *Six Historic Americans*, Part I, pp. 120-21.

its theory. Those who have been called to administer the government have not been men making any public profession of Christianity. . . . Washington was a man of valor and wisdom. He was esteemed by the whole world as a great and good man but he was not a professing Christian.

The late Mr. Roosevelt, in one of his more facetious and gracious moments, referred to Thomas Paine, who had rendered most notable services in promoting the independence and formation of our country, as a "dirty little Atheist." By the same criteria most of the Fathers, certainly Franklin, Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Morris, and Monroe, were likewise "dirty little Atheists," as they all shared the religious belief of Paine and most other intellectuals of the time, namely, either Unitarianism or Deism.

The Deists had come into existence about the middle of the seventeenth century when their principles were formulated by Lord Herbert of Cherbury. The Deists held that there was a universal religion natural or common to all men in all times and places. This "natural religion" was based fundamentally upon the dictates and concepts of human reason, as opposed to the faith and credulity of the orthodox Christian of 1776 or 1926. The fundamental tenets of Deism were: (1) belief in a supernatural being or Deity; (2) this Deity should be worshipped by man; (3) the chief purpose of worship is to promote human virtue; and (4) the nature of the life after death will be determined by the life led by the individual upon earth. The Deists believed that these views and doctrines had been, in differing degrees of development, evident among all branches of the human race since the period of creation. They did not derive them in any sense from the Jews nor did they believe the Bible to be a specially revealed or inspired book. As far as Christianity possessed any validity, the Deists held that this was solely because the teachings of Jesus squared fairly well with the fundamental principles of Deism and not in any sense because Christianity was derived from a supposedly sacred book.³⁸

It will thus be seen that Deism was the religion of the thorough-going rationalists, and differed widely from modern orthodoxy either Catholic or Protestant. It was essentially identical with the religious opinions of the present liberal theologians which are

³⁸ A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought before Kant*, Chap. X.

being so vigorously assailed by the Fundamentalists. Among the great intellects of the eighteenth century who espoused Deism were Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon, Adam Smith and Tom Paine. There was in Deism a tendency to identify God and nature, and to look upon nature in a somewhat mechanistic way. The influence of Sir Isaac Newton was very powerful here. Thus Deism was closely related to the natural rights political philosophy as well as to the religious views of the Fathers who had so thoroughly assimilated this natural rights philosophy.³⁹ It will be readily apparent from the above that the Deists were in no sense atheists, but they have always appeared so to orthodox clergymen who have been wont to denounce some of the greatest Deists like Voltaire as atheists. It is true, however, that the enlightened Deists entertained for religious views like those of Mr. Bryan and Mr. Straton the utmost contempt.

When we examine the religious views of the leading Fathers we find that nearly all of them were Deists or Unitarians, both viewed by the orthodox as groups made up solely of infidels.⁴⁰ It is well-known that in his youth Benjamin Franklin was a thorough-going Deist, but because he proposed that prayers be said in the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 many have contended that in later life he became a pious and orthodox Christian.⁴¹ It is probable that his proposal of prayers had a purely political and diplomatic objective. At any rate, at the age of eighty-four he formulated his religious beliefs for President Ezra Stiles of Yale College. It will be seen from the following citations from his creed at this time that he was still a thorough-going Deist:⁴²

I believe in one God, the Creator of the universe. That he governs it by his providence. That he ought to be worshiped. That the most acceptable service we render him is doing good to his other children. That the soul of man is immortal, and will be treated with justice in another life respecting its conduct in this. . . . As to Jesus of Nazareth, my opinion of whom you particularly desire, I think his system of morals and his religion, as he left them to us, the best

³⁹ Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*, Chap. ii.

⁴⁰ J. H. Crooker, *The Unitarian Church*, pp. 48-55; W. Riley, *American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism*; McGiffert, op. cit., pp. 251-2.

⁴¹ Atwood, *Keep God in American History*.

⁴² Remsburg, op. cit., p. 171; S. G. Fisher, *The True Benjamin Franklin*, p. 91.

the world ever saw, or is like to see; but I apprehend it has received various corrupting changes, and I have, with most of the present Dissenters in England, some doubts as to his Divinity; though it is a question I do not dogmatize upon, having never studied it, and think it needless to busy myself with it now, when I expect soon an opportunity of knowing the truth with less trouble. I see no harm, however, in its being believed, if that belief has the good consequence, as probably it has, of making his doctrines more respected and more observed; especially as I do not perceive that the Supreme takes it amiss, by distinguishing the unbelievers in his government of the world with any peculiar marks or his displeasure.

As Sydney George Fisher has well expressed it: "So Franklin's belief at the close of his life was deism, which was the same faith that he had professed when a boy. From boyish deism he had passed to youthful negation, and from negation returned to deism again."⁴³

George Washington is usually represented as having been a pious and devout communicant of the Episcopal church, but both Bishop William White and the Reverend Doctor James Abercrombie, pastors of the churches which Washington attended, have denied that Washington ever received communion while a member of their congregation. Washington was in the habit of leaving the church before the communion, and Dr. Abercrombie once preached a sermon at him emphasizing the danger of persons in high places setting a bad example. Thereafter Washington never attended church on Communion Sunday.⁴⁴ Dr. Abercrombie stated categorically that Washington was unquestionably a Deist.⁴⁵ Theodore Parker says of Washington's religion: ⁴⁶

He had much of the principle, little of the sentiments of religion. He was more moral than pious. In early life a certain respect for ecclesiastical forms made him vestryman at two churches. This respect for outward forms with ministers and reporters for newspapers very often passes for the substance of religion. It does not appear that Washington took a deep and spontaneous delight in religious emotions more than in poetry, in works of art, or in the beauties of nature. . . . Silence is a figure of speech, and in the latter years of his life I suppose his theological opinions were those of John Adams,

⁴³ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁴⁴ Remsburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 101ff.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-2.

Dr. Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson, only he was not a speculative man, and did not care to publish them to the world.

Essentially the same judgment is rendered by the Reverend Doctor Minot J. Savage: ⁴⁷

Those best qualified to testify tell us that he was decidedly Liberal in his theology in his mature manhood; and we know he was not shocked by the teachings of Thomas Paine. That he trusted in God, believed in a Providence that in some large way guided human destiny, is, doubtless, true; but that he was an evangelical Christian is almost certainly not true.

In negotiating a treaty with Tripoli regarding the settlement of the piracy nuisance late in his second administration Washington's representative hastened to reassure the Mohammedans by declaring that "the government of the United States is not in any sense founded upon the Christian religion." The treaty was sent to the Senate with his approval by John Adams. In 1806 an effort was made to insert in the Constitution a "Christian Amendment," which would specifically mention the name of Jesus. A speaker for the amendment deplored Washington's "atheistic" proclivities and pointed to "the desperate condition of his army in the Jerseys, when the great commander, instead of ordering the Bible to be read to his regiments, ordered Tom Paine's *Crisis* read aloud to his hungry and barefoot soldiers."

John Adams was originally trained for the ministry, but his independence and originality of thought soon led him to the conviction that he could not possibly find intellectual or professional satisfaction in this line of endeavor. Mr. John T. Morse thus describes Adams' struggles over the problem and his decision to abandon the ministry in the interest of religious radicalism and the practice of law: ⁴⁸

Adams was really at war with the prevalent church spirit of New England. Thus one evening in a conversation with Major Greene "about the divinity and satisfaction of Jesus Christ," the major advanced the argument that "a mere creature of finite being could not make satisfaction to infinite justice for any crimes," and suggested

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 142. The whole matter of Washington's religious beliefs and practices is admirably summarized in P. L. Ford, *The True George Washington*, pp. 76-83.

⁴⁸ J. T. Morse, *John Adams*, pp. 14-15.

that "these things are very mysterious." Adams's crisp commentary was: "Thus mystery is made a convenient cover for absurdity." Again he asks: "Where do we find a precept in the gospel requiring ecclesiastical synods? convocations? councils? decrees? creeds? confessions? oaths? subscriptions? and whole cart-loads of other trumpery that we find religion incumbered with in these days?" Independence in thought and expression soon caused him to be charged with the heinous unsoundness of Arminianism, an accusation which he endeavored neither to palliate nor deny, but quite cheerfully admitted. A few such comments, more commerce even with the tiny colonial world around him, a little thinking and discussion upon doctrinal points, sufficed for his shrewd common sense, and satisfied him that he was not fitted to labor in the ministerial vineyard as he saw it platted and walled in.

Specifically, Adams was a Unitarian, as was his son John Quincy Adams.

Of all the Fathers the most outspoken in regard to religious beliefs was Thomas Jefferson. He has been diversely claimed as a Unitarian and a Deist, but the decision as to which he was is of little importance as far as religious radicalism is concerned. Above all considerations of religion Jefferson placed the dominion of Reason, and wrote thus to his nephew while the latter was attending school: ⁴⁹

Fix Reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve the homage of reason than of blindfolded fear. . . . Do not be frightened from this inquiry by any fear of its consequences. If it end in a belief that there is no God, you will find incitements to virtue in the comfort and pleasantness you feel in its exercise and in the love of others which it will procure for you.

Jefferson's views about the nature of the Bible are well brought out in the following paragraph: ⁵⁰

Read the Bible as you would Livy or Tacitus. For example, in the book of Joshua we are told the sun stood still for several hours. Were we to read that fact in Livy or Tacitus we should class it with their showers of blood, speaking of their statues, beasts, etc. But it is said that the writer of that book was inspired. Examine,

⁴⁹ Cited in Remsburg, *op. cit.*, p. 66; *Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 430ff. Cf. W. E. Curtis, *The True Thomas Jefferson*, Chap. xi.

⁵⁰ Remsburg, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

therefore, candidly, what evidence there is of his having been inspired. The pretension is entitled to your inquiry, because millions believe it. On the other hand, you are astronomer enough to know how contrary it is to the law of nature.

The views of Jefferson in regard to Jesus and the New Testament emerge from the following representative quotations:⁵¹

Keep in your eye the opposite pretensions: First, of those who say he (Jesus) was begotten by God, born of a virgin, suspended and reversed the laws of Nature at will, and ascended bodily into heaven; and second, of those who say he was a man of illegitimate birth, of a benevolent heart, enthusiastic mind, who set out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing them, and was punished capitally for sedition by being gibbeted, according to the Roman law, which punished the first commission of that offence by whipping, and the second by exile or death in *furca*. . . .

The day will come when the mystical generation of Jesus, by the Supreme Being as his father, in the womb of a virgin, will be classed with the fable of the generation of Minerva in the brain of Jupiter. . . .

Among the sayings and discourses imputed to him by his biographers, I find many passages of fine imagination, correct morality, and of the most lovely benevolence; and others, again, of so much ignorance, of so much absurdity, so much untruth and imposture, as to pronounce it impossible that such contradictions should have proceeded from the same being. I separate, therefore, the gold from the dross, restore to him the former, and leave the latter to the stupidity of some and the roguery of others of his disciples. . . .

Following out the suggestions contained in the last paragraph Jefferson actually compiled an expurgated edition of the New Testament endeavoring to emphasize the moral teachings of Jesus. This has recently been published by Boni and Liveright, both in the King James version which Jefferson used and the modernized Weymouth version. Jefferson possessed the natural hatred of the rationalist and free-thinker for the savagery of the early Jews and their conception of God. He denominates the Old Testament God "a being of terrific character—cruel, vindictive, capricious and unjust." The orthodox patriarchal Jews he describes as "a bloody race, as cruel and remorseless as the being whom they represented as the family God of Abraham, of Isaac, and Jacob,

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-69.

and the local God of Israel." ⁵² And Jefferson had little use for ministers of the Gospel, speaking of them in the following fashion: ⁵³

In every country and in every age the priest has been hostile to liberty; he is always in alliance with the despot, abetting his abuses in return for protection to his own. . . .

The serious enemies are the priests of the different religious sects to whose spells on the human mind its improvement is ominous. . . .

The Presbyterian clergy are the loudest, the most intolerant of all sects; the most tyrannical and ambitious, ready at the word of the law-giver, if such a word could now be obtained, to put their torch to the pile, and to rekindle in this virgin hemisphere the flame in which their oracle, Calvin, consumed the poor Servetus, because he could not subscribe to the proposition of Calvin, that magistrates have a right to exterminate all heretics to the Calvinistic creed! They pant to re-establish by law that holy inquisition which they can now only infuse into public opinion.

Jefferson's free-thinking was so marked that it aroused the fear of some even in his relatively godless generation. In the campaign of 1800 the Federalists exploited this popular alarm over Jefferson's religious views and brought out a pamphlet compiled by J. M. Mason, entitled "Serious Considerations on the Election of a President, and a Voice of Warning to Christians in the Ensuing Election." McMaster thus summarizes some of the more notable charges against Jefferson in this literature of criticism: ⁵⁴

Jefferson has denied that shells found on the mountain-tops are proofs of the great flood. . . . Instead of placing the Bible and Testament in the hands of the children, he would store their minds with the useful facts of Greek and Roman history. He has impiously written in his *Notes* "It does me no injury for my neighbor to say that there are twenty Gods or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." But it is not in his book alone that his hatred of Christ and His Church is betrayed. His daily speech is that of an infidel. The Rev. John B. Smith of Virginia, once had the famous Mazzei as his guest. The talk ran on religious topics. Mazzei made no secret of his infidelity, and, when Dr. Smith marked it, exclaimed, "Why, your great philosopher and statesman Mr.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-9.

⁵⁴ J. B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, Vol. II, pp. 501-2.

Jefferson is rather farther gone in infidelity than I." And think this is the man who now seeks for the suffrage of the Christian people! Elect him and the character of the United States will sink in the estimation of every foreign people. At home religion will be destroyed. Immorality will flourish. His admirers tell us that he is a man of too much genius to meddle with the religious opinions of others, or attempt to spread his own views. What assurance have we? What said Hazael when told of the crimes he would commit? Did he not cry out in indignation, "Is thy servant a dog, that he should do this great thing?" Yet he did it. No man knows what an infidel President will do until the opportunity to act is given him.

Of the remaining presidents in the first generation of our country's existence both Madison and Monroe were in general accord with their philosophic and political master, Mr. Jefferson. Madison's famous "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" in Virginia is one of the most notable statements ever prepared in this country of the dangers and oppression inherent in any form of connection between church and state. It was also incidentally a noble plea for religious freedom and liberty.⁵⁵ The three outstanding Fathers who were not presidents, namely, Hamilton, Marshall and Gouverneur Morris, were notable free-thinkers. It was Hamilton who took the lead in opposing Franklin's proposition to have prayers in the Constitutional Convention of 1787;⁵⁶ Marshall was an outspoken Unitarian;⁵⁷ and Morris was an extreme rationalist.⁵⁸ Therefore, it is overwhelmingly apparent that our contemporary Fundamentalists can get slight satisfaction and comfort out of the writings of the Fathers, unless they possess the heroic and divinely guided powers of exegesis exhibited by our friends Mr. Atwood and Dr. Gunsaulus.

IX. WERE THE FATHERS JOY-KILLERS?

The conventional view of the Fathers' attitude towards social life and recreation represents the Patristic generation as one which spent all of its time, aside from whole-hearted and laborious devotion to the affairs of the state and of God, in Bible reading, and

⁵⁵ Remsburg, p. 120; *Writings of James Madison* (Edited by Hunt), Vol. II, pp. 183-191.

⁵⁶ Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, Vol. I, p. 452.

⁵⁷ Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, Vol. IV, pp. 67-9.

⁵⁸ Ford, *The True George Washington*, p. 81.

in a perusal of Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and Baxter's *Saint's Everlasting Rest*. It would normally be regarded as sacrilege to suggest that the Fathers and their contemporaries were addicted to the devilish practices of dancing, drinking, gambling and what are conventionally looked upon as even worse vices. The men's Bible class of the central Methodist Episcopal church of Huntington, West Virginia, recently denounced dancing as "a thing and practice that will reach to the highest pinnacle known to man and pluck the brightest jewels in all the land and drag them down to degradation and shame and finally to a devil's hell. Dancing is in opposition to the church of God." Yet Paul Leicester Ford tells us in the following paragraphs of Washington's astonishing fondness for terpsichorean dissipation: ⁵⁹

A distinct weakness was dancing. When on the frontier he sighed, "the hours at present are melancholy dull. Neither the rugged toils of war, nor the gentler conflict of A(ssembly) B(alls,) is in my choice." His diary shows him at balls and "Routs" frequently; when he was President he was a constant attendant at the regular "Dancing Assemblies" in New York and Philadelphia, and when at Mount Vernon he frequently went ten miles to Alexandria to attend dances. Of one of these Alexandria balls he has left an amusing description: "Went to a ball at Alexandria, where Musick and dancing was the chief Entertainment, however in a convenient room detached for the purpose abounded great plenty of bread and butter, some biscuits, with tea and coffee, which the drinkers of could not distinguish from hot water sweet'ned—Be it remembered that pocket handkerchiefs served the purposes of Table cloths & Napkins and that no apologies were made for either. I shall therefore distinguish this ball by the stile and title of the Bread & Butter Ball."

During the Revolution, too, he killed many a weary hour of winter quarters by dancing. When the camp spent a day rejoicing over the French alliance, "the celebration," according to Thacher, "was concluded by a splendid ball opened by his Excellency General Washington, having for his partner the lady of General Knox." Greene describes how "we had a little dance at my quarters a few evenings past. His Excellency and Mrs. Greene danced upwards of three hours without once sitting down." Knox, too, tells of "a most genteel entertainment given by self and officers" at which Washington danced. "Everybody allows it to be the first of the kind ever exhibited in this State at least. We had above seventy ladies, all of the first ton in

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 183-5.

the State, and between three and four hundred gentlemen. We danced all night—an elegant room, the illuminating, fireworks, &c., were more than pretty.” And at Newport, when Rochambeau gave a ball, by request it was opened by Washington. The dance selected by his partner was “A Successful Campaign,” then in high favor, and the French officers took the instruments from the musicians and played while he danced the first figure.

While in winter quarters he subscribed four hundred dollars (paper money, equal to eleven dollars in gold) to get up a series of balls, of which Greene wrote, “We have opened an assembly in Camp. From this apparent ease, I suppose it is thought we must be in happy circumstances. I wish it was so, but, alas, it is not. Our provisions are in a manner, gone. We have not a ton of hay at command, nor magazine to draw from. Money is extremely scarce and worth little when we get it. We have been so poor in camp for a fortnight, that we could not forward the public dispatches, for want of cash to support the expresses.” At the farewell ball given at Annapolis, when the commander-in-chief resigned his command, Tilton relates that “the General danced in every set, that all the ladies might have the pleasure of dancing with him; or as it has since been handsomely expressed, ‘get a touch of him.’” He still danced in 1796, when sixty-four years of age, but when invited to the Alexandria Assembly in 1799, he wrote to the managers, “Mrs. Washington and myself have been honored with your polite invitation to the assemblies of Alexandria this winter, and thank you for this mark of your attention. But, alas! our dancing days are no more. We wish, however all those who have a relish for so agreeable and innocent an amusement all the pleasure the season will afford them; and I am, gentlemen,

“Your most obedient and obliged humble servant,

“Geo. Washington.”

It is known that Franklin missed few socio-amatory opportunities during his various missions to London and Paris.⁶⁰ Alexander Hamilton was much addicted to the deplorable vice of attending the theatre and symphony concerts.⁶¹ The generation of the Fathers was by modern standards a heavy drinking age, enormous quantities of strong spirits being consumed. Among the distinguished Fathers whom we have mentioned in various connections above it seems that James Madison was the only one who could claim to be even approximately an abstainer. Franklin and Washington are particularly known as connoisseurs of good liquor. Washing-

⁶⁰ Fisher, *op. cit.*, Chaps. III, VII, IX-X.

⁶¹ A. M. Hamilton, *The Intimate Life of Alexander Hamilton*.

ton conducted an excellent distillery on his Mt. Vernon plantation clearing around \$1500 a year on the sale of liquor.⁶² Most of the Fathers were also very fond of card-playing, though none is known to have achieved the remarkable distinction and prowess as a gambler possessed by Henry Clay in the next generation. Washington is known to have been particularly fond of card-playing, having literally bought packs of playing cards by the dozen, and he frequently played for no inconsiderable stakes.⁶³

When we come to the matter of the sexual life of the Fathers there is no doubt that this was a period before American culture had been marred by the sinister efforts of men like Dio Lewis and Anthony Comstock, and before the Puritanical influences of the frontier society had wrought any serious lesions on the American mores.⁶⁴ The writer has frequently discussed this problem with the more notable American authorities on the figures of this time, and, though these historians are both admirers of this age and opposed to scandal-mongering, they have almost uniformly agreed that the Patristic period was, when judged by conventional contemporary moral standards, an immoral era. Of course no historian worthy of the name would accept for a moment the vast number of wild stories circulated about the alleged heroic immoralities of the Fathers, any more than he would take seriously the great number of apocryphal tales about the plural nature of Lincoln's paternity. We may even pass over the oft-cited correspondence between Washington and Jefferson concerning the amatory possibilities residing in their more pulchritudinous mulatto slaves, as well as Jefferson's reputed proposal to establish a house of prostitution as an integral element in the equipment of his newly founded University of Virginia, and the well known Herculean amatory achievements of Aaron Burr, who was divorced on the grounds of a statutory offense at eighty years of age. We shall content ourselves, in illustrating the moral life of the age, with reference to two perfectly well authenticated cases of so-called sex dereliction, namely, the sexual record of Benjamin Franklin, and Alexander Hamilton's affair with Mrs. Reynolds. We are not, of course, assuming that Hamilton and Frank-

⁶² Ford, *op. cit.*, p. 123; cf. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, Vol. I, p. 23 and notes.

⁶³ Ford, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-9.

⁶⁴ H. O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*, p. 9, and Chap. I, *passim*.

lin were in any sense "worse" than their distinguished contemporaries. Franklin was regarded by his generation as of only average amatory horse-power, while Hamilton was looked upon as distinctly less given to lascivious endeavor than most other gentlemen of his day. It merely so happens that we have accessible, authentic printed information relative to these two, and the writer is not disposed to undertake the archival labors which would be necessary to secure illustrative material of equal relevance concerning their illustrious colleagues. Franklin is known to have had at least two illegitimate children. His illegitimate son, William Franklin, was Royal Governor of New Jersey on the eve of the Revolution, and his illegitimate daughter married John Foxcroft.⁶⁵ Franklin seems to have enjoyed a youth which, in regard to sexual experiences, greatly resembled the early days of St. Augustine, and both seem to have had much the same difficulty in arriving at a determination to alter their habits. Franklin thus describes his early experience with prostitutes and his fear of venereal disease: ⁶⁶

That hard to be governed passion of youth had hurried me frequently into intrigues with low women that fell in my way, which were attended with some expense and great inconvenience, besides a continual risk to my health by a distemper, which of all things I dreaded, though by great good luck I escaped it.

Particularly famous is Franklin's advice given to a young man in regard to choosing a mistress in the year 1745. Franklin counsels marriage but goes on to say: ⁶⁷

But if you will not take this counsel and persist in thinking a commerce with the fair sex inevitable, then I repeat my former advice,—in all your amours you should prefer old women to young ones. You call this a paradox and demand my reasons. They are these:—

Because they have more knowledge of the world, their minds are better stored with conversation, their conversation is more improved and more lastingly agreeable.

Because when women cease to be handsome they study to be good. To maintain their influence over man they supply the diminution of beauty by an augmentation of utility. They learn to do a thousand

⁶⁵ Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 102ff.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-7; and W. J. Robinson, *Sexual Truths*, pp. 398-400.

services, small and great, and are the most tender and careful of all friends when one is sick. Thus they continue amiable and hence there is hardly such a thing to be found as an old woman who is not a good woman.

Because there is no hazard of children, which irregularly produced may be attended with much inconvenience.

Because thru' more experience they are more prudent and discreet in conducting an intrigue to prevent suspicion. The commerce with them is therefore safe with regard to your reputation and with regard to this, that if the affair should happen to be known considerate people might be inclined to excuse an old woman who would kindly take care of a young man by her good counsels and prevent his ruining his health and fortune among mercenary prostitutes.

Because in every animal that walks upright the deficiency of the fluid that fills the muscles appears but in the highest part. The face first grows lank and wrinkled, then the neck, then the breast and arms, the lower parts continuing to the last as plump as ever, so that, covering all above with a basket and regarding that only which is below the girdle, it is impossible to know of two women an old from a younger. And as in the dark all cats are gray, the pleasure of corporeal enjoyment with an old woman is at least equal and frequently superior, every knack being by practice capable of improvement.

Because the sin is less. The debauching of a virgin may be her ruin and make her life unhappy.

Because the compunction is less. The having made a young girl miserable may give you frequent bitter reflections, none of which can attend the making of an old woman happy. And lastly, they are so happy and grateful. This much for my paradox.

The one unhappy instance in which Hamilton was detected in extra-conjugal relations came as result of a blackmail plot on the part of James Reynolds and his wife, which was exploited for political purposes by his rivals, Muhlenburg, Venable and Monroe. Hamilton made a courageous confession of the whole situation, which reflects rather more credit upon him than the exposure does upon Monroe. The following is Hamilton's explanation of the episode: ⁶⁸

The charges against me is a connection with one James Reynolds for purposes of improper pecuniary speculation. My real crime is an amorous connection with his wife for a considerable time, with

⁶⁸ *Works*, Vol. VII, pp. 378, 388-9.

his privity and connivance, if not originally brought on by a combination between the husband and wife with the design to extort money from me. . . . Some time in the summer of the year 1791, a woman called at my house in the city of Philadelphia, and asked to speak with me in private. I attended her into a room apart from my family. With a seeming air of affliction she informed me that she was a daughter of a Mr. Lewis, sister to a Mr. G. Livingston of the State of New York, and wife to a Mr. Reynolds, whose father was in the Commissary Department during the war with Great Britain; that her husband, who for a long time had treated her very cruelly, had lately left her to live with another woman, and in so destitute a condition that, though desirous of returning to her friends, she had not the means; that knowing I was citizen of New York, she had taken liberty at the moment to apply to my humanity for assistance.

I replied, that her situation was a very interesting one—that I was disposed to afford her assistance to convey her to her friends, but this at the moment not being convenient to me (which was the fact), I must request the place of her residence, to which I should bring or send a small supply of money. She told me the street and the number of the house where she lodged. In the evening I put a bank-bill in my pocket and went to the house. I enquired for Mrs. Reynolds and was shown up stairs, at the head of which she met me and conducted me into a bedroom. I took the bill out of my pocket and gave it to her. Some conversation ensued, from which it was quickly apparent that other than pecuniary consolation would be acceptable.

After this I had frequent meetings with her, most of them at my own house; Mrs. Hamilton with her children being absent on a visit to her father.

In short, it would seem that the net result of this casual survey of the social and recreational ideals and activities of the Fathers simply proves that they were gentlemen. To be such was once neither a sin nor a crime in this country of ours. But the times have altered, and to-day this is perhaps the most severe indictment which can be drawn against the individual example of *homo sapiens* inhabiting the United States of America in the twentieth century. The habits and tastes of a gentleman are denounced throughout the length and breadth of the land by John Roach Straton, Wayne B. Wheeler, John S. Sumner and others of their ilk. We may well close this section with a review of tastes and morals of the distinguished Sage of Monticello, unquestionably the finest fruit of the Patristic culture, by William Eleroy Curtis in his *The True Thomas Jefferson*:

The chief offender among newspapers was the *Richmond Recorder*, edited by a Scotchman named Callender, who sought an asylum in this country to escape punishment for libels published in England. He was not here long before he was arrested and imprisoned under the sedition act and was one of those whom Jefferson pardoned on the day that he became President. This incident brought him personally to Jefferson's acquaintance, and for a time he proved to be useful to the Democratic leaders as a writer. Jefferson defended and shielded him as long as his patience would permit, and aided him from time to time with loans of money that were never repaid, but was finally compelled to repudiate him when Callender turned upon his benefactor. It was he who discovered Hamilton's relations with Mrs. Reynolds, and published the story with Jefferson's approval. He afterwards blackmailed Hamilton with evidence he had secured in a dishonest manner. He was the author of several miserable scandals about Washington. He attempted to blackmail Jefferson into making him postmaster at Richmond, but Jefferson had the moral courage to refuse, even though he knew what to expect, and the penalty of his refusal was the publication of a series of the most revolting stories about his private life, which were copied by the Federalist newspapers of the Northern States with what President Cleveland called "ghoulish glee." Some of these stories were based upon local gossip at Charlottesville, and doubtless had a slender vein of truth, a meagre excuse for existence, but Callender's vulgar and malicious mind magnified and distorted them. Jefferson never stooped to a denial, and his political opponents chose to interpret his silence as an admission of guilt. He was probably no more immoral than Franklin, Washington, Hamilton, and other men of his time. He was neither a St. Anthony nor a Don Juan. Judged by the standards of his generation, his vices were those of a gentleman, and such as did not deprive him of the respect and confidence of the community.

The scandals circulated by the Federalist newspapers were so generally believed that Thomas Moore, the famous Irish poet, accepted them as true, and, visiting the United States during the period of Jefferson's presidency, wrote some verses of which the following is a sample:

"The patriot, fresh from Freedom's councils come,
Now pleas'd, retires to lash his slaves at home;
Or woo, perhaps, some black Aspasia's charms,
And dream of Freedom in his bondmaid's arms."

This poem may be found in the London edition of the "Poetical Works of Thomas Moore," published in 1853, and is embellished by a foot-note explaining that the President of the United States was referred to.

The local traditions attribute to Jefferson the paternity of a distinguished man of the generation following him who was prominently identified in the development of the West, and whose mother, famous for her beauty and attractions, lived near Monticello. Her husband was a dissolute wretch and abandoned her to the protection of friends. Jefferson looked after her interests, advised her concerning the management of her little property, educated her son, appointed him to office, pushed him into political prominence, furnished him opportunities for advancement, and showed an affectionate solicitude for his welfare. It is charitable to suppose that this was due to a friendly rather than a paternal interest.

In early days, and up to a recent period, nearly every mulatto by the name of Jefferson in Albemarle County, and they were numerous, claimed descent from the Sage of Monticello, which gratified their pride but seriously damaged his reputation. Jefferson does not appear to have taken notice of these scandals, except in a single instance. During the campaign of 1804 a respectable mulatto living in Ohio, named Madison Henings, boasted that he was a son of the President and Sally Henings, who was one of his slaves, and Jefferson invoked his carefully kept record of vital statistics at Monticello to prove an alibi. The date of Madison Hening's birth made it impossible for Jefferson to have been his father, and Edward Bacon, the overseer of the plantation, made a statement to a clergyman in which he gave circumstantial evidence to prove Jefferson's innocence . . .

His overseer, Edward Bacon, in dictating his recollections of Jefferson to a clergyman said: "He did not use tobacco in any form. He never used a profane word or anything like it. He never played cards. I never saw a card in the house at Monticello, and I had particular orders from him to suppress card playing among the negroes, whom you know, are very fond of it." Mrs. Randolph, in memoranda prepared for her father's biographer, gave similar testimony, which has been accepted and copied by nearly every writer of Jeffersoniana; and Jefferson himself said, "Gambling corrupts all dispositions and creates a habit of hostility against all mankind." Nevertheless, his account-books contain frequent entries of money won or lost in games of chance; but they were small amounts, never more than a few shillings, which were always carefully noted like this:

"Lost at Backgammon.....	7 / 6
Won at cards.....	7 /
Won at Backgammon.....	7d.
Won at Cross and Pyle.....	3 /
Lost at Lotto	18 /
Mrs. Jefferson lost at cards.....	1 / 3"

Although he was a breeder of fine horses and a famous equestrian, Jefferson never allowed any of them on the turf. Nor did he ever attend a race, so Bacon and his daughter testify, or patronize, or encourage horse-racing in any way, although at that date it was one of the universal amusements of the Virginia gentleman. This is said to have been quite as much from an indifference to the sport as from principle. He was a liberal patron of the theatre and attended every musical entertainment that came within his convenience.

He rarely missed a show of any kind. It has been said that "his curiosity was in quantity as a child's, in quality as a philosopher's." His diary abounds in entries like these:

"1791 Dec 20 pd for seeing a lion 21 months old 11, ½d

"1792 June 1 pd seeing a small seal .125

"1797 March 10 pd seeing elephant .5d

" 13 pd seeing elk .75 d

"1798 Jan 25 pd seeing Caleb Phillips a dwarf .25d

(Note he weighs—lb now and when born he weighed with the clothes in which he was swaddled 31 lb, he is—years old.)

"April 10 1800 pd seeing a painting .25 d"

During the most critical period of his administration of the foreign policy of the government he paid six pence to see an alligator and a shilling to see a learned pig. This might be accounted for by his well-known love of natural history had he not attended a balloon ascension at the same time at the enormous expense of fifteen shillings, and paid one shilling to see "a wax figure of the King of Prussia," and two shillings to witness a puppet show. Nor did Jefferson have the ordinary excuse that some grown-up people consider necessary to justify gratifying curiosity in such a manner, for his children and grandchildren were at Monticello.

He was a man of temperate habits, but spent a great deal of money for wine. His daughter testifies that "he never drank ardent spirits or strong wines. Such was his aversion that when in his last illness his physician desired him to use brandy as an astringent, he could not be induced to take it strong enough." Bacon gives similar testimony. Jefferson himself says: "Of all the great calamities, intemperance is the greatest. The drunkard as much as the maniac requires restrictive measures to save him from the fatal infatuation under which he is destroying his health, his morals, his family and his usefulness to society." Again he refers to "The loathsome and fatal effects of whiskey, destroying the fortunes, the bodies, the minds and the morals of our people."

At the same time Jefferson was an advocate of the use of wine as a matter of health and principle. "I rejoice as a moralist," he says, "at the prospect of a reduction of the duties on wine by our national

legislature. It is an error to view a tax on that liquor as merely a tax on the rich. It is a prohibition of its use among the middle classes of our citizens, and a condemnation of them to the poison of whiskey, which is desolating their homes. No nation is drunken where wine is cheap; and none sober where the dearness of wine substitutes ardent whiskey or spirits as the common beverage. It is in truth, the only antidote to the bane of whiskey."

Jefferson imported large quantities of wine, and kept a record of every bottle bought and every bottle consumed, which he explained was "to try the fidelity of Martin," evidently the servant in charge of his cellar. From his account-book we know that during his first year in the White House he spent \$2,262.33 for wines and during his last year only \$75.88. During his first year his groceries cost him \$2,003.71; during his last year \$258.00. This may be explained by the circumstance that he was in the habit of importing large quantities of dainties for which he had acquired a taste during his residence at the French capital, and also because of his increasing anxiety concerning his debts. From the account-book owned by the late Samuel J. Tilden we are able to learn exactly how much Jefferson expended for his entertainments at the White House and for his other personal expenses. It appears that his wines cost him the following sums in the years named, according to his own calculations:

\$2,622.33	in 1801
1,975.72	in 1802
1,253.57	in 1803
2,668.94	in 1804
546.41	in 1805
659.38	in 1806
553.97	in 1807
75.58	in 1808

Total \$10,855.90

"Average per year $\frac{1}{8}$ th \$1,356.98"

His Maderia seems to have occupied a larger share of his thoughts than any other of his wines. . . .

The two hundred bottles of champagne which appear to have been received from M. D'Yrujo, "100 December 11, 1802 and 100 January 10, 1803," gave occasion for the following letter from the President to the collector at Philadelphia:

"DEAR SIR,—Mons. d'Yrujo the Spanish minister here has been so kind as to spare me two hundred bottles of champagne part of a large parcel imported for his own use and consequently privileged from duty; but it would be improper for me to take the benefit of that. I must therefore ask the favor of you to take the proper measures for

paying the duty, for which purpose I enclose you a bank-check for twenty-two and a half dollars, the amount of it. If it could be done without mentioning my name, it would avoid ill-intentioned observation, as in some such way as this, 'By duty paid on a part of such a parcel of wines not entitled to privilege,' or in any other way you please. The wine was imported into Philadelphia about midsummer last. Accept assurance of my great esteem and respect.

"TH. JEFFERSON."

"General Muhlenberg."

During the latter years of his life he wrote a friend: "I have lived temperately, eating little animal food and that not as an aliment so much as a condiment for the vegetables which constitute my principal diet. I double, however, the Doctor's glass and a half of wine, and even treble it with a friend; but half its effects by drinking weak wines only. The ardent wines I cannot drink, nor do I use ardent spirits in any form. Malt liquors and cider are my table drinks, and my breakfast, like that also of my friend, is of tea and coffee."

X. CONCLUSIONS

The scanty and scattering material collected above gives us a much more intelligible and convincing view of the Fathers than we obtain in the conventional folk-lore. Out of their own mouths they prove themselves to have been corporeal human beings and capable and keen-minded men. Their feet were planted solidly on the ground of factual reality, entirely divorced from the metaphysical and transcendental gush and nonsense with which subsequent generations have surrounded them. They were free and fearless in their expressions of opinion, and uniformly opposed to the arbitrary restriction of the human intellect. They were also cultivated gentlemen, and not the contemptible goose-steppers who now infest our halls of legislation and dance to the music of Wayne B. Wheeler, John S. Sumner, the Watch and Ward Society and the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church. We may well refer the younger generation to Patristic literature but we should understand that the perusal of this material is much more likely to produce a crop of young Menckens, Fabian Franklins, Beards, Deweys, Robinsons, Rodger Baldwins, Harry Thurston Pecks, Crolys and Villards than to generate a flock of juvenile Judge Garys, William D.

Guthries, James M. Becks, John Roach Stratons and Calvin Coolidges.⁶⁹

SELECTED REFERENCES

Beard, C. A., *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States; Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy; The Economic Basis of Politics*; Bennett, J. L., *The Essential American Tradition*; Beveridge, A. J., *The Life of John Marshall*; Curtis, W. E., *The True Thomas Jefferson*; Farrand, M., *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787; The Framing of the Constitution; The Fathers of the Constitution*; Fisher, S. G., *The True Benjamin Franklin*; Ford, H. J., *Washington and His Colleagues; Alexander Hamilton*; Ford, P. L., *The True George Washington*; Hamilton, A. M., *The Intimate Life of Alexander Hamilton*; Harlow, R. V., *Samuel Adams*; Hulbert, A. B., *Colonel Washington; Washington and the West; The Washington We Forget*; McMaster, J. B., *With the Fathers*; Merriam, C. E., *American Political Theories*; Morse, J. T. Jr. (Editor), *American Statesmen Series*; Muzzey, D. S., *Thomas Jefferson*; Myers, G., *History of the Supreme Court*; Oliver, F. S., *Alexander Hamilton*; Oneal, J., *The Workers in American History*; Prussing, E. E., "George Washington: Captain of Industry," in *Scribner's Magazine*, October and November, 1921; Remsburg, J. E., *Six Historic Americans*; Simons, A. M., *Social Forces in American History*; Smith, J. A., *The Spirit of the American Government*; Walsh, C. M., *The Political Science of John Adams*; Wandell, S. H., *Aaron Burr; The Diaries of George Washington, 1748-1799*, edited by J. C. Fitzpatrick.

⁶⁹ Cf. C. A. Beard, in *New Republic*, July 29, 1925, pp. 269-70.

CHAPTER XI

HUNTING BOLSHEVIKS IN 1798

I. THE RADICAL BOGY: ANCIENT AND MODERN

WITHIN the last decade, beginning with the Woodrovian assault upon the constitutional liberties of the citizen in the so-called espionage legislation of 1917 and running down to Mr. Coolidge's explosion of indignation against Senator Walsh and his associates for intruding upon the austere privacy of Messrs. Mellon, Daugherty, McLean *et al.*, we have witnessed one of the most interesting and significant recorded attempts of American politicians to protect themselves and their henchmen from public criticism and popular indignation. While this ominous debauch of intimidation and repression has probably been the most serious in our history, such political defense-mechanisms are not without precedent in the American past, and I shall here attempt, in proof of it, a brief review of the first important episode of the sort—the case of the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798–1800, already familiar to many, perhaps, in its general outlines, but all too little studied in detail.

Such a survey is likely to be interesting, not only because it illustrates the diverse and unforeseen dangers of such oppressive legislation, but also because it makes clear the fact that the Fathers, who are now regarded with almost superstitious reverence by the conservative classes, were in their own day looked upon as most dangerous and licentious radicals. They were, in truth, twofold or double-barreled revolutionists. Such men as Hamilton, John Adams and John Hancock had not only helped, in Benjamin Franklin's phrase, to break "that beautiful vase, the British Empire"; they had also "brought into contempt" the government which had been set up in the United States under the Articles of Confederation,—worse, they had overthrown it and established a new one through bloodless but truly revolutionary action. So much for the Federalist leaders. The radicals, led by Jefferson, were regarded even by the Federalists much as William D. Guthrie

and his sympathizers viewed the suspended Socialist legislators at Albany, or as Scott Nearing is looked upon by Senator Lusk. These lineal party ancestors of the late Attorney-General Palmer, whose traditions he probably piously imagined himself to be carrying out, were held by their more respectable contemporaries to be dangerous and foul-mouthed incendiaries, who were a menace to the safety of the country and its institutions and whose deportation or imprisonment was dictated by every consideration of political principle and moral expediency. Finally, the revolutionary refugees from France, with whose descendants even the most conservative Americans of to-day join heartily in celebrating the destruction of the Bastille, were viewed by all right-thinking men in the America of 1798 almost exactly as sympathizers with the Soviet government of Russia are put before the right-thinkers of to-day by Charles E. Hughes and the gifted editorial writers of the New York *Herald-Tribune* and *Times*.

In an interesting article on this period of antique Bolshevism, in the New York *Times* for October 12, 1919, Mr. Alfred B. Williams thus describes the radicalism of the period immediately preceding the Alien and Sedition Laws:

Bolshevism and revolutionary tendencies as we have them now compare with the frenzies with which President Washington had to deal as a mild attack of dyspeptic irritation compares with a roaring case of delirium tremens.

From April, 1793, well into 1796 rabid anarchy swept over the baby Republic, from Boston to Savannah, like prairie fire. Comparison with delirium tremens is right, because, so far as we may judge from the scraps of history available, the little Nation was wildly drunk the greater part of the three years. Certainly liquor was sprinkled, poured, and soaked throughout the orgy. The reek of it comes to us strongly across more than a century and a quarter of time in the frantic speeches, toasts, printed articles, and crazy, limping versification vociferously applauded by crowds at banquets spread to glorify the red cap and the guillotine.

Cities, sections, and classes seem to have vied with one another in howling threats to destroy our own Government and all government and to make here a reign of terror in faithful imitation of the worst excesses of the French Revolution. The thoughts, the talk, and the songs of men and the columns of newspapers and pages of pamphlets bristled and burnt with "Ca ira," with "la lanterne" for the bourgeoisie, the capitalist and the stock jobber, tumbrils and the ax for all aristocrats, with daggers for the hearts of Senators and rulers,

the torch for the homes of wealth, the tumbling over and tearing down of authority.

This was in the happy, simple, and sturdily patriotic early days of our land which orators lament with pathetic glibness and extol with blatant belittling of the present. The school histories, and most of the others, cater to national vanity and ancestral pride by gliding over this period of contagious lunacy and treason with dutiful daintiness. Apparently it has been thought not good to inform oncoming generations that so many of those we are taught to revere as the founders had their desperate spree, tried to fire the temple before it had been completed, and were far more dangerous than all wild-eyed and wild-ideaed foreigners we are denouncing and dreading.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS.

The setting of the Alien and Sedition Laws is well known. The growing strength of the Republican party, with its adoption of principles which challenged sharply the strong centralizing and aristocratic policies of the Federalists, frightened the latter and led the lesser minds among them to believe that something should and could be done to put down the new menace by direct repression. Foreign relations also played their part. Feeling against France and the French revolutionary government had been intensified by the X. Y. Z. episode, which had diverted the sympathy of the masses from the revolutionary forces in France, and produced a revulsion of popular opinion against the Jeffersonian view of the French question. The situation was still further affected by the fact that many European, particularly French, radicals had fled to the United States, and proceeded to carry on their political controversy from our shores.

The United States, indeed, had become an asylum for radicals, and they had taken advantage of the liberal institutions of the new Republic to secure release from the accumulated repressions they had brought with them from Europe. This they had accomplished by attacking those who, in America, represented the political power and authority which they had come so thoroughly to hate in Europe. Worst of all, from the Federalist point of view, their virulence was being exploited by Jefferson and his supporters in their effort to organize a new party of opposition to the Federalists. Professor Channing has well summarized the situation in June, 1798:

Many of these newcomers were extreme radicals and expressed their opinions by speech or pen with a venomous facility that has few counterparts in these milder times. In their old homes, they had detested kings and governors, but had been compelled to keep their thoughts more or less to themselves. In America, they condemned whatever magistrate they found in power without fear of guillotine, ax, Bastille or Tower. . . . It was inevitable that, in 1798, some one should ask by what right a lot of foreigners came over here and malignantly reproached those whom the voters had placed in high station. If these foreigners did not like the men and things that appealed to the majority of American voters, let them keep away, or if they had come over, let them get out.

The Federalists were greatly alarmed over the success which seemed to be attending Jefferson's effort to organize the radical elements into a stable party, but it is doubtful if all the sagacity of Jefferson, all the logic of Madison, and all the shrewdness of Burr could have aided their cause and turned public sentiment against their opponents as readily as the Federalists did themselves by their indiscretion in the moment of victory. These Federalists, stirred by the X. Y. Z. trouble and the virulence of the Republican press, and observing accurately that public opinion had begun to turn in their favor, now foolishly "signed their own death-warrant." On June 21, 1798, the House passed an act, previously passed by the Senate, entitled "An Act Concerning Aliens," and providing for the deportation of obnoxious foreigners. The act enabled the President to order such aliens as he deemed dangerous to leave the country; and upon their failure to comply with his order they might be imprisoned for three years at hard labor and forfeit all future possibility of becoming American citizens. If an alien should return to the country after having been once sent out, he could be imprisoned at hard labor for a term discretionary with the President.

On July 3 another act, entitled "An Act Respecting Alien Enemies," was passed by the Senate, to which it had been sent by the House, and it was approved by the President on July 6. This provided that in case of war between the United States and any other country, all citizens of that country should be liable to be seized and held as alien enemies. The President was to determine the conditions of restraining them, and the circumstances under which they might be permitted to remain in the United States, as

well as to provide for the removal of those who were not allowed to remain.

Finally, on July 10, the House passed the most obnoxious of all this triad of repressive measures, the famous Sedition Act. The first section provided that all persons or combinations of persons venturing to oppose the passage of measures before Congress, to impede the operation of the laws of the United States, to intimidate a public official or prevent him from doing his duty, or to attempt to incite an insurrection or riot, should be fined not more than \$5,000, and be imprisoned from six months to five years.

The second and most odious section was as follows:

And be it enacted that if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause to procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly and wittingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them or either of them into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the Constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage, or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof duly convicted before any court or tribunal of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

It should be made clear, of course, that this legislation was not sanctioned by the best minds of the time, even among the conservatives. As in the case of the Espionage Act and the exclusion of the Socialist members at Albany, the three acts were the product of the Palmers and Lusks of that era—the petty politicians and irritated mediocrities in Congress and the insignificant functionaries in the administration whose inflated pride was injured by criticism and who resented the support which the foreign radicals

gave to Jefferson and his party. As such men as Charles E. Hughes, Nicholas Murray Butler and Harlan D. Stone denounced the excesses of 1918-20, so Hamilton and Marshall attacked the Alien and Sedition Acts as untimely, unwise and ill-considered, and even Adams himself was only lukewarm in their support.

III. REACTION AGAINST THE REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION

It is easy to surmise what effect such measures as these, which, however great the provocation the Federalists may have had for passing them, certainly had no justification in constitutional law, would have on Jefferson and his party. Here was something which monarchical England would not tolerate, and compared to which the measures of Hamilton were mild, indeed. But however aroused and embittered Jefferson may have been, his conduct stands out in remarkably favorable contrast to the precipitate and ill-considered action of the Federalists. The wily sage of Monticello realized that as soon as the real import of the acts was fully grasped by the country at large, there would be a marked revulsion of opinion against the Federalists and a transfer of sympathy to his party. He was careful to see to it that, while legal protests might be made against them and popular sentiment aroused, no act of violence should be permitted against the government which might, like the Whisky Insurrection, the Genet trouble, or the X. Y. Z. affair, cause the people to forget their wrongs and grievances and again rally to the support of the administration.

Early in June, 1798, he wrote to Madison: "they have brought into the lower house a Sedition bill, which among other enormities, undertakes to make printing certain matter criminal, though one of the amendments to the Constitution has so expressly taken religion, printing presses, etc., out of their coercion. Indeed, this bill and the Alien bill both are so palpably in the teeth of the Constitution as to show they mean to pay no respect to it." To Steven T. Mason he wrote on October 11 his most vigorous criticism of these measures:

The X. Y. Z. fever has considerably abated through the country, as I am informed, and the Alien and Sedition laws are working hard. I fancy that some of the State Legislatures will take strong ground on this occasion. [Jefferson was at this very time writing the Kentucky Resolutions.] For my part, I consider these laws are merely an experiment on the American mind to see how far it will bear an

avowed violation of the Constitution. If this goes down we shall immediately see attempted another act of Congress, declaring that the President shall continue in office during life, reserving to another occasion the transfer of the succession to his heirs, and the establishment of the Senate for life. At least this may be the aim of the Oliverians [Adams and his followers], while Monk [Hamilton] and the Cavaliers, who are perhaps the strongest, may be playing their game for the restoration of his most gracious majesty, George the Third. That these things are in contemplation, I have no doubt; nor can I be confident of their failure, after the dupery of which our countrymen have shown themselves susceptible.

On February 13, 1799, Jefferson wrote to Archibald Stuart telling him of the change of public opinion and expressing the hope that an insurrection might not break out and injure their cause:

The public are getting back to the point where they were when the X. Y. Z. story was played off on them. A wonderful and rapid change is taking place in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York. Congress is daily plied with petitions against the Alien and Sedition laws and standing armies. Several parts of this State [Pennsylvania] are so violent that we fear an insurrection. This will be brought about by some [Federalists] if they can. It is the only thing we have to fear. The appearance of an attack against the government would check the present current of the middle States and rally them around the government, whereas if suffered to go on, it will pass on to a reformation of abuses. The materials now bearing on the public mind will infallibly restore it to its republican soundness in the course of the present Summer, if the knowledge of the facts can only be disseminated among the people.

To Edmund Pendleton he wrote a letter the next day expressing the same general attitude:

The violations of the Constitution, propensities to war, to expense, and to a particular foreign connection, which we have lately seen, are becoming evident to the people, and are dispelling that mist which X. Y. Z. had spread before their eyes. This State [Pennsylvania] is coming forward with a boldness not yet seen. Even the German counties of York and Lancaster, hitherto the most devoted, have come about, and by petitions by 4,000 signers remonstrated against the Alien and Sedition laws, standing armies, and discretionary powers in the President. New York and New Jersey are also getting into great agitation. In this State we fear that the ill-designing may produce insurrection. Nothing could be so fatal.

Anything like force would check the progress of public opinion and rally them around the government. This is not the kind of opposition the American people will permit. But keep away all show of force and they will bear down the evil propensities of the government by the constitutional means of election and petition. If we can be quiet, therefore, the tide now turning will take a steady and proper direction. Even in New Hampshire there are strong symptoms of a rising inquietude. In this state of things, my dear sir, it is more in your power than in any man's in the United States, to give the *coup de grace* to the ruinous principles and practices that we have seen. In hopes you have consented to it, I shall furnish to you some additional matter which has arisen since my last.

The popular feeling against the laws was exactly what Jefferson had predicted. A storm of protest immediately went up from the Republican press. The earlier attack on the "Democratic societies" had been resented as an infringement of the right of freedom of speech and of the press, but that was in no way comparable to these sweeping tyrannical measures. Examples of popular protests against the new laws are preserved in abundance in Professor McMaster's monumental work. "What," said Greenleaf's *Daily Advertiser*, "is libel? A libel is whatever a Federalist President, marshal, judge, and grand jury choose to make it. The President orders the prosecution. The process goes on in his name. He appoints the marshal. The marshal summons the grand and petit jurors, and in a large city Federalist Tories for this duty may be had in plenty. Nor is this all. The Federal judges are likewise named by the President, who, if they behave well, may make them envoys extraordinary, as he did John Jay." "Does any man hope for an impartial trial before such a tribunal as this?" demanded Carey's *United States Recorder*. "The thing is an infamous mockery of justice. The moment the law takes effect the Democrat who squints at the President through a pair of spectacles will be guilty of sedition. To look at him through an opera-glass will subject a man to misprison of treason." And the *Independent Chronicle* added:

To laugh at the cut of a Congressman's coat, to give a dinner to a Frenchman or to let him sleep in your bed will be treason. When election time comes 'round, it will no longer be safe to speak of a member's doings in the House lest it "bring him into contempt and disrepute." Do the Tories really think their gag law will be obeyed? If one knows a member to be actuated by bad and wicked motives,

shall he not say so? Can any man read the amendments to the Constitution and say such freedom of speech can be abridged? Certainly not! The independent citizens of America will never be deterred from a manly censure on their servants. May the hand grow palsied and the voice grow dumb that shrinks from such a task, let the threats of the servants of the people be ever so loud. As for the creature who proposed this gag, let him have that kind of immortality which has fallen to the ruffian who burned down the temple of Diana. Give the name of this Vandal, this Goth, this Ostrogoth, this Hun, to be a byword among the nations! Hold him up while living to the execration of mankind. Consign him when dead to the abhorrence of posterity.

If the Federalists were imprudent in their method of attempting to restrain this abusive criticism of the press, they were no less so in their selection of the first person to experiment upon in the enforcement of the Sedition Act. The man who was singled out was Matthew Lyon, of Vermont, known in Federalist circles as "The Beast from Vermont." Two months before, Lyon had gained considerable publicity and distinction by spitting in the face of Congressman Griswold of Connecticut, whereupon Griswold proceeded to cane him in a manner which served admirably as a sort of preliminary bout to the notable Sumner-Brooks encounter, half a century later. This attack upon Lyon and the bitter articles which appeared in the Federalist papers against him had tended to make him a martyr in the eyes of the Republicans. It was natural, then, when he was arrested, that the Republicans, knowing him to be bitterly hated by the Federalists, immediately attacked his detention as a purely partisan and personal act of revenge. Doubtless this was true in a measure, and it appeared all the more evident when it was seen that Lyon's offense was a trivial one, far less serious than those of which even Hamilton and Jefferson had been guilty. After a trial which furnished the Republicans with evidence that he had been unfairly treated, he was fined one thousand dollars and sentenced to jail for four months.

Lyon's son placed his father's cause before the public in a little paper called the *Scourge of Aristocracy and Repository of Important Political Truths*. His friends petitioned the President to release him, but when Adams heard that Lyon (like Debs and others in 1921) would not humble himself enough to sign the petition, he refused their request. To pay his fine a lottery was started in which his property was made a prize, and a stirring call was is-

sued urging the people "to be prompt in saving from poverty the first sacrifice on the altar of Sedition." Steven T. Mason, of Virginia, Jefferson's old friend, started a subscription to pay his fine. Lyon was reelected to Congress by his constituency and his friends girdled the apple trees of those who had testified against him. His release was celebrated as an escape from the "Federal Bastille." There was confusion and excitement throughout the country.

Not only in the Lyon affair were the Federalists unfortunate in their attempt to enforce the Sedition law, but also in the cases of Callender and Cooper. Much of the odium which was bestowed upon them in these instances was due to the conduct of Judge Samuel Chase, who presided at both trials. McMaster brands him as "as violent and intemperate a partisan, and, therefore, as unjust a judge as ever disgraced the bench of the Circuit Court of the United States." In the Cooper case, before pronouncing sentence, he asked whether Cooper or the Republican party was to pay the fine, as he would go the limit if it was the latter. His colleague, Judge Peters, however, preserved sufficient judicial dignity to declare that the matter of party was not involved. Cooper's conviction was particularly unpopular because his offense was a mild criticism of the acts of the President, a very slight misdeed compared to what Hamilton and Pickering, two of the leading men in the Federalist party, were guilty of doing in this very same matter. It was a situation comparable to that in 1917-18, when Debs, Mrs. Stokes, Mrs. O'Hare and others were imprisoned and Roosevelt and Harvey were left unmolested. This case, together with the fact that the ten or so editors who were punished under the Sedition Act were all Republicans, branded all three laws as strictly party measures, as they doubtless were. In the Callender trial Chase is said to have throttled the attorneys for the defense. This conduct brought upon him the bitter attacks of the Republicans, who gave his name to dogs and maligned him in the press, and it no doubt served to stimulate the subsequent Republican attack on the judiciary.

IV. THE DEFEAT OF THE REACTIONARIES

As has been almost uniformly the case in modern history, this attempt to repress or destroy a liberal party through limitations on its freedom of expression resulted in consequences quite differ-

ent from those which the authors of the laws anticipated. The Jeffersonian radicals profited greatly by the relentless persecution which the Federalists directed against them, and being able to avoid violence, soon won the sympathy of many who had not hitherto been their supporters. Thus the general political result of the laws was to increase the numbers of the Republicans and to strengthen and solidify their organization, while the Federalists were at the same time dealt a blow which marked the beginning of the disintegration of their party. The whole episode, in brief, had much the same effect on the Federalists as the Wilson-Palmer indignities had on the Democratic party in 1920. McMaster has admirably summarized it thus:

For passing the [Sedition] Act there was unquestionably great provocation. No man who has not waded through the political literature of the closing years of the last century can form any conception of the depths of falsehood, of knavery, of calumny, of shameful abuse to which it is possible for writers of pamphlets and newspapers to descend. Yet the law was most untimely and unwise. Had the Federalist congressmen assembled in caucus and debated by what means they could make themselves more hated than they had ever been before, by what means they could destroy their present power, by what means they could turn thousands of "Black Cockaders" into bitter and inveterate foes, they could not by any possibility have found a means so efficient as the law against libellous and seditious writing. Hamilton saw this plainly and begged them not to set up tyranny. Energy, he reminded them, was one thing; violence was another. But they would not listen to him. Their faces were set toward destruction. And from the day the bill became a law, the Federalist party went steadily down to ruin.

Along with the Alien and Sedition Acts and the odium which they brought upon the Federalists there were, of course, other causes which contributed to the downfall of the Federalist party. A dangerous split developed in it, dividing it into two factions, one led by Adams and Marshall and the other by Hamilton and Pickering. Burr's genius for political organization in New York State, together with Jefferson's skillful exploitation of the situation created by the Alien and Sedition Acts in building up something like a national organization for the Republican party, proved sufficient to defeat the Federalists in the presidential election of 1800. When they came into power the Republicans took over most of the

strong nationalistic policies of the Federalists and left the latter with practically no program. Finally, the treachery of Pickering in his conduct with respect to the Jeffersonian embargo and the abortive attempt at secession or nullification during the War of 1812, served to end the existence of the party altogether.

In addition to their effect upon the Federalists, there was another very important result of the Alien and Sedition Acts, namely, the doctrine of nullification, which first appeared in the famous Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions drafted by Jefferson and Madison. Going beyond mere party organization, these Republican leaders attempted to arouse legislative opposition to the acts in the Southern States. The Kentucky Resolutions were drawn up by Jefferson and were introduced in the Kentucky legislature on November 10, 1798. A year later they were strengthened by the addition of the doctrine that every state in the Union possessed the right to nullify laws passed by the Federal government which exceeded the powers delegated to it by the Constitution. Though Jefferson was unable at the time to get any significant following for this doctrine, it furnished a precedent for the Hartford Convention and for the later theory of Calhoun. The Virginia Resolutions were drafted by Madison and were introduced in the Virginia legislature on December 27, 1798. While agreeing in general with the doctrines expressed in the Kentucky Resolutions, they did not declare as clearly for nullification, but rather called upon the other states to join in a "condemnation" of the hated legislation.

The one significant generalization to be made concerning the Alien and Sedition episode is that, as in the case of almost every other effort at repression, the results ran wholly toward defeating the objects of the legislation. In 1798 the Federalist congressmen and officials had been subjected to humiliating but in no way menacing criticism from a group with little prestige or power in the country. In their foolhardy effort to rid themselves of this irritation they increased the volume and violence of the onslaught, wrecked the Federalist party as a political force, greatly aided in augmenting and solidifying the opposing party led by Jefferson, and brought forth the constitutional theory which proved most destructive of the whole Federalist philosophy of government, to wit, the doctrine of nullification. It took a bloody civil war to bring American constitutional theory and practice back to where Washington and Hamilton had left it. The revival of so impotent

and dangerous a device in 1917 by an ex-professor of American history is but another proof that "the greatest lesson which history teaches us is that history teaches us nothing."

SELECTED REFERENCES

Bassett, J. S., *The Federalist System*; Chafee, Z., *The Freedom of Speech*; Channing, E., *History of the United States*, Vol. IV; MacDonald, W., *Select Documents Illustrative of the History of the United States, 1776-1861*; McMaster, J. B., *History of the People of the United States*, Vol. II; Schlesinger, A. M., *New Viewpoints in American History*, Chap. X; Schouler, J., *History of the United States*, Vol. I; Warfield, E. D., *The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798*; Williams, A. B., "When Real Bolshevism was here in 1793-1796," in *New York Times*, October 12, 1919.

CHAPTER XII

THE SECOND WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

I. THE EPIC OF 1812

NEXT to the epoch of the Revolutionary War and its preliminaries, the period of our history from 1783 to 1812 has been the one most exploited by the patriotic type of historians, and the one most zealously guarded against any invasion of truth and candor by our hundred per cent. custodians of textbooks. The orthodox view of the period, in so far as its events relate to the Anglo-American problem, is substantially as follows:

As soon as it had partially recovered from the effect of the crushing military blow which it had received from American arms in the Revolution, the British government began a systematic campaign of insults and oppression, as if determined to drive the United States into another war, in the hope that it might be forced back into the British Empire. The treaty of 1783 was ruthlessly violated by Great Britain, and the diplomatic attempt of John Jay to remedy the unendurable situation only added new grievances and insults. American ships were subjected to search without provocation and in violation of every accepted dictate of international law. American subjects were pressed into unlawful and unwilling service in the British navy and were forced to fight against France, our former ally. As if not satisfied with these atrocities, Great Britain discovered an even more exasperating engine of oppression in the Orders in Council. By these she attempted to destroy the American merchant marine, which had grown to such proportions as to arouse the jealousy of British merchants. There being no disposition on the part of the English public or the British government to alter this onerous and insulting system of extortion and exploitation, the United States was aroused to a man. By force of arms we compelled the relinquishment of the impositions in a "second war for independence," marked by a series of brilliant victories on land and sea. These victories again demonstrated

the greater public virtue and military capacity of the Americans, and forever discouraged Great Britain from desiring another test of arms with the United States.

II. THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION

One reason, perhaps, for all this misconception of the background of the War of 1812 lies in the fact that we tend to project back into the period from 1783 to 1812 the relative strength and position of the United States and Great Britain to-day. We forget that England looked upon the United States after 1783 with the same amused and semi-benevolent contempt with which, for example, the United States viewed Cuba and Porto Rico after 1898. We constituted a new, small and insignificant country that had still to make its way into international society. England, with her prestige and her hold upon Canada and the West Indies, was inclined to take our pretensions and interests about as seriously as the United States views the interests of Haiti and the nations of the Caribbean. Nor was she alone in this attitude. Our "friend," France, was equally arrogant and contemptuous of the United States. As Professor Channing points out, French officials in the United States were given an authority comparable to that of American consuls in China at the close of the nineteenth century.

The period from 1783 to 1812 was but a long prelude to another war with Great Britain. It is impossible to say what might have happened if Great Britain, in 1793, had not been plunged into a general European war which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, with occasionally a brief truce. If Europe had remained at peace then, there is reason to believe that America might have speedily reached an amicable adjustment with her former enemy. But with the United States a neutral country, and with the two great American parties taking opposite sides in the European conflict, pacific diplomacy was quite impossible. If a foreign country appeared willing to negotiate fairly, the party of opposition in the United States saw to it that the negotiations were undone lest its opponent make political capital out of success.

The first dispute after the Revolution arose from a combination of the refusal of the British to fulfil all the terms of the treaty of 1783 along with the impositions laid upon our trade as a result of the exigencies of the European war. But it is hard to assign the entire blame for the failure to enforce the treaty of 1783 to

Great Britain. The infractions of the treaty were about equally divided between the two parties to it. Great Britain was continually governed by her economic, political and international interests rather than by any regard for legal exactness. She retained the western trading posts she had agreed to surrender because their retention would allow her agents to control the valuable fur trade of the Mississippi and Great Lakes area, and to continue the military alliance with the Indians. She also was guilty of removing Negroes at the time of her evacuation of American cities. She justified this conduct on the basis of the not inaccurate charge that "America has not complied with even one article of the treaty." The United States, in truth, had treated the Loyalists shamefully after 1783, had confiscated their estates, and had obstructed as far as possible the collection of debts due to British subjects. Even John Jay admitted that there had not been a single day since 1783 on which the treaty had not been violated by some one of the states. He called it a record of lawlessness which it would be desirable to hide from posterity. Thus, it is probably safe to conclude with Professor Channing, the latest careful student of the problem, that the subject of violations of the treaties is an intricate one, with responsibility distributed about "fifty-fifty."

The first serious attempt to adjust the consequent difficulties was made by John Jay when he went to England in 1794. But his treaty, which reached America in 1795, was hardly satisfactory. Jay had been courteously received at the English court, but he had been forced to accept terms which were in some respects more favorable to England than to the United States. It is difficult now to tell how much these terms were due to English stubbornness and how much they were a result of insufficient insistence on the part of Jay. The worst feature of the treaty, as it is seen to-day, was a clause on the West Indian trade which would have greatly burdened the future Southern cotton industry, but this was not actually important before the general adoption of the cotton-gin, invented in 1793. In 1791 only thirty-eight bales of cotton had been exported, and Jay can hardly be blamed for not foreseeing the results of an invention of which he had, perhaps, never heard.

The exactions of England were the price the United States had to pay for securing her recognition of our independence, and for abating her commercial hostility, which might well have ruined our national credit and thrown the United States into anarchy and disintegration. Our finances could not have weathered a com-

mercial war with England in 1794, to say nothing of a war of arms. Jay's treaty averted hostilities for the time being and made us better prepared for them when they came eighteen years later. In reality the whole treaty embodied Hamilton's policy. As Professor Samuel F. Bemis has well said:

The terms of his treaty were the result of the powerful influence of Alexander Hamilton, to whom in the last analysis any praise or blame for the instrument must be given. It was the price paid by the Federalists for a peace which they believed indispensable to the perpetuation of American nationality. More aptly the treaty might be called Hamilton's.

Any one who holds to-day that England was extortionate in exploiting our weakness should delve into the history of American financial and commercial negotiations in Latin America and the Far East during the last generation.

III. THE IMPRESSMENT OF SEAMEN

The Jay treaty, however, was a mere passing incident in the development of strained relations between the United States and Great Britain.

The first, and one of the chief causes of friction was the impressment of seamen on American ships, alleged to be former British subjects. According to the English law, and, for that matter, according to the international law of Europe at the time, citizenship was inalienable. A person who was born an English citizen could not renounce his citizenship and become a citizen of another nation. The United States, being a new nation, and desirous of attracting immigrants, had made a new departure in international law by legalizing the transfer of citizenship. That Great Britain would honor this novelty as a part of international law was as unlikely as it would be to expect the United States Supreme Court to alter a decision to-day because of the ruling of an inferior court in some remote rural district. Few reputable authorities have denied that, from the standpoint of the accepted international law of the time, England was wholly within her rights in stopping a trading vessel on the high seas and taking from it former British citizens. In fact, in 1799 the United States Supreme Court had essentially recognized the legality of the act.

Not only is it agreed that England was legally correct in search-

ing American ships and taking from them her former subjects, but it is equally frankly admitted that the situation was sufficiently serious to justify her action. She was engaged in a life and death struggle with Napoleon, and could not afford to countenance wholesale desertions from either her navy or her merchant marine. That such wholesale desertions were attempted with the complete acquiescence of the American authorities is undeniable. The increased trade of the United States had raised the demand for, and the pay of, sailors far beyond anything known at the time in England, and this encouraged English sailors to desert their country's ships, buy American citizenship papers and enter the American service. Henry Adams, the great authority on the period, describes the situation in the following paragraph :

Every English vessel which entered a Virginia port was at once abandoned by her crew, who hastened to enter the public or private ships of the United States. The captain of any British frigate which might happen to run into the harbor of New York, if he went ashore, was likely to meet on his return to the wharf some of his boat's crew strolling about the town, every man supplied with papers of American citizenship. This was the more annoying because American agents in British ports habitually claimed and received the benefit of the British law; while so far as American papers were concerned, no pretense was made of concealing the fraud, but they were issued in any required quantity, and were transferred for a few dollars from hand to hand.

Adams concludes that if the American government had been willing to discontinue the encouragement of desertions and enforce a strict naturalization law there would have been little or no trouble over impressment. McMaster agrees with him as to the seriousness of the desertions which the British had to face at a time of grave danger, and as to the unwillingness of the Americans to aid in the enforcement of their own law. He says :

At Norfolk the crew of a British vessel quit in a body and shipped for a cruise on an American sloop of war. At New York almost every English vessel that came into port was forced to go short-handed away. To get the men back was impossible, for neither magistrates nor people would apprehend them.

As America thus encouraged desertions and protected deserters, England to that degree became more indiscriminate in her impress-

ments, and in the end came virtually to ignore the actual fact of nativity. Thus a vicious circle of grievances was set up. As far as causes are concerned, the blame was apparently about equally divided, but unquestionably England had the better of the legal argument.

IV. THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL AND THE TREACHERY OF TIMOTHY PICKERING

The second main cause of the War of 1812 was British interference with American trade under the Orders in Council of 1807-1812.

These Orders in Council were not original and unprovoked examples of British arrogance and perversity, but were simply part of a necessary program of retaliation to meet Napoleon's Continental system. The British had formally blockaded the French coast before Napoleon issued his Berlin Decree, but Fox, the Foreign Minister, in order to conciliate British and American merchants, had ordered that the blockade be enforced only between Havre and Ostend. As a formal counter-move to this partially unenforced British blockade, Napoleon, whose pride would not allow him to secure neutral goods through British connivance, issued the Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806, which "cut the roots of neutral rights and American commerce with Europe." It is important to remember that this ruthless trade war upon neutral commercial rights was thus initiated by Napoleon.

The first British Order in Council was issued on January 7, 1807. It was more liberal to America than Napoleon's decree, for, while he had ordered all the British ports blockaded, the Order in Council allowed Americans to trade with France through Bordeaux. This moderate policy, however, was abandoned very quickly, for, with the accession of Canning, Percival, and the reactionary Tory ministry, a new Order in Council was promulgated on November 11, 1807. This was as severe as the Napoleonic decree, for it practically excluded American ships from all ports which were closed to British shipping, namely, those from the Adriatic to the Baltic. Napoleon perfected the French retaliation by his Milan Decree of December 17, 1807. It is perhaps instructive at this point to recall that in 1917 the United States went to war on the side of England after she had for three years interfered in a high-handed manner with our mails and shipping and

had excluded our ships from German and Austrian ports as thoroughly as she did from French ports from 1807 to 1812. Similar treatment assuredly does not, at different times, induce identical reactions.

The last Order in Council was a crushing and fatal blow to the American carrying trade, but the American cause was not without its advocates among influential Englishmen and especially among English merchants. Lord Bathurst, president of the Board of Trade, bitterly criticized all the Orders and correctly maintained that the commerce of England and America would suffer more than that of Napoleon. Henry Brougham conducted a veritable campaign in Parliament against the Orders during the winter and spring of 1808. After having taken two weeks to demonstrate their ruinous effects, he concluded his opposition by a brilliant speech advocating their repeal. Alexander Baring, later Lord Ashburton, a prominent British merchant, published a vigorous pamphlet attacking the new trade policy. Lord Erskine attacked it also, and with great energy, and Grey questioned its wisdom. In general, the Whigs bitterly opposed the Tory ministry, much as they had in the period during the Revolution.

It is probable that the British ministry, under such pressure at home, and with Jefferson's embargo to face, might have been compelled to rescind or modify the Orders in Council if the enemies of Jefferson had not interfered and made such a move impossible. Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts, that noble Puritan patriot, who was twice the leader in determined attempts to break up the United States through the secession of New England (first at the time of the purchase of Louisiana, when he feared that the newly added territory would give the South a predominant position in the Union, and again at the time of the notorious Hartford Convention of 1814), and whose hatred for Jefferson and his party quite outweighed his interest in the welfare of his country, hastened to intervene against the favorable trend of affairs lest Jefferson be successful in his embargo and thus gain added prestige for himself and his party. Pickering got into direct contact with George Canning and urged him to persist in his program. He was not deterred in the slightest by the fact that, ironically enough, he had himself, when Secretary of State a decade earlier, secured the passage of a law which made such conduct a crime punishable by a fine of five thousand dollars and by imprisonment from six months to ten years. This law was still in force. As Adams re-

marks, Pickering hated Jefferson as Cotton Mather hated a witch, and to placate his conscience he developed the projective illusion that Jefferson was abjectly controlled by Napoleon. Adams says of his conduct:

When Pickering defied fine and imprisonment under his own law in order to make a concert of political action with George Canning to keep the British government steady in aggression, he believed that his end justified his means, and he avowed his end to be the bringing of his friends into power. For this purpose he offered himself to Canning as an instrument for organizing what was in fact a British party in New England, asking in return only the persistence of Great Britain in a line of policy already adopted, which was sure to work against Republican rule. Pickering knew that his conduct was illegal, but he had in his hands an excuse which justified him, as he chose to think, in disregarding the law. He persuaded himself that Jefferson was secretly bound by an engagement with Napoleon to effect the ruin of England.

This outrageous slander of the Jeffersonian policy, which was duly exploited by the unscrupulous Canning, effectively terminated any possibility of an immediate and peaceful settlement of the controversy. The ultimate responsibility for the War of 1812 thus probably rests upon Timothy Pickering more than upon any other single individual in England or America. In spite of this, he violently opposed the war and tried to make it an excuse for the secession of New England. When the anthology of American traitors is completed and objectively analyzed, Pickering will doubtless occupy a far more prominent place in the hierarchy than Benedict Arnold or Aaron Burr.

This unfortunate blocking of a diplomatic adjustment led the American people to believe that Great Britain was determined to persist in her commercial restrictions and to remain impervious to American appeals. That belief naturally gave encouragement to the war party, which was greatly increased in strength and vigor in 1810 by the election of a group of younger congressmen, led by Clay, Cheves, Lowndes, Williams, Grundy, Calhoun, Johnson and Porter, who demanded war to avenge the alleged insults to our national honor. This party was probably ignorant of the effect of Pickering's underhanded interference in England, and it also ignored the general European political situation and the division of English sentiment. It represented primarily the frontier opinion of the time, the American frontier having moved, in the half

century after 1770, from western Virginia to Kentucky. Clay was the Patrick Henry of 1810. Babcock says of the group as a whole:

Their patriotism was untroubled by fear of war and its horrors, and untrammelled by any traditional obligations or sentiments regarding foreign relations, unless it was a chronic suspicion of England, bordering on unreason. With the fine and ready resentment of youth, they scorned the vacillations of Madison and led him and his administration speedily out of the labyrinth into which Jefferson had first guided the Republican party.

While these young "war-hawks" exploited the impressment of seamen and the Orders in Council in their speeches, they were really chiefly interested in conquering Canada, which they not inaccurately looked upon as a perennial source of danger to the United States so long as it remained in British hands and could be used as a point of departure for Indian raids on our territory. As an immediate cause of the War of 1812 the Indian and Canadian issue was more important than the maritime one, just as Professor Alvord and others have shown that the land policies of Great Britain with respect to the Ohio and Mississippi valleys were probably a more potent cause of the Revolution than the fiscal and commercial policies of Grenville, Townshend and Lord North. There was much truth in John Randolph's assertion that "agrarian cupidity, not maritime right, urges the war. Ever since the report of the committee on foreign relations came into the House, we have heard but one word—like the whippoorwill, but one eternal monotonous tone—Canada, Canada, Canada!" To insure himself renomination and reelection, Madison reluctantly yielded to the war party. Canning's arrogant attitude and the indiscretions of poorly chosen British envoys to the United States gave him an excuse for a declaration of war on June 18, 1812. Clay's exuberant enthusiasm and optimism with respect to the imminent Canadian campaign knew no bounds. "I trust," he said, "that I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state that I verily believe that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and upper Canada at your feet."

Great Britain, in the meantime, had relented and decided to modify its commercial policy. Even the governing Tory aristocracy, while it had little respect or love for the United States, did not desire war in 1812. Percival, who had been chiefly responsible for

the second and oppressive Order in Council, was assassinated on May 11, 1812, and Brougham and the Whigs redoubled their pressure on the government for a withdrawal of the Orders in Council. The shutting off of American products from England had caused considerable privation and there was a strong popular British sentiment in favor of repeal.

Unable to maintain itself under all this pressure, Canning and his party gave way and agreed on June 16 to repeal the Orders, which they did on June 23. Thus there is no doubt that the War of 1812 was due in its immediate precipitation almost wholly to the fact that our modern methods of rapid communication were lacking at that time. A cablegram from England on June 16, telling of the action of the British government, should have averted the American declaration of war two days later. By the time that the news reached the United States, matters had gone too far to allow of a pacific adjustment.

V. THE REALITIES OF 1812

Opinion in the United States as to the justifiability and wisdom of the War of 1812 was about as much divided as American sentiment had been a generation before in regard to the Revolution. In general, the North was opposed to the war and the South and West supported it. So far did the opposition go that Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut refused to contribute their quotas of troops to the national army, but instead mobilized their militia to resist the Federal authorities. A New England convention was called at Hartford in 1814 to formulate plans for nullification and secession. The leading spirit in this movement was none other than our old friend, Timothy Pickering. Most of the provisions for the English army in Canada were treasonably sent in by New York and New England. Yet New England made no serious contributions to war expenses.

As to the actual war, the less said about it the better, despite the fact that the epic mongers have exploited its events to a degree almost equalling their utilization of the heroic deeds of the Revolution. It was, admittedly, the most needless, purposeless war of any proportions in which the United States has engaged during its whole history, and also the most barren of good results. The Canadian campaign failed miserably, even more pathetically than that of Arnold and Montgomery in 1777. The national capital

was captured and burned—the worst humiliation we have ever met as an independent nation. These defeats were in part offset by a few brilliant victories at sea, by the triumphs of Perry and Mac-Donough on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, and particularly by Jackson's crushing defeat of Pakenham at New Orleans—after the treaty of Ghent had been signed. It is eloquent of the progress of rapid communication in a century that the War of 1812 was thus precipitated by a declaration made after the chief alleged cause had been eliminated, and that the one conspicuous American victory was achieved after peace had been signed.

But the chief thing which impresses itself upon the modern student of the conflict is its utter insignificance. The wiping out of the St. Mihiel salient in a single day cost more in lives and ammunition than the entire War of 1812. Indeed, there is little doubt nearly as many American soldiers died on the morning of November 11, 1918, in needless fighting after the armistice had been signed. It is also probably as true that all of the American war-ships which took part in the naval conflicts could be ranked up comfortably side by side on the deck of a single modern superdreadnaught. The whole naval war, the description of which started Theodore Roosevelt on his career as an historian and added greatly to the fame of Admiral Mahan, was an insignificant enterprise compared to the conflicts between rum runners and Prohibition enforcement officers during a single year off the New Jersey coast. It is, of course, far from my intention to imply that there were no deeds of heroism performed during the struggle. It probably required more physical vigor and courage to participate in the Battle of Lake Erie than it did to take part in the Battle of Jutland, in the same way that it takes more courage to captain a rum-runner to-day than was required of Admiral Dewey at Manila Bay. What I hope to make clear is simply the pettiness of the whole affair, even as compared with the Spanish-American War.

Not only was it an insignificant war; it was also a humiliating one, for the most prosperous section of the country practiced determined sabotage and refused to participate in the active conduct of the conflict. If the war stimulated nationalism in some sections it developed secession sentiment in others. Finally, it was futile. The Orders in Council had been rescinded before war was declared. The English had sent Napoleon to Elba before Jackson defeated Pakenham. English trade fell off markedly with the coming of peace, and there was thenceforth little need for

the impressment of seamen. Canada, not conquered in war, might have been readily acquired by peaceful methods. As Professor Dunning has pointed out, Alexander Baring remarked to John Quincy Adams, one of our negotiators in formulating the treaty of Ghent, that he wished that the United States would accept Canada as a gift. In this period of anti-imperialistic sentiment in Great Britain, a conciliatory American attitude, together with the addition of a sum of money equal to the cost of the war, would in all probability have performed the great service of adding Canada to the domain of the United States.

More than anything else, then, the War of 1812 is a monument to the disastrous and futile results of political partisanship, aggravated to the point of treason, and of chauvinistic demagoguery. No attempt is made here to give England a clean bill, but her acts were not of the sort which required or justified war, and the mitigation or elimination of them could have been far better accomplished by a pacific and conciliatory attitude.

VI. RECONCILIATION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The fact of the division of American sentiment on the matter of the war, together with the English tendency to view it all as a minor side-show, as compared with the major circus of the Napoleonic War, led to a rather speedy eradication of the memory of the late bitterness. In less than a decade after the Treaty of Ghent we find Great Britain, even under Canning's direction still, taking a crucial part in aiding the United States to make its first crucial and constructive step in stating its basic policy in international relations, namely the Monroe Doctrine.

Though the conventional textbook implies that it was directed primarily against British aggression, Great Britain may actually be designated as the instigator of this classic document in American foreign policy—it was “made in England,” as Hart and Lawson have abundantly proved. When, in 1823, the Quadruple (distinctly not the Holy) Alliance, was engaged in its work of crushing the growing spirit of liberalism and democracy in Europe, and proposed to interfere in America and restore the rebellious Spanish colonies to the fold of absolutism, England alone of the prominent European powers offered a determined opposition to the plan. Not, to be sure, because of any love of liberty and democracy, but because her trading interests would be advanced by the continu-

ance of the independence of the Latin American states. When Mr. Rush, the American minister in London, conferred with Canning in regard to the common interest of England and the United States in blocking the interference of European absolutism in America, George Canning—the old foe of America in the Orders in Council days—suggested a joint note of protest to the reactionary powers.

While the United States felt obliged to decline the British proposal of a joint note, it developed Canning's suggestion into that most famous expression of American foreign policy—the Monroe Doctrine—formulated by John Quincy Adams and inserted in the annual presidential message of December, 1823.

This expression of American opinion was warmly seconded by Great Britain, and by British public opinion. In fact, Canning, while never a sincere friend of the United States, helped this country out of the prospective embarrassment of having to make good its declared policy by force of arms. He secured the assurance of the French king that France would not support any move to restore the Spanish colonies in America to Spanish control, and gave the Quadruple Alliance to understand that any such move on their part would be opposed by England through naval intervention if necessary. The core of American foreign policy, though previously anticipated by Washington and Jefferson, thus received its classic formulation as a result of British suggestions and was promulgated and made effective under British favor and protection.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Adams, H., *The History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*; Babcock, K. C., *The Rise of American Nationality*; Bemis, S. F., *Jay's Treaty*; Channing, E., *History of the United States*, Vol. IV; Dunning, W. A., *The British Empire and the United States*; Lawson, L. A., *The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine*; Mahan, A. T., *Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812*; McMaster, J. B., *A History of the People of the United States*, Vols. III-V; Paine, R. D., *The Struggle for a Free Sea*; Smith, T. C., *The Wars Between England and America*.

.

CHAPTER XIII

SOME ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY¹

I. INTRODUCTORY

SOME preliminary notion of what is meant by democracy will be indispensable at the outset in order to provide some logical basis for the organization of a discussion of its historical development. As a general concept it may be held that democracy is a form of *social organization* in which the participation of each individual in the various phases of group activities is free from such artificial restrictions as are not indispensable to the most efficient functioning of the group, and in which group policy is ultimately determined by the consent of the majority of the whole society. The procedure adopted will be to trace the evolution of democracy in each succeeding period, as: (1) a practical fact in society; (2) a concept in social, political, and economic theory.

II. DEMOCRACY IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY

Critical ethnologists have come into essential agreement that the earliest type of social organization among primitive men was that of the *local group* organized about the institutions of the family and the village, and characterized by the absence of any elaborate kinship organization. It is in these small social groupings that the nearest approach is found to the so-called "primitive democracy." Here one finds small groups on a basis of intimate association, little affected by external influences, and the component individuals participate in the whole culture of the group to a degree unknown in modern society. As Professor Cooley has pointed out, these circumstances provide a psychological situation highly adapted to the development of intimacy and freedom in social relations. But, at the same time, as Professor Durkheim

¹ From the *Encyclopedia Americana*.

has vigorously insisted, these conditions are conducive to the maximum operation of those socio-psychological influences so familiar to the student of crowd psychology. Consequently, one finds in these primitive local groups a very considerable prevalence of customary regulations and restrictions, some tendencies toward the development of caste, and a particular susceptibility to the domination of the forceful personality—all of which seriously impair the operation of a democratic type of social organization and functioning. Also it must be recognized that these approximations to democracy in primitive society are rather incidents of an undeveloped pre-political condition than the result of conscious planning of social organization on the basis of political liberalism.

When one turns to examine what are generally the more advanced types of primitive society organized on a kinship basis, with either maternal or paternal descent, even less appears of the alleged democratic characteristics of primitive society. Every phase of life within the group is minutely ordered by a veritable maze of customary regulations which are enforced with great rigidity and severity. Within the group the freedom of the individual is further restricted by the general prevalence of social ranks and grades. The much vaunted tribal assemblies have been reduced by modern critical research from the "original fountain springs of political liberty," as pictured by such writers as Maurer, Kemble and Freeman, to mere formal gatherings to grant a pre-assured acquiescence in the policies of the leaders of the group—a function strangely similar to that of the American party convention. A distinguished authority has remarked that the defiance of the policies of the chiefs by a tribal assembly is such a rarity as to constitute no less than a political revolution, something which is even less frequent in primitive than in modern society. Finally, an individual in primitive kinship society is not free to transfer his membership from one group to another, but must remain forever in his own group, as an individual in primitive society has no standing outside of his kinship group, and in such a case occupies the position of an outlaw. Viewed externally, then, primitive society is a "closed shop," and internally it is dominated by a mass of customary regulations and is organized more or less according to a hierarchy of social classes. As primitive society approaches most closely the beginnings of real political or civil society the undemocratic features of social organization greatly increase.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the fact that aside from mythology there is no specific theorizing with respect to social and political relations in primitive society. In that period there is only one theory as to the foundations and justification of the existing social order, namely, that it is the only "safe" order. Its perpetuation unaltered and unimpaired is the only guaranty of relative immunity from the dangers lurking in the unknown. In primitive society, as among modern conservatives, there is a veritable sanctity in the existing order which precludes the possibility of any critical examination of its origin and justification.

III. DEMOCRACY IN EARLY POLITICAL SOCIETY

If any position of historical sociology can be regarded as established it is that political society and the state originated through the amalgamation of tribal groups as a result of the incessant wars waged in what Bagehot has called the "nation-making age." In the highly autocratic and hierarchical caste society which thus developed and which characterized early political society there was, of course, only the slightest approximation to anything democratic in any field of social relations. In no other stage has the individual counted for so little and been so circumscribed in his liberty as in the period of the formation of states and the development of early despotisms. The facts almost justify Hegel's famous dogma that in this period only the despot was free.

Early political society is characterized by as complete an absence of democracy in theory as in practice. The only expenditure of political thought was in justifying the existing régime on the basis of the sanctions of a uniquely revealed religion or the superior wisdom of ancestors. Existing institutions were held to be a part of the divine order as in primitive society they had been regarded as the source of the "luck" of the social group.

IV. DEMOCRACY DURING CLASSICAL TIMES

It is impossible to make any sweeping statement as to the degree of democracy realized in ancient Greece as the situation varied greatly in different periods in both Athens and Sparta. The radical transformation of Greek governments from tyranny to aristocracy and from aristocracy to the so-called democracy were so frequent as to give rise to the famous Platonic and Aristotelian

theory of the cycles of governmental changes. True democracy was not prominent in Hellenic society. Even Athens, the most liberally inclined of the Greek city-states, at the period of its most democratic organization could scarcely be regarded as a democracy in the modern implication of a term. While, as Mr. Zimmern has pointed out, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the number of slaves in Athens, there can be no doubt that there was never a time in Athenian history when a majority of the population were not excluded from participation in the life of the state. Greek "democracy" meant relative social and political equality only among the citizen class—the class, which, in the opinion of Aristotle, was "born to rule." Within this privileged citizen class, however, Athenian society made the closest approximation in antiquity to a democratic control of group activities.

In republican Rome the same conception of exclusiveness in the citizenship existed as had prevailed in Greece. The large numbers of slaves and foreigners were excluded from the political life of the state and within the citizen body itself there was less of a democratic control of political activities than had existed in Athens. Despite the gains made by the plebeians in the fourth century B. C. and the later attempts of the Gracchi to break down the domination of the aristocratic governing clique, the government of Rome drifted steadily into the control of the autocratic "ordo senatorius" and from that into the principate and the empire. The sodalities or industrial associations were the only approximation to social democracy, and they were discouraged or prohibited by the government. During the imperial period a slight movement toward democracy might be detected in the reduction of the number of slaves through manumission and the extinction of many of the sources of supply, but this minor symptom was more than offset by the growth of imperial despotism, the increase of plutocracy and the extinction of the curiate or middle class through the disproportionate burdens of taxation imposed upon it. As a result, the middle class, the lower class freemen and the slaves were very generally assimilated into one semi-free class—the so-called "colonate." Classical antiquity, then, never brought real democracy in the political, social or economic realms. It passed, leaving a more decided condition of inequality than it had received from the primitive tribal society with which it had started.

With the Greeks systematic speculation regarding the foundations of society and politics first appears. In the *Republic* and

the *Statesman* Plato discussed the nature of democracy. He defined it as the rule of the many and held that it inevitably tended to degenerate into anarchy. Plato's "rule of the many," of course, meant only the rule of the citizen minority of the population. Even this shadowy democracy did not attract Plato who preferred an enlightened monarchy. Aristotle devoted a portion of his *Politics* to a discussion and definition of democracy. From the standpoint of the terminology of political science he maintained that democracy was that form of government in which the majority of the citizens, excluding foreigners and slaves, directed the activities of the state for the advancement of their own class interests. It was, then, the corrupt form of "popular" government, the term "polity" being reserved for the virtuous administration of government by the whole body of the citizens. From an economic standpoint Aristotle held that democracy meant the control of public policy by the mass of the poor citizens who possessed little or no property. Aristotle was no more favorable than Plato to the exclusive "democracy" of the Greeks and held that the only valuable function of the people lay in electing and "scrutinizing" the officials, and not in the direct and actual control and operation of the government. Finally, Aristotle was as distinctly opposed to the full application of the democratic principle in society as in the state. He laid down his famous dictum that merit should determine social and political position and held that certain individuals, on account of their inferior intelligence, were born to serve the more intelligent and capable members of society. It is scarcely necessary to add that by the "intelligent and capable," Aristotle meant the Attic Greeks, and by those fitted for perpetual servitude, the "barbarians." Thus, his seemingly useful conception of social differentiation on the basis of ability resolves itself upon closer examination into a chauvinistic apology for racial egoism.

While Plato and Aristotle had looked with disfavor upon even the limited democracy of Greece, Polybius held that in any stable state some permanent concessions must be made to the democratic principle. Drawing upon the experiences of the early Roman republic he put forth his famous theory of "checks and balances" which were to be brought about by including in the organization of the government the monarchical element, the aristocratic senate and the democratic assemblies. Only through this arrangement could one hope to prevent the continual changes in

government which had been outlined in the famous classical theory of the cycle of governmental transformations. Finally, one finds among the Greeks the first adumbration of the doctrine of a governmental contract as the origin of political society—a theory first stated by the Sophists, Plato and the Epicureans and which was destined in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to work strongly for the development of democratic tendencies in politics.

Among the Romans the only significant development in political theory making for democracy was the doctrine of the Roman lawyers concerning the origin and justification of the political order. The lawyers held that the foundations of political authority lay in the consent of the people. Though the emperor might in fact be chosen by his legions in a remote border district, the legal theory always held that he owed his authority to the tacit assent of the whole body of the Roman citizens. This theory fitted in well with, and advanced the doctrine of, the origin of political authority in a governmental compact. The individual also first truly emerges in history in the conceptions of Roman law.

V. DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The Roman Empire ended with the growth of plutocracy and the crushing out of practically all of the few democratic tendencies which existed. With the barbarian "invasions" and the establishment of the Teutonic kingdoms the fruits of classical civilization were for the most part lost and western Europe dropped back in a cultural sense into the conditions out of which ancient civilization had developed a thousand years earlier. Even the feeble advances which classical civilization had made in the direction of democracy had to be regained before further progress could be made toward the securing of personal freedom, political enfranchisement and popular control of public policy.

Feudal society, developing from roots in the Roman *villa* and in the German *mark* and *comitatus*, offered little opportunity for the growth of democracy. With its perpetuation to a slight degree of the slavery of classical times and its retention on an extensive scale of the serfdom or half-free condition found in the *colonnate* of the later Roman Empire, the feudal age was in general even less democratic in a political sense than the classical city-states. On the manors there were some democratic tendencies in the intimate communal life of the serfs, and Professor Giddings has in-

sisted that the real origin of modern social democracy is to be looked for in the enforced "equality" among the members of this servile class in the Middle Ages. Some symptoms of democracy also appeared in the medieval free towns, but they were not extensive. The political, social and economic organization was hierarchical and restrictive, and equality in the medieval town, as in the classical city-state, meant the equality of the favored few.

The Magna Carta as a harbinger of modern democracy has withered before modern historical research quite as much as the Teutonic folk-moot. It did not mark a movement looking toward modern political liberalism, but was a reactionary manifesto of the feudal lords who were irritated by the recent extension of royal power, and in 1215 made an effort to pull England back into the decentralized lawlessness and local tyranny of the feudal period.

The only notable development of democracy in the Middle Ages occurred as an incident of the rise of Christianity. A number of writers have claimed with some degree of justification that the first instances of real democratic society are to be found in the early Christian communities of the Apostolic Age. Certainly, the only extensive development of democracy in social organization in the medieval period occurred in the monastic movement, and in the monasteries essential equality was the general rule. The organization of the secular clergy in the medieval Church, however, with its elaborate hierarchies for ecclesiastical administration and for the control of the sacraments, was scarcely less autocratic than the feudal society of the period. The only concession that the medieval Church made to democracy was that its offices were in theory, at least, open to all classes solely on the basis of merit. On the whole, however, democracy or any strong prophecy of democracy scarcely appeared during the thousand years that followed the collapse of the western Roman Empire.

The advances made toward the development of the theoretical concept of democracy during the medieval period were as scanty as the achievements in the field of democratic practices. The Christian conception of the "brotherhood of man" was certainly more democratic in its implications than the early Stoic doctrine. The Stoics had meant by this phrase merely the brotherhood of the intellectual *élite*, but the Christians rejected this limitation and emphasized the reality of universal human brotherhood through the medium of faith and belief. In the field of political

theory there were few developments beyond a revival of various doctrines which had appeared in classical antiquity. Manegold of Lautenbach, in the last half of the eleventh century, gave the first explicit statement of the medieval version of a governmental compact as the basis of political society and held that the breaking of this contract by the prince was sufficient to justify rebellion among his subjects. In the same century the revival of Roman law familiarized western Europe with the lawyers' doctrine of popular sovereignty, a conception later developed with great vigor by Marsiglio of Padua. The Conciliar movement of the fifteenth century, based largely upon the Roman legal theory of the corporation, attempted to work out a theory of representation for ecclesiastical government. While the insistence of the great theorists of the Conciliar movement, such as Gerson and Cusanus, upon the validity of the doctrine of popular sovereignty was an important development in the direction of democratic political theory, the Conciliar doctrine of representative government was rather one which looked back to the system of feudal estates than forward to the modern parliament based on geographic units of representation. Those who look to the Conciliar movement for the origins of modern representative democracy are not less in error than those who try to derive it from the Magna Carta. Some writers, such as Lord Acton, contend that the struggles between church and state in the Middle Ages contributed notably to theoretical and practical foundations of democracy.

The term "democracy" scarcely figured in medieval discussion save in the writings of those medieval scholastic philosophers who revived the Aristotelian terminology and analysis with its contempt for democracy. The concept of the "people," which appeared so frequently in the latter part of the medieval period, in the discussions of popular sovereignty was scarcely a democratic notion. By the "people" was meant only the first three estates, excluding the peasantry which constituted the vast majority of the population, and it did not usually refer to the people as individuals but as a corporate entity.

VI. DEMOCRACY FROM THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Beginning with the opening of the sixteenth century and extending over about two centuries there occurred that great transforma-

tion which marks the dawn of modern society—the “Commercial Revolution.” The explorations and discoveries and the resulting contact with new cultures broke through the “cake” of medieval custom and opened the way for the development of modern institutions and ideas. The increased volume of wealth at the disposal of the monarch, as a result of the “intervention of capital,” enabled him to develop a paid officialdom and army and by their assistance to crush feudalism and perfect the national state. But the most important of all of its results was the great increase of the *bourgeoisie*, or middle class, which, as Professor Hayes has so well explained, was destined for centuries to be the center from which all liberalizing and democratizing influences spread and which ultimately secured the well-nigh universal destruction of the autocratic and exclusive social and political régime which had characterized the Middle Ages. The Protestant Reformation made few contributions to democracy in politics. In fact, it made the lot of the peasantry harder than before, but it did increase the power of the upper middle class and thus accelerated the movement already begun by the Commercial Revolution. Also, its undoubted contribution to the development of “sovereign” national states is regarded by many as an impulse to modern political tendencies.

In England during this period the new middle class effected the greatest transformation of the social and political order which was accomplished before the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the seventeenth century the power of the feudal nobility had generally vanished, serfdom had disappeared and the restrictive gild system of industrial organization had been practically eliminated. Before the close of the century, through successive concessions from the king and through the revolutions of 1649 and 1689, the *bourgeoisie* had dethroned two autocratic monarchs, had eliminated royal arbitrariness in politics and law, had brought about the predominance of Parliament in the government and had enacted into a constitutional document those guarantees which have since come to be recognized as the most fundamental of human rights. While oppressive religious disabilities, exclusive property qualifications for participation in political life and the perpetuation of many of the social phases of medieval feudal aristocracy all operated to prevent England from being classed as a democratic nation in 1700, the fact that the middle class had created a constitutional system and had secured the complete

ascendency of Parliament—the popular branch of the government—constituted an epoch-making step toward the ultimate realization of democracy.

In France, even more than in Tudor England, the Commercial Revolution at first made rather for the development of royal absolutism than for the growth of constitutional or democratic government. The Estates-General, summoned in 1614 for the last time in 175 years, made a pathetic failure as compared with the achievements of the English Parliament, and the hope of a gradual evolution of legislative supremacy in France, such as had taken place in England, perished. The political power of the feudal nobility was crushed by Richelieu's centralizing policies and by the suppression of the "Fronde" in 1652, but they retained their oppressive social and economic privileges until the "August days" of 1789. The French Revolution of 1789 to 1795 was the product of the abuses of the "old régime," of the revolutionary political theory of the English Whigs, of the intellectual impulse from the French *philosophes*, and of the American example of a successful experiment with revolution and the beginnings of "democracy." The "third estate" had been too weak in 1614 successfully to oppose the combined strength of the monarch and the first two estates, but their strength had so increased by 1789, as a result of the effects of the Commercial Revolution, that they were able to coerce the monarch, the weakened nobility and the clergy, and they proceeded to clear away not only the vestiges of feudalism but also the oppression of the Church and the tyranny of the monarch. The calling of the Estates-General in 1789 is worthy of passing mention in any historical survey of the development of democracy because the first instance in history of the exercise of universal manhood suffrage occurred quite incidentally in the election of the deputies of the third estate. The most significant achievements of the French Revolution were the abolition of those economic and social aspects of feudalism which still persisted, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1791 and of a republic in 1792. Though many of these reforms proved transitory, their effect was never entirely lost and they constituted the stimulus and precedent for the more gradual development of French democracy in the nineteenth century.

In all other important European states, with the exception of the abortive reforms of Joseph II of Austria and the benevolent despotism of Frederick the Great, the old régime with all of its

medieval institutions and practices remained practically undisturbed until the nineteenth century. It was not until after the influence of the French Revolution was spread throughout Europe by Napoleon, and the "Industrial Revolution" had still further increased the numerical strength of the *bourgeoisie* that this class was able to carry its liberalizing activities with some degree of success into central, southern and eastern Europe.

The establishment of an aristocratic republic in America in the closing years of the eighteenth century marked an important advance in the development of democracy. While American society and politics at the beginning of our national history abounded in undemocratic features, the new state had been founded on revolution from established authority; and it was one of the first examples in history of an extensive federal republic and of a government organized on the basis of a written constitution formulated by a national constituent convention. It, therefore, stimulated the growth of constitutionalism and republicanism elsewhere, most notably in France, and it laid the foundations for what became in the nineteenth century the most ambitious experiment which has yet been conducted in the democratic control of political institutions. In America, as in England and France, the revolutionary movement was organized by the middle class made up of merchants and the professional classes.

In the period between 1500 and 1800 many notable advances were made toward the development of democratic tendencies in political theory. The most significant and influential of these was the doctrine of a social contract as the explanation of the origin and justification of social institutions and political organization. This doctrine, as distinguished from the earlier theory of a governmental contract, was first enunciated by Æneas Sylvius in the middle of the fifteenth century, but it did not become an important dogma in political theory until it was expressed by the English churchman, Hooker, and the German jurist, Althusius, at the opening of the seventeenth century. It received a systematic exposition in a number of classical works, particularly those of Hobbes, Pufendorf, Spinoza, Sydney, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Fichte. It was not necessarily a democratic doctrine and it was used by some of its adherents, most notably by Hobbes, to defend royal absolutism. In the hands of Locke and his plagiarist, Rousseau, however, it worked strongly for the destruction of the obscurantist and autocratic divine right theory and provided a theo-

retical justification for altering the existing political order when it had become subversive of the terms of the original contract. In other words, it provided a doctrinal foundation for political revolutions, and it was used to inspire and justify the great revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, France and America.

This revolutionary version of the social contract theory powerfully stimulated the development of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Another important contribution was the doctrine that "life, liberty and property" are the natural and inherent rights of all men. This theory, first stated by Fortescue at the close of the fifteenth century, was again enunciated by the Levellers in the middle of the seventeenth century and was given a permanent position in political theory through the influence of John Locke. It was widely at variance with the contemporary social and economic oppression and arbitrary government and it was highly influential in combating these conditions, especially when these "rights" became a part of the program of the radical party in the various countries. In addition to their early formulation of the doctrine of natural rights, the Levellers made another significant contribution to the general body of democratic political theory, namely, the doctrine that every citizen should be accorded the right of participating in political activity through the exercise of the suffrage. Another important doctrine making for democracy in politics was that which was most vigorously expounded by Locke, namely, the legal supremacy of the legislative or popular branch of the government. The importance of this doctrine appears when one reflects that without the predominant power of the elective or popular branch of the government, which makes it possible for the representatives of the people to control the policies of the state, the fact that the people have the right of universal suffrage and the election of representatives does not ensure a democratic control of public policy. The situation in France under the Second Empire, and the impotence of the German Reichstag and the autocratic nature of the German imperial government, in spite of universal suffrage, are the most striking modern demonstrations of the fact that without a powerful legislature all the other incidents of democracy may be vain and empty forms. Finally, the Utopian socialistic schemes of such writers as More, Bacon, Campanella and the pre-Revolutionary socialists in France made provision for the introduction of some degree of social democracy.

It is most significant, however, that during this entire period there was no systematic analysis of the meaning and implications of democracy, nor, with the doubtful exception of Mably in France, Tom Paine in England, and Jefferson in America, was there any important defense of democracy as the ideal form of government. Most of the radicals regarded a constitutional monarchy or, at the most, an aristocratic republic as the ideal form of government. Montesquieu and Rousseau, for example, both held that a democracy would only be tolerable in a very small state and could never be successful in an extensive country. In short, all of the theories of the period which have been briefly summarized above were mere fragmentary contributions which might later be utilized in a systematic analysis and defense of democracy, rather than anything which could be regarded as comprehensive and thorough-going discussions of the nature and validity of democracy itself.

VII. DEMOCRACY FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DAY

1. *Practical Achievements in Democratic Progress.*

At the opening of the nineteenth century democracy did not prevail in any country in the world, and only England, France and the United States had made any notable progress in that direction. Even these modest advances seemed destined to be crushed and the old order restored after 1815 through the sinister influence of Metternich, the able and alert statesman of the old régime, who had extended his reactionary system throughout continental Europe by 1823. But in that year he received his initial reverse in Great Britain's challenge to the intervention of the reactionaries in the South American revolutions. This action of Great Britain was scarcely motivated by an abstract love of liberty and revolution, for these were scarcely more pleasing to her Tory ministry than to Metternich; she was rather led to this course by the fact that her trading interests, so greatly increased by the Industrial Revolution, were more likely to be advanced by the freedom of the Spanish-American republics than through the return of Spanish control. The Industrial Revolution thus gave the old régime its first serious rebuff, and from that time on it has caused it continually to retreat until to-day it has almost completely disappeared from Europe.

This greatest transformation of all phases of life in the history of mankind, which has been known since Arnold Toynbee's time as the "Industrial Revolution," came first in England between 1750 and 1825 and was passed along to the Continent, reaching France between 1825 and 1840, Germany from 1840 onward, but especially after 1870, Austria about the same time, and scarcely touching Russia until the last decade of the nineteenth century. In addition to its great series of mechanical inventions, it tremendously accelerated the process begun by the Commercial Revolution, namely, the increase of the *bourgeoisie* or middle class, to which the world owes most of the great advances in civilization and liberalism. This class, motivated in part by sentiments of enlightened humanity and in part by selfish class interests, carried the day against the autocracy of the old régime, and made it possible for the proletariat, which was also created by the Industrial Revolution, to consolidate the positions already won for it by the *bourgeoisie* and to begin the struggle for the final realization of democracy in the true sense of the word. The battle for political and social democracy, then, in the last century has centred about three successive tasks: (1) the elimination of the vestiges of the old régime—the heritage of the Middle Ages; (2) the establishment of the liberal régime of the "benevolent *bourgeoisie*"; and (3) the attack upon the supremacy of the *bourgeoisie* by the proletariat, beginning about the middle of the nineteenth century.

All of these forces were created or set in motion by the Industrial Revolution, and attention may be turned to the manner in which they have been realized in the leading countries of the western world. Most of the achievements in these directions have consisted in the extension of the suffrage, the increase in the importance of the popular or legislative branch of the government as compared with the executive, the extension of representative institutions, a broadening of the conception of the scope and functions of government, and the drafting of written constitutions which acknowledge and guarantee these progressive achievements. As important as political and social democracy is economic democracy, or the equal right of all classes to such action as is necessary to advance and safeguard their material interests. At the beginning of the nineteenth century economic democracy was as far from realization as political democracy, and the advances made since that time have been most notable. In 1800 most of the extensive restrictive economic regulations which had been enacted during the two

previous centuries operated in favor of the vested interests of the squirearchy. With the growth of the political power of the *bourgeoisie* after the Industrial Revolution went the abolition of most of the old restrictions on economic activities, and there was instituted the reign of *laissez-faire* which gave the middle class manufacturers and merchants unrestricted opportunities for the development of their great industrial enterprises and for the enjoyment of the "blessings" of the freedom of contract. This individualistic movement was most thorough-going in England, where it was chiefly associated with the work of Cobden, Bright, Mill and Gladstone, but no European country entirely escaped its influence. *Laissez-faire*, however, gave economic liberty only to the upper middle classes and it is to the development of labor unionism that one must look for the movement which has been, up to the present time, the most effective instrument for advancing economic democracy among the laboring classes.

In England the middle class secured their first great triumph over the old order in the Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1832 and in the Municipal Reform Act of 1835. These reforms destroyed the medieval system of election and representation which had persisted in England until that time and gave political recognition to the dislocation of economic interests and population caused by the Industrial Revolution. They were scarcely a direct victory for democracy, as they did not carry with them an enfranchisement of the masses, but they did constitute an indirect triumph in that they brought into power the *bourgeoisie* who immediately proceeded to clear away many of the most formidable obstacles to the ultimate realization of democracy. The democratic movement of this period—Chartism—proved a pathetic failure, but essentially all of the Chartist demands have since been realized, a significant testimony to the progress of democracy in England. The first important direct step in the actual realization of political democracy in England came in Disraeli's Borough Franchise Bill of 1867 which brought something approaching universal manhood suffrage to the residents of boroughs. A similar extension of the franchise to the working classes in the country by Gladstone's bill of 1884, for all practical purposes, made England a political democracy. The process has been carried to completion by the sweeping Franchise Act of February, 1918, which brought universal suffrage to males and introduced on a very liberal scale the principle of woman suffrage. Fortunately, England, two centuries before, had es-

tablished the supremacy of Parliament, and when the people secured the vote they were able to use it to influence the policies of the government and secure for themselves the substance as well as the forms of political and social democracy. The grip of the people upon the legislative power in Great Britain was made more extensive and more certain by the Parliament Bill of 1911 which finally assured the supremacy of the House of Commons. Beginning with the Elementary Education Act of 1870, the people have been able in part to transform England into a social as well as a political democracy. Especially rapid has been the progress in this direction under the Liberal domination since 1905, as is abundantly testified by the remarkable series of reform measures passed since that time. Among the most conspicuous of these have been the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, the Education Act of 1906, the Small Holdings Act of 1907, the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908, the Labor acts of 1909 and 1913, the Lloyd George Budget of 1909-10, the National Insurance Act of 1912 and the Franchise and Education Acts of 1918. These are a convincing demonstration of the fact that the English proletariat has almost gained for itself the position held in 1815 by the Tory squirearchy and in 1848 by the *bourgeois* liberals. Economic democracy in England has been advanced through the abolition of the various restrictions upon the freedom of economic activity which existed in 1800. This was accomplished through the efforts of the middle class and the proletariat. Especially significant has been the development of labor unionism. This was first legalized through the activities of Francis Place and Joseph Hume in 1824-25. It has received further legislative encouragement by the laws of 1871-76, 1906 and 1913, and, in spite of some recent adverse court decisions, the right of trade unions to organize and act seems firmly established in England. In spite of a titular monarch and aristocracy, England is at the present day, perhaps, the most democratic of the great modern nations. The permanent ascendancy of the Labor party seems not far off.

In France the ultra-conservative squirearchy, led by the arch-reactionary Charles X, made a most daring and determined effort, between 1815 and 1830, to restore the old régime. The futility of the attempt to revive in France the order of things which had existed before 1789 was demonstrated by the Revolution of 1830 which sent into final oblivion the autocracy and corruption of Bourbon absolutism. The *bourgeois* liberals, strengthened by

the effects of the Industrial Revolution, came into power with the Orleanist monarchy of 1830 to 1848. Louis Philippe, however, refused to square his policies with the growth of liberalism and met, in 1848, the fate which Charles X had encountered in 1830. The new Republican government developed a fatal split over its policies, and the Bonapartist adventurer, by the aid of this division among Republicans and Socialists and the romantic lustre of his name, was able to establish a temporary autocracy. But during its brief period of power the provisional government of 1848 secured for France the enactment of a universal male suffrage law, which has been retained with little change down to the present day. This gave France the double honor of being the nation which originated the practice of universal manhood suffrage in 1789 and also the first powerful nation to adopt as a permanent political institution the practice of universal manhood suffrage. Like his predecessors, Charles X and Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon was unable to resist the growing forces of democracy and liberalism which were being continually augmented by the effects of the Industrial Revolution and the growth of the *bourgeoisie* and proletariat, and even before he was swept off the throne by the débâcle of 1870 he had been compelled to relinquish most of the attributes of autocracy and to establish a liberal constitutional monarchy. The attempts to return to monarchy between 1871 and 1879 failed utterly, and with the accession of President Grévy in 1879 it was definitely established that the constitution of 1875 would be interpreted to mean that France was henceforth to be a Parliamentary Republic. Gathering impetus in the decade of the eighties, through the vigorous leadership of Jules Ferry, the Republic gained sufficient strength to be able to withstand the onslaughts of monarchists and clericals in the Boulanger episode and the Dreyfus affair and emerged from the latter stronger than ever. Under the Third Republic the French proletariat has increased in political power until the progressive democratic element is to-day as firmly entrenched in its control of political policies as the *bourgeoisie* were in 1840. Their power has been given objective expression in a series of social reform acts which rival England's achievement in this field. In France, economic democracy was advanced by the law of 1864, giving workingmen the right to combine for strikes, and by that of 1884, granting general freedom of organization to the working class. The attempt of the government employees, however, to establish their right to strike in 1909

and 1910 failed almost completely. In France, as in England, democracy is to-day well along towards realization.

Vastly different from the record of England and France was the course of events in central Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Stein and Hardenberg had abolished serfdom in Prussia in 1808-11 but in 1815 Metternich was able to preserve the old régime intact in Austria and was also able to nullify the decree of the Congress of Vienna which ordered each ruler in the German Confederation to give his state a constitution. Between 1815 and 1848 the power of the middle class was increased by the first effects of the Industrial Revolution and a disgruntled proletariat was also created. A liberal and democratic régime would probably have come into existence in central Europe in 1848 had it not been for the fact that the problems and issues of nationality and dynasty conflicted with the cause of liberalism and democracy. Taking advantage of this division of strength and interests among the liberals, the reactionaries, led by Schwartzemberg, were enabled to triumph in 1848-50 as they had under Metternich following 1815.

The tragic significance of this failure of the liberal movement in mid-Europe in 1848 can scarcely be exaggerated. In Germany it meant that German unity was not to be accomplished under the benevolent auspices of the liberals of the Frankfort Parliament, but under the autocratic "blood and iron" policy of Bismarck, who, after creating the German Empire in this manner, was able to throttle all subsequent attempts to liberalize it and bring it up to the level of modern democratic nations. Taking over bodily the mechanical aspects of the Industrial Revolution from England, Germany presented, as Professor Veblen has so convincingly pointed out, the curious spectacle of a great modern industrial and commercial nation dominated by political autocracy and a medieval dynastic atmosphere. The semi-medieval constitution given to Prussia in January, 1850, by Frederick William IV was retained practically unchanged to 1918 and no redistribution of seats in the Prussian Landtag had taken place since 1860, thus giving rise to a situation resembling that of the notorious "rotten boroughs" of England before 1832. Furthermore, the exclusive three-class system of distributing the suffrage, and the archaic method of oral voting in Prussia destroyed even those slight traces of democracy which might have existed in spite of discouraging surroundings. In the German Empire universal manhood suffrage was introduced in 1871 for elections to the Reichstag, but as the Reichstag was

only an impotent debating society dominated by the autocratic Bundesrat and the still more medieval Prussia, the representatives of the people could not make their will effective in the government, and the vaunted universal suffrage and the alleged democratic Reichstag appear upon close examination to have been merely empty shams, the verbal eulogies of Prussian apologists notwithstanding. To make matters still worse, the distribution of electoral districts for seats in the Reichstag was not altered from 1870 to 1918. This excluded the great industrial cities of modern Germany from anything like an equitable representation, deprived the *bourgeoisie* and proletariat of a just expression of their will, even in the forensic department of the German political organization, and perpetuated the dominating influence of the reactionary squirearchy.

Nor was there any greater degree of real social democracy in Germany. The elaborate social legislation program of Bismarck came not from the influence of the people, nor as a result of the modern democratic conception of the state as the agent and servant of the people, but proceeded from Bismarck's highly undemocratic desire to crush the Social Democrats, to ensure a healthy nation as the indispensable basis of a strong military system, and to attach the people to the autocratic German state through gratitude for its paternalism. The social legislation of modern Germany was, thus, in no way a symptom of social democracy, but was simply the outgrowth of the same eighteenth-century enlightened despotism that impelled Frederick the Great to undertake his internal reforms in Prussia. Of the truth of this assertion overwhelming proof is afforded by the fact that the Social Democrats invariably opposed the social legislation of Bismarck, and by Bismarck's acknowledged purposes in undertaking the program of social reform. In Germany, labor unionism, as a movement toward economic democracy, made its first appearance as a significant movement in the decade of the sixties, but was greatly weakened and suppressed during the period of anti-Socialistic legislation between 1878 and 1890. After 1890 it revived and has received legal sanction for extensive economic activities.

The aftermath of the disasters of the World War brought to Germany at least temporarily a complete democratization. The Hohenzollern dynasty was repudiated, the Empire abolished and a Republic proclaimed. Much additional social legislation was introduced. Many very advanced conceptions of social reconstruc-

tion have been proposed and seriously considered. The arrogant and oppressive treatment of Germany by the Allies, particularly France, at the Peace Conference and after has, however, greatly aided in discrediting democracy in Germany and in stimulating the revival of the autocratic and militaristic clique. It is probable that Poincaré contributed more to the election of von Hindenburg as the president of the Republic than any other single factor or event. What the outcome will be cannot be safely predicted, but if German democracy falls the responsibility will lie at the door of the short-sighted French statesmen of 1918-1924.

In the Austrian Empire political liberalism, since its defeat in 1850, has met a somewhat kinder fate than in the Prussianized German Empire. No serious attempt was made to restore the feudal system which was abolished in 1848-49, and in the period from 1860 to 1867 the liberally inclined Francis Joseph, in order to placate his own subjects and the Hungarians for their disappointments in 1848-49, granted reforms which embodied many of the aspirations of the liberals of 1848. An important approximation to real parliamentary government was secured by the Constitution of 1861 and the "fundamental laws" of 1867 which gave the Austrian legislature a legal position of much greater power than that possessed by the German imperial Reichstag, carrying with it the institution of ministerial responsibility. While the suffrage was at first extremely exclusive, the acts of 1896 and 1907 have introduced universal manhood suffrage. The existence of a considerable degree of social democracy in Austria is also attested to by the passage of a number of important social reform acts since 1885 which have not been simply a perpetuation of the benevolent despotism of Joseph II, but have been largely a result of the agitation of Socialists and Liberals. Economic democracy has appeared in Austria as a result of the legalization of labor unionism in 1869 and its subsequent growth since that time. As in the case of Germany, the World War brought to Austria democracy and republicanism along with territorial decimation.

Hungary, however, has been little affected by the progress of either political or social democracy in the other member of the Dual Monarchy. It has made almost no advances in a liberal direction beyond the situation which existed in 1847 except to retain the act of the liberals of 1848 abolishing the political and economic aspects of feudalism. In Hungary the reactionaries were able to defeat the efforts of Karolyi and other liberals to

democratize the country after 1918. Hungary remains to the present day politically and socially the most illiberal, archaic and medieval of any important European nation.

In Italy the permanent establishment of parliamentary government was anticipated by Charles Albert of Piedmont in 1847-48 and was assured by the efforts of Cavour, a great admirer of the English system and one of the most vigorous advocates of parliamentary institutions among the liberal statesmen of the nineteenth century. The necessary complement of parliamentary government, universal suffrage, was secured by the laws of 1882 and 1912. Finally, social democracy has made great strides in the laws of 1886, 1898, 1908 and 1912 which protected the labor of women and children, insured the working classes against accident, sickness and old age and established a national life insurance system. In Italy labor unionism has had a very recent origin and development. Coming into existence along with the growth of the strength of radical parties recruited from the proletariat, labor unionism has been little hampered in Italy by restrictive legislation. Since 1923 Italy has been in the grip of a dictatorship led by the Fascisti and directed by B. Mussolini. Its permanence is, however, dubious.

In Russia, which retained most aspects of the medieval system unimpaired, with the exception of the transitory reforms of Alexander I, down to the middle of the nineteenth century, an epoch-making step was taken in the formal abolition of serfdom by the decree of Alexander II on March 3, 1861. The adjustment of the conditions of emancipation, however, brought little progress in the direction of social democracy, but resulted essentially in a transformation of the peasantry from serfs of nobles to "serfs of the state." Not until the manifesto of November 16, 1905, the edict of November, 1906, and the sweeping land reforms of July 27, 1910 and June 11, 1911, were the intended benefits of the Emancipation Act of 1861 and the real abolition of serfdom actually accomplished. The first important movement in the direction of political democracy in modern Russia came in 1864, when Alexander II issued his notable decree reviving the local assemblies or *zemstvos*, thereby introducing some degree of local self-government into Russia, something which had not existed since the period of centralization under Peter the Great at the opening of the eighteenth century. After the Polish revolt of 1863 Alexander II, like his uncle, Alexander I, abandoned his early reforming tendencies and the night of reaction settled upon Russia which was not to be

broken for forty years, in spite of the policy of revolutionary terrorism and the assassination of tsars, dukes and public officials. But the grip of reaction, which assassinations could not break, was weakened by that deadly and persistent enemy of medievalism in politics and society—the Industrial Revolution—which first began to affect Russia on a considerable scale in the nineties during the ministership of Witte. This greatly strengthened the hitherto insignificant Russian middle class, in which lay the strong hope of liberalism. Guided by such able leaders as Professor Milyukov and aided by the discrediting of the old régime through the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War, the *bourgeoisie*, in the revolutionary movement of 1905–06, were able to extort from the tsar the grant of approximate universal suffrage and the creation of a constitutional parliamentary government. When freed from the strain of war, however, the tsar, encouraged by his reactionary ministers, proceeded to abrogate his liberal measures by limiting the powers of the Duma and by altering the electoral law so as to defeat the principle of universal suffrage. While this reactionary policy proved temporarily successful, in 1917 disasters more serious than those of 1904–05 drove the distracted autocracy from Russia in complete humiliation. During the summer of 1917 the Russian revolution passed through those stages, so familiar to students of French history between 1789 and 1793: from the control of conservative *bourgeois* statesmen to that of the leaders of the Bolshevik radicalism. The ultimate outcome of the revolution cannot be predicted, but it is probable that it will be as impossible to reestablish the conditions of 1900 in Russia, as it was in France to bring about a return to the order of things which existed in 1788. In spite of the fact that the Allies proclaimed that they were fighting to “make the world safe for democracy,” they intervened by force of arms in the futile effort to crush democracy in Russia.

In the United States democracy was nearer to realization in 1800 than in most European countries, and, consequently, the advances made since that time have been more gradual and less spectacular than those in Europe. In the first half of the century the main “achievements” in “democratizing” the nation consisted in the abolition of the aristocratic property qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage and in the vulgarization of the concept and practices of democracy, as a result of the Jacksonian system. To men like Jefferson democracy had a strong Aristotelian flavor and great emphasis was laid upon special training, high intelligence and expert

direction of government. With the advent of the Jacksonians all this was changed. The "dangers" of special preparation for office were emphasized, supreme faith was put in "pure" democracy, and rotation in office and the "spoils system" were made the indispensable guides for administrative procedure. It was not strange, then, that the rule of statesmen ceased in the United States and the era of politicians, so inseparably connected with the democracy of America, began. The scandals of the "spoils system" were in some degree curbed by the movement for civil service reform which began in the administrations of Grant, Hayes, and Arthur. This salutary tendency was courageously supported by Cleveland, particularly in his second term and, though it was weakened somewhat by McKinley, it was revived with renewed vigor by Roosevelt and Taft. Even firmer and more extensive is the hold of the spoils system on American state and local government. Democracy in America has, thus, failed to produce that efficiency in the public service which has been realized in autocratic Germany or in democratic England. The most pressing problem in American politics is to work out a plan for the introduction into the democracy, already partially won, of the principle of special fitness for public service.

One great obstacle to social democracy in America—negro slavery—was removed in part in 1863, but this question has been one in which democracy has been complicated with the much more difficult problems of race prejudice, and its final solution is not likely to be arrived at for a century. In many ways the show of strength of the Progressive party and the victory of the Democratic party in 1912 may be regarded as a gain for social democracy, as they were symptoms of a great popular protest against the domination of American politics and legislation by the conservative wing of the capitalistic class, which became entrenched in American politics as never before after the retirement of President Roosevelt. Unfortunately, the decline of morale and intellectual alertness in the United States, as a result of the reaction from the World War, led to a surrender of the American federal government to a reign of corrupt plutocratic interests quite unprecedented in our national history, if not in the whole history of representative government. The effort of the late Senator La Follette to lead the people in a crusade against this national disgrace proved a most humiliating, dismal and portentous failure. Economic democracy is only partially achieved in America. The use of

"blanket injunctions" against labor unions, so common in the labor disputes of the nineties, has declined greatly, and the attempt of the conservative capitalists between 1908 and 1912 to bring the labor unions within the reach of the anti-combination acts was at last defeated by the Clayton bill. The chief obstacle to economic and social democracy is the judicial interpretation of the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, it must be noted that "democracy in America" is no longer restricted, as it was in the time of De Tocqueville, to the United States alone, but has become an assured fact in the Dominion of Canada and has made notable advances in some of the leading countries of Latin America.

Nor is the United States, as it was in De Tocqueville's day, the most advanced and extensive laboratory in the democratic experiment. That position has passed to the Australasian possessions of Great Britain. Building on the precedent of the United States, Australia and New Zealand have passed far beyond their model in the originality and extent of their experiments in social, economic and political democracy. With their universal male, and practically universal female suffrage, their parliamentary government, their elaborate series of social reform measures, and their original experiments in attempting to solve the perplexing problems of economic democracy they are easily entitled to the front rank in the vanguard of the world's progress toward ultimate democracy.

These notable achievements, which have been all too briefly enumerated above, have constituted great strides in the direction of political democracy since 1800, but they have left many grave problems still unsolved which will have to be met and conquered before democracy can be regarded as finally achieved. The securing of universal suffrage and representative government has made political democracy possible, rather than assured its existence. As Lord Bryce and Dr. Michels have so well pointed out, the political boss has proved quite as much of an obstacle to modern democracy as did the feudal lord to democratic tendencies in the medieval period. Attempts have been made, which are as yet only partially successful, to eliminate his sinister influence through such devices as the direct primary and the civil service laws. Also archaic forms of political institutions have often been found unsuited to a rapid and flexible adjustment to the desires and needs of the people, and such machinery as the initiative, referendum and recall has been introduced in the

hope of making government more sensitive and responsive to the public will. Again, many of the problems connected with the perfection of representative institutions are yet to be solved, and to meet this need schemes are being proposed and adopted which embrace the principle of minority and proportional representation and the representation of professional and economic groups. Then, Mr. Hobhouse and others, from the standpoint of political theory, and Woodrow Wilson, from the position of the constructive statesman, have reminded the world that most difficult and perplexing problems are involved in reconciling political democracy at home with the repression of subject peoples in imperial dominions. Finally, no one can seriously maintain that social and economic democracy are yet fully achieved when such extremes of social and economic position exist as are revealed, not in the vocal harangue of the soap-box orator, but in the sober and reliable statistics gathered by every great modern nation. While it is neither probable nor desirable that society permanently adopt any method of determining social and economic reward other than that of services rendered, it is a patent fact that the prevailing methods of deciding the value of services is sadly antiquated and in need of revision, particularly in the direction of preventing rewards from being inherited instead of earned. It is further necessary to take such steps as shall be required to ensure that all members of society, in proportion to their innate ability, receive approximate equality of opportunity and equipment for rendering services to society and receiving their reward therefor.

The World War not only brought democracy to Germany, Austria and Russia, but also created a number of new national states in central Europe, as well as adding much to the territory of certain existing states in the central European and Balkan areas. Most of these new states have been organized on a democratic and republican plan, and some of them have gone beyond the major democratic states in their adoption of advanced types of political institutions and methods such as proportional and vocational representation. The Russian soviet organization is a novel and interesting experiment which may prove worthy of adoption later as a mode of decentralizing the overgrown modern state and adapting it to the economic realities of the modern age. It is a scheme which could be exploited by capitalism as well as by communism. While the War did not bring at once any such revolutionary developments in social and economic democracy as many groups, such

as the British Labor Party, hoped for, there is little doubt that its ultimate reaction will be notably to forward the cause of social justice. The enormous debts contracted by the various states will, however, make it difficult to add much immediately to the appropriations for desirable social legislation.

2. *Progress of Democratic Theory.*

The development of the importance of democracy as a problem for theoretical analysis by the various branches of social science since 1800 has been fully as remarkable as the phenomenal growth of democracy in social, political and economic life. As was pointed out above, democracy until this period was not of sufficient importance in political philosophy ever to have received a comprehensive and systematic analysis by a political theorist. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, works on various phases of democracy have appeared in such a volume that only a few leading tendencies can be noticed in the scanty space which remains.

In the first place, it is interesting and significant that the chief trends in the development of democracy in political theory closely paralleled, and, to a large degree, were determined by the actual development of democracy in practice. Just as the first great advances toward democracy in the nineteenth century were the work of the middle class advocates of *laissez-faire*, so the first great expositions and defenses of democracy came from individualists in political theory such as Jefferson, Mill, Cobden and Spencer, who defended a semi-Aristotelian variety of democracy, in which the masses should participate but should be directed by the intellectually *élite*. Again, in the same way that democracy has in fact been made more inclusive, to embrace the proletariat as well as the *bourgeoisie* and has tended to adopt a broad program of social reform and state activity, so to-day the chief advanced exponents of modern democracy are to be found among the Socialists and radicals—men like the great socialistic leaders Bebel, Liebknecht and Jaurès, such radicals as the Webbs, Tawney, H. G. Wells, Bernard Shaw and others of the English Fabian group, and sociological reformers who advocate a policy of extensive state activity and a radical program of social reconstruction in behalf of the proletariat. The present-day adherents of the mid-Victorian individualism of Mill have become the conservatives, who, in political theory, occupy to-day the position once held by Metternich and

the Duke of Wellington and their apologists, Burke, Bonald, De Maistre, and von Haller.

An interesting development in the field of the analysis of democracy in social and political theory has been the clarification of the definition of democracy. The early definitions were generally formalistic and concerned chiefly with such problems as distinguishing between direct and "representative" democracy and analyzing the political concept of democracy. Especially important has been the "democratizing" of the very conception of democracy. The old Aristotelian notion of the "people" as the upper and middle class members of society, which persisted down to the close of the eighteenth century, has been supplanted by the newer view which regards the people as embracing all the members of society with no exception. Consequently, the phrase "government by the people" meant quite a different thing when used by Lincoln than it did when employed by Aristotle, Cusanus, Locke or Rousseau. Again, more recent students of the subject have come to see that democracy is far more than merely a form of government. Professor Giddings, who may be taken as typical of the recent synthetic interpretation of democracy, finds that democracy is a form of government, a form of the state and a type of social organization and social control. As a form of government a "pure democracy" is held to mean the enfranchisement of the majority of the population and the direct participation of the whole mass of the citizens in the operation of all the affairs of government. The much more common "representative democracy" is defined as one in which the citizens govern indirectly through periodically selected deputies or representatives. As a form of the state, democracy implies the existence of popular sovereignty. Lastly, as a form of society, democracy means both a democratic organization and the control of non-political forms of activity by a majority of the citizens. Finally, a number of students of democracy, among them Professor James Harvey Robinson, have become dissatisfied with a formalistic and static analysis of democracy, have given it a pragmatic definition, and have identified it with a dynamic program. Professor Robinson, for example, holds that democracy not only requires the popular control of public policy, but also implies a type of social organization which will develop to the fullest extent the latent potentialities of every member of the society, and imposes upon society the moral obligation to do everything in its power to hasten the realization of such a state of affairs.

Another phase of the development of the theory of democracy in the last century which can only be touched upon here is the great controversies over the merits of democracy as opposed to monarchy and aristocracy. That anyone should have thought democracy worthy of a lengthy and sustained attack or defense is significant of the growing importance of the subject, for such a thing rarely or never occurred before this period. The first phases of the controversy, following the French Revolution, were particularly acrimonious and partisan when the reactionaries, such as Burke, Bonald, DeMaistre and von Haller bitterly attacked the new order of things and were answered in kind by its admirers such as Paine, Jefferson, Bancroft, Lamennais and Lamartine. The more recent echoes of the Burke-Paine controversy have been more scholarly. F. J. Stephen, Maine, Lecky, Cram, Mallock, Faguet, Le Bon and Treitschke have questioned the merits of democracy and they have been energetically answered by Giddings, Sumner, Lowell, Eliot and the English Liberals and Fabians. On the whole, English, French and American writers now tend to defend the efficacy of a democratic form of social and political organization, while many Teutonic writers, with the exception of the Liberals and Socialists, have drifted away from their mid-century liberalism and have tended more and more to defend autocracy. Both tendencies have, no doubt, been the logical outgrowth of their social and political environment. Much the most telling attack which has ever been made on democratic theory has been launched recently by the differential biologists and psychologists who have called attention to the wide differences in ability among different individuals and classes in society, and have shown rather conclusively that literal majority rule would almost inevitably and invariably mean the rule of the mentally inferior groups. They have proved beyond serious controversy the fact that sound democratic theory and practice must be founded upon some adequate scheme for insuring the rule of the capable minority, subject to the general scrutiny of the majority. It certainly must be admitted that the twentieth century has witnessed the development of a distinctly sceptical attitude towards democracy, even on the part of its earlier optimistic exponents. Even Lord Bryce, at the end of his life, found it necessary to close the most extensive survey ever prepared of the actual achievements of existing democracies with the conclusion that the most that could be said for democracy was that other forms of government might be worse. Certainly

no existing democracy has ever achieved the efficiency of the former German Empire.

The remaining tendency in the development of democratic theory, and that which is destined to bring the most fruitful results, has been the gradual shift of method from a priori mythology and generalization, setting forth what some theorists imagine democracy to be, to a real concrete and inductive study of democracy in operation and an analysis of its fundamental foundations. The first conspicuous case of a concrete study of a democracy in action was made by De Tocqueville nearly a century ago and it remained for over a half century the only analysis of its kind. James Bryce next essayed the task with equal success in his remarkable *American Commonwealth*. Still more recently Ostrogorski and Croly have continued this line of approach in a brilliant but less comprehensive manner. Bryce, just before his death, completed a thorough study of the leading modern democracies. These studies, however, though epoch-making, were mainly descriptive rather than analytical. The need of a more profound analysis has been effectively stated by Mr. Graham Wallas and a number of fragmentary attempts have been made to supply this need. The impulse to this more penetrating analysis has come mainly from sociologists and economists, as the political scientists have, for the most part, been content to proceed with the further development of the external, and somewhat superficial, formalistic and legalistic line of approach to politics, which received its most effective formulation in the monumental works of Professor Burgess.

Professor Beard's brilliant and original torso has for the first time presented in their true perspective the origins of American democracy. Mr. Bentley, in a profound and too little read book, has brought the methodology of Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer and Small to bear on an analysis of that struggle of economic interests in society and politics which furnishes the only key to the understanding of so many problems in modern political life. The sociologists, particularly in America, have shown that democracy is not something which may be plucked from the clouds, but requires certain indispensable conditions in the social environment for its successful operation, and they have tried to indicate the nature of some of these indispensable prerequisites of a successful democracy. William Graham Sumner and Walter Weyl have dealt with the assaults of plutocracy on democracy in the United States, and Lloyd and Brooks have exposed the resulting corruption of

our political institutions. Professor Giddings, in a number of thoughtful volumes and essays, has sketched the environmental background which determines the nature of political life and organization, has pointed out the necessity of homogeneity of mental reactions for the existence of a liberal and democratic society, has attempted a harmonizing of the Aristotle-Harrington conception of the leadership of the intellectually *élite* with the modern view of the necessity of a democratic control in society, and has outlined the significant reasons for believing that democracy and imperialism are not mutually exclusive. Professor Ross has carried out Professor Giddings' conception of the necessity of homogeneity and general intelligence for the successful operation of a democracy and has shown by trenchant writings the grave dangers to American democracy from the carelessness and indifference of the government in allowing the unrestricted immigration of heterogeneous and ignorant elements from the "surplus populations" of Europe. Also, following out Professor Giddings' emphasis on the importance of racial and psychological homogeneity in democracy and upon the determination of political organization by the conditions in the social environment, Professor Tenney has pointed out many of the most important biological foundations and prerequisites of democracy and has sounded a note of warning against the dangers latent in the admission to the United States of peoples and classes who neither satisfy these conditions nor can be made to satisfy them by assimilation into the population. Professor Cooley, in a brilliantly written work, has analyzed, in a penetrating manner, the psychological problems inherent in the organization of democratic society on a large scale and has made numerous helpful suggestions as to how some of these perplexing problems may be solved.

The students of social psychology, such as Sighele in Italy, Tarde, Durkheim and Le Bon in France, Bagehot, Wallas, McDougall and Trotter in England, and Giddings, Sumner, Cooley, Ross, Martin, Eldridge, Bernard, Lippmann and Bogardus in America, have analyzed the diverse phases of those socio-psychic phenomena that affect group behavior and are especially prominent in modern democracies with their predominance of urban life and the resulting increase in the volume and variety of psychic reactions, intercourse and interstimulation. Professor Ellwood, in several erudite and lucid volumes, has produced a synthesis of the chief results of the work of the social psychologists and has indi-

cated their bearing upon the problems of politics in general and of American democracy in particular. Finally, statisticians, led by Professors Mayo-Smith and Willcox, have begun that quantitative measurement of political and social phenomena which Professors Wallas and Giddings have insisted is the only procedure which will be able to raise politics and sociology to the level of true sciences. These diverse but complementary contributions toward a concrete investigation and a fundamental analysis of the problems of democracy doubtless forecast the most fruitful tendencies in the future formulation of the "theory" of democracy. The synthesis of these various lines of approach to the analysis of the foundations of democracy—geographical, economical, biological and psychological—studied by the exact methods of statistical measurements, is the most pressing task which awaits execution in the field of political and social theory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMITIVE SOCIETY: Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*; Goldenweiser, A. A., "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America" (in *Journal of American Folklore*, October-December, 1914); "Sociological Terminology in Ethnology" (in *American Anthropologist*, July-September, 1916); Hobhouse, L. T., *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*; Levy-Bruhl, L., *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*; Lowie, R. H., "Social Organization" (in *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1914); *Primitive Society*; Marett, R. R., *Anthropology* (Chap. vi); Rivers, W. H. R., *Kinship and Social Organization*; Swanton, J. R., "A Reconstruction of the Theory of Social Organization" (Boas Anniversary Volume, 1906).

EARLY POLITICAL SOCIETY: Breasted, J. H., *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*; *A History of the Ancient Egyptians*; Delaporte, L., *Mesopotamia*; Janet, P., *Histoire de la science politique* (Vol. I); Jastrow, M., *Civilization in Babylonia and Assyria* (Chap. vi); Marvin, F. S., *The Living Past* (Chap. iii); Petrie, W. M. F., *Social Life in Ancient Egypt*; Sayce, A., *The Babylonians and Assyrians*; Taylor, H. O., *Ancient Ideals*; Willoughby, W. W., *Political Theories of the Ancient World*.

CLASSICAL TIMES—I. In Practice: Botsford, G. W., *Hellenic History*; *Hellenic Civilization*; *The Roman Assemblies*; Dill, S., *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*; *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*; Fowler, W., *Social Life at Rome*; *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*; Marvin, F. S., *The Living*

Past (Chaps. iv-v); Zimmern, A., *The Greek Commonwealth*. 2. *In Theory*: Barker, E., *The Political Theory of Plato and Aristotle*; Carlyle, A. J., *A History of Medieval Political Theory* (Vol. I); Coker, F. W., *Readings in Political Philosophy* (Chaps. i-iii); Dunning, W. A., *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval* (Chaps. i-iv); Loos, I., *Studies in the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato*; Nettleship, R. L., *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*; Willoughby, W. W., *Political Theories of the Ancient World*; Zeller, E., *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*.

THE MIDDLE AGES—I. *In Practice*: Adams, G. B., *Civilization during the Middle Ages*; Bryce, James, *The Holy Roman Empire*; Bury, J. B., *The History of the Freedom of Thought*; Davis, W. S., *Life on a Medieval Barony*; Emerton, E., *Introduction to the Study of the Middle Ages*; *Medieval Europe*; Giry and Reville, *Emancipation of the Medieval Towns*; Luchaire, A., *Social France in the Time of Philip Augustus*; Seignobos, C., *The Feudal Régime*; Thorndike, L., *The History of Medieval Europe*; Vinogradoff, P., "The Foundations of Society" (in *Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. II, Chap. xx); *The Growth of the Manor*; *English Society in the Eleventh Century*. 2. *In Theory*: Carlyle, A. J., *A History of Medieval Political Theory* (Vols. I-III); Coker, F. W., *Readings in Political Philosophy* (Chaps. iv-vii); Dunning, W. A., *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval* (Chaps. v-xi); Figgis, J. N., *From Gerson to Grotius*; Gierke, O., *Political Theories of the Middle Age*.

FROM THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION—I. *In Practice*: Cross, A. L., *A History of England and Greater Britain* (Chaps. xviii-xliv); Cunningham, W., *Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspects: Medieval and Modern Times* (Book V); Hayes, C. J. H., *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe* (Vol. I); Oppenheimer, F., *The State* (Chap. vi); Robinson and Beard, *Development of Modern Europe* (Vol. I); Seignobos, C., *Medieval and Modern Civilization* (Chap. xvii). 2. *In Theory*: Atger, F., *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*; Bluntschli, J. K., *Geschichte der neueren Staatswissenschaft*; Coker, F. W., *Readings in Political Philosophy* (Chaps. viii-xx); Dunning, W. A., *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*; Franck, A., *Reformateurs et publicistes de l'Europe* (3 vols.); Gooch, G. P., *A History of English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*; *Political Theory from Bacon to Halifax*; Graham, W., *English Political Philosophy*; Scherger, G. L., *Evolution of Modern Liberty*.

FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DAY—I. *In Practice*: Beard, C. A., *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*; *Some Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*; Bryce, James, *The American Commonwealth*; *Modern Democracies*; Croly, H., *Progressive Democracy*; *The Promise of*

American Life; De Tocqueville, A., *Democracy in America*; Ford, H. J., *Rise and Growth of American Politics*; Haworth, P. L., *America in Ferment*; Hayes, C. J. H., *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe* (Vol. II); Hazen, C. D., *Europe since 1815*; Hobhouse, L. T., *The Labor Movement*; Howe, F. C., *Socialized Germany*; Marvin, F. S., *The Century of Hope*; Ogg, F. A., *The Governments of Europe*; *The Economic Development of Modern Europe*; Orth, S. P., *Socialism and Democracy in Europe*; Ostrogorski, M., *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*; Robinson and Beard, *Development of Modern Europe* (Vol. II); Rose, J. H., *The Rise of Democracy*; Rosenblatt, F., *The Chartist Movement*; Slater, G., *The Making of Modern England*; Slosson, P. W., *The Decline of the Chartist Movement*; Webb, S., and Webb, B., *The History of the Trade Unionism*; Weyl, W., *The New Democracy*. 2. In Theory: Addams, Jane, *Democracy and Social Ethics*; Barker, E., *Political Theory in England from Spencer to the Present Day*; Bentley, A. F., *The Process of Government*; Cooley, C. H., *Social Organization*; Duprat, G., *Science sociale et démocratique*; Ellwood, C. A., *The Psychology of Human Society*; Faguet, E., *The Cult of Incompetence*; Giddings, F. H., *Democracy and Empire*; *Inductive Sociology*; *A Theory of Social Causation*; Godkin, E. L., *Problems of Modern Democracy*; Hayes, C. J. H., "German Socialism Reconsidered" (in *American Historical Review*, October, 1917); Hobhouse, L. T., *Democracy and Reaction*; *Liberalism*; *Social Evolution and Political Theory*; Hobson, J. A., *Imperialism*; Kirkup, T., *A History of Socialism*; Lowell, A. L., *Public Opinion and Popular Government*; Merriam, C. E., *A History of American Political Theories*; Michels, R., *Political Parties*; Mill, J. S., *Essay on Liberty*; Ross, E. A., *Social Control*; Sellars, R. W., *The Next Step in Democracy*; Shaw, G. B., et al. *The Fabian Essays*; Small, A. W., *Between Eras*; *From Capitalism to Democracy*; Spencer, H., *Social Statics*; *Man versus the State*; Tenney, A. A., *Social Population and Democracy*; Tufts, J. H., *Our Democracy*; Wells, H. G., *A Modern Utopia*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE POLITICAL PARTY IN DEMOCRACY¹

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTIES IN MODERN POLITICAL LIFE

IN contemporary American society party government has become the most prominent and publicly recognized phase of political activity. The average citizen participates in political life chiefly as a member of a party. His whole interest in politics is centered in the victory of a certain group of candidates. The typical voter has little conception of the general nature or purpose of government. He grasps feebly or not at all the general issues which are involved in the contemporary political situation. His whole political outlook is concentrated upon the entity or organization known as the political party, and the candidates and symbols which to him give the party vitality and interest. Though parties are supposed to have distinct and important programs or policies, these attract far less attention and arouse much less interest than the personal and symbolic aspects of party activity. In other words, we may say that in modern representative and democratic government, the political party transcends in importance all other phases of political interest and activity. It may further be asserted that whatever the defects of the party in actual practice, party government is the only possible form of government in a representative democracy. Hence, it is important to inquire into the history, nature, present defects and hopes of future improvement in the conduct of political activities through the instrumentality of the party system.

II. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Realistic students look upon the political party not as a spontaneous and voluntary benevolent association—the political manifestation of the *logos*—but as the public organization through

¹From *Humanity and Its Problems*, September, 1924.

which interest-groups seek to promote their specific objects and ambitions.² The party is an interest-group or a combination of interest-groups into an organization which can advance in a more powerful way the aspirations of the component groups. If the party represents a combination of interest-groups and is, at the same time, a coherent and well disciplined party, the specific interests of the constituent groups must have more common than divergent elements and objectives or the party will sooner or later disintegrate. Interest-groups must compromise with each other in organization in a great party, in the same way that compromise is essential in legislation and the final adjustment of interests in governmental action. On this account considerable latitude must be given in party platforms, or whatever serves as the basis of party unity. The strongest parties are those which can unite the greatest number of individuals in a single interest-group or can most successfully combine in a harmonious manner without sacrificing aggressiveness the largest number of interest-groups. This conception of the political party has been concisely summarized by Bentley: ³

The party gets its strength from the interests it represents, the convention and executive committee from the party, and the chairman from the convention and committee. In each grade of this series the social fact actually before us is leadership of some underlying interest or set of interests.

To be sure, no informed person would claim that this position as to the nature of political parties is a novel and unique contribution to the subject. It has been the prevailing interpretation of the fundamental nature of political parties by penetrating students of politics from the time of Aristotle to that of John Adams, Madison, Calhoun, Ratzenhofer and Bentley. It was particularly dom-

² Robert Michels has well stated the compensatory tendency of political parties to represent their program as conceived in the interest of society at large and to deny special party or class aims. "Political parties, however much they may be founded upon narrow class interests and however evidently they may work against the interests of the majority, love to identify themselves with the universe, or at least to present themselves as coöperating with all the citizens of the state, and to proclaim that they are fighting in the name of all and for the good of all." *Political Parties*, p. 16.

³ Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 225. Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 286ff., 306ff.

inant among the leaders of American political thought and practice in the Patristic period, John Adams, Hamilton, Madison and Jefferson.⁴ What the sociologists can claim is a large share in the current revival of this doctrine and the more profound and elaborate analysis of this proposition. While others have made notable contributions to this phase of sociological analysis, the real credit for this departure must be assigned to Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Oppenheimer in Europe, and to their disciples and collaborators in this country, Small, Bentley, Ward and Beard. While there is no doubt that Gumplowicz was the first of this group in respect to the priority of the promulgation of the doctrine, the most thorough analysis of political processes, and of parties as the social manifestation of the dynamic impulses coming from vital human interests, has been the work of Ratzenhofer and Bentley. As Professor Small puts it: ⁵

We need to know, in the concrete, just how human interests have combined with each other in every variety of circumstance within human experience. There has never, to my knowledge, been a fairly successful attempt to schedule efficient human interests in general, till Ratzenhofer did it less than ten years ago in *Das Wesen und Zweck der Politik*. With this work sociology attained its majority. Henceforth all study of human relations must be rated as provincial, which calculates problems of life with reference to a less comprehensive scheme of interests than his analysis exhibits.

The linking up of this view of political parties with observed facts in party history and activity is easy when attention is concentrated on European parties or most phases of American party history. The "Fathers" were perfectly frank in acknowledging that the early parties in this country represented an alignment of interests. In the last two decades, however, since the currency, tariff and expansionist policies have ceased to divide the two old parties in this country, it is difficult for some to harmonize American party alignments with the theory of the party as an interest-group. In-cisive publicists have, however, pointed out the fact that the task is not difficult when one goes beneath the superficial declamations

⁴ See the admirable review of this subject in C. A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics*. See above Chap. X.

⁵ A. W. Small, in discussion of Professor Giddings' paper on "Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 2, p. 181. See the "Vorwort" to Ratzenhofer's *Sociologie*, p. xii for an acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Gumplowicz.

of the party leaders and the party press. Both parties in this country are at present wholehearted representatives of the capitalistic groups and neither represents the agrarian and labor elements which have for various special reasons failed to develop a coherent party organization.⁶ In other words, real representative party government in this country has for the time being been suspended. Further, there has been in the major parties a distinct perversion of the means into an end. To the "organization" or "machine" elements the party has become an end in itself, and the income which it has received from the spoils and favors granted to it by the protected vested interests has made it worth conserving and has made the party "ring" an interest-group of the most persistent and insidious sort.⁷ As Mr. Bentley has summarized this matter, "the spoils system has operated to hold the party leaders from big to little together in a strong interest-group, which came, on the line of analysis I have previously set forth, to be more like an underlying interest-group than like a strict party formation on a representative level."⁸

As to the social function of political parties, viewed as contending interest-groups, sociologists are inclined to hold that, in spite of all obvious selfishness and corruption, party strife is the chief dynamic agency in promoting political progress and stimulating a healthy political activity. In the same way that the physical conflict of social groups created the state and modern political institutions, so the more peaceful struggle of parties within the state secures the continuance of political evolution. In no healthy and progressive state can one expect a cessation of the conflict of interest-groups, though, as Novicow long ago pointed out, the highest form of conflict is that which is carried on in the psychic and cultural realm. This may ultimately be expected to supersede the prevailing economic struggles of the present day in the same way that the latter have generally replaced the lower biological contest of groups in the "state-making age."⁹ Lester F. Ward,

⁶ Cf. A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History*, Chap. XII; and W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*.

⁷ For an analysis of the perversion of representative government under the recent American party system see W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*; P. L. Haworth, *America in Ferment*; C. A. Beard, *Contemporary American History*; W. G. Sumner, *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*; A. W. Small, *Between Eras: from Capitalism to Democracy*.

⁸ Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

⁹ Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 306ff.; see also Professor Small's

with his striving for scientific analogies, has defined party strife as "social synergy"—a powerful creative force or principle. Ward summarizes in the following paragraph his notion of the contributions of parties to political progress:¹⁰

The vigorous interaction of the two forces, which look so much like antagonism, strife and struggle, transforms force into energy and energy into power, and builds political and social structures. And after they are constructed, the same influences transform them, and it is this that constitutes social progress. Political institutions—the laws of every country—are the product of this political synergy, the crystallized action of legislative bodies created by political parties.

Next to the nature of political parties and their social function the most important sociological problem is the explanation of the seemingly inevitable tendency of political parties to become oligarchical in their organization and to identify the party with the organization itself and the leaders in the organization. Professor Giddings has suggested that this is the result of the inevitable tendency of the few to dominate in all social organization and activity. Linking this up with his basic theory of social causation as differential response to stimulation, he finds that some react to new situations much more readily than others and, by their priority and resourcefulness, dominate all situations and activities. Oligarchy in parties, then, is a natural result of unlike or differential response to stimulation, and of the tendency in all organization to convert means into ends:¹¹

Not all individuals react to a given stimulation with equal promptness, or completeness, or persistence. Therefore in every situation there are individuals that react more effectively than others do. They reinforce the original stimulation and play a major part in instimulation. They initiate and take responsibility. They lead; they conduct experiments in a more or less systematic fashion.

Those individuals that react most effectively command the situation and create new situations to which other individuals must adjust themselves. Few or many, the alert and effective are a protocracy: a dominating plurum from which ruling classes are derived. Protoc-

review of E. A. Ross' *Sin and Society*, in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, January, 1908, pp. 566-568.

¹⁰ L. F. Ward, "The Sociology of Political Parties," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, January, 1908, pp. 440-441.

¹¹ F. H. Giddings, "Pluralistic Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, March, 1920, p. 539. *The Responsible State*, p. 19.

racy is always with us. We let George do it, and George to a greater or less extent "does" us.

Every kleptocracy of brigands and conquerors, every plutocracy, every aristocracy, and every democracy begins as a protocracy. It comes into existence and begins its career as a little band of alert and capable persons who see the situation, grasp the opportunity, and, in the expressive slang of our modern competitive life, "go to it" with no unnecessary delay.

We have now arrived at the first induction, the fundamental principle of political science, which is, namely: *The few always dominate.*

A number of the social psychologists have suggested explanations for this oligarchical tendency of parties. Sighele, Le Bon, Tarde, Durkheim, and Ross have held that it is due to the domination of crowd psychology in modern political assemblies and even in states as a whole, where psychic contagion is induced by the operation of the press and other agencies for expediting the communication of information and the generation of uniform emotional states. Under these circumstances the leaders can manipulate the masses at will and hold the situation completely under their control.¹²

The technique through which party leaders dominate the party and manipulate public opinion has been incisively analyzed from the psychological standpoint by Professor Graham Wallas. The important political entities which stimulate mankind are not interpreted by the citizens as a complex of ideas and desires, but only through the association of this political complex with some symbol. The most important among the modern stimuli from the political order are furnished by the political party. While a party may have a conscious intellectual origin and be designed to achieve a definite end, it will have little strength or duration unless it secures symbols with sufficiently high emotional values, such as party colors, tunes, names and the like. A skillful party makes use of its symbols in the same way that a commercial concern employs its trademarks and advertisements. If a candidate is not properly surrounded by and vested with symbols he has no chance of success. The most insignificant non-entity properly associated with the

¹² S. Sighele, *Psychologie des sectes; La foule criminelle; Contro il parlamentarismo: Saggio di psicologia collettiva; L'intelligenza della folla.* G. Le Bon, *The Crowd; La psychologie politique; The Psychology of Socialism;* G. Tarde, *Les transformations du pouvoir; Les crimes des foules.* E. Durkheim, *Les règles de la méthode sociologique.* E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology.*

party symbols is much more likely to be successful in an election than the strongest personality in the country if the latter has cut himself off from party connections and makes a direct appeal to the intelligence and good judgment of the citizens. In this way the public is put at the mercy of the political organization, and the latter soon comes to regard the party as an end in itself or as a means for advancing the interests of the machine. The only avenue of escape from party tyranny lies in a removal of the psychological power of party symbols and in the discrediting of the political "spell-binder" through some method of revealing to the public the manner in which they are being exploited through set phrases and emotion-charged symbols. Such a procedure might operate as a political therapeutic.¹³

A remarkable sociological synthesis of the causes for the universal development of oligarchical tendencies in political parties is furnished in the monumental sociological analysis of political parties by the Swiss professor, Robert Michels.¹⁴ He finds that oligarchical tendencies are inevitable in all forms of political organization and in all parties, even though the political organization be that extreme form of decentralization known as syndicalism or the parties be radical revolutionary parties. He finds that there are three chief causes for this situation, the psychology of the individual, the psychological characteristics of groups and mass government, and the inevitable accompaniments of organization. The average individual is stupid and lacking in initiative and resourcefulness. The more alert and intelligent naturally come to the top as leaders. But the psychological consequences of leadership are vanity, arrogance, impatience of popular control and a tendency on the part of the leaders to forget that they owe their position to popular consent. Under modern conditions democracy, in a broad sense, is mass rule. But masses are incoherent and inarticulate; they must have leaders. Further, the masses cannot participate directly in government; they must choose representatives, and representative government means organization. Wherever the masses do act in modern politics they are subject to the crowd-psychological state. In elections they are easily manipulated. The press, which is under the control of the leaders, can easily deceive them.

¹³ Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, pp. 54, 72-186; cf. also W. Lippmann, *The Phantom Public*.

¹⁴ R. Michels, *Political Parties, a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*.

Even modern parliaments, made up of chosen representatives, operate under psychological conditions very similar to the crowd. They are so large and unwieldy that they inevitably come under the domination of the able minority. But the great cause of oligarchy in political parties comes from the necessity of organization. It is the inevitable organization which a political party must undertake, if it is to function effectively, which produces the necessity of leadership and the consequent development of oligarchy. In the light of present experience and past history, one is safe in concluding that democracy is much more likely to be a healthy aspiration than a successful realization. The following rearranged excerpts from Michels' treatise summarize his position in a fairly adequate manner: ¹⁵

Democracy is inconceivable without organization. Yet this politically necessary principle of organization, while it overcomes that disorganization of forces which would be favorable to the adversary, brings other dangers in its train. We escape Scylla only to dash ourselves on Charybdis. Organization is, in fact, the source from which the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy, occasioning there disastrous floods and rendering the plain unrecognizable. It is obvious that such a gigantic number of persons belonging to a unitary organization cannot do any practical work upon a system of direct discussion. Hence the need for delegation, for the system in which the delegates represent the mass and carry out its will. Even in groups sincerely animated with the democratic spirit, current business, the preparation and the carrying out of the most important actions, is necessarily left in the hands of individuals. Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy. In every organization, whether it be a political party, a professional union, or any other association of the kind, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly. The mechanism of the organization, while conferring a solidity of structure, induces serious changes in the organized mass, completely inverting the respective positions of the leaders and the led. As a result of organization, every party or professional union becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of directed. Every solidly constructed organization, whether it be a democratic state, a political party, or a league of

¹⁵ R. Michels, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 22, 31, 32, 33, 35, 130, 135, 230, 401, 405. While the above summary and the following excerpts summarize the author's chief theoretical proposition they give no adequate impression of the subtle analysis and the large amount of concrete illustrative material contained in what is the most important sociological contribution to the study of political parties.

proletarians for the resistance of economic oppression, presents a soil eminently favorable for the differentiation of organs and functions. The technical specialization that inevitably results from all extensive organization renders necessary what is called expert leadership. Consequently the power of determination comes to be considered one of the specific attributes of leadership, and is gradually withdrawn from the masses to be concentrated in the hands of the leaders alone. Thus the leaders, who were at first no more than the executive organs of the collective, will soon emancipate themselves from the mass and become independent of its control. It is indisputable that the oligarchical and bureaucratic tendencies of party organization is a matter of technical and practical necessity. It is the inevitable product of the varied principle of organization. The press constitutes a potent instrument for the conquest, the preservation, and the consolidation of power on the part of the leaders. The press is the most suitable means of diffusing the fame of the individual leaders among the masses, for popularizing their names. In all cases the press remains in the hands of the leaders and is never controlled by the rank and file. When in any organization the oligarchy has attained an advanced stage of development, the leaders begin to identify with themselves, not merely the party institutions, but even the party property, this phenomenon being common both to the party and to the state. Reduced to its most concise expression, the fundamental sociological law of political parties may be formulated in the following terms: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy." The treasure in the fable may well symbolize democracy. Democracy is a treasure which no one will ever discover by deliberate search. But in continuing our search, in labouring indefatigably to discover the undiscoverable, we shall perform a work which will have fertile results in the democratic sense.

Probably no better summary statement could be found than that contained in the last paragraph of the brilliant brochure of Professor Charles A. Beard on *The Economic Basis of Politics*.¹⁶

The grand conclusion, therefore, seems to be that advanced by our own James Madison in the Tenth Number of the *Federalist*. To express his thought in modern terms: a landed interest, a transport interest, a railway interest, a shipping interest, an engineering interest, a manufacturing interest, a public-official interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in all great societies and divide

¹⁶ Op. cit., p. 99.

them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests, whatever may be the formula for the ownership of property, constitutes the principal task of modern statesmen and involves the spirit of party in the necessary and ordinary operations of government. In other words, there is no rest for mankind, no final solution of eternal contradictions. Such is the design of the universe. The recognition of this fact is the beginning of wisdom—and of statesmanship.

III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL PARTY

To many it may appear somewhat strange to learn that political parties have not existed at all times since the origin of the state. As a matter of history, party government did not attain any considerable degree of importance or respectability until about the opening of the nineteenth century. In the city-states of classical antiquity, there was some development of party, or perhaps better, factional activity. But there was no permanent party organization in classical times, much less any recognition of the party as a stable and desirable factor in political life. In fact, all the great political philosophers of classical antiquity condemned parties and factions as fatal to any stable and organized form of political activity. In the Middle Ages, likewise, there were no permanent parties. The main type of political contention was that between the Church and the State, but such disputes were chiefly international in scope, and there was little in the way of permanent party alignments within any state of the medieval period. There were at times factions or parties which aligned themselves on the side of the empire or the papacy, as for example, in the historic conflict between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines. They did not exist for the purpose of carrying on organized governmental activity, but rather for the purpose of capturing and controlling the Holy Roman Empire in the interest of its particular champion. There was little in these medieval factions which resembled at all modern party conflict and organization. The other chief types of conflict in the medieval period, namely, the struggle between the townsmen and the feudal lords and between the townsmen and the king, represented a form of social and economic conflict, rather than anything like the modern party divisions and struggles. Until the great series of historic changes between 1500 and 1800 had created the beginnings of modern parliamentary, representative

and constitutional government, there was no possibility of developing the party system.

In the centuries immediately following 1500, there began a series of developments which produced the modern age. Europe began the great process of expansion overseas. This produced important industrial, commercial, social and political changes in Europe itself. Manufacturing and trade steadily increased in volume. Great quantities of precious metals were brought in from the New World, thus replenishing the scanty stock which existed in Europe before this time. Banking, speculation, stock exchanges, and new forms of business organization, came into being. These changes led to a great increase in the size, position and power of the middle class. At first, this class made common cause with the king against their old traditional medieval enemies, the feudal lords, and helped to create the early modern national dynastic and absolutistic state. But in due time they found the kings as obstructive of their interests as the feudal lords had been in the medieval age. Forthwith, they turned against the kings, subjected them to constitutional limitations, and substituted parliamentary rule for the régime of royal absolutism.

With the emergence of parliamentary government and the representative system, it became necessary to find some sort of machinery which would enable the contending classes of landlords and merchants to organize their forces, advance their interests and elect their candidates. This machinery was supplied by the modern political party, which began to make its appearance in England just before the middle of the seventeenth century, and gradually established itself, so that by the middle of the nineteenth century it had become the most vital element in modern political life. The gradual development of parties may be traced to the struggles of the English Revolution between the English King and the merchant classes in the period from 1640-1649. The process continued particularly in the period of the Restoration. Before the Revolution of 1688, the Whig and Tory parties had actually come into existence. They were not able to function, however, in a peaceable and constructive manner. It was believed that the defeated party leader should be impeached and punished as an enemy of the public order. Gradually, however, under the new parliamentary system, party government became better established. It was necessary to organize the parties in parliament in order to advance the interests of the two great antagonistic groups of land-

lords and merchants. As the cabinet system developed under Walpole in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Whigs improved their party organization while remaining in control of English politics. The Tories, likewise, as the party of opposition, developed their party life and machinery for the purpose of rendering the supremacy of the Whigs as uncomfortable and intolerable as possible, and during this same period the practice of punishing the defeated party leader was gradually abandoned.

But the English party system of the eighteenth century was not of the same type as that of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. The majority of the people were excluded from the right to vote, so that party organization did not imply at that time the organization of the electorate. The Reform Bill of 1832 introduced for the first time the modern system of representative government in England, and the two great Suffrage Acts of 1867 and 1884 served to give the vote to the majority of the adult males. These bills made it necessary, not merely to organize parliament, but to organize the voters, and the party in this way assumed its modern democratic form. In France, parties had developed in the period of the first or great French Revolution following 1789, and, while suffering a temporary eclipse under Napoleon, became well established in the French political system after 1814. By the time of the July Revolution of 1830, they had come to play the major part in French political life. In central Europe, political parties reached an elementary stage of development in the series of revolutions of 1848.

IV. ORIGINS OF PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

While parties are necessary in all types of modern states, party government has been particularly necessary in the United States. In the first place, in our federal system, we have a division of the power and functions of government between the federal government and the several so-called states. Further than this, the Fathers so designed it that the three major departments of government—the executive, legislative and judicial—should be sharply separated and balanced one against the other. Finally, both our federal and state governments provide for a large number of elective and appointive political offices which are filled, not on the basis of merit or special qualification, but as a reward for party activity. The political party has furnished the machinery which

has given unity of purpose and control between federal and state governments and has joined up, even if in an awkward way, the several departments of the federal government. Therefore, in addition to the general necessity of party organization in every modern representative and democratic state, the United States has been compelled to devise a party system in order to solve certain problems which have been created by the particular form of government which has been provided for us in the federal and many of the state constitutions.

Parties have existed in the United States since the settlement of the English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard in the seventeenth century. As John Adams once said: "You say our divisions began with federalism and anti-federalism? Alas! they began with human nature; they have existed in America from its first plantation. In every colony, divisions always prevailed. In New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and all the rest, a court and country party always contended." As early as 1720, we have evidence of the party caucus being utilized in Boston. In spite of this familiarity with party life, the Fathers who drew up our federal constitution distrusted party activity. Parties are not mentioned in the constitution, and in the electoral college the Fathers provided what they supposed would be adequate assurance against the development of party strife in the selection of the chief executive of the country. It was hoped and expected that the electors would be the most eminent men in the public life of the several states, and that they would meet, deliberate and choose, after careful consideration and on a non-partisan basis, the ablest man available in the whole country. It was further contemplated that after the president was chosen in this manner, he would proceed to appoint as officials in the several departments of the federal service men who were distinguished by special preparation and achievements along the particular lines involved.

The most eminent political thinkers of the constitutional period all denounced parties. Madison in the *Federalist*, contended that parties constituted the chief cause of alarm to those who feared for the future of popular government. Jefferson said in 1789 that he would prefer to go to hell rather than to attain heaven as a result of strict partisan activity. John Marshall in 1799 contended that nothing debases or pollutes the human mind more than the political party. Washington, in his Farewell Address, maintained that parties and party strife were destructive of the fundamental

principles of free government. These illustrations of the adverse opinion of the Fathers toward parties could be multiplied indefinitely. Yet the system of government which the Fathers created rendered essential the origin of the party system, if this new federal government was to be successfully operated. By 1800 the electoral college had ceased to be anything more than an empty, obstructive and undemocratic sham. The election of federal officers had come to be based upon a thoroughly partisan attitude and procedure. Within another generation all the federal offices were filled by those who had in some way or another rendered important service to the successful political party. The party and spoils system had been introduced into the state governments even earlier than into the federal government. In this way the non-partisan scheme of government, which had been contemplated by the Fathers, disappeared under their very eyes, and the party system came to be thoroughly and permanently established.

V. ABUSES IN THE PARTY SYSTEM

In spite of the indispensable nature of the political party in modern government, it inevitably developed serious abuses in the process of growth. Many of these abuses are not, of course, inherent in, and inseparable from, party government; some of them were due to the defects inevitable in the first stages of experimentation with any new institution or procedure. Party government is a relatively late and novel experiment in the history of politics, and if its abuses have seemed extensive and prevalent, this should in no way lead us to believe that they must always remain, or at least that they must always continue to be as prominent as they have been in our own generation. It may perhaps be helpful in understanding the nature and future of party government, to deal briefly with the types of corruption and abuses which have been most evident in the modern political party in the United States, and to indicate how we have attempted, in one way or another, to eradicate these defects.

First and foremost among the abuses of the modern party is the all-prevalent domination of the boss and the machine. It is a general and popular superstition in regard to the American government that the individual citizen is in a position directly to advance his interests or make his opinion felt in governmental matters, and in one way or another, is able to get into personal contact

with lawmakers. In other words, the government is supposed to be the direct representative of the citizens whose wishes should dominate and direct all legislation. But all who have made even an elementary study of the processes of American government in the last fifty years know that this conception is but a pious aspiration and a misleading myth. It has been well-nigh impossible for any citizen or any group of citizens to exert pressure upon any governmental organization. Legislation can only be secured through an advance negotiation with, and approval by, the boss and the machine. Instead of direct government, we have built up what has been so frequently called "the invisible government," which really controls all phases of American political life. Elihu Root once said that for nearly a generation the center of the government of the Empire State was not at Albany, but in the offices of Thomas C. Platt, of the United States Express Company.

There was thus built up an almost insuperable obstacle to representative and democratic government. Then, down to a generation ago, voting was not secret. It was possible for a boss or his representative to know how every citizen voted. This made it easy for the employer of the voter or for representatives of the political machine to intimidate the citizen and compel him to vote otherwise than he might have done, had he been able to exercise a real choice. Again, the machine completely controlled the selection of delegates to the nominating conventions. Even the delegates themselves at the party conventions had relatively little part in the choice of candidates, the selection of whom was normally pre-arranged and already decided upon by a narrow clique of the more powerful members of the machine. As one eminent writer once remarked: "The chief function of the delegates at a party convention was to sing 'we're here because we're here.'" The delegates merely ratified the slate of candidates prepared in advance by the more powerful party bosses, and then the people were given the opportunity to reject or ratify the candidates thus chosen, in whose selection the great mass of the citizens had had no part whatever. In this way, all the officers of government, who theoretically owed their position to popular election, were actually chosen by the machine. The nomination of Warren G. Harding in 1920 was one of the most flagrant examples of the undemocratic nature of convention nominations. Mr. Harding was an almost unheard-of nonentity in 1920. He was known merely as a strictly conventional organization Republican senator of above the average

pulchritude, with the sartorial acumen of better than the average Elk. He made a miserable showing in the pre-convention primaries, and even his own manager was not elected to the Chicago convention. There was a dead-lock between Johnson, Lowden and Wood, which apparently could not be broken. The weather was unspeakably hot in Chicago at the time, and the delegates were disconsolate and inconsolable over the thought of another week-end in this city, especially as the beer-supply had run low. The leaders of the plutocrats at the convention saw their chance of exploiting this desire of the delegates to get away from Chicago in the interest of slipping in a candidate who would be most plastic in their hands if elected to the presidency. Harding seemed to be their man, as he was known to be wholly safe and complaisant and his physiognomy seemed the most promising with which to decorate the campaign pictures. Hence, Myron T. Herrick, George Harvey and a half-dozen others railroaded him through the convention. He was in no sense whatever the choice of the people. Had there been a popular plebiscite held throughout the United States on the eve of the Chicago convention of 1920, it is doubtful if Harding would have received 100,000 votes. He was nominated, and over 15,500,000 surged forward to place their stamp of approval upon him. The man the great majority of the people really desired to see nominated for the presidency, Mr. Herbert Hoover, was not seriously considered by the convention.

Not only did the boss and the machine control voting and nominations, they also controlled legislation. As we have already pointed out, the boss and the machine completely dominated legislative processes. Even if the machine would graciously allow a citizen or a group of citizens to introduce a bill embodying their ideals or desires, it stood no chance of being favorably reported out of committee and passed unless it had met the approval of the party leaders. In most cases, bills not approved by the party machine were not even introduced in the legislature. Legislation was a matter secretly and effectively arranged between the favored groups and classes, on the one hand, and the party machine, on the other. The real government was centered in the collusion between the machine and the lobby. In some few instances where the labor groups possessed an unusual degree of power, they also began to exert the same sort of pressure upon legislation that had earlier been evidenced in the majority of cases in the activities of capitalistic representatives. Under a labor government there is

little probability that we should have less class and party rule than we have had under plutocratic domination since the Civil War. What we are concerned with now is the undoubted fact that within the last fifty years popular wishes have had very little to do with the majority of the legislation passed in our federal and state governments. The plutocracy have calmly used their power over the legislatures to embody their wishes and objectives in legislation, and have then utilized a willing and subservient press to convince the populace that such laws and policies were not only what the people really needed to advance the public welfare, but were also exactly what the mass of the people actually desired. In most cases they have been wholly successful in executing this technique of deception. We are not, of course, arguing for any special diabolism on the part of American capitalism. Jefferson and the agrarians were as unscrupulous in their day, and if we were to have a society dominated by the proletariat we should certainly witness a most faithful continuance of the same methods which they now so warmly criticize when exploited by their plutocratic masters. It merely so happens that we are now controlled by the business classes.

The only limitations upon thorough-going government by the vested interests and the machine is the fact that, at least up to 1920, this collusion could not well be carried too far without its leading to popular indignation and the development of a revolt against the party. Instances of this sort of excess and the reaction against it have appeared from time to time in the Liberal Republican Movement, the Mugwump Secession, Bryan Democracy, the Roosevelt Progressivism of 1912, the repudiation of Wilsonism and Palmerism in 1920, and the rebuke to the Republican party in the Congressional election of 1922. In general, however, the "Interests" and the politicians have been able to deceive, soothe and reassure the public, and the revolts against plutocratic control have not been frequent or very successful. The failure to repudiate Coolidge and the Republican Party in 1924 after the Oil and Veterans' Bureau scandals well illustrates the docility of the public in the face of the gravest abuses. As a reward to the boss for keeping the government in line with the interests of the dominant economic groups, the boss and the machine have been granted all sorts of gross and petty graft, and innumerable opportunities for public corruption. Favorable contracts on government works, spoils of appointive office, "pork-barrel" legislation and other types of positive and sig-

nificant rewards have been handed over to the boss for his efficient services in keeping the populace and the party subservient.

With the growth of the population, the more perfect organization of the party and the increased necessity of partisan alertness, the expenses which have been connected with successful party organization and campaigns have enormously increased. Vast sums of money have been spent to secure the nomination of candidates favored by the interests and the machine. In order to elect their candidates, political leaders have demanded large contributions from the powerful economic interests. This practice first became notorious, perhaps, in the Republican campaign of 1896, when Mark Hanna raised vast sums from Wall Street in order to secure the election of Major McKinley and to defeat what was believed to be the revolutionary program of William Jennings Bryan. The consciences of even the best types of political leaders were none too tender upon this particular issue. Even President Roosevelt did not object in 1904 to the receipt of a substantial check from E. H. Harriman, whose economic policies Mr. Roosevelt had roundly denounced. The notorious Newberry case in Michigan has been the most notable of the recent scandals of this sort. Not only have great sums of money been expended in the election of candidates already selected, but more recently there has been a deplorable development of excessive expenditures for the securing of nominations to offices, particularly the nomination to the office of President of the United States. So far did this go that Mr. Roosevelt's campaign for nomination in 1912 cost \$750,000, and in the period preceding the Republican convention of 1920 so much money was expended by candidates in the struggle for delegates that two of the most prominent candidates were practically disqualified by the revelation of the pre-convention expenditures in their campaign for nomination. The campaign of Leonard Wood for the nomination at this time cost \$1,775,000.

With the development of the party, the machinery and organization, which are really supposed to be a means for advancing the end of a party program and a body of definite principles, have become ends in themselves. Since the campaign of 1896 there has been little or no important contrast of principles between the Republican and Democratic parties. They have taken no fundamentally divergent stand upon any of the more significant public problems before us. The whole aim and goal of these parties in the last generation has been the spoils of office. An effort has

been made to keep the machinery of the party intact and to prevent a sufficiently powerful insurgent movement, which might wreck one of the grand old parties and substitute a new party with a definite and original party program. For the last twenty-five years the citizen has merely been asked to decide which party machine he prefers and not to choose between two fundamentally different programs of public policy.¹⁷ The election of 1912 offers a slight exception to this situation, but even this episode proved the power of the machine in the political party. Even the most powerful, dynamic and popular figure in American political life in the last fifty years, with the most attractive and constructive party program which has been worked out since the original platform of the Republican party of 1856, was unable to carry through a successful revolt against the corrupt Republican machine. The power of the machine was also demonstrated in 1912 through its ability to exclude from the Republican nomination for the presidency the man who was unquestionably overwhelmingly the choice of the Republican voters of the country.

Another source of the corruption and defects of party government lies in the strength and power of party symbols and party shibboleths, catch-words and phrases, which are unreasoningly accepted by the mass of citizens. The majority of the citizens react to propositions and suggestions in a fundamentally emotional, rather than an intellectual manner. Hence, party symbols, party shibboleths, campaign catch-words, such as "the bloody shirt," "the full dinner pail," and "the new freedom," references to the "grand old party," and to distinguished men who have led the party in the past, are relied upon to hold the voter in line and secure his allegiance, even though he knows nothing of the platform of the party, and would be likely to disapprove of it if it were made clear to him. Those who would endeavor to purify and improve our political life and to wage a successful fight against the corruption and inefficiency which prevail in the major political parties of the United States, find this power of party symbolism and phraseology an almost insuperable obstacle. To the average American audience, the sudden flashing upon the screen of the elephant, the donkey, the pictures of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Grant, McKinley, Bryan or Roosevelt, weigh far more heavily and arouse more instant response and approval than the most carefully considered and most effectively delivered political speech which

¹⁷ See Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History*, Chap. xii.

we could well imagine. Particularly significant is the fact that the time of political campaigns is the period in which the voter should employ the greatest amount of rationality, but is actually the moment when he is most at the mercy of the emotions of party strife. The partisanship which between campaigns is but a mild neurosis becomes inflated during the campaign periods into a most malignant psychosis accompanied by almost complete dementia.

VI. EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE REFORM OF PARTY ABUSES

The more enlightened citizens from the days of George William Curtis and Carl Schurz, have been thoroughly aware of this degradation of our political life which has been associated with the rise and domination of the party machine, and we have witnessed various attempts to reduce the elements of autocracy, corruption and inefficiency in party government. One of the first modes of attack upon the party system came in the effort to substitute the civil service system for the spoils system. This movement began to get thoroughly under way about 1872, and it has progressively developed until the majority of our federal offices are, at least in legal theory, filled upon the basis of merit as proved by competitive examinations. But the federal civil service is by no means perfect at the present time, and the state and municipal civil service systems are far inferior to that of the national government. Still, the situation has infinitely improved in comparison to that which prevailed in the time of President Grant, and, of all the attempts to limit the complete rule of the boss, it is probable that the civil service movement has been the most conspicuously successful. Elective offices are still, of course, completely in the control of the party system.

The intimidation of the voter through a knowledge of how he was voting has been in part eliminated through the introduction of the Australian ballot, which came into this country in the decade following 1885. At the present time, the secret ballot is in use in some forty-six of the forty-eight states. Yet this secret or Australian ballot has not prevented the boss from knowing how a man votes, if it is in his power to intimidate the individual. Various special directions as to names to be written in the blank column on the ballot serve to reveal the vote of an individual to the boss or his representatives about as adequately as in the earlier

days when the vote was by show-of-hand or word-of-mouth.

In the matter of the complete domination of legislation by the boss, there have been attempts by various groups of citizens and reform organizations to organize for the purpose of advancing certain types of legislation, and by large-scale persistent effort, it has become increasingly possible for a sufficiently powerful group of citizens to secure at least the introduction, if not the passage, of bills looking toward political improvement and a better public policy. Even more important than the activities of these voluntary organizations of citizens has been the development of the initiative and referendum. These devices are intended to give the people a large share in the direct proposal and initiation of legislation and in the rejection of legislation passed by the machine-ridden legislature. But, excellent as these have been in theory, their practical operation has not been conspicuously successful. The people have shown a general apathy, popular organization has been difficult, and the general body of the citizens have found it impossible to vote intelligently on technical problems involved in many legislative measures. If they vote at all on such matters they prefer to accept the suggestions of the party leaders. It is still true, therefore, that the vast body of legislation is introduced and passed at the behest, and under the control of, the machine leaders.

Attempts have been made to reduce the volume of graft and corruption in politics through the impeachment or dismissal of legislators and public officials found guilty of receiving bribes, through investigations of building scandals in connection with state capitols and public works, and through the introduction in the federal, and some state governments, of a budget system, thus reducing the possibility of the wholesale graft and wild expenditures involved in the old "pork-barrel" and "rider" system. Efforts have been made to diminish the amount of expenditures in political campaigns by compelling the publication of campaign expenses by the candidates of all parties. These have not, however, in most cases, actually limited the amount which might be spent, but have simply erected a minor check through the possibility of a revulsion of popular feeling against a candidate who has spent enormous sums to advance his interests. But these revelations need not be made until *after* the election and the only salutary result which this could have is to make more difficult the reelection of a candidate who has made a grossly excessive use of money in securing his election.

The complete domination of the party machine in the matter of selection of candidates has been lessened in part by the development of the direct primary system. Certain early anticipations of this principle came in the California law of 1866 and the Ohio law of 1871, but most of the progress has been made since the opening of the twentieth century. In large part, the contemporary movement towards direct primaries was the result of the agitation of Robert M. La Follette, of Wisconsin, in his struggle against the boss dominated conventions of his state. The direct primary system was thoroughly introduced in Minnesota in 1901, and is now utilized in widely varying degrees in some half of the states of the Union. While in theory the direct primary provides admirable and adequate machinery to allow the voters to break down the control of the boss and the machine over the nomination of party candidates, it has in practice proved to be rather unsatisfactory. This has not been due to the defects in the principle or mechanism of the direct primary, but rather because of the lack of public interest and intelligence. The majority of the voters remain away from the polls on primary day and allow the few faithful members of the old guard, who vote under the direction of the machine, to cast most of the votes for the candidates. In this way, the machine actually controls nominations much as it did under the old caucus and convention systems, the only difference being that it costs the state somewhat more under the primary system to select candidates. In fact, so indifferent have the people shown themselves to the direct primary in many states that they have allowed the bosses gradually, but surely, to reintroduce the convention system.

In regard to the emotional power of party symbols and catchwords, the only effective antidote is education as to the real meaning of political parties, their true function in political life, and the manner in which politicians have fooled and deceived the citizens on all these points. As Graham Wallas pointed out in the first part of his famous work on *Human Nature in Politics*, these party symbols tend to lose much of their strength once the people are shown how they have been duped by them in the past. Political education thus furnishes a sort of party psycho-therapy. Still, it cannot be hoped that education can entirely eliminate the emotional potency of the party symbol. The majority of the voters will always be likely to react fundamentally on an emotional plane, and education is most effective with those who consider public, as well as other problems, in a rational light. Nevertheless, with all

classes, education in political matters is bound to be, in varying degrees, a partial mode of relief from the more significant abuses in our modern political system.

Looking at the problem in its broadest light, one may say that the reform of the contemporary party government is but a phase of the necessary reorganization of modern political life as a whole. In the first place, it is doubtful if we can ever hope to provide for thorough-going direct majority rule, and it is even more doubtful that this would be desirable if we could obtain it. In all probability, we must accept the fact that society is destined always to be dominated by the superior intellects, unless certain unfair economic and social institutions and practices prevent real leadership from asserting itself. Hence the autocratic aspect of political parties is not in itself to be deplored. It is probably both inevitable and desirable. What is disastrous in modern party autocracy is the type of leader who has dominated contemporary political parties. What we need to-day is to substitute for the corrupt boss and his plutocratic backers properly educated and socialized leaders, who will realize their responsibility in public service and who will endeavor to use their position of ascendancy for the advancement and the well-being of society. There is no doubt that this is in large part a pious aspiration, but the only way out lies in a series of successive approximations to this ultimate goal. But an isolated leadership is not likely to operate effectively unless linked up with an active popular interest in political life. This is something which is well-nigh impossible under the political conditions which exist in the modern state. The great territorial states of the present time, with their complexity of social and economic problems, which have arisen as a result of the Industrial Revolution, have so far removed government from the interest and scrutiny of the average citizen that he is unable to grasp its nature, significance and problems. The citizen has thus lost most of his interest in, and practical knowledge of, general political issues, and his sole participation in politics usually lies in an unreasoning allegiance to some emotion-bearing party or personality.

We need to find various methods for reviving within the great national territorial states of the present day that active interest in government which characterized citizens in the earlier periods of smaller political units. This can be in part achieved by strengthening the element of local government, thus bringing many important governmental problems closer to the people. Community

interests and community organization, as Professor MacIver and Miss Follett have pointed out, must be greatly strengthened. The powers of the central government must be more and more limited to certain large general interests which concern all the citizens of the entire country. By thus strengthening the local political community, it is likely that the citizens will begin to take a greater interest in problems of government and be able to exert a more intelligent control over public affairs. The other most promising proposal as to political reform lies in wiping out the old irrational practice of representative government on the basis of territory and population, and the substitution of representation by professions and vocations. Under such a system, every citizen would find his own occupation or profession directly and immediately represented in government. This would give to him a real *rationale* in political affairs. He would then take an active interest in the nomination and election of representatives, and he would be likely to insist that the representative of his profession be a competent and worthy member of that particular calling. He would no longer be willing to be represented in a law-making body by a person whom he would be embarrassed to entertain in his home or recognize upon the street.

Finally, we must provide for a great extension of realistic education upon public problems and political machinery. At the present time, it may be pretty safely asserted that there is little or no realistic political education to be found in the public schools of the country, and surprisingly little even in the universities. We must more and more demand that greater attention be given to the study of government in the schools and universities, and that the instruction in such courses be no longer limited to a meaningless description of external forms of political institutions, and pious, platitudinous inaccuracies as to the derivation and operation of political machinery. We must rather insist that the real nature and purpose of government be thoroughly taught, and the defects of our present experiments along this line most clearly brought out. Above all, we must cease to inculcate in the minds of students, of whatever age, the idea that our form of government is not only better than any other in existence, but is itself perfect and not subject to possible improvement. Humility is the beginning of wisdom no less in political affairs than in any other range of human activity.

Specifically and directly, the voter should carefully study the is-

issues which present themselves for political settlement and adjustment in the present-day era. He should then demand that the political parties give definite and convincing evidence of real and fairly divergent positions upon these issues. The voter should also make sure that these party attitudes represent firm convictions and not mere strategic manoeuvres for the purpose of vote-getting. Further, each party should be compelled to give relevant proof that it will supply a personnel which will command confidence as to capacity and integrity on the part of the voters. In municipal politics the element of personnel is likely to be more important than that of political issues. The voters should then ally themselves with whichever political party seems to combine the best leadership with what is regarded by the particular voter as the most intelligent attitude with respect to most of the public issues involved. Allegiance to a political party should cease to depend upon the fact that one's grandfather happened to be affiliated with this or that party. This does not mean necessarily that the present political parties must go by the board, but it does mean that if they are to exist as useful agencies of government, they must undergo a most thorough-going house-cleaning, both as to platforms and as to leaders. It is certain that at the present time neither of our major political parties can really command the respect of an intelligent person as to either personnel or policy. If they cannot so rejuvenate themselves as to make this charge no longer valid, their immediate extinction is as highly desirable as it is unlikely.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Beard, C. A., *American Government and Politics* (1924); Bentley, A. F., *The Process of Government*; Brooks, R. C., *Corruption in American Politics and Life*; Brooks, R. C., *Political Parties and Electoral Methods*; Follett, M. P., *The New State*; Kales, A. M., *Unpopular Government in the United States*; Lippmann, W., *Public Opinion*; *The Phantom Public*; Merriam, C. E., *The American Party System*; Meyer, E. C., *Nominating Systems*; Michels, R., *Political Parties*; Morse, A. D., *Political Parties and Party Leaders*; Ostrogorski, M., *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*; Ray, P. O., *An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics*; Wallas, G., *Human Nature in Politics*; Weyl, W. E., *The New Democracy*; Woodburn, J. A., *Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States*.

CHAPTER XV

THE ELECTION OF 1924 AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY¹

The sentiment of the people is most readily and successfully exercised in their judgment of persons. . . . The plainest men have an inbred shrewdness in judging human nature which makes them good critics of persons. . . . On this shrewd judgment of persons the advocate of democracy chiefly grounds his faith that the people will be right in the long run.

C. H. COOLEY, *Social Organization*.

I. PARTY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

FOLLOWING close upon the general elections in England, which resulted in a notable gain of the Labor group in the popular vote and a more striking loss in parliamentary seats, came the Federal and State elections in the United States on November 4, 1924. The results were so striking and decisive that they command the attention and analysis of all seriously interested in the problems of history, politics and society.

In the first place, it seems to the writer that the elections were most interesting as one more exemplification of the great burlesque of party government in democracies, which is carried to the most futile and notorious extreme in the United States. As Graham Wallas pointed out so clearly nearly two decades ago in his *Human Nature in Politics*, the human animal seems quite incapable of exploiting his thought centers when confronted by the realities and devices of party government. He succumbs almost without a struggle to the overwhelming power of the party spell-binders,

¹From *The Progressive*, December 15, 1924. The problem of Mr. Coolidge is the one which, for various personal reasons, the writer would prefer to avoid treating more than any other controversial topic covered in this volume, but he does not feel that it can be omitted, as the "Coolidge myth" is undoubtedly the chief obstacle to social intelligence in the United States to-day.

shibboleths, catch-words, songs, photographs and seductive propaganda. Party activity seems to generate psychic excitement and mental paralysis; emotion well-nigh completely excludes the possibility of reasoned judgment. It is no exaggeration to say that the average voter exercises a far greater degree of rational judgment in hiring a maid or selecting a chauffeur or garage mechanic than in voting for a candidate for the presidency of the United States. Further, the power of thought in the field of partisan politics, always feeble and slight, is reduced to a nullity in the periods of campaigns—the very moment in which sanity, reasoned convictions and a calm investigation of the facts are most needed.

Whether or not progress has been made in Europe or Canada since 1908 in reducing the influence of the partisan neurosis and amentia by means of the political therapeutics suggested by Mr. Wallas the writer cannot say, but he is certain that things have definitely gone from bad to worse in the United States in the last twenty-five years, and that the degree of intelligence evidenced by the American populace shows a very perceptible decrease at each quadrennial explosion. One main reason why the psychic debauchery of party government reaches a lower level in the United States than in other civilized states is that for the last quarter of a century there have been no real issues dividing the two major parties. Their platforms have never shown sharply contrasting policies on any major issue before the country during this period. Hence it has become merely a question of which group shall be invited to reside in Washington for four years and carry on the process of looting the public treasury and disposing of the national resources. The campaigns are, thus, reduced to personalities and personal encomiums and recriminations, something which stimulates the emotions and eliminates rationally determined judgments with nearly perfect efficiency. The lack of real issues between the major parties also makes difficult the development or exploitation of any real political education during campaigns.

Another interesting general situation once more exemplified by the recent elections in the United States is the curious fact that although our party government in the period since the Civil War has been materialistic, corrupt and interest-seeking to a degree not matched elsewhere in the world, we have maintained and developed an unrivalled naïve compensatory popular illusion of the innate purity and idealism of party activities and aspirations. There is little of that realistic knowledge and assumption which pre-

vails in Europe to the effect that parties are but interest-groups or combinations of interest-groups organized to advance their particular programs, and that the general welfare will be secured only by adherence to the particular groups that seem most intelligent and alive to contemporary problems. This explains in large part the general attitude of injured innocence which at least formerly was assumed by citizens of this country when unusually unsavory and extensive graft was uncovered in periodic investigations.

II. EXPLANATIONS OF THE COOLIDGE LANDSLIDE

As to the reasons why Coolidge and Dawes triumphed by such an overwhelming majority² we can, it would seem, be rather clear and definite. First and foremost was the superior power of the Republican party to exploit the emotion-bearing and thought-paralyzing devices of political campaigns. They had far the most money available for campaign expenditures—a fund far in excess of anything yet distributed in the history of mankind at a single time for political purposes. This made them able to hire more and better speakers, print and distribute more literature, pictures and other propaganda, exploit the radio more extensively and otherwise to bring more effectively before the people the emotional appeal of the party and its candidates.

Second in order must be put the already notorious "Coolidge Myth," namely, the popular conception which has got abroad in this country as to the pre-eminent intellectual caliber, herculean courage, personal integrity, statesmanlike qualities, and broad vision of Mr. Coolidge, with which is strangely combined a contrary feeling that he is a common man like the masses, with a keen sympathy for the plain citizen and a passion for humanity. This is one of the most interesting and least mysterious facts in American public life to-day. About no other figure in American public life in recent years has there been such unanimity of opinion among (1) the educated and informed citizens in the United States and (2) the mass of the voters, with at the same time an absolute and abysmal gulf between these two estimates. The repute of Mr. Coolidge among the American intellectuals, in spite of his endorse-

² A popular vote of 15,500,000 as against 8,500,000 for Davis and 4,500,000 for La Follette; and 382 votes in the Electoral College against 136 for Davis and 13 for La Follette.

ment by several American college presidents and even more college professors, is substantially that expressed by H. L. Mencken in the Baltimore *Evening Sun* of Monday, November 3, 1924:

Though he is praised in lush, voluptuous terms by the president of the Johns Hopkins University, the Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, the *Wall Street Journal*, the Hon. Frank A. Munsey, the proprietor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, and other such agents of a delicate and enlightened patriotism, and though his election, barring some act of God, seems to be as certain as to-morrow's dawn, it is difficult to see how any self-respecting man will be able to vote for the Hon. Mr. Coolidge without swallowing hard and making a face.

For if the campaign has developed anything at all, it has developed the fact that this gentleman, for all the high encomiums lavished upon him, is at bottom simply a cheap and trashy fellow, deficient in sense and almost devoid of any notion of honor—in brief, a dreadful little cad. I doubt that any man of dignity, even among his most ardent supporters, has any respect for him as a man. His friends are all ninth-raters like himself. Even in the trade of politics, until the martyrdom of the illustrious Harding heaved him into the White House, he was regarded not as a leader, but as a docile camp-follower. He remains essentially a camp-follower to-day. He will be safe, but he will be ignoble.

The popular view of Mr. Coolidge's qualities is adequately attested by the quantitative statement of the results of the election, though this in no way refutes the fact of the reality and extent of the "myth" of Mr. Coolidge's personal capacity, as is implied in the editorial in the New York *Tribune* of November 6, 1924. No organ in the United States holds in lower esteem the popular judgments than does the *Tribune*, except when a plebiscite vindicates and supports a particular hobby or prejudice of that paper.

The truth about Mr. Coolidge seems to lie between these extremes of satirical criticism and indiscriminate adulation. Perhaps the best brief characterization which could be made of him is that of a shrewd Yankee horse-jockey of 1850 born out of his time. That he possesses a certain canny insight and innate shrewdness cannot well be denied. Yet his intellectual and educational limitations make it impossible for him to apply these qualities to the solution of the problems of contemporary statesmanship which, in their scope and complexity, quite outrun his limited outlook and intellectual grasp. He has been projected into a position where his only possible personal reaction must be either confusion or

evasion. The exactions of the office of governor of Massachusetts put an over-severe strain upon his talents; those of the presidency of the United States simply overwhelm and submerge him. Unfortunately, in this country inaction is to many the best proof of statesmanlike gravity and competence. As governor of Massachusetts he did sponsor certain commendable minor administrative reforms looking towards greater economy and better organization, but these real achievements—the only ones of his career—have, strangely enough, never been brought forward as a reason for his fitness to be a candidate for the presidency. His grooming and nomination were based solely upon the ludicrous hypothesis of his courage and decision as manifest in his mythological suppression of the Boston Police Strike. And certainly his most obsessed supporter could never contend with a straight face that his achievements as governor deserve to rank with those of men like Johnson of California, Folk of Missouri, Johnson of Minnesota, Lowden of Illinois or Pinchot of Pennsylvania.³

The genesis of the "Coolidge Myth" is to be explained upon two grounds, his personal characteristics and the operation of the mechanism of newspaper publicity in the United States. His personal traits are of the type which appeal with unparalleled force to the Babbitry, Gopher Prairieism and peasantry of this country which make up more than ninety-five per cent. of our population. He has never given the slightest evidence of erudition, independent and original thought, discernible knowledge of the real issues and problems in contemporary life, a sense of humor, or intellectual subtlety, those qualities which would immediately arouse suspicion and create an avoidance-complex on the part of the mass of mankind in America. His utterances have been of the kind that

³ The most significant and arresting testimonial to the merit of Mr. Coolidge which has come to the attention of the writer is the allegation that back in 1895 in the senior vote at Amherst on the member of the senior class most likely to make a notable record in some career the overwhelming majority of the votes went to the distinguished, lawyer, banker and publicist, Dwight Whitney Morrow, while Mr. Morrow himself cast his ballot for Coolidge, being the only member of his class who did so. It is apparent, however, that this fact is exploited primarily by those who are not personally aware of the fact that Mr. Morrow not only possesses a robust, if refined and discriminating, sense of humor, but is also an extremely keen analyst of American society. There is little doubt that if H. L. Mencken or Samuel L. Clemens or Ambrose Bierce had likewise been classmates of Mr. Coolidge they would have cast their vote for our present chief executive.

can be understood and approved by the majority of the citizens, and which commend themselves to the readers of boiler-plate country journals, Ayer's *Almanac* and the *Saturday Evening Post*. They are to such persons evidence of solidity, stability and strength. They look upon him, quite correctly, as one of themselves. He has never shown enough personal energy and independence to make any powerful enemies in public life, and his docility has made him a model personage for campaign managers to direct without the slightest fear that he would muddle their plans by indiscreet or brilliant statements or unpredictable actions. The seemingly unlimited affection of the American plutocracy for Mr. Coolidge is not difficult to understand. Through the myth which they have been able to foist upon the American public they are able symbolically to exploit Coolidge in the interest of adamant conservatism, law and order, and the impeccable nature of the fundamental verities of American tradition. At the same time his docility and inertia make him the ideal type of conservative to control. There is no danger that his æsthetic sensibilities or his acute intelligence might lead him occasionally to kick over the traces as Mr. Taft did, and as such a person as Nicholas Murray Butler or George Wharton Pepper might be expected to do. He presents the almost unique combination of being one hundred per cent. useful and not one half of one per cent. dangerous. Given the above qualities, a large amount of pure good luck, such as the death of Mr. Harding, and the newspaper publicity which he has been able to command, the "Coolidge Myth," far from being a mystery, became inevitable. Mr. Coolidge, indeed, possesses a unique advantage over any other president, in that his real qualities secure for him popularity on the ground that he is just one of the plain people, while the myth of his greatness adds the essential element of awe and reverence. To the thinking element in the population these qualities of simple-mindedness and rusticity, on the one hand, and great ability, on the other, would appear to be mutually exclusive, but, fortunately for Mr. Coolidge, modern majorities do not think.

Friend and foe agree in the correctness of the above diagnosis of the basis of Mr. Coolidge's popularity with the American people. H. L. Mencken, in a review of Mr. Coolidge's official anthology of his political and social philosophy, *The Price of Freedom*, in the *American Mercury* for June, 1924, presents the following estimate of Mr. Coolidge's intellectual qualities and thus analyzes his powers of popular seduction:

If the Hon. Mr. Coolidge is actually a romantic figure, then every honest barber in the land is another. What he presents, indeed, is an almost classical picture of normalcy. He is the true and perfect one hundred per cent. Americano from head to heels. Not a drop of gipsy blood is in him. He is absolutely correct as a husband and father, absolutely correct, in the sense that correctness prevails in politics, as a politician, and absolutely correct as an animal that thinks. His ideas in all fields of human inquiry are precisely the ideas of a Kiwanis secretary, or an editorial writer on a provincial newspaper. No puckish and abominable thought has ever beset him, luring him voluptuously from the track. He is the consummate end-product of two hundred years of the little red schoolhouse. He is the perfect American college graduate, the pedagogic idea realized. He is a jug filled to the brim, the cork rammed home.

In his own book of speeches—twenty-eight of them, with a college prize essay and a veto message as Governor of Massachusetts added—one finds a superb summary of the contents of the normal American mind. The whole repertory of Rotary Club ideas is rehearsed and exhausted; the wisdom of an entire race is boiled down to a series of apothegms, all indubitable, all freely granted by every right-thinking man. I open the volume at random and hit upon a discourse entitled "Thought, the Master of Things." The theme is boldly stated in the first paragraph: "Thought is the master of things." And then: "Mankind . . . have always set up ideals." And then: "Education is undertaken to give a larger comprehension of life." And then: "There have been great men with little of what we call education." And then: "The present age has been marked by science and commercialism." And then: "The world to-day is absolutely dependent on science and commerce." And then: "The age of science and commercialism is here." And then: "No question can be adequately comprehended without knowing its historical background." And then: "Modern civilization dates from Greece and Rome." And then: "It is impossible for society to break with its past." And then: "The development of society is a gradual accomplishment."

And so on, and so on, and so on, for 407 large pages. I do not seek out unfair specimens. All I have quoted come from the first four pages of a speech before the American Classical League at the University of Pennsylvania. All the other speeches are made up of the same blowsy and idiotic stuff exactly. The collection is not merely dull; it is appalling. Plowing through such dreadful drivel for page after page, speech after speech, one begins to wonder faintly if it is not burlesque—more, one begins to *hope* that it is burlesque. No such luck! It is presented in all solemnity and intended seriously; it represents the best thought of the First Chief of the American Republic, chosen by himself to reveal his parts. It is the cream of his thought

and discourse. No offhand, unconsidered toying with ideas is here. Into each and every essay the eminent author has poured the pearls of his meditation, arranging them in neat and tight patterns. A certain talent for this arranging is not lacking; the English is clear and simple; the imbecile gibberish of the late Harding is missing. But under the words there is only a vacuum. Not a trace of actual thinking is in the book. It is a series of rubber-stamps, and nine-tenths of them are worn out.

Here, I hope, no one will assume that I make a false assumption that is all too common, to wit, the false assumption that a President of the United States ought to be a man of powerful and original mind, a daring and revolutionary thinker. I believe, in fact, nothing of the kind. The last fellow of that sort who sat upon the throne, the late Woodrow, almost wrecked the country; it will be two generations before we get over his lush Presbyterian fancies. Even Roosevelt, though most of his ideas were borrowed, gave them such fresh vigor that life under his rule was full of discomforts and alarms. In my doctrine that such highly cerebral men make dangerous Presidents I am supported, I believe, by the high-toned usurers who actually run the nation. They are not annoyed and affrighted by good Calvin's rustic platitudes; they are delighted. Not since McKinley, perhaps, have they had a President more precisely to their taste; even Taft had a way of forgetting his lines now and then, and even Harding was too amiable to be quite safe. Dr. Coolidge is as safe as Bishop Manning or the Supreme Court of the United States. Grounded in all the essentials of human knowledge at Amherst and trained in statecraft by that incomparable serpent of the science, the Hon. Murray Crane, he brings to his high office the exact talents that are needed, and nothing more. Not while he is on the bench hallowed by McKinley, Chester A. Arthur and Benjamin Harrison will there be any hazardous spouting of metaphysics in the manner of Woodrow, or any reign of terror in the style of Roosevelt, or any gross scandal of the Harding kind. Dr. Coolidge, whatever his defects as a philosopher, at least knows what his job is as President; he knows that his main business is to keep the mob quiet, to keep the animals in their cages, to restore and cherish normalcy. To this benign enterprise he now addresses himself. His words are few, and when they issue from him they are reassuring. No dynamite is in them. What they say has been said before—by the pastor of Little Bethel last Sunday evening, by the *Daily Patriot* this morning, by the cashier of the bank down the street, by the provincial superior of Kiwanis, by Old Man Blodgett at the cigar-store. Cal is the perfect spokesman of the general, the consecrated prophet of the usual. If he had not become President he would have made an admirable county superintendent of schools.

I have said that the usurers who own and run the Republic like him; I believe that the plain people like him quite as well, and will ratify the act of God that put him into the White House by a colossal majority in November. His very cheapness has endeared him to them, as his complete lack of intellectual enterprise has commended him to their masters. Honor, dignity, plain-dealing, a high pride—these qualities make no votes under democracy; the mob glows with recognition and sympathy when it is in the presence of commonness, trashiness, lack of self-respect. Cal hung on to Denby and Daugherty as long as he could, eager to avoid offending their friends and clients; when he let them go at last it was cravenly, and with puerile and ignominious gestures. The President of the United States turned out to be a devious and shady fellow. But did the populace resent it? The populace did not. On the contrary, it applauded him, first for trying to protect his friends and save his own bacon, and then for sacrificing them when the bacon began to burn. The whole transaction was one that inferior men could understand; it fitted into the pattern of their own daily struggles. The Washington correspondents, with characteristic lack of sense, mistake his crossroads cunning for simple-mindedness, and try to read a certain profundity into it. But simple-mindedness is something quite different; one does not find it in ignoble politicians, but in men of honor. The mob itself is surely not simple-minded; it is harsh, grasping, dishonorable, base. Its morality is simply fear of the police and the devil; it grabs whatever it can get, with no delicacy to stay it. Coolidge, grabbing whatever he can get, regardless of generosity, dignity and decency, does not offend it. Instead, he subtly flatters and caresses it, as a clergyman who is a baseball rooter flatters and caresses it. For the first time in nearly a hundred years it sees a President on the throne who is actually of its own kidney.

Such is the verdict of the caustic and fearless critic who has written more courageously against the Coolidge Myth than any other distinguished American. In fundamental agreement with him as to the sources of Coolidge's popularity is Dr. A. K. Warner, who contributed the following dithyrambic eulogy to the columns of the *Chicago Tribune* for August 22, 1925:

Your recent editorial endeavoring to explain President Coolidge's popularity, though excellent and able, missed the mark. Behind every worthy reality there must be an illuminating personality exhibiting a vital purpose and lesson that the ordinary man and woman can readily comprehend. Coolidge in every sense of the word is that personality.

In order to discover the cause of his hold on the people you must go back to his origin. His forbears trekked through the narrow Plymouth

notch to join the revolutionary army being formed at Cambridge. Being impressed with the value of the notch embedded among the green Vermont mountains, after the war they returned there and made it their home. As the psalmist proclaims, "I will lift up my eyes unto the hills from whence cometh my strength." If environment means anything together with heredity, it means everything to the Coolidge clan. For simplicity and beauty it is unsurpassed. You do not have to dig deep there before you come to solid rock, typifying solidity of character, the gorgeous verdure of the encircling and everlasting mountains engendering the flowering of the spirit; the clear, bracing atmosphere and intense and solemn silence of the resplendent starry night broken only by the laughing, rippling descending brooks instilling into the soul hope, trust, and endurance.

When one is led into the small and humble lower chamber by the father of the President, and hears him tell you that where you now stand the Vice-President stood when he took the oath of office, and where you sit he sat in the same chair and at the same table where he signed the oath of office as President of the United States, reverential awe takes possession of your being and you can in a small measure understand the tight grip Calvin Coolidge has on the American mind.

Furthermore, he has stepped out from among the people and not from without to within to become their leader. And he has not advanced so far ahead of them that they require a field glass to observe him.

His pleasures are not the pastime of the leisure classes. He does not play on the golf links of Florida. His golf stick is his pen, his tennis racquet is his voice, his stimulation is the people's interest.

His reserved, democratic, and venerable father, in his little and unpretentious New England home; the devotion of the son to his parent, together with the simplicity, honesty, and sincerity of the President, have sunk deeply into the hearts of the common people. He is one of them and is still in their midst. More than any other President in this generation he has most manifestly succeeded in impressing upon the people that he has the interest of each and every one in his keeping. And nothing more is needed to explain the immense and increasing popularity of Calvin Coolidge.

On this point middle-of-the-road interpreters appear to agree with critics and eulogists. In a discriminating article on "The Great Coolidge Mystery" in *Harper's Magazine* for December, 1925, Mr. Bruce Bliven presents the following characterization of Mr. Coolidge's personality:

Yet see the paradox: this national hero possesses just the qualities which, a few years ago, one would have selected as being sure to make popularity impossible. He is a meager, sour-faced, unimpressive man,

wholly lacking in social accomplishments. He takes no part in any of the normal sports and recreations by which one usually demonstrates that he is a good fellow. Spending the summer at White Court, the only amusements he could think of were sitting on the porch, standing on the lawn, or taking one of his grim, compulsory exercise-walks. He does not dance, swim, motor, or play golf, tennis, or any other game; he rides only an electric gymnasium horse. If "personal magnetism" were indicated by a bump on the head, Mr. Coolidge would have a hollow there. He is as incapable of the ordinary politician's lavish friendliness, which embraces all comers like a subway turnstile, as he is of throwing a double back-somersault in the air. And still the country seems not only willing but overflowingly eager to toss its cap in the air and cry huzza! where surely huzza was never cried before. . . .

There is, in my opinion, no "mystery" of Calvin Coolidge. After rather exceptional opportunities for close personal observation, beginning when he was Governor of Massachusetts and continuing through his service as Vice-President, I am convinced that he is just what he seems to be.

There are always those who see Machiavellian shrewdness behind every countenance which possesses immobility; and these insist on interpreting Mr. Coolidge's as being the very perfection of all "poker faces." They are wrong. As a general rule, he speaks what he thinks, and all of it. To be sure, he can keep a secret; but nine times out of ten if he is silent it is not the stillness of the crouching tiger, but that of a man who can't, at the moment, think of anything which seems to him worth saying. It is only fair to add that the attribution of this nonexistent guile is no fault of the President. To some extent press agents have helped to paint a distorted picture of him; but he himself never pretends to any qualities he does not possess. Mostly, those who are deceived on this point are self-deceived. . . .

There is little foundation in fact for the frequent admiring comments on his sense of humor. He has, it is true, a thin and intermittent vein of brief, ironic statement which seems funny to those who have his own temperament. Sometimes he is credited, as is every public man, with being funny when he has no such intention, and many apocryphal anecdotes about him are in circulation; a stock of Coolidge stories is as indispensable to the raconteur as a string of Ford jokes once was. The President is by no means incapable of appreciating other men's humor of the quiet, Yankee brand; but he is hardly ever able to create it. . . .

If I were asked, then, to sum up the salient characteristics of Calvin Coolidge in a few words, I should say that he is honest, simple, modest, rather lacking in humor, slow in his reactions, stubborn, shrewd, inclined to follow the advice of those whom he trusts, and to

trust a few men implicitly, disinclined to make decisions, legalistic in temperament—by which I mean that he looks for precedents and when he finds one clings to it as to a solid rock in an uncertain and shifting world—authoritarian, and withal entirely well-meaning, trying sincerely, within the framework of his genuine conservatism, to do as well as possible for all classes and for the Republic as a whole. . . .

To the common man he seems, quite correctly, to be in many ways just a common man himself. He photographs in the movies as well as possible, from this point of view: that is, he looks acutely miserable, self-conscious, and ashamed. Every man who has felt that way when facing the photographer's lens has a fellow-feeling at once.

While Coolidge has drawn his strength primarily from the fact that his mentality and culture are of the sort which appeals to the mass of the citizenry and makes them believe that he is one of them, it is at the same time true that we have probably never had another president so completely at the mercy of the plutocracy and so obviously forgetful of or opposed to the interests of the common people as a class. Even the Major McKinley-Mark Hanna combination was far more solicitous of the masses than Coolidge and possessed of a much keener conscience with respect to trading with corrupt wealth at the expense of the common man.

In the *Arbitrator* for December, 1925, Mr. William Floyd has called the attention of his readers to a few salient points bearing upon this subject:

Though he took no part in curbing the rioting at the time of the Boston police strike, Mr. Coolidge accepted the credit for the settlement which involved deposing all strikers and granting the strike-breakers better terms than the original men had demanded.

When the Teapot Dome oil scandal with the \$100,000 bribe was discovered, he was more interested in suppressing the inquiry than in dismissing his guilty cabinet. He is still permitting the persecution of Senator Wheeler who took an active part in tracing the illegal government action.

When he saw the danger to big business from the Federal Trade Commission, he changed their personnel so that combinations of capital like the Nickle Plate railroad merger, the \$400,000,000 baking trust and the packers should be unhampered. . . .

When Congress awarded an increase in pay to postal clerks, who were receiving less than \$2,000 a year, the President vetoed the bill, but within a few weeks signed a bill for increased pay for Congressmen who were receiving \$7,500 a year, and usually had other sources of income.

His refusal to grant an increase to postal clerks (later conceded when new taxes on the public were imposed) was on the ground of economy, but soon thereafter he said the Government surplus would be so great that taxes on large incomes must be reduced.

He urged lower taxes for the rich so that more capital would be available in this country and the workers be given employment, but sanctioned the enormous foreign loans that took the capital away.

He agreed with Secretary of the Treasury Mellon that a reduction in surtaxes would produce greater revenue for the Government, but a few months later argued that a similar reduction in surtaxes would produce less revenue and so reduce the surplus.

He emphasized the advantage to all people from a cut in taxes that would shift the burden from the rich to the public.

Mr. Coolidge has recently stated that religion is the most important guide for government. It is to be presumed that his personal actions are also influenced by his religion. "Redemption must come through sacrifice, and sacrifice is the essence of religion." What sacrifice has President Coolidge ever demanded from a wealthy man? He does not advocate an increase in pay for the miners in order that the public may have coal.

Coolidge's first bit of good fortune came in 1919 when it was decided that the Boston police situation was the most fruitful area for activity by which to forestall the possible alignment of American public opinion with the workers in the impending strike in the works of the United States Steel Corporation. A police strike was fomented and precipitated; Governor Sproul of Pennsylvania appeared in Boston with a carefully prepared speech in which he discovered in Governor Coolidge the foremost American exponent of law and order since Grover Cleveland; and newspapers everywhere heralded him as the apostle of law and order. Some even mentioned him as a potential presidential nominee, a suggestion which greatly disgusted many of his Northampton neighbors who later actually paraded with ecstatic frenzy in celebration of his victory in 1924—thus demonstrating the power of the growing myth even where a prophet is supposed to be without honor. Mr. Coolidge actually did nothing to suppress the strike, and his only forceful remarks after the crisis were dictated by the late Senator Murray Crane. But the illusion won him the vice-presidency.⁴

⁴There is a full and authoritative account of the realities of the police strike in a letter by former Mayor Andrew J. Peters, published in the *Boston Post*, October 21, 1924. It is a melancholy symptom that in a telegram to the *Post* after election Mr. Coolidge officially sanctioned the

Then came the unexpected death of Mr. Harding in 1923, at which time Mr. Coolidge had practically faded from the public remembrance, and was generally regarded as too weak a candidate to be renominated by the Republicans for vice-president along with Mr. Harding. Thrown into the White House in this manner, he has staged the most spectacular come-back which we have ever witnessed, in spite of the fact that even distinguished Republicans admit that his two years in office have been the most futile period of equal length in the history of American presidential administrations. This success and repute have been achieved through the enormous publicity advantage possessed by the President of the United States in his relation to the newspapers. How this has actually worked out has been admirably described by an eye-witness, Frank Kent, one of the half-dozen most talented and experienced newspapermen in the country to-day:⁵

In the three years that Mr. Coolidge was Vice-President he made neither friends nor foes. Socially and politically, he was generally considered hopeless. He was as near nothing as any man we have ever had in that office, and it is no secret that had Mr. Harding lived the plan was not to renominate him. That single fact is the most revealing index of the intellectual inanimation and forcelessness of the man. . . . This is the man who became President last August. He is exactly the same man that he was before. . . . The answer (to the remarkable increase of his prestige) is, of course, publicity. . . . No man ever had a better press. Democratic as well as Republican papers endowed him with virtues and qualities that as Vice-President everybody in Washington knew he lacked—and laughed about. . . . That (President Coolidge's own remarks to the Washington reporters) seems pretty thin material for a story. It seems flat and colorless, but by the time the correspondents have injected their own vigor into those pale and anemic utterances, it emerges very different. . . . The weak and watery utterances of a passive and pallid little man, torn by indecision and doubt, become the forceful and vigorous talk of a red-blooded, resolute, two-fisted fighting executive, thoroughly aroused and determined. . . . To every close observer it has been clear that instead of a wise, strong, silent man in the White House what we really have there is a very much dismayed and huddled little man who is as close to complete futility as any man in his position can ever get.

strike myth. Many of his apologists had up to this time contended that Coolidge had never personally actually claimed credit for suppressing the Boston strike.

⁵ *The American Mercury*, August, 1924.

It must be admitted, however, that though the notion of Coolidge's strength is almost wholly a "myth," it is one which has captured the American imagination as a sober actuality and has developed into a vote-getting legend of unique power, as is evidenced by the great personal victory and testimonial secured by Mr. Coolidge in every part of the country except the solid South. The myth is destined to continue almost indefinitely, as there is no way for even the fairly intelligent citizen to check up on it and refute it, unless he knows Mr. Coolidge personally or is well acquainted with a large number of responsible persons who are thoroughly familiar with Mr. Coolidge's origins and past "achievements." The citizens are at the mercy of the press. They read that "Mr. Coolidge will settle the French debt problem," or that "the taxation system awaits Mr. Coolidge's attention," or that "Mr. Coolidge is considering the economics of the coal situation," and so on, and they conclude that he possesses the colossal cerebral power and the comprehensive knowledge of technical economics to enable him to deal intelligently with such problems. Those who know him understand that in all probability he does not even possess the capacity to listen to capable advisers with intelligent discernment of the issues involved. It is unquestionably true that if Mr. Coolidge were literally faced with the alternative of making up the weekly pay-roll at the McCallum Hosiery Company in his home-town of Northampton or hanging, he would have to go to the gallows. Yet the citizen of Peoria can never learn these hard facts, but will continue to believe what the *Chicago Tribune* or the *New York Herald-Tribune* tells him about Mr. Coolidge's easy mastery of corporation finance, railroad economics, international trade and exchange, the labor problem, the currency problem, classical philology, the diplomatic background of the World War, and the salient facts of American history.

Along with these two major causes of the Republican landslide must be placed a number of others of importance. There was the fear of La Follette, which was skillfully manipulated by the Republican campaign managers until it attained the dimensions of a phobia and obsession in certain parts of the country. The writer was informed by a number of otherwise sane businessmen that they intended to throw all the stock and securities they possessed on the market on the morning of November 5th in the event that Mr. La Follette was elected. This hallucination went even

so far as to lead to the wide distribution of a campaign pamphlet which would have been disgraceful and absurd even in the days of the World War and Palmerism. It was prepared by Martin W. Littleton, a professionally most successful but intellectually and culturally undistinguished lawyer. It alleged the close and intimate association and coöperation of Mr. La Follette and the Russian Bolshevik government. Several professors at Ohio State University were tried for communism as a result of their support of La Follette. Mr. La Follette's most intelligent supporters were sadly disappointed by their candidate's conservatism and anachronisms rather than alarmed by his radicalism. His economic policy was chiefly a reversion to Populism, and his foreign policy little more than an unusually benign brand of the conventional American tradition of isolation. He had expressly defied and repudiated the Communist element here and abroad. John R. Commons, the most distinguished economist of the University of Wisconsin, had proved by a resort to hard facts that in the State of Wisconsin, where the La Follette system had enjoyed almost undisputed sway for a generation, legitimate business had in no way suffered. In spite of all this, his opponents were able to create the impression among a large portion of our citizenry that Mr. La Follette and his supporters represented a determined organization of the most desperate and despicable elements against the fundamental principles and decencies of orderly society and American civilization.

Again, there was a notable failure to organize and deliver the Farmer-Labor vote for the La Follette forces. The western farmers were diverted from their resentment over a quarter of a century of general pecuniary distress and the prevailing hard times by a slight increase in the current price of wheat, thus proving the difficulty of inculcating a tenaciously maintained appreciation of fundamental and basic issues among what Mencken calls "the lonely companions of *Bos terras*." Then the laborers were in some instances not attracted by the prospect of an alliance with the farmer elements. In other cases they forgot the sufferings of the hard times of the past nine months in the face of the ardent promises of better times by their employers in the event that Coolidge be elected. Others were plainly intimidated by the frequent and numerous open threats of employers that they could either vote for Coolidge or starve. In some cases employers closed their factories before election and informed their employees that they would be opened only in case of Coolidge's election. Further, the Re-

publicans profited greatly by their ability to prevent the spread of any general knowledge of the serious business depression that has been in existence in the United States since late in 1923. Much money was spent in the effort to delay the foreseen slump beyond the campaign summer if possible. When this failed it was easy for the great industrial and commercial interests practically to exclude from the influential American newspapers any important or extensive reference to the current economic situation as to unemployment and business failures. Unless this had been done the basic Republican appeal to the mercenary and materialistic interests of the country would have been much less attractive and forceful.

Finally, we have this very matter of the more direct, certain and materialistic appeal of the Republican party to the voters. La Follette promised a better age for all of mankind in the future, but he could not promise higher prices for wheat, corn and hogs or higher wages in the next six months. Davis could promise contributions to the cause of world peace and the dignified and effective assumption by the United States of her legitimate responsibilities in the society of modern nations, but he did not convince his hearers that either their pockets or their stomachs would be notably distended after the passage of a year. But Coolidge and Dawes, however hypocritical and unhistorical the foundations of their promises, talked a language that the mass of ballot-markers could understand and appreciate. They promised something that meant more bacon, beans, cabbage, Fords, fur coats, felt boots and movie tickets; and this appeal required no extensive or delicate exegesis; nor did it fall on stony ground. The fact that the majority of our depressions since 1865 have fallen in Republican administrations, that at least half of the period since 1920 has been characterized by relatively severe economic distress, and that the Republicans produced no evidence that they could permanently or effectively make good their promise of four years of plenty, did not, apparently, appeal to the voters as a cogent factor in the situation. Doubtless, many who did not believe in the possibility of a notable bettering of conditions under Republican rule did feel, not without good and substantial reasons, that if the Republicans could not improve matters they had it in their power to make matters immensely worse, and would fake an unprecedentedly serious depression in the event of a La Follette victory in order to discredit the progressive movement and defeat it in 1928.

How far woman suffrage aided in bringing about the enormous vote for Coolidge it is hard to say, but there is no doubt that its influence and effect were considerable. Woman suffrage has, of course, intensified the travesty of democratic party government, not so much because women are different from men as because they resemble men. As in the case of men, the enfranchisement of women added the votes of at least seven incapable or unintelligent women to three women able to cast their ballots on the basis of well-reasoned judgments. Then women are doubtless much less in touch with the realities of public life and modern industrial problems, and are inclined to base their decisions on even lesser trivialities than men. There is no doubt that at least two million women cast their votes for Coolidge on the basis of something as irrelevant to the issues as his lamentable loss of a son during the summer preceding the election.

III. DECLINE OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

One of the most important aspects of the elections was the bearing of the results upon the possibilities of a strong third party movement in the United States. It is a distressing but pertinent fact that while, on the one hand, the older a party is the more anachronistic normally becomes its program, and the more out of touch with the times its whole outlook and attitude; on the other hand, the greater its antiquity the more emotion evoking and compelling are its symbols and traditions and, hence, the more difficult it is to dislodge or disrupt the party. In other words, the need of a new party alignment is about exactly proportionate to the difficulty of securing it. The bearing of this on the results of the late election is obvious. In spite of La Follette's popular vote of 4,500,000, this represents a following weaker than that mustered by Weaver, the Populist candidate in 1892, in proportion to the number of qualified voters then and now. It gives little promise of being the nucleus of any substantial third party movement for 1928. Indeed, with an almost unique situation as to personalities and issues to command strong support for a third party, the results of the vote of November 4th would seem to indicate that in this generation, at least, there is no prospect of initiating a powerful third party movement unless there is a wide cleft opened up in the Republican party, or the solid South is entirely divorced from its Democratic fixation, conditions and requirements that certainly

promise no immediate probability of realization. While nothing else would do as much to give tone and *rationale* to American politics as a disruption of the Democratic and Republican parties and the division of the voters of the country into definitely conservative and progressive camps, there has never been a time in our history when this desirable objective seems less likely of speedy realization.

Aside from the emotional appeal of old parties there are some important special reasons why this formation of a third party is difficult in the United States. The theoretical exponents of a third party lose their courage when confronted by the practical situation. Mr. Munsey argued for a third party a year or two ago, but when one was actually formed by the only possible leader of such a movement to-day, Mr. Munsey fled panic-stricken into Mr. Coolidge's camp. The only classes which could just now form the material basis of a third party are the farmers and laborers, but an effective union of these two groups has been made but once in American history, namely, in Jackson's time. Mr. La Follette seems to have been less successful here than either Lincoln or the Populists. It is doubtful if these two groups can actually ever be permanently and effectively linked for political purposes. As Ricardo long ago insisted, their interests are as fundamentally opposed as those of capital and labor or those of capital and the landlord. Their occasional, half-hearted and sporadic coöperation on the basis of mutual hatred of the capitalistic groups is no adequate basis for effective political collaboration. Further, it would seem that neither class is capable of a really intelligent grasp upon, and persistent pursuit of, its basic interests and welfare. While often hungry, both of these groups can invariably be counted upon to be more stupid than hungry. One square meal under their belts on the morning of election seems to be able to erase a decade of economic distress and political determination. Then, they are the least educated and most emotional elements in the population and, hence, most susceptible to the seductiveness of conventional partisan appeals. While a third party movement is for the time hopeless, the election does not mean, as some of our conservative papers have contended, a return to the strict two-party system and the disappearance of the "bloc" system in Congress. With the diversification of interests, the bloc system has come to stay in modern political life, whether or not all of the blocs actually emerge as distinct and permanent parties. But no one need be dis-

turbed over this, for, as every penetrating writer on politics from Aristotle to A. F. Bentley has properly pointed out, government has ever been and will always continue to be *bloc* government.

An incidental phase of the failure of the third party is the apparent fact that the American people have lost the power of arousing or demonstrating moral indignation. The scandals of the Grant administration were able to call forth the Liberal Republican protest, and Blaine's unsavory political past produced the Mugwumps and elected Cleveland. But the party responsible for the recent scandals has been publicly commended, overwhelmingly vindicated and cordially invited to return and graft on a larger scale than before. In fact, there seemed to be far more public indignation directed against those who courageously revealed the corruption than was brought forth against the perpetrators of these crimes against common honesty and political integrity. I know of no sane person who doubts that Harry Daugherty would have received more votes in the recent election than Mr. La Follette if he had been nominated. And this cannot be explained on any allegation of the non-culpability of Coolidge and Dawes. Coolidge listened to the deals put through the cabinet which resulted in the abstraction of the oil leases, without ever voicing the slightest protest. He heard these abuses aired and exposed in the Senate long before the actual investigations, without giving evidence of the slightest concern; and he was forced by his political advisers, and apparently against his own will, to accept Denby's resignation and to demand that of Daugherty. And Dawes has been proved guilty of similar dereliction in connection with the scandals in the state finances and banking of Illinois, and was chiefly responsible for bringing about the cessation of the government prosecution of the war profiteers. Neither Coolidge nor Dawes could make as good a claim for innocence and integrity as Mr. McAdoo, who was regarded as disqualified for nomination by his party.

IV. THE TRIUMPH OF REACTION AND MEDIOCRITY

In conclusion, the election seems to have been an overwhelming victory for conservatism all along the line. The Ku Klux Klan made enormous gains, electing Republican governors throughout the North. The personal and political squabble which elevated "Ma" Ferguson in Texas deceives no penetrating and informed observer as to the permanent and thorough hold which the Klan has on

Texas and the South. The nonsense in the phobia about the "Red Menace" in America, which was spread by all types of men from Vice-President Coolidge himself to President Atwood of Clark University, Senator Lusk of New York, and Stanwood Menken of the National Security League, was never more clearly revealed. There were no true "Reds" before the American electorate on November 4th, and the only one who could muster a healthy pink, Mr. W. Z. Foster, received but a handful of votes. Fortunately or unfortunately, as one views the matter, radicalism has no chance whatever in the United States for years to come. The "Reds" are about as much of a menace as the Hindoos or Theosophists. Some, however, feel that in electing Mr. Coolidge the conservatives have overdone that matter and will thereby invite a much more formidable insurrection in 1928 than that piloted by La Follette this year. Of such an opinion is Mr. H. L. Mencken:

Those who support Coolidge because of his safeness tend to forget, I fear, the rest of it. They inevitably wriggle themselves into the position of contending that nothing else matters. It is, I believe, a dangerous doctrine. The four years of Coolidge will be four years of puerile and putrid politics. The very worst elements in the Republican party, already corrupt beyond redemption, will be in the saddle, and full of intelligent self-interest. It will be a debauch of grab. And it will be followed by a revolt that will make the cautious radicalism of Mr. La Follette appear almost like the gospel of Rotary. Let the friends of safety paste that in their hat. They are trying to put out a fire by squirting gasoline upon it.

The writer shares Mr. Mencken's dire forebodings as to the probable nature of the Coolidge and Dawes administration, but he cannot share his optimism as to the imminence or strength of any movement of protest. The big business interests which control Mr. Coolidge have already made no little progress in inducing him to attempt to destroy or undermine all the progress made by Roosevelt and Wilson in bringing the railroads and corporations under federal supervision and control. Coolidge also made the most strenuous efforts to get a subaltern of the Sugar Trust appointed as Attorney General of the United States. This sinister and insidious business is well summarized by Senator George W. Norris in the *New York Nation* for September 16, 1925. Indeed, it is doubtful if any previous President has so ignobly and overtly surrendered himself to the "malefactors of great wealth."

Even Grant preserved the outward forms and presumptions of being the real chief executive and head of the nation. It seems doubtful if he would have tolerated a Frank Stearns. Yet, in spite of all this, there is no popular protest, and the masses still continue to think of Mr. Coolidge as ever considering their interests and working for their welfare. The only protection is the obstacle of a few brave and courageous men in Congress, and Mr. Coolidge's own lack of adroitness which will put definite limits upon the ability of the plutocracy to secure entire success in "grabbing" the country in the next four years. This safeguard has been well described by Mr. Kent:

It is a rather absurd situation. The newspapers and the business interests so overwhelmingly committed themselves to him in the campaign that now when the inherent helplessness of the man is beginning to be revealed, they valiantly struggle to keep from admitting, even to themselves, that their hero is not as heroic as he seemed. To confess their judgment so far off the mark, so soon after his inauguration would put these editors and business leaders in a position far too foolish to be comfortable. Besides, there is no sense in shifting support. There is no place else to go. They are beginning to suspect that they will not be able to get what they want through Mr. Coolidge, because he has not the strength to give it, but they certainly will not get it from anyone else. They put him in for four years, and there he is to the end of the row—sincere, sound, solemn—and ineffectual.

While one must always be on his guard against the statement of the ridiculous when generalizing as to the cosmic or historical significance of an event close at hand, the writer cannot avoid expressing the conviction that the election of Coolidge by such a majority as he piled up constitutes the most severe blow to the friends of democracy and intelligently conceived reform the world over which they have yet received in the course of human history, compared with which the dispersal of the Frankfort Parliament or the suppression of the Revolutions of 1848 are as nothing. It is inconceivable that there could ever again be a more decisive test of the degree of intelligence which a democracy can muster than that of November 4th, and the result is as dismal as it is convincing and instructive. It would be difficult to construct, even in the unbridled imagination, a goal towards which all dictates of information and intelligence would have more inevitably led than the desirability of defeating Mr. Coolidge. The history of his party in recent years, the record of the Republican administra-

tion in the past four years, his absolute lack of a single qualification for chief executive of the land, either of intellect, achievement or personal charm, and the ultimate economic welfare of the country, all overwhelmingly demanded his definitive repudiation, but he won the greatest personal triumph in the history of American politics.

The least capable and attractive candidate ever nominated by a major party for the presidential office was avidly approved by the greatest number of votes ever cast for a human being in the history of our planet, with the sombre exception of Mr. Harding. And he had opposing him in Mr. Davis one of the most cultured and capable of the candidates ever nominated for the presidency, and in Mr. La Follette not only a man of great personal ability, but the one with the most unchallenged record as to consistency of policy and personal integrity in our history during the last thirty years. November 4, 1924, is the conclusive proof, if any had been needed, of the apparent incapacity of the human animal for self-government. The whole matter was admirably put by President Henry Noble MacCracken of Vassar College in one of the few really independent and courageous statements made during the campaign of 1924, published in the *New York Times* for October 18, 1924:

I shall work for Davis because I prefer a man to a myth. I know something about Davis. I know he is the leading lawyer of the American bar. I know his opinion on every great issue. His record is an open book. He is a man of utter integrity. I trust him.

I know nothing about Coolidge. He is a myth. Secrecy surrounds him. I cannot find out the truth about his record as Governor. I don't even know whether he wrote the magazine articles he signed when he was Vice-President. What else he did as Vice-President I don't know. He sat at Cabinet meetings with Fall and Denby and Daugherty, and could see no reason for change when he came to select his own Cabinet. He is an edited man; he was put together in a publicity office; and he will be plausible just as long as he can find some one to tell him what to think.

I have seen him in the movies. "Smile," says the picture man and he smiles. "Go to ball games!" "Give Henry Ford a bucket of sap!" "Toss some hay!" and he obeys anxiously and humbly. But is that the real Coolidge? I don't know. I know who tells him to smile, for I can see a movie. But I don't know who tells him to sign on the dotted line, for I am not there and I haven't a dictaphone on the job. . . . Why anyone past the age of fairy tales wants to vote for a myth like Coolidge, I cannot see.

With an ever more complex and difficult set of problems to be solved by statesmen, we seem, in this country, at least, to be condemned to face them under the leadership of ever less capable men. The descent from Roosevelt and Taft to Harding is one sufficient to stun the objective observer, but even few of his best friends would claim that Coolidge is as able or attractive a person as the late Mr. Harding. When we reflect that a man of the majestic powers of Alexander Hamilton was called upon to handle a political and economic problem less complicated or extensive than the annual budget of the city of Cleveland in 1925, we must stand appalled at the prospect of handing over the United States of America of to-day, with its staggering domestic complexities and problems and its international relations and involvements, to a man of Coolidge's intellectual stature! Indeed, it is not so much Mr. Coolidge's conservatism as his utter personal insignificance which alarms, repels and disheartens thoughtful observers. Any calm progressive might view with some equanimity the elevation of a conservative of the stripe of Nicholas Murray Butler, Oscar Underwood, George Wharton Pepper, Lawrence Lowell or even Reed Smoot to the White House. Much prattle was disseminated during the campaign concerning the danger of allowing the election to go to Congress with the chance that Mr. Bryan might be chosen, but the burden of proof rests upon those who assert that Bryan is intellectually less distinguished than Coolidge or of less demonstrable personal integrity. The present is certainly no time for a regent in the White House.

Some writers take the opposite view and contend that the saving grace about Mr. Coolidge is his very personal incompetence which leads to the practical fact of a regency. They argue that this will bring about the control of our federal policy by men of the undoubted ability of Dwight W. Morrow and Herbert Hoover. If this were true the writer would heartily agree to their contention. Mr. Hoover was unquestionably the man the people of the United States, whether Republicans or Democrats, desired to see elevated to the presidency in 1920, and Mr. Morrow is a man of far too marked ability, high scholarship and real public-spiritedness even to be seriously considered for the presidency in a democratic country. But the personal inadequacy of Coolidge does not mean that he relies wholly upon men like Hoover and Morrow. Far more important and powerful are the sinister representatives of the plutocracy and their servants. First, we have the shrewd and

subtle financiers, like Mr. Mellon, who attempt no direct raid on the public treasury, but seek laws which will free great wealth from its legitimate burdens and adequate governmental control and pass the major costs of taxation on to the mass of the citizens. Next, we have the devoted representatives of the manufacturing and commercial interests constituted of men like Weeks, Butler and Stearns, who view government as but the adjunct and servant of big business and are utterly devoid of any sense of social justice and responsibility. Then come the overt corruptionists, well illustrated by Fall, Sinclair and Doheny in the Harding administration, and the party ghouls, together with their newspaper friends, led by "Ned" McLean and their like. By the time these latter types have exercised their influence over Mr. Coolidge, men like Morrow and Hoover can do little to salvage the wreck.

It is also necessary to emphasize the bearing of Mr. Coolidge's lack of innate capacity upon his inability to assume a position of leadership with Congress. While newspaper publicity and other instruments for myth-mongering suffice to maintain and enhance the prestige of Mr. Coolidge among the citizens of Bad Axe, Michigan, and Bangor, Maine, they have little influence upon the hard-boiled crew who dwell under the dome of the Capitol in Washington and have looked upon Mr. Coolidge at first hand and in the flesh. They are under no illusions as to his capacities and limitations, and hold him in the disregard to which they think him justly entitled, in spite of occasional "soft-soapings" by Senator Pepper and others for political and partisan purposes. It need not be pointed out that a lack of presidential leadership with Congress constitutes one of the greatest handicaps to successful government and effective legislation in this country. Many of the qualities which make Mr. Coolidge most popular with the masses serve quite as effectively to maintain him as a non-entity with Congress.

This is surely a situation, indeed a crisis, which cannot be viewed justly or adequately from the standpoint of either partisan politics or personal hates or affections. It is the province of the dispassionate publicist, institutional historian, and social scientist. But it will require many repudiations of November 4, 1924, to convince some of us that, to use Mr. Wells' figure of modern civilization as the race between catastrophe and education, the former has not gained an insuperable lead in the last quarter of a century. The complete absence of any probability that the country as a

whole will recover from the Coolidge obsession and learn anything from the burlesque of November, 1924, is well indicated by Mr. Bliven, who calls attention to the fact that President Coolidge's futility in office is only exceeded by the steady growth of his popularity throughout the nation. After demonstrating that Mr. Coolidge has failed to secure the enactment of any of his major positive recommendations, he emphasizes the fact that Mr. Coolidge is easily as popular with the mass of Americans at the beginning of 1926 as was Mr. Roosevelt in 1904:

He is extraordinarily popular. After visiting in recent months a number of cities in all parts of the Middle West and East and talking with hundreds of persons from all walks of life, I can testify (as does every other political observer who has had the same experience) that President Coolidge is one of the two best-liked occupants of the White House in a generation. While the admiration for him is of a different variety—and comparisons are therefore difficult—I believe he is as generally admired and trusted as was Roosevelt, if not more so. That puts him in a category which contains at the highest estimate not more than four or five other names in our whole history. . . .

The ominous and significant reasons for this growing popularity appear to Mr. Bliven to be the following: the continuation of the same publicity advantages which originally manufactured the "Coolidge Myth"; Mr. Coolidge's conservatism, inertia and utter lack of initiative, which render him completely safe in a negative sense; popular sympathy with certain evidences of timidity and incompetence which the people interpret as being due to the surprise and confusion occasioned by his being called to the White House as a "substitute player" upon the death of President Harding; the feeling of the common man that he is akin to Mr. Coolidge, and yet not quite equal to him; the utter absence in Mr. Coolidge of lofty idealism or attractive personality and good fellowship, two qualities which have been at least temporarily discredited in America by the examples of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Harding, respectively; his impecunious thrift which lends itself to general approval and to delicate symbolic compensatory exploitation and exegesis by the plutocracy; his archaic and Puritanical moral and social views which lead him to regard such things as dancing and the wearing of belts by boys as trial plunges in the brimstone surf; the contemporary repudiation of intelligence in the United States, with the resulting distrust of the high-brow and a corresponding con-

fidence in "character" and "good intentions," never fulfilled; and the general trend in this country since 1917 towards unthinking conservatism, generated in part by the disappearance of the American frontier and pioneering spirit, and in part by the challenge of Russia on the new economic, political and social frontier.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Ayres, C. E., "Behind Coolidge: Butler," in *New Republic*, June 18, 1924; Bliven, Bruce, "Two Presidents," in *New Republic*, August 15, 1925; "The Ohio Gang," Ibid., May 7 to June 4, 1924; "Hail to the Accidental Chief," Ibid., June 18, 1924; "The Great Coolidge Mystery," in *Harper's*, December, 1925; Coolidge, Calvin, *Have Faith in Massachusetts; The Price of Freedom; America's Need for Education*; "Enemies of the Republic: the Reds in the Women's Colleges," in *Delineator*, June, July, August, 1921; Croly, Herbert, "Coolidgisms," in *New Republic*, August 3, 1921; "Distributing the Blame for Teapot Dome," Ibid., February 13, 1924; "Mr. Dawes Explains," Ibid., October 1, 1924; "Coolidge and the Republican Party," Ibid., March 25, 1925; Gilbert, C. W., "You Takes Your Choice"; Green, H., *Life of Calvin Coolidge*; Hennessy, M. E. H., *Calvin Coolidge*; Kent, Frank R., "Mr. Coolidge," in *American Mercury*, August, 1924; "The Ineffectual Mr. Coolidge," in *New Republic*, April 15, 1925; Lowry, E. G., "Mr. Coolidge's America," in *New Republic*, May 13, 1925; Norris, G. W., "Boring from Within," in *Nation*, September 16, 1925; Peters, A. J., "The Boston Police Strike," in *Boston Post*, October 21, 1924; Ravage, M. E., *The Story of Teapot Dome*; Richberg, Donald, "De-bunking Mr. Dawes," in *New Republic*, July 9, 1924; Roberts, K. L., *Concentrated New England*; Rowell, C. H., "Why I Shall Vote for Mr. Coolidge," in *New Republic*, October 29, 1924; Villard, Oswald G., "Calvin Coolidge, Made by a Myth," in *Nation*, August 15, 1923; "Mr. Coolidge Dismisses Mr. Daugherty," Ibid., April 9, 1924; "Coolidge," Ibid., June 18, 1924; "Business Wins," Ibid., November 12, 1924; "King Calvin," Ibid., September 16, 1925; Washburn, R. M., *Calvin Coolidge*; White, W. A., *Calvin Coolidge*; Whiting, E. E., *Calvin Coolidge: His Ideals of Citizenship*; *President Coolidge*; Woods, R. A., *The Preparation of Calvin Coolidge*.

CHAPTER XVI

THE COST OF DEMOCRACY

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

How the cost of government in the United States has increased is strikingly shown by a few figures. In the decade from 1791 to 1800 the total expenditures of the Federal government were \$68,256,000, which, on the basis of the census of 1800, was approximately \$13 per individual. In the decade from 1911 to 1920 these expenditures, on the basis of the population of 1920, had increased to approximately \$425 per head. For the year 1922 alone the federal expenditures were approximately \$34 per individual, thus being nearly three times as great as during the whole first decade of our national history.

TABLE I
HISTORICAL GROWTH OF FEDERAL APPOINTEES

The following statement is intended to show the number of employes in the Civil Service from the time figures became available to the present time, and also the number of classified employes at various dates since 1883. By "classified service" is meant that part of the service to which examinations extend. These numbers are approximate only, but are based on the best available information.

In estimating the number of classified employes for the years since 1916 it was known that the percentage of increase due to the war was greater in the classified than in the unclassified service.

The numbers are estimates; no facilities are available for a definite statement.

Year.	Population of the United States	Approximate Number of Employes in Civil Service, Classified and Unclassified	Per Ct. of Classified Employes	Number of Population to Each Federal Employee
1816.....	6,327
1821.....	9,638,483 (1820)	8,221
1831.....	12,866,020 (1830)	19,800

Year.	Population of the United States	Approximate Number of Employees in Civil Service, Per Classified and Unclassified	Ct. of Classified Employees	Number of Population to Each Federal Employee
1841.....	17,069,453 (1840)	23,700
1851.....	23,191,876 (1850)	33,300
1861.....	31,443,321 (1860)	49,200
1871.....	39,555,000	53,900
1881.....	51,316,000	107,000
1883.....	53,693,000
1891.....	64,361,624	166,000	20.4	388
1893.....	66,970,496	180,000	24.4	372
1895.....	69,579,868	189,000	20.2	368
1897.....	72,189,240	192,000	44.6	375
1899.....	74,798,612	208,000	44.8	359
1900.....	77,256,630	256,000	41.5	301
1903.....	80,983,390	301,000	44.6	269
1905.....	84,269,378	301,000	57	280
1907.....	87,445,366	306,000	63	285
1909.....	90,691,354	340,000	69	266
1911.....	93,682,189	360,000	63.2	260
1913.....	96,562,407	435,000	65	222
1915.....	99,342,625	440,000	66.4	225
1916.....	100,757,735	438,000	67.8	230
1918.....	103,587,955	917,760	70	113
1920.....	107,436,441	691,116	72	155
1921.....	597,483	75	...
1922.....	560,863	77	...

Democracy is not necessarily accompanied by more corruption than other forms of government. Yet, in contrast with an autocracy or monarchy a democracy presents a far more widely distributed invitation to individual support and enrichment at the hands of the government. As some contemporary writers have expressed it, democracy inevitably brings more snouts to the trough than any other of the leading forms of government. Yet it must not be assumed that the enormous increase of governmental expenditures in the last century has been due exclusively to the growth of democratic ideas and practices. These ever-increasing costs of government are to no small degree produced by the enormously greater complexity of social problems which the scientific and industrial revolutions have brought about in the last 150 years. An ever greater intervention of the government has been necessary in social, economic and cultural activities. At the

same time there is unquestionably a vast amount of unnecessary sumptuary legislation and inquisitorial intervention which is either useless or harmful and calls for lavish expenditures to maintain the functionaries who are invested with the authority to execute these acts. The fact remains, however, that the historic changes of the last century have unquestionably made necessary a remarkable increase in the scope and expense of state activities. These historic developments have also produced a triumph of democratic institutions, so that our present state socialistic trends and responsibilities are entrusted to democratic institutions for their execution.

II. UNSCIENTIFIC METHODS OF RAISING AND EXPENDING REVENUE

An analysis of governmental expenditures in the United States reveals an almost unique and weirdly unscientific method of determining our Federal expenditures and providing for the appropriations to meet them. Down to the time of the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 the procedure in determining Federal revenues and expenditures was essentially the following: In October the heads of the various Cabinet departments would send to the Secretary of the Treasury their estimates of the required expenditures for the ensuing year. It was invariably the practice for these departments to ask for more than they needed, because they feared that their requests would probably be pruned by Congressional committees. The Secretary of the Treasury had, however, no real power to reduce these estimates. While the executive department heads were in this way submitting their estimates to the Secretary of the Treasury, the half-dozen or more committees in the House of Representatives in control of the various kinds of expenditures were preparing their estimates chiefly on the basis of the expenditures of the previous year. Often there was no co-operation between the department heads and the Secretary of the Treasury on the one hand and the House committees on the other. Nor were either of these groups directly in contact with or in any sense coördinated with the House committee on revenue, namely, the Committee on Ways and Means. There was plenty of opportunity for informal collaboration, but the Committee on Ways and Means could work independently of the committees on appropriations and the executive departments, so that either too much or too little revenue might be raised. If the revenues contemplated

by the Committee on Ways and Means were not adequate, the President, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Controller had the authority to decide what should be allotted to each department within the limitations prescribed by the existence of specific appropriation bills designed for particular purposes and to be expended by appropriate departments.

Much enthusiasm has been generated by the passage in 1921 of the Budget and Accounting Act. Yet about all that the bill actually achieved was officially to invite and stimulate what had actually been possible before, namely, direct presidential scrutiny and leadership in the preparation of the estimated executive expenditures for the fiscal year. The President is required to lay before Congress at the time of the opening of each regular session a composite budget setting forth the revenues and expenditures of the previous year and the suggested revenues and expenditures for the next fiscal year. The specific information which is thus required is obtained by the Director of the Budget Bureau. No authority is given to the President or any Cabinet official, such as the Secretary of the Treasury, to introduce bills for these expenditures or to provide the specific basis for raising the revenue which they would require. At the best the President can only revise the estimates, which Congress can increase if it sees fit to do so. The Committee on Appropriations can in greater or less degree ignore the President's recommendations, and the Committee on Ways and Means is not in any way legally required to respect the activities and proposals of either the President or the Committee on Appropriations. The most important achievement lay in the substitution of one House Committee on Appropriations for the six or eight committees which earlier existed.

The budget system of the Federal government is therefore no scientific budget system at all. There is no direct and compulsory coördination of executive and legislative activity nor any effective control or reduction of the notorious pork-barrel system and log-rolling. In his recent authoritative treatise Professor Charles A. Beard concludes that "in actual practice the first test of the new budget system worked a number of economies, but it did not materially reduce the amount of log-rolling or the size of the 'pork-barrel.'" Obviously such a confused and uncoördinated system of controlling expenditures and receipts is almost perfectly adapted to inviting and fostering every sort of partisan, sectional and class graft and corruption.

When it comes to the general determination of Federal expenditures by the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives in subsequent collaboration with the Senate, the two conspicuous and ingenious aspects of raiding the public treasury are the "pork-barrel" and the "omnibus" bill. The term "pork-barrel," it is interesting to recall, originated from a usage on the Southern plantation, where salt pork was given out to the slaves at definite times. A frequent method of distributing it was to smash the large barrel which contained the pork and allow the slaves to crowd up to the broken barrel and seize as much as they could for themselves. The similarity of this procedure to that of Congressmen in their haste and anxiety to include appropriations for their own locality and constituents in the general appropriation bills led certain cynical observers to refer to the latter as the "pork-barrel," and the name has clung to the practice ever since. The "omnibus" bill is self-explanatory. It simply means the elimination of the practice of passing specific appropriations for particular purposes for definite localities, and the substitution of the method of lumping together in a single bill the appropriations of a generally similar type for the country at large.

The advantages of the pork-barrel system and the omnibus bill in encouraging graft and corruption are at once evident. In the old days, when appropriation bills were introduced for specific purposes in a particular area by individual Congressmen, any abuses or excesses in the proposal were eagerly and zealously pounced upon by fellow-Congressmen who feared lest inordinate appropriations for the locality and constituents of a particular Congressman would lead to the reduction of the revenue available for the needs of their own districts. Hence, it was relatively difficult to get through any notorious example of graft or wasteful expenditure. In due time, however, the typical legislative device of log-rolling suggested a way out. If the appropriations of any type could be provided for, not in special bills introduced by individual Congressmen for local needs, but in a general or omnibus bill, then the majority of the Congressmen would all have fingers in the pie and a very definite reason for supporting the general appropriation bill. From the time of the adoption of this practice it became easy to secure the Congressional acceptance of proposals for wild and extravagant expenditures which would have been contemptuously and promptly excluded if they had been introduced as single and isolated bills by an individual member of Congress.

The pork-barrel system triumphed in the appropriations for rivers and harbors by the time of the close of the American Civil War, and only two Presidents—Arthur and Cleveland—have dared at any time to attempt seriously to curtail the omnibus appropriations for such purposes, which amount to about \$50,000,000 a year. The best authorities estimate that probably half of this money is either wasted or devoted to projects which are practically useless and add nothing to the efficiency and happiness of the country at large. The next important development of the pork-barrel system, initiated in 1901, was in connection with appropriations for Federal buildings, such as post offices and custom houses. Between 1902 and 1919 the appropriations for Federal buildings were four times as great as those which had been provided for in the whole 113 years preceding the advent of the pork-barrel. Petty hamlets whose post office needs would be amply cared for in the corner of a drug store were graced by elaborate granite or brick structures adequate for the needs of a city of 100,000. Professor C. C. Maxey in an article in the *National Municipal Review* for December, 1919, cites the following interesting figures with respect to the population of certain typical small American towns and the cost of the post offices erected in each village :

Aledo, Ill., population 2,144, cost \$65,000.
Bad Axe, Mich., population 1,559, cost \$55,000.
Bardstown, Ky., population 2,136, cost \$70,000.
Basin, Wyo., population 763, cost \$56,000.
Big Stone Gap, Va., population 2,590, cost \$100,000.
Buffalo, Wyo., population 1,368, cost \$69,000.
Fallon, Nev., population 741, cost \$55,000.
Gilmore, Tex., population 1,484, cost \$55,000.
Jellico, Tenn., population 1,862, cost \$80,000.
Vernal, Utah, population 836, cost \$50,000.

In 1909 the Postmaster General complained that Congress had appropriated no less than \$20,000,000 for the construction of post offices in petty towns where his department believed that no changes at all were required.

Even more disgraceful has been the conquest of pension legislation by the pork-barrel régime. Until 1908 it had been necessary to consider pension bills independently and on their individual merit. There had, of course, been abuses in pension legislation before this time, but they were insignificant compared with those

which have sprung up in the last two decades, and particularly since 1908. Fifty per cent. more special pension grants were made between 1908 and 1916 than in the forty-seven years between 1861 and 1908. At the present time the special pension grants each year actually exceed the number which were allowed in the entire thirty years following 1865. Not only has the quantity of pension grants enormously increased, but the graft and injustice connected with the system have also been notoriously augmented. Professor Maxey says on this point:

To say that the majority of them have provided gratuities for persons who have absolutely no claim upon the benevolence of the country is to speak with great moderation. When we read of the deserters, the bounty jumpers, the unpensionable widows, the remote relatives, the post-bellum recruits, and the various other species of undeserving scoundrels who have had their names inscribed on the pension rolls by means of the special act, we wonder whether every omnibus pension bill is not a tissue of venality and corruption.

The expenditures for pensions in 1922 amounted to \$252,576,000 as compared with the expenditure of \$16,338,000 in 1865.

Apart from the insane expenditures for armament and war; the river and harbor bills, the appropriations for Federal buildings and the exploitation of the omnibus bill for private pension grants constitute the most notorious abuses in Federal financial legislation. There are, however, certain other aspects of the pork-barrel system and allied practices worth mentioning. Among them was the provision, now at an end, for the distribution of tons of seeds to the constituents of Congressmen. There still are the abuses in the Congressional franking of mail, the waste in public printing, the maintenance of assay offices, the establishment and financing of army posts and obsolete forts, and the support of Indian schools in districts remote from the Indian reservations. But these forms of waste and graft, however atrocious when considered in detail, are not significant when taken in bulk, and are perhaps more amusing than important, even if they embody expenditures far in excess of the Congressional appropriations for educational, scientific and cultural purposes.

III. THE GROWING ARMY OF JOB-HOLDERS

The increasing number of Federal job-holders is another grave and important source of augmenting expenditures. This is usually

ascribed in particular to democratic institutions and practices, though in all probability it has been brought about to no small degree by the growth of state intervention. In an article on "The Washington Job-Holder," in the *American Mercury* for March, 1924, Harvey Fergusson, in the spirit of Senator Reed of Missouri, thus calls attention to the remarkable development of the extensive bureaucracy which has grown up at Washington and elsewhere to provide employment for the Americans who desire the security and nebulous dignity which goes with Federal employment:

The Government job is very nearly the ideal job for the young fellow who wants above all to be sure of an easy living, made in a genteel way. All of the posts under Uncle Sam, except a few held mostly by negroes, are white collar jobs with high-sounding titles. The salaries are fixed by law and guaranteed by the Government. A Federal employe cannot be dismissed except for the rankest kind of incompetence or misconduct, and in case of trouble with his superiors he can always appeal to his Congressman, to the Civil Service Commission or to the Federal Employes' Union. When he is superannuated he draws a pension. . . .

Few Americans are aware of the rate at which this horde of job-holders has grown. . . . The records of the Civil Service Commission show that in 1821 there were 8,211 civilian employes on the Government rolls. The population of the United States was then about 9,000,000, which meant about 3,500,000 persons gainfully employed. There was thus one Federal civil employe, approximately, for every 425 Americans gainfully employed. In March, 1923, there were 504,778 civilian employes on the Federal roster. Calculating in the same way, this means that one out of every seventy-five American breadwinners had a hoof in the Federal trough. It means that the army of job-holders had grown five times as fast as the population. . . .

The roll has grown, not naturally, but by a series of rapid expansions, each of which involved stretching the Constitution to permit the founding of new bureaux. Every one of these bureaux began as a small office having from two to a dozen employes. But by a law which almost never fails to operate, each has grown until it now gives employment to dozens, hundreds, and in some instances thousands of job-holders.

The first additions to the simple governmental machine of the Fathers were the Interior Department and the Department of Agriculture, established under the constitutional power of the Federal Government to promote industry and agriculture. They began as

one-man or two-man offices. They grew quickly and each began to throw off branches.

The second stage began with the era of Government regulation of industry. The Interstate Commerce Commission was the first and remains a typical product of that movement. It began with less than a dozen employes and now has nearly two thousand. Its chief work has been the physical valuation of the railroads, upon which it has been engaged since 1917. This work is now generally conceded to be futile—but it has provided a thousand or more patriots with good livings for years.

The third stage in the expansion of the bureaucracy was begun by the brilliant political invention of the half-and-half plan, whereby the Federal Government appropriates funds to be spent in States which raise an amount equal to the Federal allotment. By this ingenious device, which has just begun to work, the Federal Government has gone into road-building, vocational education, the care of infants and expectant mothers, and teaching housewives how to can beans, and has added many thousands of deserving incompetents to the Federal pay-roll.

The fourth and last stage in the process now apparently impends. It will consist in the actual operation of industry by the Government.

The details of this enormous increase in the Federal service are indicated by Tables I, II and III, which accompany this article. In 1816 there were about 6,000 in the classified and unclassified federal positions. By 1861 the number had increased to about 50,000. By 1890 the number had more than trebled, reaching 166,000. In 1916, the year before we entered the war, the Federal positions numbered 438,000. In 1918 the war increased these to some 917,760. By 1922 there was a shrinkage which brought the number down to 560,863.

TABLE II

Table showing number of employes, classified and unclassified, in the Civil Service on June 30, 1916, and on June 30, 1922, and the number of increases occasioned by the war.

GROUP I—CHANGES WHOLLY OR PRINCIPALLY RESULT OF WAR

Group.	Employes, June 30, 1916	Employes, June 30, 1922	Increase or Decrease, En- tire Service
Department of State.....	2,783	3,852	1,069
Department of the Treasury..	30,629	55,970	25,341
Department of War.....	37,695	51,279	13,584
Department of the Navy...	35,722	55,847	20,125

Group	Employees, June 30, 1916	Employees, June 30, 1922	Increase or Decrease, En- tire Service
Department of Labor.....	2,504	3,525	1,021
Shipping Board †	4,070	4,070
Railroad Administration.....	1,247	1,247
Alien Property Custodian....	139	139
Superintendent State, War and Navy Buildings.....	217	1,006	789
Veterans' Bureau.....	31,802	31,802
Railroad Labor Board.....	75	75
Civil Service Commission....	250	409	159
Total	109,800	209,221	99,421

GROUP 2—CHANGES PARTIALLY RESULT OF WAR

Department of Justice.....	2,610	2,971	361
Department of Commerce....	9,903	11,213	1,310
Government Printing Office..	4,028	4,111	83
General Accounting Office....	2,006	2,006
Total	16,541	20,301	3,760

GROUP 3—CHANGES NOT AT ALL OR SLIGHTLY AFFECTED BY WAR

Department of Interior.....	19,347	17,419	— 1,028
Department of Agriculture...	18,736	19,704	968
Post Office Department.....	250,885	282,636	31,751
Smithsonian Institution.....	784	509	— 275
Bureau of Efficiency.....	27	50	23
Federal Trade Commission...	238	318	80
Tariff Commission.....	...	96	96
Employees' Compensation Com- mission	78	78
Federal Board of Vocational Education	80	80
Panama Canal.....	19,291	8,415	—10,876
Interstate Commerce Commis- sion	2,243	1,798	— 445
Miscellaneous *	165	238	73
Total	311,716	331,341	19,625
Grand total	438,057	560,863	122,806

* Estimated. † Include administrative officers of Emergency Fleet Corporation, but not workers in yard, warehouses or vessels. — Decrease.

Note—The total number of employees in 1916 consisted of 39,442 in the District of Columbia and 398,615 outside; in 1922 the figures were 69,980 in the District and 490,883 outside.

TABLE III

The following table shows the number of employes in the District of Columbia and outside the District of Columbia on certain intermediate dates during and following the World War.

Date.	In District of Columbia	Outside District of Columbia	Total
Nov. 11, 1918.....	117,760	* 800,000	* 917,760
July 31, 1920.....	90,559	* 600,557	* 691,116
Dec. 31, 1920.....	86,650	553,525	640,175
July 31, 1921.....	78,865	518,617	597,482
Dec. 31, 1921.....	75,823	492,567	568,390

* Estimated.

It has been supposed by many that the gradual development of the civil service system, which was introduced in a feeble fashion in 1883 and has been gradually extended and strengthened since that time, operates specifically and notably to reduce the graft and expense connected with Federal offices. This is not in any sense true. The civil service system does not in any way operate to curtail the actual number of employes on the Federal payroll, but is designed rather to secure greater efficiency among those who are actually chosen for Federal jobs. In one sense the civil service system doubtless operates to increase the actual number of Federal employes in that it makes it more difficult and embarrassing, though of course not legally impossible, to discontinue an obsolete or unnecessary branch of the service and discharge supposedly faithful and devoted employes.

While it is necessary to bear in mind the great increase in the Federal civil service in the last century, the fact should not be overlooked that a very considerable increase per capita is to be expected and desired in the light of the increased complexity of the social and economic life since 1800 which has to be regulated through political activity. We can scarcely expect to restore the bucolic simplicity and frugality of the days of Thomas Jefferson. Then, as compared with expenditures for war and preparedness, the civil list in the United States, however much petty bureaucracy and paternalism may be connected with it, is not relatively costly. If the whole Federal civil service were abolished we should not save ten per cent. of the Federal appropriations as at present distributed and allotted.

IV. EFFECT OF ELECTION COSTS

Another contribution of democracy to the increase of expenditures is to be found in the methods and practices which are forced upon candidates to secure nomination and election to public office. The costs of nomination and election have mounted enormously with the rise of the party caucus and convention systems. Few candidates can expect success in either the caucus and primary or in the election unless they can make elaborate promises to their constituents in the way of prospective favors and appointments, or can demonstrate an excellent past record in this respect. Further, unless a Representative or Senator is possessed of large personal wealth he must find some means, direct or indirect, of indemnifying himself for the heavy expenditures which he incurs in his campaign for nomination and election. Hence, a Representative or a Senator is regarded as successful by his constituents chiefly in the light of the benefits which he can demonstrate that his services have brought to his own district. Professor Henry Jones Ford cites an interesting campaign advertisement published by a Wisconsin Congressional candidate in 1908:

He prevented the tearing up of the side-track to the Navy Yard, which if taken up would have closed down the Navy Yard, throwing hundreds of men out of work, and the excuse could be used that there was no way to get the raw material to the Navy Yard, and all the work would then be turned over to the Steel Trust. . . .

Also fought hard to defeat Section 6 of the Panama Bill, which read, "Reduce the wages of the men in Panama 25%." . . .

He passed nine special pension bills for worthy old soldiers, which is a record for a new member as the rule is generally four.

He worked with Congressman Stafford and procured an appropriation of \$50,000 for a new Custom House warehouse to be built on the east side.

He worked with Congressman Stafford to secure the appropriation of \$75,000 for a new lightship to be placed in Milwaukee bay.

He straightened out the Kinnickinnic River appropriation so that the city could go ahead with the work, and he stood by the President in all matters.

With nomination and election methods becoming ever more complicated and expensive there is no immediate prospect that the graft and corruption arising from these sources will be reduced.

Rather, there is every reason to believe that they will be considerably increased as time goes on. There is a popular illusion that the compulsory publication of campaign expenditures will inevitably and certainly reduce this form of lavish outlay in American public life which the people ultimately pay for in final analysis. As a matter of fact, nomination and election expenses have actually increased at a most striking, if not alarming, rate during the very period in which the legislation has been put upon the statute books compelling publicity in regard to campaign expenses. There is little or nothing in present legislation which is designed to limit this type of expenditure beyond the vague and rather dubious pressure of hypothetically outraged public opinion.

The following summary of election costs in 1920 provides illuminating material for reflection upon the point under discussion:

Presidential and Congressional campaign expenditures in 1920, including the run in the preferential primaries, totalled at least \$10,338,000 according to the report to the U. S. Senate, March 1, 1921, by Chairman Kenyon of the Committee on Privileges and Elections. The inquiry had been made by a subcommittee, which took testimony under oath. The committee reported the campaign expenditures in the interest of the Republican and Democratic Presidential candidates as follows saying: "The Committee investigated the receipts and expenditures of money in connection with the candidacies of 17 persons, including avowed candidates in both the Republican and Democratic Parties and those not formally candidates, but in whose interests activities were apparent. In certain instances the financial interlocking arrangements of the various organizations in the interest of a candidate were of such a nature that it is difficult to arrive at a specified sum as representing the total funds used. The following compilation, however, based both upon the testimony taken and an examination of the financial statements of receipts and expenditures as furnished the committee is, in our judgment, a fair statement of the approximate amounts of the campaign funds used in the interest of each candidate as found by the committee." The list is alphabetically arranged.

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Rep.	\$ 40,550
Gov. Calvin Coolidge, Rep.	68,375
Gov. Jas. M. Cox, Dem.	22,000
Gov. Edw. I. Edwards, Dem.	12,900
Sen. Jos. Irwin France, Rep.	None
James W. Gerard, Dem.	14,040
Sen. Warren G. Harding, Rep.	113,109

Sen. Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Dem.	3,337
Herbert Hoover, Rep.	173,542
Sen. Hiram W. Johnson, Rep.	194,393
Gov. Frank O. Lowden, Rep.	414,984
Wm. G. McAdoo, Dem.	None
Sen. Robert L. Owen, Dem.	8,595
A. Mitchell Palmer, Dem.	59,610
Sen. Miles Poindexter, Rep.	77,150
Sen. Howard Sutherland, Rep.	4,145
Gen. Leonard Wood, Rep.	1,773,303
Total	<u>\$2,980,033</u>

The Kenyon Committee stated the expenditures of the Republican and Democratic National and Congressional Committees in 1920, as follows:

Republican National Committee (does not include a loan of \$306,233.50 to the Republican Congressional Committee, a major portion of which the records show was paid back, or the loan of \$100,000 to the Senatorial Committee, which the records show was repaid in full)	\$5,319,720.32
Democratic National Committee	<u>\$1,318,274.02</u>
Total	<u>\$6,638,003.34</u>
Republican Congressional Committee	\$ 375,969.05
Democratic Congressional Committee	<u>24,498.05</u>
Total	<u>\$ 400,467.10</u>
Republican Senatorial Committee	\$ 326,980.29
Bureau of Senatorial Elections, Democratic National Committee	<u>6,675.00</u>
Total	<u>\$ 333,655.29</u>
Making a grand total of	<u>\$7,372,125.73</u>

Treasurer William V. Hodges, of the Republican National Committee, filed a supplemental statement showing that headquarters had collected up to October 20 a total of \$2,829,990.33.

V. THE CHALLENGE OF WAR TO CIVILIZATION AND ECONOMY

Of all the types of public expenditures by the Federal government those for war are unquestionably the largest, the most serious and at present the most indefensible. From 1911 to 1920 the

Federal expenditures for armament and pensions constituted over fifty-four per cent. of the total appropriations. To this would need to be added the increased public debt and the growth of interest charges upon it, together with many incidental expenditures not so directly involved in armament, wars or pensions, so that we may safely say that more than three-fourths of the Federal expenditures are devoted to the payment for past wars or to preparations for future wars. The present oppressive income taxes can be assigned almost entirely to the results of the World War upon American public finance. In 1914 the amount raised by income and profit taxes was only \$71,381,000. By 1920 we were raising by the same type of taxes no less than \$4,000,000,000, an increase of approximately sixty-fold. Thus, when a citizen becomes enraged over his income taxes he should not direct his wrath so much against the impressive new post office in Podunk or the humble plodder in the Federal trough at Washington as against the chauvinistic organizations which urge war and armament, and against the men who were chiefly responsible for the entry of the United States into the late expensive and disastrous conflict. *It is thus scarcely too much to say that the cost of democracy is essentially the cost of war and the preparation for war.*

Many will contend that it is unfair to include the expenditures for war in any discussion of the cost of democracy. It is the contention of such individuals that war is primarily a product of autocracy, and that democracy will insure the disappearance of all military activity and preparations. The events of the last decade are a sufficient answer to any such position. We now know well enough that democracy is no safeguard whatever against war. The well established facts about war origins from 1914-17 prove conclusively that the democracies of France, Great Britain and the United States went into war as enthusiastically and with as little justification as the autocracies of Russia, Germany and Austria. As Professor Blakeslee pointed out in an interesting article in the *Journal of Race Development*, in 1918, democracy by itself will in no sense make the world safe. The technique for "stirring the animals" is now developed on a plane of unprecedented complexity and efficiency through newspapers and radios. As long as the concepts of war and aggression dominate the minds of leaders in democracies there will be even less difficulty in organizing a democratic country for war in the twentieth century than faced the autocrat of the seventeenth century. That democracies cannot

be either slaughtered or taxed into a pacific frame of mind is well proved by the history of France since 1914, particularly the docile acceptance of the vast increases in the public debt since 1918. Therefore, there is not the slightest reason for expecting any reduction in the expenditures for war, armament, pensions and reparations merely because of the progress of democratic forms of government in the world at large. Reductions of this type of expenditure will be secured only through forms of international organization designed to enforce peace through mutual and compulsory agreements for honest and thorough-going disarmament, and through a concerted program of education against the whole philosophy of war and force. The League of Nations may well be regarded as having more relevance and promise for the reduction of Federal expenditures in the United States than any budget bill, which would continue the general nature of present Federal appropriations.

The following compilation prepared by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ indicates the idiotic contemporary waste of war:

WHAT WARS ARE COSTING TO-DAY

In answer to the frequent inquiry as to what the various nations are spending on war preparations we publish below the most authoritative data that can be assembled on the subject at this time. The appropriations, expressed in the monetary units of the respective countries, were furnished by the Statistics Branch of the War Department of the United States. These units have been converted into American dollars by one of the leading banking houses of New York. They are in some cases approximations because in these instances no recent transactions have occurred by which the values might be definitely fixed.

MILITARY BUDGETS

Country	Year	Army	Navy	Air	Total
Albania	1923	\$ 1,017,229			\$ 1,017,229
Argentina	1924	23,285,512	\$ 16,540,806		39,826,318
Australia	1924	5,210,546	10,142,212	\$ 798,012	16,150,770
Austria	1924	7,857,142			7,857,142
Belgium	1924	24,562,629			24,562,629
Bolivia	1924	2,958,285			2,958,285
Brazil	1924	17,304,597	9,513,750		26,818,347
Bulgaria	1924	1,134,000			1,134,000
Canada	1924	10,036,237	1,515,500	1,250,000	12,801,737
Chile	1923	7,948,032	8,177,407		16,125,439
Colombia	1924	2,986,123			2,986,123

Country	Year	Army	Navy	Air	Total
Costa Rica ...	1924	130,264			130,264
Cuba	1924				10,959,799
Czecho-Slovakia	1924	68,999			68,999
Denmark	1924	6,440,000	4,240,000		10,680,000
Ecuador	1924				2,720,846
Esthonia	1923				4,844,036
Finland	1924				10,395,000
France	1924	172,076,462	48,327,139	?	220,403,601
Germany	1924	107,100,000			107,100,000
Great Britain..	1924	268,342,470	290,109,199	94,245,120	652,696,789
Greece	1924				40,567,814
Guatemala	1924				1,584,247
Haiti	1924				1,045,310
Honduras	1924				2,173,543
Hungary	1923	2,629,015			2,629,015
India	1923	182,500,000			182,500,000
Italy	1924	72,533,978	29,397,433	15,162,000	117,093,411
Japan	1924	7,913,000	9,770,300		17,683,300
Jugoslavia	1924				39,120,020
Latvia	1924				5,605,365
Lithuania	1923				5,176,682
Mexico	1923				63,238,095
Netherlands ...	1924	25,251,895	17,153,605		42,405,500
Nicaragua	1923				145,827
Norway	1924	6,020,742	2,291,034		8,311,776
Paraguay	1923				470,252
Peru	1924	4,420,729	1,300,796		5,721,525
Portugal	1924	7,420,886	3,733,980		11,154,866
Poland	1924				85,102,964
Rumania	1924				17,873,503
Russia	1923	96,921,930	8,830,140		105,752,070
Salvador	1924				664,205
Santo Domingo	1924				1,124,827
Spain	1924	51,976,783	24,624,460		76,601,243
Sweden	1924				40,012,400
Switzerland ..	1924				15,733,361
Turkey	1924				24,340,880
United States .	1924	257,274,768	297,097,250		554,372,018
Uruguay	1924				7,027,556
Venezuela	1924				2,400,000

VI. WASTE IN THE STATES

We have thus far devoted attention solely to the striking increase of expenditures by the Federal government, but it should not be forgotten that all of the abuses and extravagances which

we have briefly and incompletely catalogued above are duplicated and triplicated to an even more distressing and vulgar degree in the state and local governments of our country. However much critical and pessimistic writers may deplore the decline in the level of morale and efficiency in our Federal government, particularly in the legislative branch, there can be no doubt that the Federal Congress ranks infinitely above the average state legislature as to intelligence, honesty and economy, while the typical state legislature is normally as much superior to the average Board of Aldermen in an American municipality. It is safe to say that in proportion to the wealth available for public levies and the graft and corruption which can be safely concealed, extravagance and graft increase directly as one passes from the central government through the various stages of the political hierarchy to the municipal and other forms of local government in the country. Obnoxious as the Federal income tax may be to the average citizen, he files more or less simultaneously with it a state income tax return which in many cases exceeds the Federal tax. And if he is a holder of taxable real property the citizen is normally gouged much more seriously by the local municipal tax collector than by either the Federal or the state governments. As far back as 1902, for example, when the cost of the National government was \$593,038,905, the expenditures for the state and lesser governments were not less than \$1,156,447,085. There is little wonder, then, that many citizens are beginning to consider with serious interest, if not with sober alarm, the synchronous increase of expenditures for government and the development of persistent charges, in many cases well substantiated, of the decline in the morale and efficiency of every branch of our public service.

VII. PROSPECT OF RELIEF

Few, if any, of the expedients and measures yet tried have shown particular promise of efficacy in bringing about relief. There would seem to be little or no promise in anything short of a great improvement in the morale, character and efficiency of public life, all of which must necessarily rest upon the introduction and successful execution of a program of more accurate and realistic political education for both adults and the students in our schools and colleges. And there is strikingly little prospect that anything of immediate significance may be expected in this direc-

tion. Probably the only practical relief will come from such incidental and superficial sources as the occasional existence of a President like Mr. Coolidge, blessed with a sense of primitive, bucolic economy, or a Governor like Alfred E. Smith, impressed with the desirability of introducing into state administration some modicum of the elementary principles of business economics. For most people, most of the time, there is no other prospect than a continuation of cursing and muttering each spring when we compile our Federal and state income tax returns, and each autumn when our sense of decency is outraged by the receipt of the local tax bill.

VIII. POLITICAL WASTE AND SOCIAL WASTE

While this chapter is designed to deal primarily with the wastes inherent in contemporary political corruption and inefficiency in the United States, it must be recognized that the lack of economy and efficiency in government is in no sense unique, but is simply a particular aspect of the general prevalence of social wastage evident in every phase of modern life. When considered quantitatively the costs of government appear insignificant as compared with the economic and social waste involved in modern industrial production and social consumption. There is little hope of remedying the situation in politics except as one element in a program of comprehensive social reconstruction designed to eliminate every aspect of unnecessary waste in contemporary society. Mr. Stuart Chase has brought together the following striking and suggestive conclusions in his important study, *The Tragedy of Waste*:

In the foregoing chapters we have tried to run a chain and compass line through a more or less trackless field. Too often the needle has trembled, the chain broken, the line left its course. To gather in one brief volume the many viewpoints, the twisting concepts, the assorted philosophies—and some measure of the quantitative data—of the problem of economic waste is a difficult task. Classifications, however carefully planned, usurp one another's territory. Illth (consumption wastes) merges into the technique of production, production into distribution; man-power is inextricably bound up with materials. Separation for the purposes of exposition has been inevitable, but the underlying separation in fact is more dubious, and often non-existent except in a very general way. An aeroplane view of America would disclose a very large fraction of the available man-power workless on any given working day; would disclose another large fraction making and distributing things which are of no real use to

anybody; and a third fraction taking two hours to do a job which engineers have found can be done in one—and which some men are actually doing in one. And equipped with a sort of earth crust X-ray, the observer would see water invading the oil sands, the mountain coming in on the coal measures; and above ground, the gusher giving its gas to the air and its oil to surrounding landscape, the rush of millions of horse-power down unyoked rivers, the glare of forest fires, the refuse piles charged with unclaimed chemical riches. But once beyond these very broad distinctions, classifications overlap and intertwine.

What is clear by now, however, is the fact that no man or group of men, however profound their research, can show in quantitative terms the margin of waste. The percentage of lost man-power to the total available is a figure forever beyond computation. The ratio of the raw material loss to the aggregate annual tonnage taken from the earth is an unknown ratio. We hope we have demonstrated that these ratios are sufficiently serious; that under some sort of co-ordinated community control, immense savings both in man-power and in material might be made, but we have no illusions as to the practicability of arriving at any final judgment.

What we may do in summary is this—and we trust it is permissible. We may list one by one the outstanding items of loss and leakage which the survey has disclosed, and beside them give such quantitative estimates as are capable of rough verification, and which do not duplicate with estimates in other fields. An addition of such estimates in the three main channels, should give at least a minimum record of the margin of wasted man-power. At the end of Chapters VI, VIII, X and XI such tables have already been prepared. Bringing the totals together:

The man-power going into illth is at least	8,000,000
The man-power idle on a given working day is at least ..	6,000,000
The man-power wasted in production methods is at least	4,000,000
The man-power wasted in distribution methods is at least	2,500,000
<hr/>	
A total of at least	20,500,000
Against an able-bodied adult population of approximately	40,000,000
Giving a minimum ratio of waste of about	50%

On this showing, in that it tends to be a minimum, we have reason to believe that the labor power is available to at least double the current output; and further, that through improved methods of exploitation, there is adequate raw material available with which to double it without exhausting natural resources at any greater rate than they are now being exhausted. In lumber and oil and probably in coal, it would appear that output—in end products—could be doubled while *reducing* the rate of exploitation.

We suspect that an Industrial General Staff would materially better this ratio, but how much we have no means of knowing.

What would a doubled output mean in terms of the budget of the wayfaring man? Obviously it would mean something quite different from a doubled money income. Doubling food output would provide an immense unconsumable surplus. It is doubtful if food output by weight needs to be increased at all. It needs to be shifted more in accordance with dietetic value, adulteration guarded against, some wanton extravagance on the part of the very rich curtailed, and "dumping" eliminated. The labor saved by keeping food substantially at par could thus go into other necessities and comforts, and if expedient very much more than double their output. Housing construction could probably be doubled for some years to come to great advantage—including the tearing down of slums and a measure of community planning. Clothing output would hardly need to be doubled. With better durability and a decline in super-luxuries and fashions, its increase by weight would not need to be great.

The bulk of the increased output would thus find its way into the production of educational and recreational facilities, and into comforts. On the whole we are inclined to guess that with twice as much labor power available, the last family in the country could be raised above the line of economic insecurity, and still leave a wide range of income levels above that line. There would have to be no "dividing up" process. To double productive power with no increase in population represents a tremendous economic gain. Meanwhile the labor power which now goes into capital goods, in so far as such represent excess and duplicate plant capacity, might compensate for the labor needed to build the by-product ovens, the super-power lines, the rearranged terminal facilities, which a functional control would demand. As we have seen, it is only through large capital outlays that certain aspects of the waste elimination program are possible. . . .

Half and more of our man-power counting for nothing; half and more of the yearly output of natural resources heedlessly scattered and destroyed . . . a billion slaves of energy turning useless wheels, dragging unheeded loads. Motion, speed, momentum unbounded—to an end never clearly defined, to a goal unknown and unseen. If there be a philosophy of waste, it lies in the attempt to clarify that goal, to turn men's eyes towards the whyfore of the sweat of their bodies and of their brains.

Of all the dull dead weights men ever bore
None wears the soul with discontent
Like consciousness of power unused.

It almost seems as though there were a relentless law at work which, with every gain in invention, every improvement in technique, threw off a stream of parasites to eat up the slack, and leave us where we were. Invention has gained on population, output per producer grows steadily, but it does not gain when measured against the drift of land workers to the city, producers into distributors, makers of wealth into makers of illth. It is like a factory with 50 men in the workroom and 10 men in the office. There comes a time when 10 men in the workroom can produce an equal output. Let the 50 stay in the workroom and give the world five times the output? No. Keep output at par. Put the other 40 into the office to sell, advertise, compete, break down sales resistance. Not so simple as this of course—but isn't it the trend? How else is it possible to explain the phenomenal increase in productive power, with so little increase in the budget of the way-faring man? If machinery were abolished to-morrow, half the population and more would have to go back to some form of useful work—or die. The technical arts of to-day probably call for more workers, relatively, in the overhead services, but is it inevitable that they call for so many as to leave us in a dance that goes round and round with so rarely a step gained? The horn of plenty is overflowing, but a dead hand reaches up to seal its mouth, and the fruits fall as slowly as before.

It is not only fruits that concern us. The elimination of waste—the striking aside of that dead hand—is important not solely because it allows a flow of more roast beef, more bathrooms and more boots. It is important because it holds out the promise of giving the spirit of man a chance to forget roast beef and bathrooms and boots, and to develop whatever creative impulses lie within. It provides a method for getting the chores done and out of the way in the morning with the afternoon free to read in the garret or go on a picnic, or dance a new dance, or sleep in the sun. It does not call for speeding up; it calls for speeding down. The pressure is some degrees too high already—and getting worse. Like the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland, with the swarms ever moving into salesmanship, quackery, advertised specialties and super-luxuries, we have to run faster and faster to keep up with ourselves. Waste elimination does not call for a hard, bright, regimented efficiency—except in the minds of soap manufacturers. It calls for the life more abundant—for living instead of existing. Life, says Havelock Ellis, is a dance; there can be but little dancing when every gain in leisure is cupped off to feed an equal gain in waste.

We have stressed the production of goods by weight in the pages which have gone before because our survey lay in the field of economics rather than in that of the intangible values of the human spirit; and because spiritual values are difficult to cultivate with a job lost,

the rent in arrears, and the children crying for milk. Only those who have felt the clutch at the heart which goes with economic insecurity can appreciate the hypocrisy and futility of the well-fed who dare to preach spiritual values. Food, shelter and clothing are not everything, but the dance of life breaks down in the first measure unless their relentless demands are met.

In his review of L. F. Bower's *Economic Waste of Sin* Mr. H. L. Mencken has presented a vivid picture of the expense involved in what is usually regarded as wasteful or harmful consumption. His survey achieves the rare feat of general quantitative accuracy without descending into dullness and moralizing:

Here is a first attempt at a detailed study of the total annual cost of sin in the United States—what it costs the American people, in hard cash, to be happy in this world and red-hot in the next. Why was the inquiry not made long ago? It is hard to imagine a reason. All over the land there are Christian economists, baptized men, eager for good works, and every year they turn out great stacks of professional treatises—tracts on taxes, on the tariff, on food prices, on trades unionism, on the open shop, on the Bolshevik heresies—tracts full of hard work and daring speculation, statistical graphs and moral indignation. In such great centres of Christian enlightenment as the Southern Methodist University, the Ohio Wesleyan, the Baptist Christian and the Coca-Cola of Atlanta there are whole schools of them. And yet, for year after year, they have neglected the one great investigation that lay directly under their noses, beckoning them almost voluptuously. It remained for a simple business man to make it, to wit, Mr. Lahman Forrest Bower, of Carlisle, Pa. This Mr. Bower is an A. M. of Wesleyan, and once taught school, but beyond that he pretends to no learning. All his days and nights, until his retirement in 1918, were spent in manufacturing. He was successively comptroller, secretary and vice-president of the eminent Allis-Chalmers Company, and a member of its board of directors. He was in charge of great plants at Scranton, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Chicago and Milwaukee. He was thrifty as well as diligent; he acquired a competence. And all the while, busy though he was, he took note of the cost of sin. Everywhere he saw men wasting their money on drink, frittering it away on theatrical shows, and lavishing it upon loose women. He began to make memoranda, to amass statistics, to get into communication with experts. When he retired he devoted himself seriously to the inquiry, and the result is now before us in a neat duodecimo of 272 pages.

I give Mr. Bower's final conclusion at once: it costs the people of the United States \$13,568,588,743 a year to be sinful. I give it—

and file a caveat. What ails it is the fact that it covers only half the ground; thousands of varieties of sin are not so much as mentioned. For example, cigarette-smoking. If anything has been well established by moral scientists, certainly it is the fact that cigarette-smoking is an immense and crying evil—that it is responsible for at least half of all the current debauchery among the young, that it destroys the mind and palsies the frame, that it has a part in the etiology of practically every form of crime. Yet Mr. Bower does not mention it. Nor does he mention tobacco-chewing. Nor joy-riding. Nor petting. Nor the use of cosmetics. Nor the bobbing of hair. Nor gambling in any of its protean forms. Nor dancing. I am no statistician as he is, but in the cases of many of these things the figures are not hard to find. The women of America, according to a report lately in circulation, spend \$73,000,000 a year on rouges, powders, lip-sticks, hair dyes, etc. I here allude only to the white women; the colored women spend \$15,500,000 more on preparations for straightening their hair. Nearly 200,000 Americans cross the Canadian border every year to tank up, and more than 30,000 go to Havana and Nassau. The former, perhaps, spend \$50 apiece; the latter, nearer \$500. Total: certainly not less than \$115,000,000. Even before the war Americans in search of thrills spent \$100,000,000 in Europe every summer; now they probably spend \$500,000,000; last summer, indeed, their expenditures were so high that the movement of gold to the United States was halted, and several shipments had to be made eastward. I add these expenses—all wasteful, all for sin—and Mr. Bower's \$13,568,588,743 swells to more than \$14,000,000,000.

What the country's tobacco bill is every year I don't know, but it must be gigantic. So long ago as 1919 we raised a billion and a half pounds of the leaf, worth half a billion dollars, and imported nearly 100,000,000 pounds of cigars and cigarettes. During the same year the cigars, cigarettes and smoking tobacco we produced at home were valued, at wholesale, at \$1,012,933,213. But this is only the beginning of the story. The consumption of all this tobacco probably wasted \$25,000,000 worth of matches, not otherwise necessary. The ashes, falling upon rugs, carpets, table-cloths and clothes, caused perhaps \$50,000,000 damage. (I myself, during 1921, lost a suit of clothes worth \$32, and had to pay for seven table-cloths in restaurants, at \$4 apiece.) Tobacco smoke fills all our houses with dust; getting rid of it costs millions for servant girls, vacuum cleaners, furniture polish, etc. It causes bronchitis, gastritis and asthma, thus enormously increasing the annual bill for medical services, drugs, hospital accommodations, tickets to and from sanatoria, time lost from productive industry, and funeral expenses. Nor is this all. There is sound ground for holding that cigarette-smoking among the young has dreadful mental effects. Some time ago, for example, I was

told by a Christian professor at Yale that if all the students at that university were non-smokers it would be so much easier to teach them that at least 150 of the 452 professors, associate professors and instructors now on the roll might be laid off. By actual experiment it has been found that it takes an average of 18 minutes to teach a cigarette-smoking student one page of James' "Psychology," whereas a non-smoker masters it in 13½ minutes. Moreover, the non-smoker spends less with the New Haven bootleggers, eats simpler and cheaper food, and never gets into trouble with the town fancy women. Altogether, it is estimated that the abolition of the cigarette would save Yale at least \$1,500,000 a year—and Yale is but one of the 37,432 universities in America.

I mention these facts, not to cavil at Mr. Bower, but to praise him for his moderation. He says nothing whatever, for example, about the movies. They cost the American people \$500,000,000 a year, and teach them only patriotism and adultery. Nor does he mention the theatres—schools of every vice known to the Babylonians. Again, he is silent about joy-riding, with its roll of 72,000 killed and 432,500 mutilated every year, not to mention its countless girls betrayed, its colossal waste of gas and rubber, its multiplication of mortgages, its costly doubling of the police force everywhere. Worse, he is absurdly low in the estimates that he actually sets down. For example, he puts the total annual drink bill of the country at \$825,000,000. What could be more ridiculous? New York alone consumes 2,000,000 cases of Scotch a year at an average cost of \$42, not to mention 10,000,000 gallons of synthetic gin. Last Autumn its receipts of grapes from California, as officially reported, ran beyond 13,000 carloads. Made into wine, these grapes sold for at least \$50,000,000 in the speak-easies and stews of the town. Altogether, it probably spends at least \$150,000,000 a year on alcohol. If so, then Chicago spends \$75,000,000 and Detroit \$50,000,000. Mr. Bower, I fear, is deceived by the optimistic reports of the Prohibition bureau at Washington—reports about as accurate, roughly speaking, as those of Broadway press-agents. Let him visit Washington himself and see how Prohibition is working in the very citadel of Law Enforcement. "In the old days," to quote a recent authority, "the virtuous complained because the policemen, school-teachers and saloon-keepers of Washington were about equal in numbers. Now the town has one bootlegger for every hundred inhabitants." There are 435 members of the House of Representatives and they receive \$3,362,500 a year in salaries. Many of them, after they have paid their bootlegger bills, have to borrow money to get home.

Nor is Mr. Bower to be taken seriously as a statistician when he puts the total cost of harlotry in the United States at \$530,000,000 a year. This, in point of fact, is scarcely more than the cost of

new construction of hotels and apartment houses for ladies of joy in New York alone. But I do not press the point. All I desire to do is argue that his total of \$13,568,588,743 is grossly under the facts. Sin costs the people of the United States, not thirteen billions a year, but at least forty billions. Every day in the year, Sundays included, they blow in more than \$100,000,000 on their vices and follies—say a dollar apiece, counting out valetudinarians, persons in jail and the rev. clergy. That is what it costs them to be wicked. If they turned from their evil ways and saved all that money they'd have so much in ten years that every bank in the land would bulge and burst. They could pay their pastors \$50,000 a year apiece, and yet roll in gold. They could send \$1,000,000,000 a year to the missionaries in Siam, and still be richer per capita than the bootleggers of Asbury Park, N. J. They'd be healthy, at peace, and as sure of heaven as so many archbishops. But on this earth they'd have no place to go.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Bower, L. F., *The Economic Waste of Sin*; Brooks, R. C., *Corruption in American Politics and Life*; Cain, J. M., "The Pathology of Service," in *American Mercury*, November, 1925; Chase, S., *The Tragedy of Waste*; Cleveland, F. A., and Buck, A. E., *The Budget and Responsible Government*; Fergusson, H., "The Washington Jobholder," in *American Mercury*, March, 1924; Fish, C. R., *The Civil Service and the Patronage*; Ford, H. J., *The Cost of Our National Government*; Hoover, Herbert et al., *Waste in Industry* (McGraw Hill); Lloyd, H. D., *Wealth against Commonwealth*; Maxey, C. C., "A Little History of Pork," in the *National Municipal Review*, December, 1919; Smith, J. A., *The Spirit of the American Government*; Tait, S. W., "Reed of Missouri," in *American Mercury*, November, 1925; Thompson, W., *Federal Centralization*; Webb, S. and B., *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*; Willoughby, W. F., *The Problem of a National Budget*; *The Movement for Budgetary Reform in the United States*; *The Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the National Government*.

.

CHAPTER XVII

WOODROW WILSON: AN ESTIMATE

I. THE PROBLEM

THE vast amount of anecdotal and eulogistic material which appeared after the recent death of Mr. Wilson suggests the desirability of attempting a preliminary estimate of his personality, achievements and place in history. Many would urge that we must wait for years before making any effort to pass even a tentative judgment upon his career, on the familiar ground that no one who has lived in a period can write about it intelligently—that to get sound history we must delay until some one entirely ignorant of the passions of the era discussed can study the documents embodying its dead enmities and biases, and thus construct an adequate, penetrating and absolutely impartial exposition and interpretation of it. This position is based on two errors. The first lies in the assumption that a later generation will never share the prejudices of its predecessors. If you believe it, try to imagine a Boston aristocrat of 1924 writing fairly of Thomas Jefferson, or Maurice Barrès of Bismarck or Moltke! The second is found in the theory that a person living later will have a better perspective and keener insight than a contemporary. This implies a tacit acceptance of a theory of historical causation long ago disproved by Hume—that subsequent events are necessarily results of earlier ones—and also of the notion that a consideration of the remote results of a period is more valuable for estimating it than a clear view of its actual events. It is the writer's contention that while contemporaneity may possibly intensify hatreds and affections, yet the type of person likely to show a reasonable impartiality under any circumstances at all will make better use of the same evidence if he has lived through the period he deals with.

In this chapter there is little space for description. Some effort will be made to suggest plausible explanations and interpretations, but there will be no attempt at personal praise or blame. The writer does not pretend to any finality of estimate. He merely

claims to be free from a few of the more atrocious distortions of the "Drool Method" in regard to the subject chosen, and to have canvassed a great variety of written and oral estimates of the late ex-President as scholar, writer and public figure.

The extreme divergence of opinion as to Mr. Wilson's personality and achievements, and the intensity of the apologies and accusations launched by his friends and foes have astonished many impartial observers, but all of them are probably adequately explained by the luxuriating of the herd instinct during the World War. The passions of the Civil War produced like results. We often forget that Congressmen wrote home in April, 1865, that Booth had been an instrument in God's hands, and that clergymen in the North thanked God publicly for the nation's deliverance from Lincoln. It may, however, be instructive to reproduce typical examples of the encomium and the indictment in the case of Mr. Wilson. I shall choose those which are made impressive by reason of their extreme deviation from plausibility and by the fact that they are the product of distinguished historical scholars—the late Dr. William Roscoe Thayer, fresh from the presidency of the American Historical Association, and Professor William E. Dodd, who, on the basis of his professional work, was far more deserving of that honor. Professor Dodd, admittedly a highly intelligent and progressive historian, the biographer of Mr. Wilson, and even beyond Ray Stannard Baker the chief historical architect of the Wilsonian Epic, has given us his most concise delineation of his hero in an article, "Democracy's Great Triumvirate," in the *New York Times* for January 29, 1922. Typical sections follow:

Forty-eight years after Lincoln another, and the last of our three great leaders, came to the Presidency. It was Woodrow Wilson, sprung from the loins of Lincoln's broken South. He found the masters of industry, after half a century of untrammelled power, confronting him. . . . Lincoln has succeeded in one thing: the saving of the unity of the country. Jefferson succeeded in two things: the widening of the area of democracy and the marvelous revival of the democratic spirit of the people. Wilson in two or three short years carried through more, and more important, legislation than any other President ever made into law. . . . It was a great, unprecedented program, and it was successful beyond all expectation. But Wilson was marked for defeat. He was hated by many who were called great or eminent; they resolved that his career must be halted. . . . I shall not retell the story of the great conflict, of the high hopes

and the great performances of those great years, 1917-18. It was a high tide in American history, a great day for all who knew and felt the impulses of the time. Over all presided the spirit of Wilson, too fair to be unjust even to the German people; too democratic and too Christian to indulge in the language of hate. At the close of the struggle . . . he promulgated his peace of reconciliation and then his famous Fourteen Points. . . . He would make a peace the like of which men had never before known. But he was still marked for defeat. . . . Men could not forgive him for being the world's acknowledged leader. He must go. It was the ancient spirit of privilege which had warred upon Lincoln, which had hurled its anathemas at Jefferson. . . . Thus came the bitter end to him, as to Jefferson and Lincoln. It was American industry, ancient privilege, fighting for a strange hold upon the world, that mobilized all the hostile elements in 1920. . . . Industry, American industry, won at Paris.

Now for the other side. Perhaps the most bitter arraignment of Mr. Wilson ever printed is that contained in an estimate of his personality and career published by Mr. Thayer in the *North American Review* for March, 1921. I quote:

The American election day of November 2, 1920, may well remain a most conspicuous landmark, not only in the chronicles of the United States but in the history of democracy. Never before had American democracy reached so vital a crisis. An egoist who happened to be President of the country under abnormal circumstances, freed alike from precedents and moral bonds, saw the way to assemble in his own hands extraordinary powers which made him a despot of unlimited reach, and the United States a docile despotism.

Probably President Wilson did not deliberately plan to attain this result. He was an opportunist, even in his guilt. By nature stubborn, self-satisfied, and self-reliant, he was a most fertile soil for the seeds of ambition to grow in. He did not create favorable chances, but he quickly discerned and seized them when they arose. . . . This stage of egomania is, of course, very common. The peculiarity in Mr. Wilson's case is that he was able to delude many persons into asserting that his disease was the highest wisdom. I have heard him extolled as a modern Messiah, and the persons who so extolled him were unquestionably sincere. . . .

He had "kept us out of war," as long as it served his purpose. Now he spoke proudly of being in the war: "I, too, come of fighting blood," he said jauntily. More remarkable still was his ingenuity in finding reasons for our joining the Allies, or "Associates," as he preferred to call them. We took up arms "to make the world safe

for democracy," he explained. . . . The war had not progressed long before thoughtful men of every nation, shuddering at its horrors, set to thinking how all war could be abolished and peace be made permanent. Various plans were suggested. One of them, the League to Enforce Peace, seemed to many Americans the most popular and feasible. President Wilson did not initiate this . . . but when he found that it was gaining in favor, he openly espoused it, and, as chance often plays freaks of this kind, he came at last to be revered as its starter by persons who did not take the trouble to inform themselves as to the origin of the project. . . .

He saw in the League of Nations a marvelous opening to his own aggrandizement. If any league should be agreed upon when it came time to make peace, who would be more likely to be chosen its president than himself? This suggestion became an obsession, and to it he sacrificed all other considerations. . . . Having scorned to take counsel with any one, having reduced his Cabinet ministers and other officials to the status of servants, he threw off all pretense of being bound by the Constitution. . . . Whatever blocked his ambition was bad; consequently the Senate was bad. So blinded by egomania was Mr. Wilson that he imagined that the people of the United States were on his side—the very people who had defeated him by more than a million votes in 1918. Accordingly he planned to stump the country in behalf of his scheme for a League of Nations. . . . November 2nd came. Inexorable as fate, the Great and Solemn Referendum turned out to be the Greatest Repudiation in American history. . . . A majority of more than seven million and a half Americans repudiated Woodrow Wilson, his ways, his régime, and his visions.

In an effort to arrive at something like a valid interpretation of Mr. Wilson and his achievements, I shall first consider his scholarly standing and productions, and then briefly discuss the facts of his political career.

II. WOODROW WILSON AS STUDENT AND WRITER

It has been very commonly assumed that because of his having been a college professor and president he necessarily possessed a highly superior intellect and could boast of a scholarly record of unusual merit. As a matter of fact his scholarship was only average, and distinctly lower than that of the normal college professor, who is well-nigh universally embellished with a Phi Beta Kappa key earned as an undergraduate. As a student his record proves him greatly inferior to his immediate predecessors in the presi-

dency. Mr. Roosevelt was in the first eight of his class at Harvard and Mr. Taft graduated second in a class of 121 at Yale, but Mr. Wilson finished only thirty-eighth in a class of 106 at Princeton. As there is no evidence that any of the three was given to wildness at college, it may be safely assumed that these facts offer a fairly accurate reflection of their relative native intellectual endowments. Certainly no one will hold that the scholarly requirements of Princeton were more severe at the time than those which prevailed at Harvard and Yale.

I need not spend any time discussing Mr. Wilson's purely academic career. The facts are well known and they may be allowed to stand at their face value. Let us turn instead to his literary and scholarly achievements. In his professional work Mr. Wilson was primarily a political scientist rather than an historian. In this field his work was creditable if not distinguished. His most important book was his earliest, *Congressional Government*, published in 1885, which was the first considerable American treatise to move in the direction of James Bryce and Mosei Ostrogorski, and, leaving the sterile classificatory political science of Bluntschli, Burgess and Woolsey behind, to describe the chaos and depravity in the actual operation of our party system. Unfortunately, the early promise of this essay was not fulfilled. Mr. Wilson's later writings on politics became more stereotyped and formal, and, in the light of subsequent work along lines he suggested by Bryce, Ostrogorski, J. A. Smith, Bentley, Weyl, Brooks, Beard, Merriam, Kales, Young and others, *Congressional Government* now seems a product of the Mesozoic Age of American political science.

Another idea worthy of note which we may ascribe to Mr. Wilson was one to the effect that it would be a good thing to let the youth of America know that there were civilized peoples being governed passably well outside the confines of the United States. This conviction produced his well-known book, *The State*. Though embodying no original research, pathetically erroneous in its theory of political origins, exhibiting little power to penetrate beneath external forms into the processes of actual government, based very largely on a formal German manual, and, because of its detachment from the facts of government in action, one of the most difficult books to teach or learn from ever offered as a textbook in political science in an American university, it deserves the credit of having first really introduced the American academic world of the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the study of compar-

ative government. No other work from his pen possesses any real merit as a contribution to political science, but his *Mere Literature* throws significant light on his deeper attitude toward that science and its cultivation. After legitimately calling attention to the sterility of most professorial lectures and formal treatises on the subject, he recommends "poets and sonneters," as the best source of political information and inspiration. "There is more of a nation's politics to be got out of its poetry than out of all its systematic writers upon public affairs and constitutions." These are surely not the words of a realistic observer and penetrating student of politics. They give us, I believe, a clue to his real methods and preferences, and show that as a political scientist, as well as in the rôle of politician, he was a rhetorician first and always. One does not need to read Dr. William Bayard Hale's *Story of a Style* to discover that words were ever Mr. Wilson's chief stock-in-trade.

The most scholarly and persistent of his apologists has been recently reported as saying that in 1912 he was the foremost of American political scientists, but a careful perusal of all the competent written opinions on the subject and a fairly thorough canvass of oral judgments have failed to disclose a single authoritative confirmation of that estimate. As an original thinker he will not compare for a moment with such men as Pound, Beard, Bentley, Weyl, Croly, Holcombe or Shepard, nor as an assiduous compiler with F. A. Ogg, or W. F. Willoughby, nor as a penetrating delineator of governmental systems with President Lowell, nor as a master of the juristic side of political institutions with Goodnow, Freund, McIlwain, Powell or Corwin, nor as an interpreter of the actual processes of modern government with Merriam, Bentley, H. J. Ford, Beard, Brooks, Ray or Kales. Unquestionably, his success in the field of academic political science was due far more to his stimulating teaching than to his writing, and here it was chiefly the impressive rhetoric, and often keen dialectic, of his lectures that gained him popularity. Painstaking interrogation of his former students fails to disclose any evidence of their having been overwhelmed by any such combination of analytical power and erudition as that which characterizes the lectures of Roscoe Pound on jurisprudence, or brought spontaneously to their feet by any such realistic interpretation of political life and exposure of contemporary political abuses as that which thrilled Professor Beard's students for a decade, or given any such prac-

tical insight into contemporary political situations as that which has been the reward of Professor Merriam's students.

As an historian his concrete achievements were even more slender and less impressive than his feats as a political scientist. It was doubtless assumed by many that his election late in 1923 as president of the American Historical Association was convincing proof of his eminence as a devotee of Clio, but this illusion may be easily dispelled by having recourse to a printed list of ex-presidents of the Association. At least half are men whom even the most heroic imagination could not place in the front rank of contemporary historians, though it is true that in some cases distinguished scholars have been elected. The greatest scholar American historiography has produced, Herbert Levi Osgood, was never seriously considered for the presidency, though he lived to the relatively ripe age of sixty-three. Likewise, only two of the men who have placed American historical scholarship a generation ahead of that of any other nation in modernity and vitality of outlook,—such men as Robinson, Breasted, Turner, Shotwell, Beard, Cheyney, Becker, Dodd and Shepherd—have been honored by this office.

Mr. Wilson's historical works consist of a brief book on the history of the United States from 1829 to 1889, entitled *Division and Reunion*, published in 1893; a biographical study of George Washington, of interpretative and literary, but scarcely of historical, significance, published in 1896, and a popular history of the United States in several volumes, published in 1902. Of these, only *Division and Reunion* has ever attracted any favorable attention from historians. While this work is but a slender manual brought out in a textbook series, and gives no evidence of any mastery of, or particular reliance upon, source-material, it was in its day, like *Congressional Government*, rather a novelty, in that for the first time it told the story of the Civil War and Reconstruction in a spirit as free from the savagery of Thaddæus Stevens and Charles Sumner as it was from that of Ben Tillman. If it now seems puerile, when compared with the volumes of McMaster and Oberholtzer, James Ford Rhodes and Professor Dunning and his students, that fact should not obscure its value at the time of publication. Yet a hundred volumes of more merit have appeared since 1893 on various phases of American history without having incited reviewers to suggest the authors as candidates for the presidency of the American Historical Association.

The *George Washington* is not history, whatever one may think of Mr. Wilson's intuitive and literary gifts, and in fifteen years of daily contact with university departments of history I have heard the *History of the American People* mentioned but once, and that was when a venerable professor warned a seminar of undergraduates that it was not to be regarded as an authoritative work on any period of our national development. At the same time it may be conceded that it is of high literary merit and one of the best popular histories of our country that has been brought out by a single author. A widespread perusal of it would doubtless be beneficial to the majority of Americans. It is equally fair, however, to point out that it shows scarcely any use of the new scholarship that has revolutionized American history in the last twenty-five years, and that more of substantial value can be discovered in many a single volume by other men—for example, Willis Mason West's *American Democracy*, S. E. Forman's *Our Republic*, Frederick Jackson Turner's *The Frontier in American History*, Max Farrand's *Development of the United States*, A. M. Schlesinger's, *New Viewpoints in American History*, or Carl Becker's *The United States*. It is quite evident, then, that no informed person would think of suggesting that Mr. Wilson was qualified to rank as one of our leading historians. In sober fact, he here failed to compete with even Mr. Roosevelt in actual achievement.

III. WILSON'S POLITICAL CAREER IN APOLOGY AND CRITICISM

Probably the best way to reach some estimate of his place in American political life is to rehearse his contributions to progressive thought and sound legislation early in his administration, then to enumerate the phases of his *débâcle*, and finally endeavor to discover some credible, if not always adequate, explanation of his apparent inconsistencies.

While his achievements as governor of New Jersey were not epoch-making in any sense, he did certainly make some slight progress in positive legislation and in temporarily improving the public tone of that trust-ridden and machine-controlled State. And during the first two years of his administration as President of the United States his most bitter foe must concede that he got through more externally impressive legislation than can be claimed for any like period of years since Alexander Hamilton's unparalleled achievements at the opening of the Washington administrations.

We may agree with the judicious estimate of Professor Farrand that "his first administration as President of the United States will probably long remain an unequalled record of legislative achievement, for which the greatest credit must be given to Mr. Wilson himself. Merely to mention the substantial reduction in the tariff rates, a revision of the banking and currency system, the strengthening of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the bolstering up of the anti-trust laws, and the creation of a Federal Trade Commission would be sufficient to indicate his accomplishments." To these should be added the beginnings of federal provision for rural credits, and the passage of the Adamson Law, probably the most forward-looking act of Mr. Wilson's political career, however much it may have been purely opportunist. Coming to the war, it may be said that whatever the sordidness of the actual preparation and administration, of which he was probably only imperfectly conscious, he did certainly manage to keep our ostensible reasons for participating with the Allied Powers on an unprecedentedly high, if largely illusory, moral and rhetorical level. Finally, while not the originator, he was certainly the foremost practical sponsor of the most discussed plan for international co-operation in the long history of such proposals.

There are, of course, some qualifications which should be appended. Not a single new policy was involved in any of the above acts, unless it was in the Adamson Law, which can scarcely be regarded as an outcome of Wilson's well-considered philosophy of government or political program. Tariff revision had always been a basic policy with the Democrats and progressive Republicans; the banking laws were but a modification of the Aldrich plan, and have certainly failed to ward off all the evils which were alleged to be inherent in that scheme; and the legislation relating to the curbing of trusts and the strengthening of the Interstate Commerce Commission was strictly a part of the Rooseveltian heritage which had been sidetracked during the Taft defection from "my policies." And any one who thinks this latter legislation has been effective should consult the statistical exhibit of Senator La Follette in the *Congressional Record* for March 14, 1921. For this failure, however, we must assign the responsibility to what Herbert Spencer called "the great political illusion" rather than to any special lack of wisdom on the part of Mr. Wilson.

Turning now to the case for the prosecution we may pass over at once the silly vilification of Thayer and George Harvey, and

consider the allegations made by those whose criticisms possess enough objectivity and pertinence to entitle them to a hearing. They may be summarized about as follows: In his legislative policy from 1913 to 1916 Mr. Wilson did not touch the real issues involved in the reconstruction of American economic, social and political life, but was only a Bryan sixteen years delayed. *The New Freedom* was but the "cocked-hat" transformed into printed paper. We did not actually go into the World War to protect ourselves from imminent German invasion, or to make the world safe for democracy, but to protect our investment in Allied bonds, to insure a more extensive development of the manufacture of war materials and to make it possible to deliver our munitions to Allied ports. Serious infringements of international law by Allied Powers were passed over with mild protests; our inability to trade with Germany or Austria was never seriously resented. Even assuming that we did enter for the sake of advancing the cause of democracy, Mr. Wilson sanctioned during this crusade for Democracy the most serious inroads upon democratic practice and human liberty in the history of our country, wiping out in three years most of the solid gains of a century and a half of struggle against arbitrary power. When the war ended the United States—the alleged apostle of freedom—was the most reactionary state in Christendom. Though he allowed himself to be elected in 1916 on the slogan "he kept us out of war," he had instructed Colonel House in February, 1916, to tell Grey that we would do all we could to aid the Allies; and in April, 1916, at the "Sunrise Conference," he tried to get the Democratic leaders in Congress to stand with him in forcing the country into the War.

Again, during the period of formal rhetorical idealism and of great coöperative sacrifice on the part of the masses of the people, there was being carried on an orgy of profiteering and corruption, any approximation to which had never before been known among mankind. Much of Mr. Wilson's idealizing about the war to end war, it is further argued, and about the right of national self-determination, and a peace of justice and fair-dealing, was but the grossest form of compensatory, if partially subconscious, hypocrisy to assuage him for his unpleasant knowledge of the Secret Treaties. He gave the signal for the disintegration of the non-partisan devotion to the national welfare by his notorious appeal for a strong and partisan Democratic Congress in the autumn of

1918, on the eve of his departure to negotiate a just peace as the delegate of an undivided nation. His Fourteen Points were not the product of his own thought but a summary of the work of a commission, and perhaps written by a member of it. They were never understood or assimilated by him in their true implications, and were violated in spirit and letter alike in the Treaty of Peace. Though constantly speaking of a peace of charity and justice, he permitted it to be negotiated in an almost unprecedentedly arrogant manner, without allowing the vanquished to be represented, and forcing them at the point of the bayonet to deny the obvious facts of history and sign a document confessing their sole responsibility for the great conflict. The outcome of this procedure was "as harsh a product of the ruthless spirit of victory as is recorded in history."

Not satisfied with this betrayal of the trust and faith of the peoples of the world, he insisted upon wedding this hideous offspring of chauvinistic hate and greed to his plan for the ending of national enmity and stupidity. The League of Nations, a scheme to which he had been converted in 1918 by a group of progressive Republicans, was interwoven with the nefarious peace pact in such a manner that neither could be accepted or rejected without the other. But even under such circumstances and in the face of expressed executive contempt, Congress would have accepted both, had it not been for the arrogant demand of Mr. Wilson for the "whole hog or none." Had he been able to act as a realistic and conciliatory statesman, instead of as an inflexible zealot, we might five years ago have been a member of a far stronger international organization than that which the contemporary Wilsonians were urging upon Congress in the form of the Bok Peace Plan. The most sinister and potent cause of the current European confusion, misery and chaos has been the reparations sections of the Peace Treaty, and, while Mr. Wilson was not accountable for their initiation, he was responsible, it is argued, for allowing their inclusion through his silly and notorious defiance of logic and the advice of the American economic experts. Finally, though incapacitated for office in one of the most critical periods in our history, his egotism kept him from resigning, and prompted his curt dismissal of the one Cabinet member who was doing his best, however unimpressive that may have been, to maintain some semblance of existence in the executive branch of the government.

IV. SOME POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS

A number of considerations will naturally occur in extenuation or explanation of various phases of this bill of indictment. In so far as he proposed a millennial utopia his failure was simply one more addition to the museum of age-old testimonials to the inadequacy of one "righteous soul" in the face of the cursedness of mankind. Hence, probably the chief reflection on him lies not in his defeat, but in his colossal mistake in believing that it could be done at all—that it might be magically realized in a few weeks' time and in the face of the momentum of a half million years of human savagery and hunting-pack ferocity. And though the reasons assigned for our actual entry into the World War by John Kenneth Turner may be approximately the correct ones, it can be safely held that Mr. Wilson never realized that this was the case. The most probable hypothesis is that the pressure of patriots and investors, with an eager newspaper service at their disposal, became so heavy as to wear down his resistance, during which process he built up the mechanisms of justification, defense and compensation which were given oral expression in his declarations and speeches from April, 1917, onward. His mind was of such a sort that if he once *said* that we entered for purely idealistic reasons such became the indisputable and permanent fact so far as he was concerned. The phrase, with him, always vanquished the reality. He was not a hypocrite; he simply lived in an unreal and ethereal world of rhetoric and metaphysics. In complete consonance with his philosophy, he sought an interpretation of the facts and issues of the war in Luther's speeches and Milton's verse rather than in the statistics of American industry, the income-tax reports, the investments of American bankers abroad, or the shipping records of American ports. Only once, and that after the Paris Conference had ended, did he give evidence of a realistic attitude towards the war. This was exhibited in his St. Louis speech of September 5, 1919, when he offered the same interpretation of the genesis of the war which has brought Eugene Debs four years at Atlanta. Though his campaign for reëlection on the "he kept us out of war" platform would appear to have been one of the most flagrant cases of hypocrisy of which history affords any record, yet there is no doubt that he believed that his disguise of the real facts would advance the glory of God and the welfare of man, as similar conduct had previously done in the case of his exploita-

tion of popular error in regard to the nature of his break with George Harvey.

His apparent acquiescence in administrative inefficiency and corruption is to be explained in the same way. As the late Frank I. Cobb pointed out in a fine and discriminating apology in the *New York World* for March 4, 1921, Mr. Wilson's interests were in principles, not in men. Appointments were distasteful to him; they were distracting concrete realities. He rarely considered the subsequent efficiency or even the existence of an appointee unless the man ran counter to the Wilson program, in which case the examples of Bryan, Garrison and Lansing are instructive. Nor should he be too severely blamed for the decrease of liberty and tolerance during the war period. There is invariably a tightening of the social or herd machinery in times of great crises. Such a situation was inevitable, even though the American manifestation was more than necessarily atrocious, perhaps because of the unreality of the alleged group danger and the unusual necessity of artificially inflating the illusion and preventing disconcerting criticism. Those who had never lived through a period of war might have been excused in 1917 for believing in its potential ennobling impulses, but now that we have an opportunity to view the thing in its bald futility and baseness, those who still cling to the illusion should seek admission to a salubriously situated colony for the feeble-minded. And even though the corruption and graft of the Wilson administrations were so much worse than the Oil Scandals, the Veterans' Bureau steals and the other political obscenities of the Harding-Coolidge régime that one writer has compared the situation to a school of whales followed by a few straggling minnows, yet Mr. Wilson was never himself one of the "gang" in any personal sense, and his personal friends never received his conscious aid or connivance in the process of enriching themselves at the expense of the public treasury or the natural resources of the country. Further, those who compare the graft and profiteering of the Wilson era with that of the subsequent Republican administrations, to the discredit of the Wilson period, have probably failed to recognize that the debauchery of 1917-18 was a product of the war, or to ask themselves what would have happened if Harding or Coolidge had been at the helm after 1917.

Wilson was defeated at Paris primarily because he was in no sense fitted to meet the situation. His ineradicable traits of mind were his chief handicap. Even though he employed experts to

amass a vast body of information, he believed the matter practically settled when he had enunciated his attractive abstractions as to the future disposition of the world. While we may hate to believe Mr. Baker's absolutely damning assertion that his detachment from fact was so pathological that he had never read the Secret Treaties before leaving for Europe ten months after their publication in what was then America's leading evening daily, yet he certainly continued to dwell primarily in the world of words and *a priori* concepts and expedients. And when he found gradually and too late that the crimes of two thousand years of European diplomatic and military chicanery could not be effaced in a few weeks by the therapeutic influence of fourteen moral principles, he attempted to enter the diplomatic game himself, with the results that would normally attend the entrance of a rural clergyman into a poker game on a trans-Atlantic liner. Professor Carl Becker, in a judicious review of Mr. Baker's voluminous work, concludes that Mr. Wilson failed primarily because of the rapid collapse of "idealism" upon the close of hostilities—the rapid revulsion of feeling from the noblest heights to the most sordid depths, so characteristic of mankind. There is doubtless much in this, but it cannot be denied that Mr. Wilson himself fired the pistol which gave the signal for the release of the psychic toboggan when he made his appeal for a Democratic Congress in the autumn of 1918, a month before the Armistice.

One phase of this Wilson program has often escaped notice, namely, the problem of its fundamental wisdom. It has usually been assumed that the principle of complete national self-determination was both wise and inevitable. But much good opinion can be adduced on the other side, for the path of historical progress has been accompanied by the erection of larger and larger states. To a certain extent the creation of a great number of artificial political entities based only on national aspirations was in reality a reversal of the process of history. It should be remembered, however, that some of the evils attendant upon the creation of such states might have been eliminated by a thoroughgoing adoption of the League of Nations, though only a very naïve person would hold that the League at best could be more than a feeble first step in the campaign against the savagery of nations.

Mr. Wilson lost out at home upon his return because he was a Democrat first and foremost, and because of his inflexible spirit

and his eschatological interpretation of personal opposition. He had been a Democrat first, last and all the time from 1913 to 1917, a perfectly natural, defensible and fruitful attitude; he had been somewhat of a Democrat throughout the war, as was evidenced by his attitude towards Roosevelt and Wood and his unwillingness to create an able non-partisan Cabinet; and in the autumn of 1918 he once more openly caressed the donkey. Few could hold the late Senator from Massachusetts in lower esteem than the writer, who regards the characterization of him in *The Mirrors of Washington* as a eulogy, but it seems unfair to criticize him for accepting the challenge which Mr. Wilson threw down upon him. But even the opposition of Mr. Lodge might have been overcome had it not been for Mr. Wilson's impossible method of dealing with opponents. Looking upon himself as the delegate and instrument of cosmic good, the *Logos* of the new internationalism, he held his opponents to be willful servants of the spirit of evil and darkness. There was no intermediate ground, no basis for compromise.

Mr. Strunsky believes that Wilson might actually have retrieved his fortune, so sadly damaged at Paris, "if he had consented to barter with Lodge as he bartered with Lloyd George and Clemenceau." There seems no doubt that his adamant rigidity on the matters of separating the Treaty from the League and the revision of the latter was compensation for his knowledge of the weaknesses, inconsistencies and broken promises embodied in the former. He seemed to feel that he could purify a document containing endless hate, arrogance and oppression by linking it up with the mystic philological key to the new international Apocalypse.

V. WOODROVIAN "LIBERALISM" AND ITS DISAPPEARANCE

After all allowances and extenuations are made, however, one sombre fact remains and defies all apology, namely, Mr. Wilson's defection from Liberalism. It is difficult to contemplate a more striking irony of fact and fate than the circumstance that at the trial of the Boston Communists, in 1920, under the notorious espionage legislation sanctioned by him, the government expert on radicalism unwittingly branded a section read from *The New Freedom* as good Communist doctrine and just cause for the deportation of the author. It is Chafee and Post, rather than

Keynes and J. K. Turner, who have dealt the death blow to the Wilsonian Epic. He may be forgiven for falling before the superior adroitness and unscrupulousness of Lloyd George and Clemenceau in diplomacy, but nothing can remove the blot of the Palmer degradation. To be sure, many of Mr. Wilson's apologists have urged in his defense that Lincoln indulged in nearly as atrocious conduct in repressing dissent during the Civil War. But they fail to point out the fact that Lincoln quickly forgave his enemies. He would never have permitted the debauch to run on for over two years after the war had ceased. One can scarcely hold that Mr. Wilson would have prevented Charles Sumner from having Jeff Davis's head on a platter. Some have contended that he was never an apostate from Liberalism, but simply insisted upon administering it to unwilling subjects in allopathic doses by means of the maul and ramrod. Doubtless Mr. Debs would hold that this amounts to the same thing, and Senator James A. Reed is probably right when he argues that it was the Wilsonian forcible feeding of his own brand of Liberalism which made it unpalatable some time before his retirement, and rendered the name of Liberal one which is to-day everywhere in disrepute among us as never before in a half century.

The greatest problem in the complex career of Woodrow Wilson is held by some to be that presented by the transformation of the Wilson of *The New Freedom* into the sponsor of the Palmer Inquisition. But its solution is really relatively simple if one looks over his career as a whole. When this is done, the Wilson of 1910-1917 appears to be the anomaly and the Wilson of 1918-21 the normal man. His writings reveal him to be primarily an aristocrat and a conservative, whose Liberalism was abortive and opportunist. One does not need to have recourse to Chapter II of Hale's *Story of a Style* to be convinced of this. His philosophy was that of the benevolent *laissez-faire* school, and his ideal the aristocratic gentry of England and the Old South. About his only conspicuous expression of practical political opinion prior to 1910 was his wish that Bryan, the crusader against privilege in 1896, might be knocked into a cocked hat. But in his unquestionably laudable effort to make over Princeton University into a genuine educational institution he came into conflict with the alumni of that university, some of whom happened to be the very back-bone of the most rock-ribbed American conservatism and standpatism. In this battle he came to hate the class which opposed and ultimately ousted him,

and so he eagerly accepted the opportunity offered by a political career to hit back at it effectively.¹

No one can understand the divergence between the *Constitutional Government* and *The New Freedom* who does not see in the latter his economic and political challenge and defiance to his enemies of the Princeton battlefield. In the reform legislation of the first two years of his administration he had, as he felt, dealt them a good wallop, and so his animus was considerably deflated. In office and society he was thrown in more and more with them and their class, and they began to seem rather decent and tolerable after all, especially now that he was their acknowledged superior and they came to him for aid and favors. This trend was greatly magnified and hastened after the entry of the United States into the war. He depended very largely upon the group of financiers and industrialists for encouragement and guidance, and it flattered him to have them at his beck and call. In a few months the Wilson of 1912 had completed his reversion, and was his old self once more before the year 1917 had ended. When to this is added the fact that he felt himself to be the moving force and guiding angel in the greatest moral crusade in the history of humanity, one can understand his impatience at opposition and criticism—why he should feel that the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean constituted quarters altogether too comfortably appointed for Rose Pastor Stokes, Eugene Debs, Bill Haywood and Victor Berger. There is no conscious hypocrisy or overt diabolism here, merely the normal evolution and oscillations of a personality unconsciously adapting itself to changing circumstances and surroundings. The psychological mechanism known as "projection" sufficiently explains his invective against the Kaiser, against the "little group of wilful men" of 1917, and against the Republican senatorial group of 1918-19.

All these facts constitute an adequate rejoinder to Professor Dodd's thesis that Mr. Wilson was overthrown by capitalistic reactionaries. The most vigorous of his critics from 1918 to the present have been the Liberal periodicals, especially the *New Republic* and the *Nation*, a few progressive and independent dailies, and such Liberal writers as J. K. Turner, Chafee, Keynes, Weyl, and Post. Even the partisan opposition which integrated

¹ Cf. below pp. 530 ff. As an actual matter of fact there was as much wealth on Mr. Wilson's side in the Princeton struggle as there was arrayed against him.

the Republicans in the opposition following 1918 was by no means limited to, or directed by, the reactionaries. Hiram Johnson and Borah were much more vocal than paleolithic party-horses like Henry Cabot Lodge and George H. Moses. The League was defeated primarily because Mr. Wilson alienated the progressive group, who had praised his idealism and internationalism in 1918, through insisting upon linking it up in an inextricable manner with a monstrous and reactionary peace treaty. The atrocious assaults against the very foundations of American liberty executed under his *aegis* by Palmer and his dragoons endeared Mr. Wilson to the reactionaries more than the acts of any other president since Grover Cleveland, and established a popular and fatal precedent for dealing with dissident groups in a republic. Whatever ousted him, it was not the hatred, animosity or activity of the American Bourbons. The attempt of reactionary Republican Wall Street lawyers, led by Austen G. Fox, to secure the dismissal of Professor Chafee from Harvard University for revealing a small portion of the Palmer atrocities is a fair proof of how little actual hatred of the Wilson régime of the period after 1917 prevailed among the vested interests. The allegation that he was destroyed by the Morgan firm after having let himself be exploited to protect the bonds of the Allies is preposterous. The Morgan firm, in common with most other great banking houses, was strongly in favor of the League. The reparations clauses of the Treaty was approved by Mr. Wilson against sound financial advice.

VI. PROBLEMS OF THE WILSON PERSONALITY

The task remains of considering the actual Wilson personality. The problem has been well stated by the *Nation*:

If history deals gently with Woodrow Wilson it will portray him as one who wrought mightily by proclaiming ideals and painting them in moving terms. If it deals with him in the truth of justice it must also point out how universally he failed to achieve those ideals. . . . Today one can but recall his words and marvel how little has been the actual achievement for peace of the man who uttered them, how colossal the opportunities lost, how staggering the defeated idealism, how limited the sum total accomplished.

The solution, it seems to me, lies in the fact implied from time to time above, namely, the flight of his mind from the reality of

concrete situations into the illusory world of abstractions and rhetoric. Walter Weyl, in a profound and brilliant characterization, has admirably described this escape:

The simple faith of Mr. Wilson in his Fourteen Points, unexplained and unelaborated, was due, I believe, to the invincible abstractness of his mind. He seems to see the world in abstractions. To him railroad cars are not railroad cars but a gray, generalized thing called Transportation; people are not men and women, corporeal, gross, very human beings, but Humanity—Humanity very much in the abstract. In his political thinking and propaganda Mr. Wilson cuts away all the complex qualities which things possess in real life in order to fasten upon one single characteristic, and thus he creates a clear but over-simple and unreal formula.

Mr. Simeon Strunsky, in an interpretation published recently in *Foreign Affairs*, has defended the opposite thesis, namely, that Mr. Wilson was actually far greater as a realistic statesman than as a phrasemaker. His argument is based chiefly on the fact that he often made speeches which contained phrases ill suited for the moment, as, for example, the famous "too proud to fight" speech delivered three days after the sinking of the *Lusitania*. But it would seem that this fact is open to exactly the opposite interpretation, namely, that he was so detached from reality and so absorbed in phrases that he became wholly unconscious of the circumstances of the moment and was often guilty of most unfortunate, if unintentional, indiscretions. Definite proof of Mr. Wilson's capitulation to the seductiveness of phrases wholly divorced from fact and conviction is to be found in the appendix of J. K. Turner's *Shall It Be Again?* Here there are concrete exhibits proving that on every important issue connected with the war he directly contradicted himself, on occasion in the same speech and frequently on the same day. There is no question that there have been many whole books written about Mr. Wilson which throw less light on the nature of his character and personality than these twenty-five deadly pages of extracts from his speeches which Mr. Turner has assembled.

There still remains, of course, the deeper and more fundamental problem of why and how he came to possess this type of mind. For this we should doubtless have to fall back upon the psychiatrist, with his conception of the introvert and the extrovert and his theory of the mechanism of compensation and of the flight from

reality. We should need to know all the details of Mr. Wilson's personal life from his earliest childhood, purged of all rationalizations and defensive resistances and justifications. Perhaps a clue is to be found in his early failure as a practicing lawyer. That failure may well have impelled him to seek compensation in legal and political cobweb-spinning. The writer, however, does not regard this theory as sufficiently explanatory. The truth is that Mr. Wilson's basic traits seem to have been fixed in childhood on a narcissistic pattern. It is, also, not an insignificant fact that, from his earliest recorded days, he was the recipient of uniform, persistent and extensive adulation from women. I here hint at nothing improper;² I merely state a fact, itself certainly not discreditable. But every astute person knows the effect of such adulation upon masculine character, attitude and conduct. It makes for cockiness, self-assurance and intellectual exhibitionism.

One other fact may throw some light upon Mr. Wilson's penchant for regarding well said as well done. He was for twenty years a lecturing professor in political science. Now, as we all know who are in the profession and are honest enough to admit it, the professor, particularly in the fields of philosophy, literature and the social sciences, tends towards a dictatorial attitude and the utterance of a vast amount of careless spontaneous opinions and dicta—impulsive generalizations prompted by the circumstances of the moment, passed out unchecked and soon forgotten. We are faced with little probability of being interrogated or asked for proof, partly because of the general state of psychic intimidation in which college students are held, and partly because a large portion of the class, normally in various stages of somnolence and distraction, is not likely to be following the lecture or digressive remarks very attentively. Further there is little danger, even if some one in the class detects an erroneous or dubious opinion, for we may safely assume that he will have forgotten it before the next session. The looseness and arbitrariness in the use of words permitted to a professor, as compared with a doctor, lawyer, manufacturer, engineer, or stockbroker, is enormous. This tendency towards carelessness in thinking and expression becomes more apparent in proportion as one is possessed of rhetorical gifts, and Mr. Wilson was admittedly one of the most rhetorical of lecturers.

But there is one thing concerning which no wise professor will make rash and ill-considered remarks, or indulge in loose talk, and

² The writer is firmly convinced of Mr. Wilson's sexual purity.

that is the promise of a vacation. His class is sure to wake up, take notice and demand fulfilment. Woodrow Wilson promised mankind a vacation from the most horrible scourge now afflicting it—war. And the peoples of the world bestirred themselves and remained around to watch him make good. Having promised the impossible and having even failed to obtain much that was within the scope of reasonable human achievement, he collided with a universal disillusionment and discontent. It is an interesting but perhaps futile and insoluble question as to who is the more dangerous—he who promises much and produces little, thus begetting a great crop of disillusioned cynics, or he who promises nothing and achieves nothing, thus failing either to arouse hope or to produce dejection. I pass this problem on to John Dewey or Bertrand Russell, but no fair-minded person can well deny that Woodrow Wilson produced more cynics than any other figure in modern history.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Annin, R. E., *Woodrow Wilson: a Character Study*; Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*; Beck, J. M., *The Passing of the New Freedom*; Chafee, Z., *Freedom of Speech*; Daniels, J., *The Life of Woodrow Wilson*; Dodd, W. E., *Woodrow Wilson and His Work*; Ford, H. J., *Woodrow Wilson: the Man and His Work*; Gardner, G., "Why We Delayed Entering the War," in *McNaught's Monthly*, June, 1925; Gregory, T. W., Letter to *New York Times*, January 29, 1925; Hale, W. B., *Woodrow Wilson: the Story of His Life; The Story of a Style*; Lawrence, D., *The True Story of Woodrow Wilson*; Low, M., *Woodrow Wilson. an Interpretation*; McCombs, W. F., *Making Woodrow Wilson President*; Ogg, F. A., *National Progress, 1907-17*; Robinson and West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*; Seymour, C., *Woodrow Wilson and the World War*; Thayer, W. R., "The Close of an Epoch," in *North American Review*, March, 1921; Tumulty, J. P., *Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him*; Turner, J. K., *Shall It Be Again?*; Villard, O. G., "The Passing of Wilson," in *New York Nation*, March 2, 1921; "Woodrow Wilson," *Ibid.*, February 13, 1924; Weyl, W., "Woodrow Wilson: Prophet and Politician," in *New Republic*, June 7, 1919; White, W. A., *Woodrow Wilson*; Young, E. W., *The Wilson Administration*; Kerney, J., *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson*; Post, L. F., *The Deportations Delirium of 1920*.

CHAPTER XVIII

WOODROW WILSON: CONTEMPORARY APPRAISALS ¹

I. MR. ANNIN'S ANALYSIS

1. *Woodrow Wilson and the Princeton Problem*

WITH the death of Mr. Wilson and the progressive recession into the past of the emotion-charged events of 1916-19, which have created most of the controversy in regard to the ex-president's career and personality, we may begin to hope for the gradual extinction of the panegyric and diatribe, and the appearance of serious efforts to narrate accurately the salient facts of his life, and to use these as the basis of credible and plausible efforts to arrive at some approximation to an understanding of his character, type.

Granting the great value of Ray Stannard Baker's voluminous work on Mr. Wilson's peace efforts, there has been but one serious work on the life of the man as a whole. This is the biography by Professor W. E. Dodd. Though entitled *Woodrow Wilson and His Work*, the book is really a spiritual autobiography of Professor Dodd, who has projected into his hero much of his own sweetness of temper, penetrating insight into historical situations, progressive social philosophy, and disinterested devotion to educational and public causes. The talented historian of the "Statesmen of the Old South" seems to have capitulated to the lure of benign partisanship when confronted with the engaging theme of the first striking southern statesman since the passing of Calhoun and Jefferson Davis. Mr. Annin's work ² is of different authorship, scope and tone. The author is a scholarly business man, a fellow-student with Mr. Wilson during his undergraduate career

¹ From the *American Review*, 1925; and the *New Republic*.

² *Woodrow Wilson: a Character Study*, by Robert Edwards Annin, New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.

at Princeton, an active member of the Princeton alumni body, and a close and intimate friend of Moses Taylor Pyne, the leader, if reluctantly so, of the Wilson opposition in the board of trustees at Princeton, and of Dean Andrew F. West, Wilson's chief opponent in the Princeton faculty. The book is devoted, not to a consecutive narrative and complete summary of the events and achievements of Mr. Wilson's career, but rather to an effort to utilize well-established facts connected with the major phases of his professional and public life as the basis for an estimate of his personality and character. The approach is psychological quite as much as historical and biographical. This mode of attack on the problem, is, however, somewhat weakened by the fact that the author's psychology is of the rule-of-thumb and "common-sense" variety, which makes it impossible for him to do much more than assemble pertinent data which may later be used by competent psychologists. This very defect will, of course, commend itself to the respectable reader who would find his or her moral nature outraged by the exploitation of the mechanisms of dynamic psychology in the service of interpretative biography. The general tone of the book, as might be expected from the above noted affiliations of the author, is distinctly critical, but by no means bitter or abusive. As a student, debater, teacher, orator and statesman, Mr. Annin concedes to Mr. Wilson all the distinction which the latter's most ardent admirers could demand, sometimes going beyond the warrant of fact. This does not, of course, mean that the book is impartial, but it does prove it not to be hopelessly unfair and one-sided.

Quite naturally, the author utilizes for his analysis Mr. Wilson's experience at Princeton as professor and president, his New Jersey governorship and the struggle for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1912, his legislative and political achievements from 1913-1917, the entry of the United States into the World War, the conduct of the war, including an interesting study of the attitude of Wilson towards Roosevelt and Wood, the making of the Peace Covenant, and the struggle for the League of Nations. Four concluding chapters, perhaps the most valuable in the work, analyze his personal traits, his oratory and idealism, his relations to friends and enemies, and some reasons for the decline of his popularity. The generally high level of the book is marred by the character of the chapters on the progressive Wilson legislation, particularly the Adamson Act and the creation of the Shipping

Board, where the author's *laissez-faire* bias escapes control, and of those on the entry into the War, which are written somewhat in the spirit of Roosevelt's *Fear God and Take Your Own Part*, and his speeches of the 1916 campaign. Many of the absurdities in these chapters are probably due primarily to the fact that Mr. Annin has not informed himself regarding the actual circumstances connected with the outbreak of the World War as revealed in the recently published documents. This explains his retention of the mythological diabolism of 1917. Yet he concedes that von Bernstorff may have been a human being, and his arraignment of profiteering, delay and propaganda is not essentially unjust or strikingly inaccurate.

There is no space for even a brief epitome of Mr. Wilson's career and achievements as narrated by Annin, but his more significant interpretations of Mr. Wilson as student, professor, college president, governor, president and peace-maker may be presented. As a student Wilson made an excellent record for general activities and particularly distinguished himself as a writer and orator. So highly was he esteemed by his classmates at Princeton of the class of 1879 that they guaranteed a sufficiently large salary to induce Mr. Wilson to leave Wesleyan and accept the call to Princeton. Yet as a college student he exhibited those intellectual traits which were to be the source both of his power and of his ultimate failure. "His accredited biographer records that in a prize debate Mr. Wilson received the reward for oratory, but his antagonist won the prize for reasoning. This early judgment of college arbiters is likely to be confirmed by a study of the prize orator's later career." As a professor at Princeton his success was notable. His call to the presidency of his Alma Mater rested unquestionably upon his popularity as a teacher established during the twenty preceding years, though his teaching was impressive by virtue of his oratorical and rhetorical capacity and his stage presence quite as much as on account of erudition or profundity:

Whatever his idiosyncrasies then or later, there appears no doubt that Woodrow Wilson was a great teacher. He possessed not only the power of lucid and arresting exposition, as well as perfect disciplinary control; but to an unusual degree, the faculty of stimulating mental activity in his pupils. These qualities, combined with his oratorical temperament, dogmatic habits of thought, and a certain intellectual audacity fascinating to the average mind, made him undoubtedly one of the most successful teachers who ever occupied a

chair at Princeton. To this result his scholarly appearance and bearing, and serious, dignified address contributed much.

His presidency at Princeton opened as auspiciously as his professorship had begun and continued, but before many years he encountered opposition, of which he was intolerant, and after a bitter but losing fight he accepted the nomination for governor of New Jersey in order that he might escape the alternative of resignation. The parallel with his experience as President of the United States is apparent:

In reviewing his record as President of the University it is evident that but for the interposition of certain temperamental limitations his administration might have proved the most successful in the history of the Institution. . . . As a teacher he was great. As President he had instituted desirable reforms, and two promising experiments were under way, when his administration collapsed because he could not work with men of independent mind and judgment. . . . As to the result of Wilson's administration of affairs, it is not too much to say that at the time of his resignation the future of Princeton was gravely imperilled. Her unity was gone in Trustees, Faculty and Alumni; her student roll had not materially increased since Dr. Patton's time; and her finances had been brought into a dangerous condition. . . . He had proved himself a ruthless and tenacious fighter, and skillful withal until the tide of battle set seriously against him. Then he showed a tendency to lose both patience and temper, and with them, logic and judgment. . . . Dr. Wilson's presidency had been marked by an appetite for acclaim which made him notably impatient of any delay or opposition. It was also his misfortune that, for the the first five years, all influences around him combined to encourage his weaknesses rather than to call forth his strength. The Alumni applauded his optimism as if it had been achievement; the Faculty and Trustees avoided controversy whenever possible by waiving their own judgment in favor of his. After five years of this, Dr. Wilson had come to regard acquiescence as the chief function of his Trustees; obedience, of his Faculty; and adulation (coupled with financial support). of the Alumni. Thus he faced his first real contest with his Board, thoroughly spoiled. Dissent and opposition seemed to him so outrageous that they could be explained only in terms of unworthy motive, and defended in no terms at all.

Into the details of Mr. Wilson's struggle with Dean West and his supporters among trustees, faculty and alumni we cannot follow the author. Mr. Wilson's intellectual superiority would be questioned only by a bitter partisan of the Dean. There can be no doubt that sound pedagogical principles and educational pro-

gressiveness were almost wholly on the side of Mr. Wilson, and precedent, logic, consistency and candor behind his opponent. In many ways it was a striking forecast and rehearsal of the later conflict with Lodge. Then, as in 1919, he sacrificed his program as a whole because he could not have his way in a detail. His basic educational policy, as embodied in the preceptorial scheme, higher academic standards, and stimulation of intellectual interests in the student body, had been accepted and had triumphed, but he was willing to put it all in jeopardy over such unimportant details as the adoption of an experimental attitude towards the Quadrangle system and the physical location of the buildings of the Graduate School.

The analogy between this and his wrecking of the League of Nations rather than allow a reservation to Article X is not difficult to discern. And just as in 1919 he expanded his quarrel with Congress into an alleged crusade for world peace, so in 1910 he transformed his local differences with Dean West and Mr. Pyne into a national struggle between plutocracy and democracy in education, and carried his fight to the country in the form of addresses to the Princeton Alumni throughout the eastern United States. He may have been saved from the physical and mental breakdown of 1919 at this time because the gubernatorial nomination offered an escape from defeat and disgrace at Princeton. Mr. Annin is inclined to minimize the importance of the specific personalities and views of Pyne and West, and to hold that if Wilson had exhibited the temperament and methods which he displayed at Princeton from 1902 to 1910 he would have encountered much the same controversy irrespective of the institution which he had headed. This is probably correct, though the reflection is not wholly on Mr. Wilson.

Several significant facts and revelations emerge from Mr. Annin's discussion of Mr. Wilson at Princeton. In the first place, he proves false an assumption which many, including the writer, had accepted as an assured fact, namely, that Mr. Wilson was ousted from Princeton by the wealthy trustees and alumni who resented his democratic and highbrow program. Annin shows that, as a matter of fact, the great majority of the wealthy alumni and trustees were champions of the president, Mr. Pyne being about the only wealthy trustee who opposed him. The backbone of the opposition was found in the professional classes among the trustees and alumni. Hence, it is quite apparent that Mr.

Wilson created the effective myth of the assault of the plutocracy upon his schemes by a process of purely defensive rationalization. This does not mean that he consciously misrepresented the case. Mr. Pyne lived in Princeton and had an impressive country estate which Wilson might view daily. A big house symbolizing wealth would do much more to convince a man with the type of mind which Mr. Wilson possessed that he was being fought by the vested interests of the country than any set of statistical exhibits disclosing the actual quantitative facts concerning the pecuniary status of his supporters and opponents. Mr. Wilson doubtless sincerely believed in the truth of the *New York Times* editorial of February 3, 1910, however inaccurate and misleading it may have been in the light of the realities of the case. A man who looked to poets for his political facts might well rely upon the visual imagery of architecture and landscape gardening for his economic data.

Even more important is the bearing of Mr. Wilson's Princeton presidency upon his training for the technique of practical politics. It has frequently been stated that the most remarkable circumstance connected with Mr. Wilson's career is the fact that, with no experience in political life until 1910, he was able at once to exhibit rare power as a public leader and practical politician. Those who express wonder over this situation are obviously innocent both of the general nature of the conduct of college faculties and of the policies and technique of Mr. Wilson as president of Princeton. As any one who has had any experience with both political life and college faculties knows all too well, the methods are identical—even the phraseology of the technique is highly similar, the gumshoer and ward-heeler being matched by the boot-licker. Wire-pulling and manipulation are as rife in any normal college faculty as they ever were in Tammany Hall or the Quay system in Pennsylvania. Moreover, the participants in the game of politics in the colleges are in general more intelligent than those in the public arena, and hence to that degree more subtle, skillful, invidious and ruthless. To find a member of a college faculty who does *not* think in terms of salary, departmental interest and prestige, course registrations, precedence in the faculty parade, and the social status of his wife, but views matters from the standpoint of the broad educational interests and opportunities of the college, faculty and student-body as a whole, is as rare an experience as to discover a delegate to a Republican or Democratic National Convention who

ignores his party machine and thinks and votes in the light of what he believes to be the best interests of the country, irrespective of partisan considerations and personal advantage. The successful college president to-day, however much he may deplore the situation and regard himself as defiled by the necessary technique of administrative control and approximate coördination of faculty efforts, must be an adroit politician rather than a scholar. The recent administrative necrology of American college presidents may be scrutinized by those sceptical of the truth of this allegation. Especially is this true, and to a notable degree, when he attempts to introduce innovations opposed to the educational ideas and vested departmental interests of the older members of the faculty. And Mr. Wilson proposed many new departures and executed a number of important changes and reforms which were dictated by executive ideals and wishes. From 1902 to 1910 he built up a political machine, and used the political methods of rewards, patronage, personal dependence, administrative displeasure and executive leadership to an extent not later exceeded at Trenton or Washington. As Mr. Annin summarizes the situation:

Whatever the motive, there is no doubt that the effect of Wilson's first four years at Princeton was to build up what in politics would be called a personal machine, and that by methods purely political, i. e., the appeal to loyalty and the control of patronage. That this should be so was inevitable with the tendency on the President's part to think in terms of politics and political methods. He himself recognized this mental trend when (in 1907), speaking of his Princeton responsibilities, he said: "My duties have been almost exclusively political and I must say that I find myself generally thinking of a university as a political instrument." . . . He had been made independent of the Trustees in the matter of teaching contracts and the majority of his faculty therefore held their positions at his pleasure. That such power could be mercilessly used has already been demonstrated; and the teachers added in furtherance of the Preceptorial System had no delusions as to the power on which depended their tenure of office.

Along with the general political apprenticeship, Mr. Wilson learned many special devices of the practical politician, among them a recognition of the frequent handicap of consistency and the keeping of embarrassing pledges. Time and again he altered either his policies or his method of justifying and advancing them,

in accordance with trends in his support or opposition, and he informed Dean West that "We must not lay too great stress upon commitments."

Not only did Mr. Wilson develop at Princeton extensive training and experience in the technique of practical political manipulation; he also used it to further an ambition actually to enter political life which went back to his undergraduate days. His famous inaugural address as president of Princeton was devoted to a plea for the entry of university men into public life, and in that same year (1902) he had inquired of a prominent Princeton alumnus as to what he should do if offered the nomination for President of the United States or some other high political office. In 1909 and 1910 he consciously threw away all chances whatever of winning his fight at Princeton in order to give the struggle a political significance of a general character and make his position one which would gain him a reputation and publicity in a large public way:

To describe Mr. Wilson as "one of the accidents of politics" is not accurate. Every career depends largely upon elements controlled from outside itself. But in so far as a man may rough-hew his own ends, Mr. Wilson was no accident. It would be more to the point to describe him (politically) as a "self-made man." It was his own tenacity, and far-sighted, laborious preparation, that enabled him eventually to reach the position to which he had long aspired. The man met the opportunity at least half-way. . . . In his undergraduate days it had been evident that his impulse was towards public life. His specialization in study, the direction of his writings, and his cultivation of the branches which might directly or indirectly contribute to his fitness for political service, can leave small doubt that his public career was rooted in a life-long ambition. That having such aspirations, he should tenaciously and consistently train himself to grasp the opportunity when offered, was thoroughly characteristic.

To his ambition, studies and oratory, should be added certain personal qualities which made him an individual likely to attain high success as a political leader when the opportunity offered. "No familiarity with theories of party government gave him his tenacity of purpose; his almost Napoleonic instinct for the unexpected in strategy; or the ruthlessness of which he was capable, whenever cherished purposes were endangered."

2. *Wilson as a Statesman and a Politician*

We have devoted disproportionate space to a consideration of Mr. Wilson before 1910, because this is the period of his life least known to the majority of readers, and on account of the fact that Mr. Annin has cleared up many misconceptions regarding the nature of his career prior to his entry into public life, and has corrected the common mistake of looking upon his experiences after 1910 as constituting a sharp break with the past as to ambitions and methods.

As governor of New Jersey Mr. Wilson duplicated to a striking degree his record as president of Princeton. He started his term in a most auspicious manner, launched many reforms, toned up the public spirit of the state and the administration, developed a reputation as an admirable orator and a facile and courageous leader, but showed himself unscrupulous in methods, was deemed more brilliant of phrase than sound in judgment, made loyalty to himself a personal as much as a party issue, repudiated those who had put him into office and alienated many warm friends. By 1912 he was far less popular and trusted with the people of New Jersey than in 1911, and there is doubt if he could have been renominated for governor if this had been possible under New Jersey laws. But the Baltimore Convention snatched him from political oblivion at home and made him a successful candidate for president. In 1912 he received less than half the votes cast for presidential electors in New Jersey. In spite of his mistakes, however, he showed real acumen as a political leader. "As the year (1911) went on the old 'war-horses' came to realize that they were dealing with no political green-horn, but with a shrewd and audacious politician who could beat them at their own game. He could do more. He could use methods which had brought to them the imputation of iniquity, and have them imputed to him for righteousness. Both politically and morally he had them in a cleft stick." But his temperamental weaknesses were here apparent as at Princeton and Washington. His very popularity proved his undoing. "Upon his peculiar temperament the influence of high acclaim was unfortunate, inducing exaggeration of the ego, and exciting a natural tendency to arrogance. Thus after he had tamed his first legislature at Trenton and set out to 'swing around the circle' for the first time, the easy fluency with which he laid down the law of

success and tendered his advice to all professions and pursuits, caused many thoughtful men to doubt his soundness. Other indications showed that the Governor was 'feeling his oats.' Even more disastrous was his lack of good judgment of men and his insistence upon absolute personal loyalty on the part of his supporters:

Another matter which tended somewhat to diminish his influence was the progressive evidence that his judgment of men, as shown in his political appointments, was not good. This weakness was inherent and was a part of his record in each high executive position which he held. His personal appointees were on the whole far below the average level reached by his predecessors and successors at Trenton, and at Washington. His judicial appointments were considered as particularly weak. And here again as at Princeton, it was noted that whatever the case as to any appointee's fitness for his work, there was never any doubt as to his personal loyalty to the appointing power. When that weakened he was apt to cease to be an appointee.

Mr. Annin's chapters on the political setting of 1912, and Mr. Wilson's relations to George Harvey, Henry Watterson and William F. McCombs are of great interest and high value as throwing light upon that controversial period. The candid reader will probably have to conclude that Mr. Wilson achieved creditable results by discreditable means, which included repudiation of friends who had been of indispensable assistance, once their aid had become of dubious value, inconsistencies and discrepancies of statement, and a willingness to let go unchallenged obvious misstatements and misleading views when their dissemination and currency would redound to his benefit. While the reviewer's sympathies are wholly with Mr. Wilson as against Mr. Harvey, it seems indisputable that the Harvey incident was from a personal point of view indefensible. Yet it was politically a brilliant *coup*. "Mr. Harvey had been of great use thus far, but as conditions were now shaping, his usefulness was ended. If he were to be dismissed, the more striking and public the dismissal the greater would be the effect. . . . The method chosen was tremendously effective with the Western radicals. Under the coaching of Mr. Bryan and the prejudices aroused against the railway interests, hatred of the 'money power' had become a religion with this class. With the Harvey incident, therefore, Governor Wilson, previously little

known west of Pittsburgh, suddenly sprang into the limelight as the 'professor' who had publicly slapped the 'interests' in the face, and dared them to do their worst." As to McCombs, the affair is too controversial and the evidence too slight and uncertain to warrant any conclusions beyond the fact that his treatment by Mr. Wilson certainly left something to be desired in the way of gratitude for strenuous and devoted services of vital importance. It would be of great interest and significance if a dictaphone could prove the truth or falsity of McCombs' allegation that Wilson said to him after his election, "God ordained that I should be the next president of the United States. Neither you nor any other mortal could have prevented that." At any rate, McCombs leaves a better taste in the mouth than Tumulty, even if the mode of termination of the latter's long and faithful services was scarcely more creditable to Mr. Wilson than McCombs' ejection from favor.

The treatment of Mr. Wilson's legislative achievements in 1913-14 is brief, but their extent and significance is amply recognized. Mr. Annin gives full acknowledgment to the primary importance of Mr. Wilson's forceful leadership and definite and coherent, if not wholly original, program, but he also demonstrates quite adequately that this alone was not responsible for his great success. There was, in the first place, the powerful aid of the patronage to be distributed to the expectant Democrats. A hungry animal will docilely perform more tricks than one sleek and well fed, and the donkey, watering at the mouth in 1913, had enjoyed but a goat's fare since the Civil War, even Cleveland having been none too indulgent. One may well stop to consider what Roosevelt might have achieved in 1907-9 if he could have held over his party and congress such a whip hand in the patronage as Mr. Wilson did in 1913; and the latter made excellent use of this potent instrument. Further, there was the powerful aid of Mr. Bryan. It has usually been assumed that Mr. Bryan was appointed Secretary of State as a reward for his services in aiding the nomination and election of Mr. Wilson, but Annin shows rather convincingly that it was instead a good bit of political strategy. Mr. Bryan in 1913 had a personal prestige and following in the party greater than any other single individual, and his aid was of crucial value in securing party support for the Wilson program, particularly the banking laws. But when he had served his purpose the Great Commoner joined Pyne, Smith, Harvey, Watterson, and McCombs, and relinquished the pursuit of politics and diplomacy to

combat Bacchus and Wellhausen. Incidentally, Mr. Annin's references to Mr. Bryan's exploitation of the patronage in the state department offer one more convincing bit of evidence that the country may be congratulated that the person who was at once a courageous crusader against privilege and a semi-mountebank was never permitted to move into the White House.

The treatment of the Wilson administration from 1915 to 1920 is on a different and far lower level than those portions of the book devoted to Mr. Wilson's career before 1915, and to an analysis of his personality. They are perverted by the author's philosophy of the state and his complete, if benign, ignorance of the issues and causes of the World War. In his politico-economic philosophy Mr. Annin appears to be a lingering disciple of the "lost cause," that *laissez-faire* individualism of which Mr. Fabian Franklin remains the one conspicuous exponent. Therefore, while he deplores the abuses of big business as exemplified by such episodes as "the shameless wrecking of the New Haven Railroad," he is sharply repelled by Mr. Wilson's labor union legislation, as embodied in the labor clauses of the Clayton Bill and the Adamson Act, and by the creation of the Shipping Board, which he characterizes as "an experiment in socialism." He does, however, render a service in correcting a popular misconception by making it clear that the Shipping Board was not originally contemplated as a war measure, but resulted from legislation first introduced in 1914. The fact that Mr. Annin is himself engaged in the export shipping business doubtless accounts in part for his animus against the Shipping Board, but there is no doubt that it was a costly and foolhardy experiment in the light of the existing low level of administrative efficiency and congressional intelligence in the United States.

3. *The World War and the Destruction of Wilson*

The two really worth-while points that emerge from Mr. Annin's chapters on the World War are the just emphasis upon the much obscured incompetence and inefficiency of the War Department under Mr. Baker, however much the latter may have surpassed such men as General Wood or General Goethals as a social philosopher and urban reformer, and his demonstration of the impossibility of coöperation between Wilson and Roosevelt. He shows convincingly that significant service on the part of Mr. Roosevelt

in 1917-18 could have been secured only at the price of Mr. Wilson's resignation :

In character and temperament the two men were incompatible. Between them any real sympathy was out of the question. Those who foolishly desired that Roosevelt be made Secretary of War in 1917, failed to consider the inevitable effect when his irresistible vehemence should run into Wilson's immovable dogmatism. Had the alternative been the destruction of the nation, the two men could never have worked together.

Mr. Annin's account of the entry of the United States into the World War and Mr. Wilson's war philosophy is rendered virtually worthless because it is composed in the atmosphere of that era of legend which accepted the Potsdam Conference and other mythology designed to prove the sole guilt of Germany for the outbreak of the conflict, and is guided and inspired chiefly by the views of Theodore Roosevelt and that vigorous and consistent Anglophile, the late Walter Hines Page. While Mr. Wilson is sharply criticized for his neutrality and delay in entering war, it seems quite apparent that a generation hence his "too proud to fight" and "peace without victory" speeches will be regarded as his two most sagacious and far-sighted contributions to the thought of the period. But if Mr. Annin's text contributes little of importance with regard to the war period, he includes a photograph which reveals more than a dozen chapters, namely, that of Wilson and Poincaré receiving the plaudits of the French crowds. Wilson exhibits boyish simplicity and exuberance, no doubt believing that his "Fourteen Points" will be adopted by acclamation at the coming Peace Conference; Poincaré wears a satirical smile, his thoughts doubtless comprehending the diplomacy of 1912-14, the propaganda of 1914-18, the securing of the right bank of the Rhine, the crushing reparations and the potential dismemberment of Germany. In this symbol of Wilsonian association with, and surrender to, European militarism, more than in anything else, is to be discovered the much sought cause of the debacle of the metaphysical and rhetorical idealist.

In spite of the chapters on the War, Mr. Annin returns to sanity in his treatment of the peace negotiations, and his indictment of the Treaty of Versailles (pp. 296-7) is a masterpiece of comprehensive conciseness. He demonstrates amply the unfitness of the rhetorician to deal with the economic and psychological realities

underlying the facts at issue in making a just and durable peace. Yet he recognizes that Mr. Wilson made the best possible fight for what he conceived to be justice:

His simple faith was at once confronted by a thousand and one pressing questions, interwoven of racial and economic antagonisms and poisoned by selfish intrigue. Thus overwhelmed, he simply did the best he could with the powers God had given him. No one of any intelligence now supposes that the "Carthaginian Peace" would have been imposed upon Germany if Woodrow Wilson could have prevented it.

In his attitude towards the struggle for the Peace Covenant and the League of Nations in the United States, Mr. Annin appears to be a moderate admirer of Mr. Lodge and his position, but if he fails to give Mr. Wilson full credit for his brave struggle for a world organization to maintain peace, he does perform the service of indicating the impossibility of harmonizing the Pact of Versailles with the spirit of a League of Nations, and of emphasizing the inconsistent and undiplomatic conduct of Mr. Wilson:

The war was won but the prevailing opinion was that the peace had been botched, chiefly by the dogmatism and arrogance of the President himself. Against the advice of the cabinet, the senate, and contrary to the unmistakable judgment of the public, he had gone abroad. He had insisted on "American" terms of peace, of which no American had ever heard. He had deferred to European opinion at Paris only to come home and defy American opinion from Washington. He had assumed that once his decisions were made neither the American people nor their representatives possessed the right of dissent or even of criticism. It was the "Quad System" situation all over again.

There is one question which Mr. Annin does not consider, but without which no judgment of Woodrow Wilson's conduct in 1919 can be fair or adequate, namely, as to just when he became a sick man. One of his closest associates is the authority for the statement that he never really recovered from a severe case of grippe acquired in the spring of 1919, that he was never himself again, and that the breakdown of September, 1919, was simply an intensification of this debilitated condition hastened by psychic irritation and physical strain. Mr. Lawrence in his recent biography of Mr. Wilson contends that this sickness in the spring of 1919 necessitates a different interpretation of Wilson's responsibility for the

more offensive and deplorable aspects of the Treaty of Versailles. He states that after this time Mr. Wilson surrendered rather completely to the revengeful policy of the French and obstructed the English desire to make some elementary concessions of justice to the Germans. If this is true, it doubtless explains his wholly indefensible support of the preposterous and fatal reparations clauses of the Treaty.

4. *The Personal Traits of Mr. Wilson*

It is in his incisive analysis of Mr. Wilson's character and mental processes that Mr. Annin makes the most interesting contributions in his important book. While not pleasant reading to persistent Wilson admirers who have followed him loyally throughout all his changes of policy or shifts of fortune, it is based upon intimate knowledge of the subject and founded upon numerous factual illustrations. He also offers some very pertinent comments on those who can see only unrelieved good or unmitigated evil in the personality and achievements of Mr. Wilson. That his observations in this regard have "got under the skin" of certain of the "thick and thin" hundred per cent. Woodrovians is apparent from the savage attack upon his book by Mr. Hamilton Holt in May 10, 1924, issue of the International Book Review of the *Literary Digest*. We have only space to quote a few of Mr. Annin's more pertinent passages bearing upon Mr. Wilson as a rhetorician, his egotism, his pragmatic idealism and opportunism, his lack of ability to retain friends, his inability to fight effectively except when winning, and the striking repetitions in the vicissitudes of his career:

Mr. Wilson's appeal was generally most enduring to those whose minds were more at home in the realm of ideas and theories, than in the contacts of men and circumstance. . . . In argument he was fluent, and resourceful, though not always logical. . . . As an orator he was probably without a peer in his generation of English-speaking men. With an audience before him the man seemed transformed. In the exercise of his art his self-consciousness disappeared. A subtle flattery of his audience breathed from his confidential smile and intimate manner, giving to the average man a vague sense that he was being admitted to the inner shrine of a high intellectualism. Those who knew him only through the medium of unsympathetic type, missed the influence of the calm and elevated delivery of his chiselled periods; the vocal charm of his felicitous phrases, which for the moment disarmed criticism and almost compelled assent.

There was a rare power of persuading not only his hearers, but himself, that realities conformed, or could easily be made to conform, to his own opinion or desire. . . . He had a deftness in dallying with generalities which conveyed the thought that he alone was competent firmly to grasp and weigh the imponderables; but he was as impatient of an adverse fact as of a dissenting opinion. Like Gilbert's poet, he soared easily in the regions of the indefinable, but resented references to the multiplication table. . . . Mr. Wilson was almost as impervious to unwelcome logic as a child, and particularly resented being confronted with his own arguments after he had changed his position.

Mr. Wilson, though an apostle of political democracy was, intellectually, as great an autocrat as, perhaps, ever lived. . . . There were few, either friends or enemies, who did not regard Mr. Wilson as possessed of extraordinary self-esteem. . . . Whatever may have been the influence of this quality upon Mr. Wilson's fortunes, there can be no doubt that it progressively increased through his public life. It finally seemed to render him impervious to even the most friendly criticism, and incapable of profiting by the advice of any whose minds did not "run willingly with his." . . . At Princeton those who opposed his startling panacea were "educational dilettanti." In economics, those who predicted the ultimate result of his "Ship Purchase Bill" were "blind and ignorant." At Paris, criticisms of either proposals or methods was a "betrayal of civilization"; at Washington, to doubt the verbal inspiration of the Covenant was to break the heart of the world. . . . Mr. Wilson was most dangerous in exact proportion to his sincere belief in himself and his destiny. His self-faith and confidence were literally unbounded. No just estimate of his career will ever be made which does not fully recognize that such belief, rising to a point of almost religious enthusiasm, greatly influenced, and at times controlled his mental processes. . . . Of all the qualities which he displayed this alone appears to have been constant. In matters of policy, he exercised an opportunism which sometimes reached the verge of shiftiness. His other weaknesses were often offset or neutralized by his agile mind and his persuasive powers. But from his egoism he never escaped, in good or evil fortune, success or failure; only when fortune was unkind it seemed to assert itself less aggressively. When fostered by events, it reached a stage so acute that it distorted his perception of vital and obvious facts, it was impossible that the final collapse could be long postponed.

It was natural that, with his bent of mind, he should have recourse to the spectacular, for which he had a genius. He was, as Henry Watterson remarked, an intellectual adventurer; and with active mind, and marvellous self-reliance, he prepared a remedial formula

for every evil. . . . A love of the unexpected and picturesque was one of his marked characteristics. During his two terms of office he made repeated use of this method, and never (except at the last) without advancing the matter in hand. . . . A representative being taunted with failure to stand by the President replied that he "would gladly stand by the President if the President would only stand still." Mr. Wilson was in truth so agile in his opportunism that those who followed his leadership were in constant danger of meeting him coming back. No one could make these sharp turns more deftly, while screening awkward facts behind graceful and comforting phrases. But this could by no stretch of imagination be considered as a sign of a logical mind. . . . His action or non-action were often governed by considerations which most people would regard as personal, but which he, with his ego-centric outlook upon life, would regard as altruistic to the point of self-sacrifice.

One of his most outstanding idiosyncrasies was the consistent and progressive loss of friends and supporters who had been brought into close relations with him. It was once remarked that admiration for Mr. Wilson increased directly as the square of the distance. . . . One of the pathetic features of his life was his genius for repelling the friendship and chilling the loyalty of those who came closest to him, although he earnestly craved the love and admiration of his fellow-men, and could never understand why he failed to retain them. From the dawn of his success to his retirement, most of those who had been his friends, either were more or less openly repudiated by him or voluntarily renounced him. . . . He had never possessed the faculty of making or retaining strong personal friends. He had left Bryn Mawr after a sharp dispute with the president, and his relations with the powers at Wesleyan were not cordial when he received the call to a professorate at Princeton. His Princeton experience had alienated a large proportion of his academic friends; and his ruthless methods as Governor of New Jersey had pretty well scattered his original political supporters in that state. By the day of his election to the Presidency he had already alienated several of those whose efforts had made his election possible. This tendency persisted throughout his official career—from George Harvey to Colonel House. . . . His most consistent admirers never felt close to him. Intellectually he always condescended. Politically he was intolerant. Socially he was unresponsive. His devotees considered that "his soul was a star which dwelt apart." His critics regarded him as "cold as a clam." He secured wide political admiration and support; but he did not evoke from his supporters the personal affection and trust attracted by Mr. Roosevelt. It is doubtful if any sober man ever thought of calling him "Woody" before his face or

behind his back. And, apparently such relation between himself and his fellow-men was one of his ambitions.

Mr. Wilson, though a tenacious fighter and hard to beat, was not at his best, save with the assurance (or at least, the fair hope) of success before him. When he lost confidence in the outcome, he ceased to be effective and was apt to lose first his temper and then his nerve. This was repeatedly shown in his pre-political, as well as in his political career. It was most strikingly illustrated in his collapse of the autumn of 1919.

Sudden success and sudden failure have been common among those who have essayed public life. But Mr. Wilson's career was exceptional in this—that initial success in one field after another was sooner or later swallowed up in even more impressive failure. In education, authorship, politics and diplomacy this was, broadly speaking, the history of his career. . . . Repeated cycles of initial victory and ultimate defeat suggest the existence of a constant which he himself could not overcome, and of which he was perhaps unaware.

Such are a few of the many suggestive passages in Mr. Annin's effort to set forth the personal traits of Mr. Wilson which may be wrestled with by psychologists. There are one or two other considerations which may be added. It is the opinion of the reviewer that the vogue of Woodrow Wilson and the admiration he induced were due primarily to the novel experience of having our public life headed by a scholarly gentleman of personal dignity and impressiveness, professionally trained in the theory of government, and possessed of oratorical capacity designed to evoke attention and respect. Not having been subjected to that experience since the retirement of James Madison (or perhaps John Quincy Adams) it was a thrill of considerable magnitude from which the country did not quickly recover. In due time, however, the boobocracy awoke to the fact that he was not one of them, and they grew suspicious of his high-brow proclivities and pre-occupations, and would have no more of them. He was repudiated in favor of the apostle of normalcy and the symbol of small town politics and good-natured grafting. In this process the common people were aided by those "leaders" of American society who were fearful of a chief executive of some originality and cerebral power. These groups were joined with great reluctance by men like Borah and most liberal leaders who could no longer endure what seemed to be Mr. Wilson's flagrant hypocrisies and inconsistencies. Further, it should be stressed far more frequently

and more vigorously that the day of Woodrow Wilson was actually over when he surrendered to the European militarists and their American advocates. The Wilsonian program and methods were incompatible with the savagery of war, and the temporary elevation of his prestige which the war participation produced was but preliminary to inevitable downfall. As Mr. Villard has concisely put it: "That fatal day every reform for which Woodrow Wilson has contended lay prostrate." Not only was his program wrecked; his real and sincere following was dissipated. From then on he was doomed, for, as Amos Pinchot so deftly summarized the whole matter, the exigencies of the new path of war led him "to put his enemies in office and his friends in jail." When he had served the enemies' purpose they junked him and his idealism, and his friends were too paralyzed and repelled by blackjacking and too embittered by disillusionment ever again to trust him or to rally to his support. Finally, it may be suggested that perhaps Woodrow Wilson will be the last statesman who was esteemed great on the basis of metaphysical idealism. More and more it is becoming apparent that the problems of the modern age are scarcely amenable to settlement and solution by means of the rhetorical and idealistic technique, but rather require an extensive command of relevant facts. No untrained layman, however well intentioned, could well be entrusted to perform even a simple surgical operation. The body politic is certainly not more simple than the human anatomy!

II. MR. LAWRENCE VERSUS MR. ANNIN ON WOODROW WILSON

If a reader were to take titles too seriously he would conclude that here we must have the true and the false story of the late ex-president, for it is quite apparent that the picture drawn in both books³ cannot well be the correct one. The probability is that neither is more than a rough approximation to the desirable and accurate delineation of Mr. Wilson, the execution of which doubtless lies far in the future. Indeed, one friend of Mr. Wilson had branded Annin's book a "caricature study," though the reviewer is inclined to hold that it probably presents rather a

³ *Woodrow Wilson: A Character Study*, by Robert Edwards Annin. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. *The True Story of Woodrow Wilson*, by David Lawrence. New York: George H. Doran Company.

more plausible and reliable characterization of the Princeton Sage than does the eulogistic and voluminous episodal sketch by Mr. Lawrence. Yet both books are of real value, and admirably supplement each other by virtue of the difference in viewpoint and by the fact that phases of Mr. Wilson's career that interest one author receive little attention from the other.

Mr. Annin is an export merchant, a prominent alumnus of Princeton, and a warm personal friend of the late Moses Taylor Pyne of the Princeton Board of Trustees, and of Dean Andrew Fleming West of the Princeton faculty. His associations and friendships thus brand him at once as a definite, though not a vituperative critic of the Princeton Wilson. Mr. Lawrence, also an alumnus of Princeton, and a leading contemporary journalist, represents most obviously the eulogist, who is warmly appreciative, though not universally reverential. Accordingly, it does not seem strange that Annin lays most stress on those aspects of Mr. Wilson's career which are least likely to furnish material for unmitigated praise, such as his policies and methods at Princeton; his breaks with Smith, Harvey, Watterson, McCombs, Bryan and Tumulty; his vacillation concerning preparedness and war; his weaknesses as a peace-negotiator and seductive conciliator of senatorial jealousy and obstinacy; and the less attractive alleged traits of his personality, namely, egotism, rhetorical flights, pragmatic idealism and opportunism. Lawrence devotes most of his space to topics more congenial to a friend, namely, the achievements as a reform governor; the legislation of the first administration; the difficulty of getting an international policy which the country as a whole would support from 1914 to 1918, and the necessity of adjusting such a policy to significant changes in the European situation and the attitude of Germany; and the difficulties in the struggle of an idealist against European (particularly French and Italian) nationalism and imperialism and the arrogance and stubbornness of the senate. The books differ still further in that Annin's work is rather free from concrete anecdotal and episodal material, while this takes up somewhat more than half of the Lawrence volume.

Space does not permit of the interesting exercise of enumerating the many sharply divergent interpretations of acts and policies of Mr. Wilson as set forth by these two authors. Some representative examples will suffice. In regard to the disputed point as

to how far Wilson exploited his rhetoric for the purposes of publicity Mr. Annin assures us that

President Wilson was not less successful in the use of the press than his great predecessor (Roosevelt). No man had a keener perception of his own "news value" than Dr. Wilson. It had always been an effective argument of his that, in appeals to the public, his own material would attract wide attention while that put forth by his opponents would receive relatively scant notice.

Mr. Lawrence states with equal emphasis that

Mr. Wilson was not capable of self-advertisement or self-expression though he was a master of impersonal advocacy of broad policies. He was no publicity expert like Colonel Roosevelt. Woodrow Wilson never failed to hold national attention on major questions but in the technic of iteration he was a victim of self-consciousness and modesty.

Both agree, however, that he fell far short of the genial Colonel in his capacity to deal effectively and cordially with the reporter pest.

With respect to his alleged trend toward vague generalizations and an antipathy towards concrete facts, Annin asserts that

He had a deftness in dallying with generalities which conveyed the thought that he alone was competent firmly to grasp and weigh the imponderables; but he was as impatient of an adverse fact as of a dissenting opinion. Like Gilbert's poet, he soared easily in the regions of the indefinable, but resented references to the multiplication table.

But Mr. Lawrence avers that

He had a passion for facts. They were the things that made him change his mind. That's why he didn't hesitate to reverse himself. Facts, he said, would always conquer mere opinion.

Equally opposed are their views concerning the much debated point of Mr. Wilson's opportunism and frequent change of front on important policies. Annin contends that

Mr. Wilson was in truth so agile in his opportunism that those who followed his leadership were in constant danger of meeting him coming back. No one could make these sharp turns more deftly, while screening awkward facts behind graceful and comforting phrases. But this could by no stretch of the imagination be considered as a sign of a logical mind.

Mr. Lawrence rejoins that

Mr. Wilson felt there was Virtue in flexibility. He was already (in 1912) being accused of changing opinions he had earlier held. Indeed, when he went to the White House, this was not an uncommon source of criticism. "The man who never changes his mind," argued Mr. Wilson, "indicates his profound ignorance. If your mind does not change with changing conditions, you are out of harmony with the world. I will agree not to change my mind if someone with power to do so will guarantee that if I go to bed at night I will get up the next morning and see the world the same."

Finally, in the matter of the oft-asserted inability of Mr. Wilson to retain warm personal friends Mr. Annin insists that

One of his most outstanding idiosyncrasies was the consistent and progressive loss of friends and supporters who had been brought into close relations with him. It was once remarked that admiration for Mr. Wilson increased directly as the square of the distance. . . . From the dawn of his success to his retirement, most of those who had been his friends, either were more or less openly repudiated by him or voluntarily renounced him.

On this point Mr. Lawrence offers as his rebuttal the allegation that those repudiated were either the victims of the meanness and pettiness of themselves and their friends, or the necessary human sacrifices to Mr. Wilson's impersonal and unflinching devotion to cosmic weal:

Greater by far than those who basked in his halo was Woodrow Wilson. Petty intrigues constantly surrounded him and, at times, misled him. Seltish, jealous-minded, and often childish persons, poured into his ears the prejudices of scorn and the insidious poison of hate. Above it all Woodrow Wilson's own record stands untarnished—he fought for vital principles. He led a victorious nation in the greatest war of all history. His Napoleonic struggle for a triumph of broad idealism over provincialism met defeat on a field which counted him in its casualty list. He never intentionally hurt his fellowman though the stern paths of duty led him to part with so many who failed to grasp the impersonality of his battles.

At times, however, the books offer significant corroborative evidence, as, for example, in the case of the important matter of Wilson's training for political life before 1910. Close observers have indicated that the common view of his utter inexperience

prior to his campaign for governor in 1910 is without foundation in fact. His contacts and responsibilities in college administration had given him a training in practical politics comparable to that received by Mr. Coolidge at the hands of the late Murray Crane. Mr. Annin says of this matter:

The effect of Wilson's first four years at Princeton was to build up what in politics would be called a personal machine, and that by methods purely political, i. e., the appeal to loyalty and the control of patronage. That this should be so was inevitable with the tendency on the President's part to think in terms of politics and political methods.

Lawrence confirms this interpretation by a quotation from Mr. Wilson himself, refuting a published charge that he would be incompetent to cope with professional politicians:

"Whenever I see anything of this kind in print I can't help but think that, compared with some of the college politicians, the party politicians are amateurs. The party politician plays his hand openly. You always know what he is going to do. He always follows the same rules and is always up to the same purpose. A college politician should not be mentioned in the same breath. He is very shrewd—and you never know what he is going to do. He has the gift of speech and can make black look like white—and I have been dealing with him for the past thirty years."

Briefly to indicate the more important and somewhat original tentative contributions of these two books Mr. Annin has suggested the striking similarities and parallels which exist between the successive phases of Mr. Wilson's professional and public career. As president of Princeton, governor of New Jersey, President of the United States, and peace-negotiator, he started out with great promise and wide praise and respect, and ended in relative failure and unpopularity. Fortunately for him, up to the last instance Fate intervened to snatch him from defeat and give him another and more striking opportunity. The other significant sections of Mr. Annin's book are those which attempt a keen analysis of Mr. Wilson's postulated mental traits and indicate the irrationality of those who are able to discern only unmitigated good or unmitigated evil in his personality and career.

Perhaps the most illuminating suggestion incidentally developed by Mr. Lawrence is that of the intimate relation between Mr. Wilson's mental moods and physical health and his public achieve-

ments. His gloom following the death of his first wife in 1914 may have had much to do with the slump in his activity in domestic politics and his indecision in handling diplomatic relations. The élan and buoyancy induced by his courtship and second marriage doubtless was an important impelling factor in leading him to take his revolutionary stand on the need for a more vigorous program of preparedness in 1915-16, and explains the gusto which accompanied his speaking trip on this subject. His trip abroad to negotiate peace was virtually a second honeymoon-trip. But most important of all is Mr. Lawrence's revelation of the fact that much of the responsibility for Mr. Wilson's aberrant conduct in the latter part of the peace conference and during his struggle with the senate for ratification of the treaty and the league must be assigned to a breakdown in the spring of 1919, nearly six months before he collapsed while on his tour of the country:

Oppressed on every side by the demands on his time and aware of the intrigue set afoot to influence him, Mr. Wilson suffered his first real breakdown in Paris. He had an attack of influenza accompanied by severe digestive disturbances. There was a time when his illness was so serious that it caused alarm to his household. After the few days of illness Mr. Wilson never seemed the same to his associates. Stung by the criticism that he had compromised too much, Mr. Wilson was adamant to the last days of the Conference, refusing to concede anything and siding with the French in an insistence that the Germans be compelled to sign without modification the terms that had been proposed. Even the British were inclined to compromise and permit the Germans to make modifications, but the French would hear none of it and President Wilson, anxious to get back to America to secure the ratification of the Treaty, concurred in the French view.

Thus perished the "peace of justice" and the Fourteen Points! Mr. Lawrence would doubtless accept the hypothesis of changed circumstances as an adequate explanation of the transition from this attitude to that expressed just before his death to Mr. Kerney of the *Trenton Times*: "I should like to see Germany clean up France and I should like to meet Jusserand and tell him to his face" (p. 354). According to Mr. Lawrence the League met its fate from a similar cause:

Whether America would have benefited by entrance into the League of Nations it is not necessary to discuss, but the United

States would today be in the League officially if the President had been able to get the advice he so much needed in his enfeebled condition. On his sick bed he almost agreed to accept the Lodge reservations, but someone urged him to make an issue of it in the 1920 campaign and in January, 1920, he asked that a solemn referendum be taken.

Another matter of real interest which Mr. Lawrence reveals is the possible influence of Mrs. Wilson, 2nd., on the President. There seems no doubt that his remarkable revival of zest and power from 1915 to 1918, was due to his courtship and marriage. On the other hand, Mrs. Wilson's characteristic and natural pride in her distinguished husband and his achievements produced the break with Colonel House, whose wide-spread praise and publicity in the Paris Conference she resented. Mr. Lawrence does not appear to know, however, that many intimate friends of Mr. Wilson contend that the break with House was helped along by the alleged fact that Mr. Wilson had lost confidence in Colonel House as a result of the latter's conduct of the Italian boundary settlement. One would like to know more of her influence upon the President's attitude in the closing days of the peace conference and in the struggle with Senator Lodge; indeed, it would be interesting to know how far she was responsible for his notion of going to Paris in person. It will also remain an interesting conjecture as to how far the fact that his trip to Paris was a second honeymoon affected his diplomatic endeavors. Many believe that Mrs. Wilson prevented him from resigning when actually incapacitated for holding office, a responsibility of really serious import for the country. How much she had to do with the breaks with Tumulty and Lansing is not so clear. But whatever the good and evil results of her influence on Mr. Wilson's public policies, her record of conjugal solicitude and devotion is one which is probably without parallel in the annals of the White House.

In contrast with those who have contended that Mr. Wilson was primarily absorbed in elaborating the detached rhetorical generalities which constituted his contribution to war-time propaganda and knew little of what was actually going on in the several departments of government, Mr. Lawrence urges the opposite position, namely, that he showed a phenomenal capacity for grasping detail, even to the mechanism of new types of armament, and kept an intimate grip upon everything of importance which took place during the war period. Incidentally, he shows that the

President possessed that type of mind which shuns personal face-to-face contacts and preferred to settle matters by means of written memoranda and directions. Finally, Mr. Lawrence indicates that there were important extenuating circumstances in regard to Mr. Wilson's ill-advised appeal for a Democratic Congress in 1918. Speaker Gillett, Representative Fess, Taft and Roosevelt had all made vicious partisan appeals for the election of a Republican Congress prior to October 26th, when Mr. Wilson asked for the return of a Democratic majority to support his policy with respect to peace and reconstruction.

Neither book possesses any significant value in relation to the international situation and the war from 1914 to 1918, for both authors are as ignorant of the facts concerning the diplomacy of war origins as they are in regard to the actual reasons for the entry of the United States into the conflict. When the authoritative treatise is produced on Mr. Wilson's career and personality both of these works will be of value to the writer, but it is the prediction of the reviewer that while Mr. Lawrence's is the more entertaining, it will prove to an equal degree more tentative and ephemeral.

III. WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE ON WOODROW WILSON

The year following the death of Ex-president Wilson was rich in the production of *Woodroviana*—the dignified critique by Annin, the pious eulogy by Daniels, the somewhat discriminating and objective journalistic effort by Lawrence, and the pretentious volume under review.⁴ After having read them all carefully the writer finds it necessary regretfully to confess that this last performance is distinctly the most disappointing of the group. Not because it is by any means the worst, but because it falls farther short than any of the others of what the standing of the author and the statements of his publishers would lead the reader to expect from the volume. We are solemnly informed in the publisher's announcement that "it is high time for a thorough, frank, and impartial appraisal of Woodrow Wilson as man and president. William Allen White has made . . . a book that will

⁴ *Woodrow Wilson: The Man, His Times and His Task*, by William Allen White. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. This review, published in the *American Review* for July-August, 1925, was originally prepared for the *New Republic*.

endure as a relentlessly penetrating study in psychology." The author's reputation as a fearless and honest publicist and journalist has justly won for him international recognition. It is personally known to the writer that he has invested much time and expense in gathering information for the book. Particularly has he made some special investigation into the important and significant events of Mr. Wilson's childhood and youth. Yet it seems to the reviewer that as a serious contribution to biographical technique or American history the book is a distressing failure, in content and mode of presentation alike.

As to the scope, variety, and body of information upon which the book rests, it must be held to be relatively adequate. Most of the published books on Wilson have been read, and Mr. White has, moreover, discussed the subject of these books with their authors. He has also talked with an imposing number of friends, enemies, and relatives of Mr. Wilson. But it is a sad fact that Mr. White apparently does not possess the scientific knowledge or the historical training to use this information with any technical competence or skill. He seems not only to lack all knowledge whatever of both academic and clinical psychology, but even to be highly deficient in the possession or exploitation of that "common-sense" psychology and cleverness in amateur analysis of the Bradford-Dibble type which carried Mr. Annin through his task without serious shipwreck. And in the few instances where he has seemingly possessed a flash of keen insight he has spoiled his achievement by an almost congressional flamboyancy of style. The many valuable facts in the book would need to be patiently extracted from the morass of encumbering rhetoric before they could be seen in their proper perspective and significance of implication by the candid student of history.

Mr. White bases his interpretation of the character and achievements of Mr. Wilson upon two main theses. The first is that Mr. Wilson possessed a third-rate mind and a first-rate character. His third-rate mind was rendered even more impotent because of its being also a single-track mind, and it is most significant that Mr. Wilson ostentatiously gloried in this fact. The second basic contention is that there was in Woodrow Wilson a fundamental dualism, resting upon his Scotch-Irish ancestry. The Scotch element in his heredity, derived from the Woodrows, gave him a stern, morose, plodding sense of duty, reckless of friend and foe

alike, and contributing to the intensification of the single-track tendency. The Irish factor, coming from the Wilsons, provided the joyful and playful streak in his nature, which frequently asserted itself, and secured for him the love of relatives, friends, colleagues, and students in the same way that the Woodrovian strain made him feared or hated, or both. We may now state these theses in the words of the author:

He was not in the world's first or second class of thinkers or writers. If he had known this later in life, it would have been easier for him to mingle in fellowship with third and fourth raters in their lines of activity and of thought, with a tolerant patience which would have been beneficial to mankind. . . . His campus books written in the eighties and nineties are first-class work of a kind—but not of an important kind. They are sanely conceived, consistently worked out with such diligent preparation and research as a good college library would allow, and they are charmingly written. They are not, however, the work of an original mind, as, for instance, Franklin's work, or Josiah Royce's, or Emerson's was; yet they were written by a greater man than any of the others. . . . It was not as a great mind that he was called and elected, but as the exponent, the crusader, the covenanter of a great faith to save the world. In writing these books, hardly above the ordinary, books based somewhat upon the premise of the need of the aristocracy, which he afterward abandoned in humility, he buttressed the faith of his fathers, the Calvinism of the eighteenth century with the wisdom of the nineteenth, and so went to the conflict of the twentieth a knight full-panoplied. . . . Wilson's chief blunders as a liberal came from the vice of exalting his faults as virtues. He was proud of his single-track mind, and apparently did not try to consider many things at once. If he were busy upon a note to Carranza, he might let some monstrously reactionary appointment pass unnoticed. . . . But amidst all these inconsistencies, and they are many and obvious, there is never inconsistency of intention. His mind which he outwardly trusted, had to change, had even to trek backwards on the single track, but his direction and purpose and righteous intention never wavered.

It was strong blood, this Woodrow blood, and in the baby born in Staunton, Virginia, the Woodrow blood overcame the Wilson blood. From both sides came the forward urge—the knack for enterprise which we hope is progress; the spirit that moves the pioneer, the crusader, the martyr. From the Woodrows came the capacity for slow, continuous, dogged, undramatic, spiritual struggle. The Woodrows had the brains of scholars and their tradition held a

precious inheritance of Calvinist belief that the Right—always capitalized, always of God—will prevail. The word “compromise” makes your true Calvinist froth. From the Wilson heritage came the gay fighting blood of the Irish; contentious, imaginative, often vain, but never cold in pride; restlessly following the call of eerie fairies to lovely and surprising things. What a mix it was, the blood of Woodrow Wilson—pure Scotch, pure Irish, all Celt, with none of the American-Revolutionary blend in it; no Dutch, no French, no Swiss, no German, no Norman-Saxon strain that makes us practical men willing to die for what we call righteous causes, but entirely happy living under reasonable compromises. . . . Always in his heart he was Joseph Wilson's son, the scion of the Irish Kings, loving greatly and ever eager for the love of his kind; with a light word and a merry countenance for the run of the day, and only his dour features for the heavy hours. But the Woodrows, grave, disciplined, industrious, punctual, and serious, were intruding more and more into his conscious moments.

Of these two major propositions upon which the plan and structure of the book are constructed, it may be said that the first is distinctly an error of fact and judgment, and the second one of the most monstrous and grotesque combinations of errors which it would be possible for an author of any respectable degree of literacy to seize upon. There cannot be the slightest doubt that Wilson's mind was every whit as good as his character. This is true whether we accept Mr. White's hypothesis of a third- or fourth-rate mind, or Professor Dodd's contention that his mind is to be placed near the forefront of the second-rate minds in the field of political science. His books certainly give one a pleasanter and more savory impression of the man than his acts, when the latter are scrutinized in a candid and exacting manner after the fashion of Annin taken *cum grano*. And it is probably true, as Professor Dodd asserts, that his speeches, and, above all, his conversations revealed a better mind than do his books. This thesis is well borne out by a comparison of his conversation with Frank Cobb the day before he read his war message (pp. 354-6) with his acts following April 2, 1917. The writer would go even further, and contend that his mind was much better than his character, if by character one means something broader than sex-conduct—a matter in which Mr. Wilson was most assuredly immaculate. The hypothesis of a well-intentioned opportunist, tempered and handicapped by a strain of impatience and intolerance of opposition, harmonizes much better with the general

character and specific details of the Wilson career than Mr. White's premise of almost unearthly and consistent high-mindedness in the unwavering struggle for the advancement of mankind. But, after all, the hypothesis is erected on the naïve and anachronistic, if still common, practice of separating character from intelligence. The first minor—the single-track mind allegation—is thoroughly and successfully sustained. Would that it had been chosen as the first major!

The criticism of the mechanical, push-a-button bio-psychology of the Scotch-Irish complex will be dealt with as a phase of his methodology and technique in interpretative and historical biography.

In his methods as a biographer one finds in Mr. White an amusing but fatal combination of curious anachronisms and simple-mindedness. His interpretation of personal behavior and its motivations rests upon: (1) an acceptance of the Gobineau racial dogma to an even more excessive degree than that which afflicts Madison Grant; (2) a biological theory of the direct and specific inheritance of discernible, isolated and segregated character traits, which certainly antedates anything seriously put forward by reputable biologists since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century; (3) an Orosius-Bossuet view of the potency of the divine hand in history; (4) a rhetoric as florid and as careless of demonstrable fact as ever characterized any second-rate Romanticist historian of the middle of the last century; and (5) an uplift *Ethik* of a distinctly Pollyanna variety. It would seem that the only threadbare resource of this type which Mr. White overlooked was the casting of Mr. Wilson's horoscope. And in fact, he actually does come dangerously close to a Calvinistic adaptation of astrology.

What historian or anthropologist of standing believes that the Scot or Irishman is a "pure Celt," or, if he does so believe, can tell exactly what constitutes the psychic and cultural qualities of the Celt? And if one cannot tell the specific traits of Celts, how much less can be known of the psychic characteristics of the Scottish Celt as over against the Irish Celt, even granting the very dubious hypothesis that there may be specific and biologically permanent psychic traits which distinguish the Celt from the Nordic or Mediterranean? And who knows that Mr. Wilson's ancestors were pure Scotch or Irish? One is reminded of Karl Pearson's demonstration that the "typical Englishman,"

Charles Darwin, possessed not only an inheritance from every known European race, but from Asiatic and Mongolian blood as well!

And what could be more naïve, superficial, and unlikely than Mr. White's assumption that character is something which is almost totally a matter of biological inheritance, mechanically and discernibly compounded out of the particular traits of specific ancestors? It is surely a weird bio-psychology which interprets some specific act of Woodrow Wilson in mid-life as due to the impingement of Grandma Woodrow on his endocrinal orchestration, and another as the product of the resurgence of the spirit of some great-uncle on the Wilson side of the family in the bloodstream feeding his cerebral cortices. Yet this is the sole and only framework upon which the author erects what his publishers tell us is "a relentlessly penetrating study in psychology." Freud turned loose on Leonardo da Vinci seems by comparison a cautious and convincing performance! The opinions of Mr. White on God in history may be left to Mr. Coolidge and Henry Osborn Taylor. The rhetorical core of the book will be discussed below in connection with the stylistic qualities of the work. As for his uplift orientation Mr. White may be pardoned. It is a healthy, if overly optimistic, bias, and to be preferred to the stand-pattism of a Coolidge Republican or the fatalistic cynicism of some of the younger intellectuals.

But it is not his fallacious dualism of mind and character, or of Scot and Hibernian, nor his naïve anthropo-sociology, genetics, and psychology which brings the greatest disappointment to those who, like the reviewer, sincerely wished to see Mr. White execute a creditable piece of biographical work. The most serious disappointment has its source in his rhetorical outdoing of Cicero and Quintilian. Lord Morley, Herbert Croly, and Allen Johnson have proved by their biographies of Gladstone, Mark Hanna, and Stephen A. Douglas that intensely interesting biographies could be constructed without any appeal to the devices of literary subtlety beyond the fundamental qualities of clarity and straightforward narrative. And Strachey demonstrated that superb literature could be produced in biographical form without any intrusion whatever of Congressional floridity and nursery gush.

Mr. White seems to have chosen Papini for his model. If I were to describe in my own words his rhetorical outbursts the reader would doubtless be shocked into incredulity, wherefore I

shall introduce some representative selections. Woodrow Wilson's father, an impecunious cleric, took up his first pastorate in Staunton, Virginia, a typical southern small town in 1855. Here is what it becomes in Mr. White's verbal alchemy: "When the Reverend Joseph Ruggles Wilson, a tall commanding figure with a college education and a Princeton manner back of him, came to Staunton, Virginia, to shepherd the elect in the Presbyterian Church, he entered the place as a prince into his realm. . . . Into this painted social minuet stepped Joseph Ruggles Wilson with his pretty wife, with long curls about her face, and with their two girl babies. There he was an aristocrat by the Divine right of his cloth and the royal grant of his Irish blood. The old Kings of Ireland never begot a more gorgeous prince." The momentous birth of Woodrow is described in terms reminiscent of the Virgilian account of the advent of Augustus: "Here was born a man destined one day to come into place and power whose blood was pure Scotch-Irish colored with Calvinism. The modern world for the first time was to come under the dominion of a pure Celt, not as a lieutenant, not as a counsellor, not as an upper servant of any king or commander, but for a year and seven months as the vicegerent of his God. It was all but a prophetic hour when mankind for a moment saw rising John Calvin's millennium."

The interesting and little known fact that Wilson and Roosevelt were remotely related by marriage inspires Mr. White to the thought that "the two immortals, Theodore and Woodrow, sitting upon an Elysian cloud trying to figure out the exact nature of their kinship, may be one of the minor sources of delight to the angels." The fact that Mr. Wilson was more of a debater and writer than an intensive student at Princeton suggests that "the Celt's love of self-expression, the tremendous urge to make their private sentiment public sentiment, to impose themselves upon their fellows, is what makes the Irish the world's divinely appointed rulers and the Scotch the intellectual leaders of their neighbors. And here at Princeton was a ruler by right of spiritual heredity, who also could think, and who by inbreeding was convinced deeply that his God had elected him to a special spiritual privilege appointed and anointed by the covenant, to serve the cause of righteousness in the earth and for service rendered to enter him into a blessed reward hereafter."

In his long fight at Princeton, with Dean West, Wilson is pic-

tured as a cross between a timid toreador and St. Paul. "Dean West is a tall, robust man—a two-hundred-forty pounder—with a sea captain's ruddy skin, large features, hearty voice and manner. He speaks in the indicative, goes to the point, and spits it out. Under emotional pressure he could roar like a bull and also close his eyes and charge as blindly." When the bull got dangerously close the toreador vaulted the fence and "headed pell-mell for democracy" at the Trenton State House. But without this quarrel "he would never have gone through the fire. . . . Damascus is no very high goal for a journey's end; yet on the road to Damascus Saul of Tarsus saw a great light. The miracles of God are not done only for 'just men made perfect.'" The defeated and embittered Princeton President, eagerly searching in 1910 for something which would allow him gracefully to escape from the intolerable situation which confronted him and to support himself and his family, becomes "a sort of Scotch Cincinnatus on the Princeton links, waiting for the call of the masses." Mr. Wilson's three cultured and sensible daughters, admiring their father at the first inauguration, are transformed by Mr. White into "three Cinderellas in Washington in the White House, riding about in three White House cars, golden coaches, and with fairy princes—young army officers, young navy officers, young diplomats, young statesmen, all varieties of desirable young gods—lined up to do their beck and call. And they knew that they could wear their crystal slipper for at least four years." Examples of this kind of rhetoric could be multiplied indefinitely, but it will suffice to close this phase of the review with the description of Wilson after delivering his speech urging the declaration of war:

We must remember what manner of man he was: the Celt, the dreamer, the word-worker, the man of books and theories, the man of vision and hypotheses. We develop with the years, unfold what we are in the soil of circumstance, and we must not forget that in the kernel of this man was little Tommy Wilson, the child, writing the log of the Avenger instead of wrestling with the barn-loft gang in his alley; little Tommy Wilson seated alone, aloof, as the soldiers pass; little Tommy Wilson in the grove back of the manse playing with the elf folk and the fairies. Behold now the man grown up, the hypnotist, the world wizard! This high dream of peace, that he fabricked upon the anvil of a three years' debate with the contenders for a feudal world in the agony of its death struggle, was

perhaps the embryo plan of a new order entering the womb of time to be born in another and brighter day; even as the blood of the Irish and the environment of America planted in Tommy Wilson's soul the lovely things which his childhood knew. . . . Probably no conqueror in the world, not Philip of Macedon, not Cæsar, not Genghis Khan, not Napoleon, ever in so short a time assembled so much death-dealing force against an enemy. Wilson meeting force with force, was an Ajax hurling thunder-bolts. From day to day, from week to week, this great Celt, agile, unshaken, resourceful, even felicitous with a Titanic joy in his job, sat at the White House at the head of an army. . . . In his heart he knew that God rules; that men who are essentially noble are working in some great mystery towards some splendid hidden goal. He felt with an almost mad passion this truth about God and man. So all of the force of the spirit which he could command from America, he set to work. . . . He challenged the Kaiser in 1915 and routed him and the Devil and all his works in 1918.

Nor is this rhetorical fancy reserved for Wilson alone, for we see Colonel House "toddling about Europe, a serene Yankee Mandarin, soft-voiced, sweet-faced, and gentle, yet never fooled by the tall prattle of stupid or selfish men."

Added to the basic weaknesses just detailed, the book has some specific defects. Mr. Wilson is represented as a greenhorn in politics in 1910, in spite of his ten years of college politics; and in his Princeton struggles he is pictured as a shocked, injured, incredulous, confused, and amateurish Presbyterian elder, unable to comprehend or admit the villainies and subtleties of college intrigues. The Wilson victory in 1916 is taken to be almost wholly a vindication of his liberalism and not approval of his "neutrality policy" in "keeping us out of war." The reverse seems the correct interpretation to the reviewer. Although the myth of Mr. Hughes as a liberal is probably the greatest hoax in recent American history, with the perennial, comprehensive, and all-embracing exception of the Coolidge Myth, it was still potent in 1916, and only the discriminating few looked upon Mr. Wilson as more of a liberal than Mr. Hughes, especially as the latter had the approval of Roosevelt. The section on the War is written in the spirit of the "three-minute" speeches of the War period, in spite of the fact that the writer reveals his disillusionment about the whole matter in the next chapter. Mr. Wilson never lied. When he said things that he knew were not true he was

merely confused (p. 438). The specific errors are few, though there are some, such as the reference to the recognition of the Kerensky Government on March 22, 1918, to the "Sunrise Conference" of 1915, and to Mr. Wilson as a "sociologist."

There are several meritorious aspects of the book. One is the excellent recognition given to Mr. Wilson's liberalism from 1912 to 1917, though Mr. White quite correctly points out that this was a complete departure from his written and spoken word prior to 1908. Then, the debacle at Paris and after is accurately represented as due more to the insuperable forces of hate, cupidity, and narrow nationalism, which had been intensified by the passions of war, than to Mr. Wilson's personal defects, though these are not overlooked or unwisely appraised. But probably the greatest service rendered is the rather definite and final quietus which it puts on the aspersions cast upon Wilson's private life. Mr. Wilson is shown to have been personally a highly pious and devout Presbyterian, psychologically at least a Fundamentalist, and equipped with a healthy Scotch impurity-complex which led him to frown upon dancing. He was the furthest possible removed from a truly cultured and cultivated Humanist of the type of Harry Thurston Peck. His family life was a model of devotion. While "always a ladies' man," his attitude towards women was so innocent and naïve, and his loyalty to the monogamous ideal so intense and overwhelming, that a pressing thought of the concrete evil act apparently never entered his head—a fact which led him to do many things that laid him open to serious suspicion when his conduct was interpreted on the hypothesis of Wilson as a modernist and a realist. Both by training and conviction, as well as by lack of physical vigor, Mr. Wilson was willingly restrained by the requirements of conjugal fidelity. That he loved the company of women cannot be doubted, and he may have had erotic thrills, but they were of the nebulous and suffused sort aroused by the shuffle of silk skirts at an afternoon tea, or smiling congratulations after a lecture, and not by contemplating the imminent prospect of a European tour with a pretty actress.

While we have felt it necessary to set forth what seem the irremediable defects of the book as a serious contribution to biographical literature, it should not be supposed that we have here an uninteresting work. It is vivid and gripping, and, as a publishing venture, should be as much more successful than the book the publishers led us to expect, as was Papini's *Life of Christ*

compared to Nathaniel Schmidt's *Prophet of Nazareth*. The chief lesson to be drawn from the work is the tragedy (other than pecuniary) which must always befall a man who tries to write psychological history without being either an historian or a psychologist. Mr. White has a fruitful field in courageous journalism where he has been a notable practitioner. If he looks longingly towards the historical pastures he has his legitimate model in Gertrude Atherton's *The Conqueror*.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

I. HISTORICAL SETTING OF DEMOCRATIC PROBLEMS

1. Importance of the Historical Orientation

It is impossible to approach in a scientific fashion the problems of democratic society without an adequate comprehension of the historic changes that originally produced the demand for democracy and have so completely transformed many aspects of human society during the same period in which democracy has been at least tentatively and partially realized. The type of society and human problems which were in the minds of those who first formulated the notions of, and the demand for, democracy have all but passed away since 1776, or even since 1828. Though the writers of 1830 may have been correct in their theories of the nature and adequacy of democracy in the light of the conditions with which they were acquainted, this is no proof whatever that democracy can be adapted to the complexities and dynamic characteristics of contemporary society. Likewise, the notions of human and social behavior which have been worked out by physiologists, psychologists and social scientists in the last half-century were a closed book to the "Fathers." Hence, their assumptions concerning human nature and abilities, and group life were necessarily incomplete and in many respects inaccurate. If democracy would work, granted the truth of their views about man and society, the question remains as to whether it is feasible in the light of what we now know about man and his social relations. Democracy cannot be looked upon in a static fashion; its theory and practice must be scrutinized in the light of the fact that democracy is a human institution which has found its origins and growth embodied in the most dynamic and complex culture that man has yet experienced. Its problems can be understood and dealt with only through the exploitation of an historical orientation as dynamic as the age, and a social science as technical and complex as our

environing society. The days of the political metaphysicians and *a priori* idealists from Jefferson to Woodrow Wilson must either come to an end, or society has no prospect of extended survival. It need not be insisted that the confused and visionless ignorance of a Coolidge or Harding is infinitely more menacing than the dreams of an idealistic political philosopher.

2. *General Backwardness of Western Society in 1750*

Though the expansion of Europe and the Commercial Revolution produced enormous changes in the general character and constitution of European society, yet one should not be so impressed with the magnitude of these changes as to lose sight of the fact that in the middle of the eighteenth century western society bore little resemblance to the state of culture which today exists in the more advanced European and American areas. Intellectual life had advanced little if any beyond the state which it had reached with the Attic and Hellenistic Greeks before the Christian era, and material culture had not been transformed in its major outlines since the dawn of written history. Even the Lake Dwellers of Switzerland and Northern Italy, who lived perhaps 10,000 years ago, possessed much the same economic technique as that which existed in western Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century. Most types of domesticated animals, the chief fruits and cereals, and many aspects of manufacturing technique, particularly in the textile industry, had been widely known and utilized in the Neolithic age. The two outstanding improvements in material culture since the Stone Age had been the art of utilizing metals and the development of the science and art of navigation. There is no doubt that Voltaire or Thomas Jefferson would have been more at home in the material culture of pre-dynastic Egypt than they would be today in Paris or New York City.

A century and a half ago society was based upon a geocentric dogmatism, which represented our planet as God's chief creative achievement, and man as the supreme product of divine ingenuity and the main object of God's solicitude. Earth, man and all organic life were looked upon as having been created some six thousand years ago in the brief span of six days, and absolute proof of this fact was supposed to be embodied in an infallible and directly inspired holy work. The final, perfect and comprehensive guide to conduct was held to be found in a few precepts contained in this work, and man was believed to be perfectly free to choose

whether he would follow these divinely originated and inspired dicta, or willfully and perversely succumb to the wily seductions of the devil. There was no general comprehension of the fact that the only sure guidance for human conduct was to be sought in a study of human nature and social relationships, or that such information is to be procured only from competent scientists in the various fields involved, rather than from metaphysicians and theologians.

In the field of the natural sciences there had been some notable advances in mathematics and celestial mechanics, including the developments in arithmetic, algebra, chemistry, trigonometry, the use of logarithms and the invention of the calculus. Also, there had been some rudimentary progress in the science of physics, chemistry and biology, including such things as the beginnings of dynamics in the work of Galileo, the evolution of celestial mechanics, which was to culminate in its first stage in the synthesis of Newton, significant developments in the study of the pressure of gases, the development of the science of optics, and the application of the microscope to the study of living matter. Significant as these early contributions of natural science may have been, much more striking is the absence of the more revolutionary phases of modern science. Historical and economic geology, which explain the origin and composition of the planet, were practically undeveloped sciences. Our modern physical theories of sound, heat, light and electricity, with all their multifarious practical applications, were as yet well-nigh totally unknown. While the foundations of modern synthetic chemistry were being laid in the growth of chemical science from Paracelsus to Lavoisier, the actual discoveries which made possible modern economic and synthetic chemistry were to wait for another century, when Liebig, Wöhler, Kekulé and Fischer were to produce their epoch-making contributions. In spite of the visions of Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon and Condorcet, little or nothing had been done in the way of applying the embryonic natural sciences which existed to the service of mankind, save in the utilization of mathematics for commercial computation, and certain elementary scientific devices utilized in the art of navigation. Above all, there was no general notion of the long duration and naturalistic appearance of organic and human life upon the earth, which was to be revealed in the work of Darwin and his successors.

The fact that such works as the French *Encyclopedia* were ap-

pearing demonstrates, however, that some people were developing the scientist's attitude towards facts, though their knowledge was limited. Perhaps this open-mindedness was the most important factor in creating present-day material culture. Invention is nearly always founded on earlier scientific discovery and this flourishes only in an atmosphere where no assumption of material fact is made without material proof.

Industry was organized and conducted according to either the gild or the putting-out system. Industrial establishments were small and simple, and personal relationships between the employer and employee existed in nearly every case. Life was still primarily agrarian, there being very few manufacturing and commercial towns. This manufacturing industry was often carried on in the country-side, the finished product being taken to the distant towns for marketing. Commercial institutions were of the most rudimentary sort. The largest bank in existence in the eighteenth century had a smaller capital than is today possessed by the leading banks of second-class American cities. Only the most elementary start had been made towards the evolution of modern instruments of credit, such as bank-checks, drafts and bills of exchange. The problems of modern capitalism and industrialism, as we now know them, hardly existed.

In regard to social conditions, the normal situation still was one of stability and isolation for all but the wealthy and more fortunate minority. Our modern methods of transportation by means of good roads, railroads, steamships and automobiles, were then unknown. Furthermore, the modern methods of communicating information, such as the telephone, the telegraph, the cheap daily paper and the free and rapid delivery of mail, had not yet come into existence.

As a result, life and culture were provincial. A community lived largely unto itself, and strangers were regarded with much the same fear and suspicion as in medieval communities. The masses were still generally illiterate and weighed down with the grossest superstitions, which had changed little since primitive times. The peasantry and the poorer townsmen lived in a squalor and misery which can scarcely be imagined by the average American of the present time. Though they may not have missed some modern comforts because they were not aware of them, this should not prevent us from understanding that they lived a life only a little above that of the brutes as far as their material sur-

roundings were concerned. It is true, however, that miserable as their habitations may have been, there was never anything like the massed misery of the modern urban tenement. There was, at least, far more access to air and sunlight than was to be found after the rise of the factory town. Even among the rich, however, there were lacking ordinary comforts and conveniences which today are enjoyed even by comparatively poor people. Modern methods of personal hygiene, illumination, heat, sanitation and various forms of social protection, were either unknown or only most imperfectly developed. The population remained essentially static. During the thousand years of the so-called Middle Ages, the European population had not increased to any notable degree. Some increase and movements of population had been going on since the sixteenth century, but the tendency was not very marked by 1750.

Political conditions were equally backward. While representative government had been established in England by the middle of the eighteenth century, such was not the case in any other European state, and even by the middle of the nineteenth century France alone had joined England as an example of representative and Parliamentary institutions. In southern, central and eastern Europe, absolutism, paternalism or feudalism lingered on. Nowhere, not even in England, was there any real democracy. It was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century that universal suffrage made any general headway in Europe, and the first national law providing for universal suffrage was passed during the Revolution of 1848 in France. In fact, there were few, if any, theoretical exponents of democracy in Europe at this time. Some, like de Tocqueville, while not approving of democracy, felt that it was inevitable and urged Europe to prepare itself for the coming of democratic institutions. In general, however, the leading political philosophers of the time regarded democracy as being as impossible as it was undesirable. In the middle of the eighteenth century there was, in fact, little or nothing in the way of constitutional government in Europe. England alone was governed according to constitutional principles, and here there was no systematic and formal document embodying rules concerning political life and institutions. The British constitution was chiefly a body of tradition and a collection of petitions, charters and bills of rights widely separated in time and character. The first important written constitutions in modern history were those

drawn up by the several American states after the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain in 1776.

Likewise, there was little or nothing in the way of truly national or popular patriotism. The masses had little consciousness of the national state. Their aims and interests were essentially those of the neighborhood or locality. The wars were carried on by professional soldiers, possessing little sentimental interest in the outcome of the conflict. The nature or significance of the great series of wars in Europe in modern times was in no way understood by the masses of the population. In many cases, they were unaware of a war, except in so far as certain individuals from the neighborhood might have gone away with the armies or returned with news of the late conflict. The first significant development of a popular patriotism came in the period of the French Revolution, when the friends of the Revolution organized a popular resistance to the reactionary coalition which threatened to stamp out the revolutionary achievements. The outlook of statesmen and diplomats was closely circumscribed by narrow nationalistic concepts compounded of dynastic ambitions and mercantilistic economic theories. A few philosophic dreamers from Dante onward proposed plans of world organization or federation, but their visions were either ignored or held in contempt by those in practical control of international relations.

Though the general social and political order was actually backward and in many cases anachronistic, it was believed to be complete and perfect. Except for a few supposedly eccentric philosophers, no one took any interest in improving human society or believed this either possible or desirable. The chief social problem was the care of paupers, whom, it was believed, God had sent and would maintain in human society in order that the rich might be reminded of their good fortune, and have the poor with them as objects of charity to stimulate their altruistic sentiments. Any such thing as a social science, namely, a science of social institutions and progress, could scarcely exist in a systematic way in such an age. There cannot be a *science* of a divinely approved social order any more than there can be a science of a revealed religion.

Not only was there no real social science, but the prerequisites upon which the social sciences must be built, namely, biology, psychology and social history, existed either not at all or in a most imperfect state. Education, upon the progress of which all scientific development must depend, was at this time in a most

embryonic condition. In spite of certain beginnings toward free public education, which had been initiated by the kings of Prussia, there was no provision for free compulsory public instruction in Europe until the passage of the famous Prussian law providing for such a system in 1810. The masses were illiterate, and even the middle classes could do little more than read and write and carry on certain elementary and commonplace mathematical computations. University instruction was essentially irrelevant to the problems of individual or social life, and many universities were still organized on the basis of scholasticism, with the emphasis upon logic and the deductive method. Even the most advanced universities devoted their energies chiefly to instruction in mathematics and the classical languages and literature. Nowhere was there any general notion that education should be the basis of a sound preparation for actual life, or the indispensable foundation of any valid scheme for improving the social environment. Education was either entirely unrelated to the problems of the social order, or designed primarily to sanction and approve existing institutions.

3. *The Secular, Dynamic and Complex Contemporary Society*

At the present time practically all of these foundations of the old order have been either seriously challenged or entirely destroyed. In the light of modern astro-physics our planet becomes but the most insignificant of celestial juveniles, microscopic in size and incomparably recent in origin. In the place of a single universe existing primarily for the benefit of one of the smaller planets, we have now come to conceive of the cosmos as constituted of infinitely complex and numerous groups of universes moving with incredible speed over paths of unfathomable extent, all apparently obeying laws of the utmost uniformity and precision. In a brilliant article on "Man and His Young World" Professor Harlow Shapley has indicated the significance of modern astro-physics in providing the cosmic perspective for human efforts at social betterment:

The thing that appalls me is not the bigness of the universe, but the smallness of us. We are in all ways small—little in foresight, shriveled in spirit, minute in material content, microscopic in the vastness of measured space, evanescent in the sweep of time—inconsequential in every respect, except, perhaps, in the chemical complexities

of our mental reactions. In that alone our advance may surpass that of other terrestrial organisms.

But the sanctity of all protoplasm has practically disappeared in this, the heroic age of the physical sciences, when knowledge of the material universe, its content, structure, and dimensions, has so completely overthrown egocentrism. It should sufficiently deflate the organism, you would think, to find that his fountain of energy, the sun, is a dwarf star among thousands of millions of stars; to find that the star around which his little parasitic earth willessly plods is so far from the center of the known stellar universe that sunlight, with its incomprehensibly high velocity, cannot reach that center in a thousand generations of vain men.

The deflation, however, is not stopped at that point. We now reach much deeper into space than a few years ago, find millions of stars mightier than our sun, find greater velocities, larger masses, higher temperatures, longer durations than we have previously known. Even more illuminating, in this orientation of organisms in the physical universe, is the revelation that the earth, whose surface we infest, is not a parcel of grand antiquity. Rather recently, as astronomers now measure time, a singular incident happened in the life-history of the sun. Before that time the earth was not, nor were the animals of the earth. Nevertheless, for trillions of years, in the absence of the "Lords of all Creation," the stars had poured out their radiant energy, the celestial bodies had rolled on, law had governed the universe. Before that event, you and I, the material of our bodies, were electrons, and atoms in the solar atmosphere. Since then we have been associated with the inorganic and organic evolution of a smaller concern.

The earth, as I have intimated, appeared only a few thousand million years ago. Our sun, it seems, had already passed its prime of radiance when in its wanderings through celestial space it met up with another star—a stellar romance—a marriage made in the heavens. From that affair—realistic astronomers call it an encounter—the planets of the sun were born. The passing star, ruffling up the exterior of the sun, detached some relatively small fragments of the solar atmosphere. Now we strut on one of the surviving fragments and wonder and speculate and discuss: "How can we *better* the world?" Crown of absurdities—*we* repairing the world! That cast-off fragment, the ancestor from which and on which we descend, was composed wholly of gas! An emblem for us, that ancestral hot vapor—"How can we straighten out the world?"

The gaseous planet quickly liquefied as out in cold space it began its tireless revolutions around the parent sun. Soon after a crust formed, and we may thank our lucky stars, the distance from the

sun was right, the atmospheric and crustal chemistry was right, and other adjustments of the physical environment happened to be suitable for an elaboration of chemical reactions. The energy of the overflowing sunlight aided in complexifying this protoplasmic chemistry, a green mold formed in spots on the planet, and here we are—parasites on the energy of the sun that cast us forth. How can we better the world?

In place of the special creation hypothesis we have the concepts and processes of cosmic and biological evolution, which indicate that all matter and life are in a process of endless transformation, comprehending both progressive evolution and disintegration. Our earth, all types of organic life and man himself appear to have come into existence as an integral part of this great process of development and destruction. No human trait or characteristic has yet been discovered which clearly violates the natural laws discovered and expounded by scientists. There is nothing which can in any way support the hypothesis of the supremacy of man in the cosmos. The combined implications of cosmic and biological evolution have destroyed entirely any foundations for the hypothesis of human uniqueness, primacy or permanence. This startling fact has been lucidly expressed by Professor Shapley:

Man, as a species, has had a short and brilliant career on the face of the earth. From ape-like ancestry to the editorial board of *The Nation* is at most a few million years. There are some cynics who think it is much less than that. Thousands of other species of animals besides *homo sapiens* have also risen rapidly to a high specialization, and then ceased to be. They paid for their brilliance with extinction. The dinosaurs lasted but a single era in geological history; they rose to a great climax of size, laid their eggs, and were gathered unto their fathers. They left no lineal descendants.

But the cockroach has a straight-line ancestry of two hundred million years or more. His is a stock sufficiently strong to carry him through numerous terrestrial upheavals, through desiccations and glaciations—and the cockroach today is just as good as he ever was. . . .

Biologically, it seems, we are as inexperienced as physically we are frail. Moreover, we are hampered with brains. We have mentality to burn, and many of us do burn it, at both ends. Our more or less primitive bodies cannot keep up in the evolutionary progress of our abnormal mentalities. . . .

Our concern mainly should be with the species—can *it* survive? It has no chance against the stars, of course; but can it long hold

its own as a surviving form, or be ancestral to surviving forms, against other organisms, against primitive microbes and advanced insects? There is a fair chance, an optimistic scientist would say, if it were not that man's worst enemy is man.

The cockroach survives because it stands pat on form—it avoids experimental progress. Man, however, cannot stand still. He is delicately balanced in an unstable chemical complex; his abnormal mentality has led him to create an environment in which stagnation means extinction. Survival of the species appears to depend upon uninterrupted progress. Resignation is cowardice. Bended knees cannot help. The continued development of the reasoning intellect—our one conspicuous advantage—seems to be the only possibility. . . .

On these points the stellar perspective is clear. Protoplasm appears trivial and transient; but for man, the Drift prescribes progress and survival. If progression halts, we go to join the dinosaurs. If stagnation enters, in a million years or so, by the light of those undisturbed stars that heed life not at all, some conservative cockroach, crawling over the fossilized skull of an extinct primate, may be able to observe: "A relic here of another highly specialized organism which failed to recognize the laws of the universe, which preferred the current minor whims to the search for survival, and which missed its great opportunity to inherit the planet, perishing an early victim of the world's subtle chemistries."

The textual foundations of the opposing or orthodox view of human origins and characteristics have been entirely removed by the achievements of critical scholarship in describing the origin and nature of the supposedly divine revelations on these subjects embodied in the sacred books of the Jews. The progress of comparative religion and Biblical criticism has shown that the Bible of western civilization corresponds in the nature of its authorship and the content of its ideas to the religious literature of other nations and times. There is no convincing evidence of any sort to support the hypothesis of the uniqueness of the Hebrew Bible or the thesis that it contains the direct and explicit word of God. Modern astro-physics, as summarized above by Professor Shapley, renders absurd the Fundamentalist hypothesis that Yahweh, the ancient tribal god of Moses' father-in-law, could serve as even a symbolic expression of that force or personality which the modern liberal theologian assumes to lie back of the energy and order evident in our cosmic system.

The progress of knowledge in these fields of scholarship and in biology, psychology and sociology, has likewise served entirely

to invalidate the older views concerning the criteria of conduct. We now recognize that every human thought and act is strictly determined by a long process of antecedents, including our physico-chemical nature, our biological heredity, our endocrinal and metabolic physiology and our socially conditioned personal experiences and reactions from the time of parturition to the moment of the particular act or thought. There is not the slightest iota of choice allowed to any individual in any act or thought from birth to the grave. If better and saner types of conduct are to be achieved, this must be brought about by giving the individual a better type of opportunity through heredity, education, and association. What shall be these new guiding criteria for conduct can only be determined by the most earnest collaboration between natural and social scientists, each a specialist and all dominated by the aim of social betterment. And the criteria of what constitutes good conduct must be based upon considerations relative to the production of the most happy and efficient type of life here upon this planet. We must abandon entirely the outgrown ideas of supernatural ethical revelations and sanctions, together with the associated notion that the chief purpose of life is to prepare one's self for a cordial reception at the pearly gates.

Modern material culture has completely altered practically every phase of human life. No other transition in the history of humanity can be compared in its multifarious effects to the scientific and industrial revolution which has taken place since 1750 and is still going on in a more striking and ominous degree than at any other time in the last two centuries. Inventions were few and relatively infrequent down to the middle of the eighteenth century. In fact, the state of technology was relatively static for thousands of years prior to 1750. At the present time inventions come in great numbers. A single year often witnesses a number far in excess of those produced in a thousand years previous to 1750. Even such inventions as the *aéroplane* or the wireless telephone, which would have been regarded as nothing short of miraculous a century ago, are now complacently or nonchalantly received. We have become so adjusted now to the every-day occurrence of notable scientific and mechanical achievements that only the most striking inventions attract our attention at all. Furthermore, with the progress of modern technology, inventions are no longer the chance product of a unique genius, but are becoming more and more the inevitable result of

scientific research and experimentation. Given a need for a definite invention, such an invention is well-nigh inevitable, as Professor Ogburn has recently proved by citing numerous inventions arrived at independently and almost synchronously by a number of different inventors. At the present time, the limitations upon inventions are pecuniary rather than scientific. It is not so much a question of whether an invention is possible as whether it would pay to produce and market it.

Again, it may be pointed out that, with the number and rapidity of modern inventions, contemporary civilization has assumed a dynamic character quite foreign to that of any earlier age. The chief danger in this situation is to be found in the possibility that in creating this wonderful technical equipment, mankind will not be able to carry out with sufficient rapidity the desirable social and economic readjustments that are necessary to handle successfully the new technical equipment. There is a grave risk that scientists and inventors have created a Frankenstein monster quite capable of destroying modern civilization. As Will Irwin has shown, there is special danger in the growing efficiency of the engines of destruction utilized in modern war. Indeed, it is highly probable, unless we are able to avert future wars, that modern technology will be little more than an instrument for collective human suicide. At the same time, modern technology has put at our disposal a potential mechanism for increasing human welfare and comforts of a far greater efficiency than anything which had previously been devised through the ingenuity of man. The future alone can determine whether or not humanity can be safely entrusted with this new machinery.

In the place of the simplicity of a stagnant and provincial agrarian society we now have the complexity, the increased stimuli and the aggravated strains and stresses of modern industrial and urban civilization. This has in the period of less than a century transferred man, with his paleolithic mental and physical equipment, from the country-side to the modern city apartment, office building, and factory. The phrase, "the cave man in the modern city," is not a mere picturesque verbal gesture but a precise description of this revolutionary transformation of the psychological, cultural and social basis of life. Modern science, industry and commerce have enormously increased the number, variety and intricacy of the problems which face the statesman in the present era, so that the mayor of many a second-class

American city is confronted with economic problems and expenditures in his annual budget which far exceed in volume those which called forth the financial genius of Alexander Hamilton at the beginning of our existence as a nation.

This very augmentation of the problems which face the public official and law-maker to-day bring us to the very core of the problems of modern democracy. Written constitutions have come to embody the framework of most existing governments. Down to 1914 they were brought into existence chiefly by the business classes to secure immunity, protection and favoritism for their interests. Since the World War and the resulting revolutions, many European countries, and especially Russia, have adapted constitutional government to the cause of supporting the interests of the workers against those of the capitalists and landlords. We have now secured many of the external forms of democracy, such as universal suffrage, and we assume that the votes of the majority determine the nature and content of our legislation and public policies. But today, if it is no longer a serious problem as to whether we can secure the external stigmata of democracy, it has already become one of the major issues of contemporary life as to whether democracy is going to prove adequate to the control and solution of the problems of a society, the nature and difficulties of which were scarcely foreseen by those who created the demand for democratic institutions and looked upon them as the panacea for all human problems. Democracy was originally sought and operated to deal with the political issues of small local communities, with face to face contacts and knowledge, and with few and simple problems. These same institutions and methods are now required to meet situations as much more complex than those of Jefferson's time as a modern locomotive is more complicated than a stage-coach, or a modern printing-press than a quill pen and ink-stand. The increased importance and seductiveness of business and the professions have made it ever more difficult to recruit the best brains for public life. Little or no provision has yet been made for the special training of public leaders and legislators. Then, differential psychology has proved the intellectual inferiority of the masses and the probable deficiencies of majority judgments, unless the majority can be directed by the intelligent minority—an achievement not yet realized in the course of the democratic experiment. Social psychology has further demonstrated the

difficulty of securing rational behavior in political life, particularly in party government, and has shown how to the mediocrity of the majority must be added the tendencies toward mob-psychology in the behavior of the citizens of democracies. The average citizen is not only deficient in cerebral power but also the victim of his emotions in public affairs and political "deliberations." Finally, there is the whole and much deeper question as to whether political institutions can continue to assume control over the other processes and institutions of life. There are many who contend with force and logic that the realities of modern life are to be found in industry and the professions, and that social control must pass to the institutions which are the expression of economic and vocational life. Certainly, in many modern democracies, and especially in the United States, the political agencies of society have already become little more than the "bell-hop" service of organized industry. The example of Russia proves that under a workers' régime government tends likewise to become but a subordinate adjunct of proletarianism.

The progress of modern national emancipation and unification in a political sense, in conjunction with the much more important fact of the development of contemporary methods of national and world-wide communication and the appearance of the cheap daily newspaper to give these communicated facts general circulation, have served to transfer the narrow neighborhood outlook to the nation as a whole. There has thus developed an aggressive and intolerant popular national patriotism which was unheard of and unimagined a century and a half ago. The majority of the citizens of the modern national state still retain much of the hunting-pack and tribal psychology towards the world outside their national boundaries. But even though the majority of men still remain primarily dominated by a savage attitude towards the outside world, civilization itself has become decisively international in its intellectual and economic foundations, and mankind must sooner or later reconcile with these facts the archaic modes of determining the political relations between states which still persist. This situation has already impressed some of the more intelligent and far-sighted statesmen and diplomats, and we have developed in the last quarter of a century scores of plans for international arbitration and organization, including at least the embryonic basis for world organization, disarmament

and security in the League of Nations and the World Court, achievements which must not be overlooked in spite of the fact that in the last decade we have witnessed the most stupendous and disastrous explosion of mass insanity since dry land first emerged from the primal waters of the planet. But it must not be forgotten that this growing international character of society brings an additional set of problems to the attention of democracies, already over-burdened and confused by the diversity and complexity of problems within national boundaries.

Another important psychological and cultural result of the Industrial Revolution has been the increased range of knowledge possessed by the citizen, due to the rise of modern science and the provision of free public education and institutions of higher learning in ever greater numbers. In the middle of the 18th century, the great mass of citizens were almost completely illiterate. About all the information they possessed related to the ordinary processes of life, the superstitious tradition of the locality, common gossip, and certain archaic religious teachings which they received from the priests and ministers. At the present time, the average citizen in any western state possesses at least an elementary school education, is able to read and write, has at his disposal the modern newspaper, from which he may obtain a vast array of diversified and reasonably reliable information. Without attempting any qualitative analysis, it is probably true that the normal citizen of the present day may possess a range of information far in excess of that of the average scholar, statesman or diplomat of the thirteenth century. The fact that, in general, the individual is little able to assimilate, interpret or wisely utilize this increased information does not in any way lessen the fact of the actual degree to which the extent of accessible information has been transformed.

Not only has the range of available knowledge been enormously increased beyond anything previously known, but likewise there is a far greater range of stimuli in modern civilization. One can perhaps best visualize this alteration by comparing the life of the average peasant of the year 1750 with the daily experiences of a typical laborer at the present time in a modern industrial city. The experiences of the peasant of two hundred years ago did not differ widely from what existed at the time of the Lake Dwellers in Neolithic Switzerland, or, in fact, of the cave dwellers of the Paleolithic age. The great majority of the stimuli were those

which were original and derived directly from nature itself. The peasant of this day knew nothing of modern city life. He was ignorant of the modern street car, subway, paved street, theatre, moving-picture house, telephone, telegraph or any other of the many and diverse aspects of modern material culture. No less elementary were the stimuli in his daily industrial activities, confined chiefly to the simplest kind of agricultural life or handicraft methods of manufacturing. As compared with the modern factory situation in an urban environment, the range of stimuli coming to the average working-man of the eighteenth century was most elementary and simple indeed. It is probably true that many individuals commuting from a suburban environment to a metropolitan position, and remaining in town for dinner and theatre, are faced with a greater range and variety of experiences than came to the average English peasant of 1750 in an entire lifetime.

While there can be no doubt about the far greater volume of stimulation in a socio-psychological sense in modern culture, it by no means follows that the change in this respect has been wholly beneficial to mankind. The human organism was not made fixed and perfect from the beginning, but has slowly evolved to meet certain specific needs of a particular environment. Hence, it is possible, if not probable, that the average man was able to live a more healthy life in the simpler cultural environment of the pre-industrial and urban age than in the modern economic and social system, based as it is upon applied science, technology, the factory system, and a predominant urban existence. In as much as the human organism has been gradually shaped to meet the needs of a very simple environment, which did not change to any considerable extent for thousands of years prior to the eighteenth century, there can be no doubt that an extremely difficult problem in adaptation and adjustment has been created by this transformation of the social environment. An organism which was fairly well adapted to meet the demands of a simple agricultural environment, with its elementary economic and social life and its monotonous repetition of functions and processes, is faced with a vastly different problem in modern urban life. The increased nervous strain which is involved in meeting the new situations, the new noises, the new dangers, the new types of recreation, the greater necessity for rapid adjustment and readjustment, constitutes by far the most severe test which has ever been put upon man as a biological and sociological product.

II. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF LIBERALISM

History has long been regarded as the most futile and irrelevant of the social sciences. In fact, many of the greatest historians have refused to regard history as a social science, but have insisted that it is a branch of literature. Its respectable subject-matter in the past—battles, dynastic successions, political campaigns, and diplomatic intrigues—have, indeed, little relation to the problems of human life and social betterment. Yet it is not impossible for history to be of some service in the constructive thinking of the present day. It is only necessary to alter our conception of the nature of history to make it one of the most useful and pragmatic auxiliaries of the social sciences upon which all hope of a sane and scientific reconstruction of human society must depend. Once history is viewed as the record of the progress of human knowledge, the genesis and alteration of world outlook, and the growth of culture and institutions, it immediately becomes apparent that it can offer to the social scientist and philosopher a large amount of cogent information, and can do much to give him an intelligent orientation towards the present and future of human society. Nothing else has ever proved so obstructive to a civilized attitude towards the present and future state of man as the current misconceptions with respect to the human past.

An accurate and intelligently conceived history can dispel these common illusions and free the human mind for a courageous and realistic grappling with the varied and complex set of problems which face us today. If, as many believe, the "race between education and catastrophe" is more acute and undecided today than ever before, it behooves the historian to do his part in diverting that portion of "catastrophe" which derives from the efforts of the conservatives to exploit a superficially constructed and erroneously interpreted history in the interest of obscurantism and social ossification.

In the first place, the historian is able easily to reveal the grotesque fallacy in the almost universal assumption of the conservative that the supreme degree of human wisdom and the vast majority of substantial knowledge are to be sought in the past. The old is commonly identified with the good and the wise. The obvious error here was pointed out by Francis Bacon three centuries ago when he suggested that each generation under normal

conditions should be wiser than its predecessors, as it not only possesses the knowledge of the previous generations, but also that which it has been able to work out for itself. But Bacon did not have at his disposal cultural history, anthropology and prehistoric archeology which today may be exploited by the liberal. We now know that if we push back far towards the origins of the human race we do not approach primordial and unique human wisdom but savagery, ignorance and paralyzing superstition. We do not arrive at a pristine sage occupying Paradise but discover such undeveloped and illiterate ancestors as *Pithecanthropus Erectus* and *Homo Heidelbergensis*. Only history, through its ability to demonstrate the growth of knowledge and the accumulation of experience, can adequately prove the futility of looking backward for guidance and show the necessity of concentrating our interest on the present in the hope of improving the future.

In particular can the historian indicate with ease the fact that this perennial tendency to look back with reverence towards bygone ages is becoming ever more anachronistic and dangerous. The revolutionary and comprehensive changes in human culture and knowledge brought about by the scientific and industrial revolutions of the last century and a half have so altered our perspective and increased our knowledge that the wisest individuals in the world prior to our era could scarcely have possessed much valid or relevant information or insight which might be brought to bear upon contemporary problems and issues. The improbability of Moses being able to adjust the differential of a Ford or Aristotle being adequate to the task of installing a radio set is but a most incomplete illustrative example of the novelty of the present age. We do not even need to revert to Aristotle or Moses, but may ask ourselves what valid information a study of the life of Abraham Lincoln could bring to the solution of the problem of traffic regulation in New York City today.

Then, history can furnish a sort of cultural psychotherapeutic by revealing the process of myth-making and reverence-mongering in action. It can be shown that the ages to which we look still further back for guidance were themselves doubtful concerning the adequacy of their own intelligence and knowledge, and were wont to look back to the golden age of supposed omniscience which was believed to lie back of them.

One of the most frequent assertions of the conservative is

that we should look back to the lessons of the past and find there complete guidance for the present. Especially should we discover the disastrous results which have accompanied all past efforts to bring about rational change and improvement in human institutions. The alert and intelligent historian would answer this by pointing out the fact that, due to those scientific and industrial revolutions described above, the present age is so different in material culture and many other aspects of life that the experiences of any past age offer no valid analogies with the present. The political life of ancient Athens presents no more significant material for solving the problems of the government of Greater New York in 1925 than the construction and operation of a Phœnician galley offers with reference to the navigation problems presented by the *Maurctania*. As one incisive historian has expressed it, perhaps the greatest lesson which history has to offer is that is has no lesson for the present age. When taken literally to mean that there are few or no direct and exact analogies to be drawn between remote ages and today that may prove immediately useful to the contemporary statesman or educator, this somewhat extreme view may be held to be essentially sound and accurate.

As to the alleged disasters associated with change in the past, the historian can ask for proof of any such detrimental results as the conservative alleges, save from revolutionary changes, and he can in every case assign the responsibility for revolution, not to the few obsessed radicals, but to the obstinate conservatives who have opposed gradual and orderly development. It has been the Judge Garys and not the William Z. Fosters of the past who have been the real fomenters of the great revolutions described by the historians.

Frequently the historian encounters the opinion, common to benign conservatives, that, even though certain cultural and institutional changes may be conceded to be desirable, it is impossible to put them into execution because to do so would require a change in human nature. The cultural historian is able to answer this frequently recurring illusion by calling attention to the fact that man has not changed notably with respect to his biological heritage of "human nature" for thirty thousand or more years, while in this time we have passed from a cave habitat to the modern metropolitan apartment, from the tedious and

difficult locomotion of the primitive pedestrian to the *aéroplane*, and from informal government in a small local group to federal republics occupying half a continent and governed according to written constitutions.

The changes in the present order suggested by so extreme a radical as Eugene Debs are as nothing compared to the transformations which have been achieved in human institutions since the arrival of our Cro-Magnon ancestors. Cultural and institutional history, then, is able to put the final quietus upon this pseudo-biological refuge of the conservative.

The mind of the conservative is primarily a believing, trusting and conforming type of mentality. He finds his greatest satisfaction in being in *rapport* with his herd and in regarding himself as living in strict conformity with the institutions and ideals of his forebears. The historian can easily prove that this is the most futile and dangerous of attitudes. All progress from the eolithic age to the twentieth century has been made solely by the doubters and non-conformists in diverse fields of human interest and activity. If man had rested satisfied with existing institutions and attitudes we should obviously still be enjoying the culture of the early stone ages.

The doubter and the questioner may be a nuisance to his herd, but, as Abelard understood clearly nearly a millennium ago, only doubt and non-conformity can bring truth or progress. At the same time, the historian can point out the dangers of doubting. The ill-fate or necrology of the great doubters of history from Ikhnaton, Socrates, Jesus, Abelard, Bruno, Huss, Condorcet and others to Jaurès in our own day indicates that he who would aspire to promote human progress through salutary scepticism must be prepared to suffer himself and ready to see the rewards of contemporary society showered upon his Rotarian neighbors. He may well expect to be viewed as a common enemy of mankind until long after his earthly demise.

Urbane conservatives often grant the truth of the thought contained in the above paragraph, but contend that we must have the consciously active conservative in order to act as a brake upon what would otherwise be the precipitate changes and dizzy pace of social transformation which the liberal would bring about. Indeed, many conservatives seem to hold that, without the conservatives to apply a steady pressure to the brakes of society,

humanity would dash along automatically in a most hazardous and menacing fashion towards ever more rash experiments in new modes of life and thought.

The sociologically oriented historian can quickly refute this major thesis of the conservatives. Whatever else may be lacking in human society, it is provided with the most effective and ever-working automatic brakes in the form of custom, convention, habit, herd pressure, organized religion and education, and a hundred other factors which operate to obstruct social change and keep mankind in modes of life conformable to those of their predecessors. Society no more needs the active conservative than an automobile needs the emergency brake applied when climbing a sharp grade. The social brakes are invariably well-lined and active, but we must have the liberal, in the form of the motor, or society would remain hopelessly stalled in the mire of respectability and customary ways of thought and action. Far from being a safeguard to society the conservative is its greatest menace, as the most difficult problem which society has ever faced has been that of sufficiently rapid readjustment to changes in material culture; and the readjustment required today is infinitely greater than that demanded of any previous age.

With respect to the present struggle between religious liberals and Fundamentalists there is no branch of learning more potent than cultural history in demonstrating the infantile anachronisms and primitive illusions in the Fundamentalist position. The history of religions proves the impossibility of maintaining for a minute the unique or revealed nature of the Jewish or Christian religions, and it emphasizes the element of basic resemblances rather than of insuperable divergences between the great religious systems of the world. It shows how Judaism, and particularly Christianity, have been the product of a so-called "syncretic" process whereby they took up and assimilated many of the religious beliefs and practices which had earlier been developed in the various countries of the Near Orient and eastern Mediterranean area. Perhaps the most important of these was the Persian eschatology with its diabolism, devil mongering and other-worldly outlook which led to the Christian absorption in the problem of escaping hell and attaining heaven.

The knowledge of the historical origins of the Christian eschatology proves at once how absurd is the orthodox obsession with salvation in the world to come, with the resulting lack of

complete devotion to making this world as happy, comfortable and efficient as possible. The historian can here suggest the validity of Francis Bacon's contention that we must substitute the Kingdom of Man for the Kingdom of God as the chief object of human solicitude and activity, and work exclusively for the betterment of human society, relinquishing to God the governance of His domains. Likewise, we must look to physiology, psychology and sociology to formulate new and sounder concepts of mental health, physiological efficiency, human happiness and social solidarity.

We have already shown that the history of science indicates at once how modern astrophysics renders utterly preposterous the orthodox assumption that Yahweh—the accidental product of Moses' particular conjugal experience and a petty pastoral god of a primitive people—can pretend to the position of supreme power which the enlightened contemporary Theist assumes to lie back of the vastness, complexity and order of the cosmos. The history of historical and literary criticism, together with comparative religion, completely undermines the Fundamentalist assumption of the unique and special authority of the Bible, and with this fact disappears all reason for giving credence to the otherwise grotesque and childish superstitions preserved in its pages, among them the creation tales of Genesis, the Deluge Myth, etc.

Evolutionary biology has supplied in the place of these primitive creation tales a logically supportable and scientifically probable explanation of the origin and development of life upon this planet. Those who prefer to reject the evolutionary hypothesis must understand that they have as an alternative only a complete "goose-egg." Finally, the history of modern technology undermines the significance of the Biblical miracles by indicating how petty they were—even if proved—compared to what man has actually achieved in an age which knows the automobile, submarine, aëroplane, the radio, modern synthetic chemistry and the wonders of modern physical chemistry and electro-physics.

If the historian can draw no directly applicable lessons from the past in solving our present-day problems he can at least make a number of constructive suggestions on the basis of the observable developments of the last hundred years or so. The most striking thing is the tremendous dislocation of life caused by the far-reaching changes in our material culture produced by

the Industrial Revolution. This has made our age more divergent in modes of life from that of Thomas Jefferson than his was from that of the late Neolithic period. We have brought about technological changes unparalleled in extent and rapidity of innovation. Yet so swift and wide-spread are these transformations in material culture that the appropriate and desirable changes in institutions and social attitudes have not, and perhaps cannot, keep pace with them. Thus human society has today become something like a person with one foot in an ox-cart and the other in an aeroplane. Unless something is done to remedy this discrepancy it must of necessity prove fatal to the human race at no very distant time in the future.

The complexity of the present order makes it evident that intuition or metaphysical idealism, combined with the best intentions, is quite inadequate to the task of guiding social reconstruction. Only the social sciences, made ever more scientific and inductive, can be looked upon as sufficient to preside over this problem.

If the problems which face us are to-day more complex and baffling than ever before, it is apparent that we shall need as in no earlier period the freest and most untrammelled thought of the best intellects available. Hence obscurantism, blind conservatism, repression and censorship are today more wicked and foolhardy than at any earlier period in human history, and scientifically controlled liberalism, far from being merely desirable or tolerable, holds within itself the only possible hope of the salvation of the human race.

III. THE NECESSITY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY

The implications of those changes in the social structure which were described in an earlier section of this chapter should be readily apparent to all intelligent and informed readers. The stupendous changes wrought by critical thought, science and technology in our material civilization have given rise to problems which can be solved only by a corresponding development of the various social sciences which deal with the diverse aspects of social life that have been so thoroughly revolutionized since the days of George Washington. We can no longer hope to receive adequate guidance in these matters from the theologian, meta-

physician or politician. Rather we must bring the social sciences up to something like the same level of development and objectivity which have at present been attained by the natural and applied sciences. Not only must we develop in this way accuracy and comprehensiveness in the particular social sciences, but we must also provide for proper and intelligent coöperation between them. As modern society is a unity of diverse processes and institutions, so these social sciences must be a coöperating group enriched by contributions from investigators in many realms of human endeavor.

An excellent statement of this contrast between the progress of natural and social science in the last century, as well as an eloquent appeal for the development of the social sciences in the century to come, is embodied in the following quotations from the stimulating address recently delivered by President Walter Dill Scott of Northwestern University on "The Discovery of Truth in Universities":

The universities justly claim first place as agencies for training men in effective methods of research and for formulating and teaching the principles that form the basis for later discoveries and applications.

A survey of the progress of the agencies which promote human welfare reveals the fact that universities through the accomplishments of their teaching and research staffs have formulated principles and made discoveries and applications which have rendered the world a service much greater than is generally known.

Specific illustrations can be drawn most readily from such experimental sciences as physics, chemistry and geology and their application to engineering; or from such observational sciences as zoology, botany and bacteriology and their application to agriculture and to medicine. . . .

Advance in the physical and the biological sciences during future decades will certainly prove as helpful as at any previous time. But the most fruitful researches during the twentieth century will probably be conducted not in the natural sciences but in the social sciences. We are at last coming to see that the proper study of mankind is man. We are beginning to direct our researches to the whole life of mankind—to the nature of man as a social and political being and to the achievements of man recorded in languages, literature and institutions. There is recognized a need for a thorough rewriting of all our texts on history, economics, politics, sociology, psychology, æsthetics, pedagogy, ethics and religion. The social sciences are fostering a progress that may be measured not in mere billions of dollars,

but rather in the finer though less tangible terms of appreciation, service and sacrifice.

Research in the natural sciences has been effective in aiding the race to adjust itself to its physical environments. No such discovery of truth in the social sciences has been made in aiding the race to adjust itself to its human environments. Men are not now working together happily and effectively. There is said to be a lack of control in the home, restlessness in the school, apathy in the church, shirking in the shops, dishonesty in the counting houses, grafting in politics, crime in the city and bolshevism threatening all our institutions.

All our human relations will be improved as rapidly as we make progress in the social sciences, and I am convinced that our universities will make as great a contribution here during the twentieth century as they did by the discovery of truth in the natural sciences during the nineteenth century.

We may expect the most helpful contributions to the betterment of human relations from universities possessing certain favorable characteristics.

First, the university must be untrammelled by traditions or superstitions, by politics or cults; but must be animated by a love for truth and the members of the teaching and research staff must be zealous in their pursuits of truth in their respective fields.

Second, the university must sustain a graduate school and a group of professional schools, all in intimate contact with city life. Only in such an atmosphere and in such an environment is the seeker after truth in touch with the most progressive thought and with the most persistent presentation of the problem of human relations.

In spite of the fact that the complicated nature of the present social order has put an end to the age when adequate guidance for society might be expected from the metaphysical and rhetorical idealist, the windy, hypocritical, ignorant and partisan politician, or the intuitive and enthusiastic social reformer, the obstacles to a consistent, candid and objective development of the social sciences are becoming progressively more numerous and menacing. These who feel that they are bound to lose by any changes in social organization are becoming alert to the threat against their thorough domination of contemporary society which is potential in any honest and competent investigation of the existing social and economic order. The fact that change has been the rule of history does not impress them, and so they futilely prefer stupid and unreasoning conservatism, inviting ultimate revolution, waste and confusion, to the intelligently conceived gradual, and comparatively safe transformation of social life which is the chief aim

and justification of the social sciences. Therefore, we are faced with the somewhat disconcerting fact that at the very time when we most need a consciously coöperative development of research and instruction in the social sciences, the opposition of the vested interests to such progress is becoming more comprehensive and better organized than ever before in modern history.

The dominant interests of society always determine the type of intolerance which prevails in any era. This intolerance is certain to be directed chiefly against those thinkers who most directly challenge the dominant interests. In the Middle Ages man was chiefly interested in the scheme of salvation in the world to come, and intolerance was chiefly concentrated upon those who pursued original work and gave evidence of independent thinking in the fields of theology and philosophy. Today man is largely absorbed in material culture and pecuniary gain. Hence, twentieth century intolerance is for the most part directed against the social scientist, for he inevitably discovers defects in contemporary economic and social institutions, and consequently is led to suggest what seem to him to be desirable and possible methods of altering and improving these institutions. But whatever the opposition, there is bound to be an ever-increasing number of scholars who have come to see with President Scott that the only hope of a successful and efficient utilization of the remarkable contributions of science and technology to human society lies in a persistent and organized effort to develop those social sciences which alone can serve to guide man toward an ever more safe and adequate exploitation and control of the increased power which natural science and technology have placed at his disposal.

Fortunately, there are also a few unusually intelligent contemporary citizens of large means who believe that stupid resistance to change is the most fatuous of all possible attitudes for the wealthy and poor alike, and who are therefore inclined to support research organizations and institutions of learning, in the hope that the development of the sciences, with the resulting intelligent control of social processes, may proceed with sufficient certainty and thoroughness so as to ward off revolution and confusion. In other words, they prefer to put their trust in education as against deferred catastrophe. Among the radicals, on the other hand, there are many who are coming to realize that spontaneous and intuitive programs of social and economic reconstruc-

tion are likely to be as disastrous to the proletarian as to the capitalist. Certain groups of such enlightened radicals, well represented by the management of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, are making ever greater use of technically trained economists and sociologists. It is on this coöperation of social scientists with intelligent citizens from all classes that we must found our hope of leading society out of its present perplexities.

The "Gospel" of social science must be the tenets of a pragmatic and scientifically guided and chastened liberalism which are so admirably summarized in the recent pronouncement of James Harvey Robinson:

Liberalism—and I have no great love for the word—may be conceived as the mood of the explorer, who notes the facts as he goes along. He does not know beforehand what he is going to find over the next mountain or across the next river or lake. He learns as he goes, and adjusts his beliefs to his increasing information. We have only just begun to explore man's nature and the world in which he is placed. We have new methods of research which were not available half a century ago. New experiments are being tried on a large scale, and conditions are vastly different from those with which our ancestors had to deal. Dogmas—ancient teachings which are protected in various ways from the fermentive influence of increasing knowledge—are still congenial to a creature such as man. But, while they are sometimes harmless, their chance of being suited to the present needs and best insight of men is so slight that we should have no least hesitation in calling them in question. The open-minded will do this so far as their powers permit. Open-mindedness, like dogma, demands faith and loyalty. It is a lofty ideal and one implying a new type of the mortification of the flesh—a new conception of righteousness and salvation. Whether one strives to fulfill the behests of ancient dogma or to follow those of open-mindedness, he will often stumble and have his moments of contrition and his renewals of faith. But the new gospel places far more onerous restraints on our natural impulses than did the old. It has its promises and its rewards—sometimes its beatific vision, but these glories are as yet for the scattered few. Yet the communion of saints grows daily.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Barnes, H. E. (Ed.), *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*; Beard, C. A., *Contemporary American History*; Botsford, J. B., *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*; Bowden, W., *In-*

dustrial Society in England Towards the End of the Eighteenth Century; Bury, J. B., *The Idea of Progress*; Cannon, C. J., "American Misgivings," in *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1922; Cooley, C. H., *Social Organization*; Croly, H., *Progressive Democracy*; Ellwood, C. A., *The Reconstruction of Religion*; Garvin, J. L. (Ed.), *These Eventful Years*; Givler, R. C., *The Ethics of Hercules*; Hayes, E. C. (Ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*; Kirchwey, F. (Ed.), *Our Changing Morality*; Kropotkin, P., *Ethics, Origin and Development*; Marvin, F. S., *The Century of Hope*; (Ed.), *Science and Civilization*; McDougall, W., *Is America Safe for Democracy? Ethics and some Modern World Problems*; Penman, J. S., *The Irresistible Movement of Democracy*; Robinson, James Harvey, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*; Russell, B., *What I Believe*; Wallace, W. K., *The Trend of History*; *The Passing of Politics*; Wallas, G., *Our Social Heritage*; *The Great Society*; *Human Nature in Politics*; Weyl, W., *The New Democracy*; *Tired Radicals*; White, A. D., *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*.

INDEX

- Adams, John
 economic determinism, 320
 economic interpretation of the Constitution, 327
 religious opinions, 351 ff.
 views on revolution, 317
- Adams, Samuel
 criticism of Constitution, 337
 views on revolution, 314
- Alien and Sedition Laws, 370 ff.
- America, nationalism in, 181 ff., 286 ff.
- American Epic, revision of, 39 ff., 72 ff., 288 ff.
- American history, recent interpretations of, 39 ff., 289 ff.
 recent works on, 39 ff., 72 ff.
- American Revolution, contemporary interpretation of, 296 ff.
- Anglo-Saxon Myth, 202, 224
- Annin, Robert Edwards, on Woodrow Wilson, 526 ff.
- anthropology and history, 30 ff., 52 ff.
- anti-democratic theory, 421 ff.
- archival material, 208
- archives, 208
 effect of World War upon, 208, 227 ff.
- archeology and history, 30 ff.
- "Aryan Myth," 218 ff.
- Australian ballot, introduction of, 446
- Austria, responsibility in World War, 237 ff.
- Baker, Ray Stannard, 506, 518, 526
- Bancroft, George, 20, 212 ff.
- Barrès, Maurice, 201
- Beard, Charles Austin, 264, 422, 435, 482
- Beck, James Montgomery, 318, 333
- Becker, Carl Lotus, 30, 40, 42, 182, 299, 518
- Belgium and the World War, 268 ff.
- Bentley, Arthur Fisher, 428, 430 ff.
- Berr, Henri, 32, 56 ff.
- biological key to history, nature of, 15
- Blakeslee, George Hubbard, 170
- Bliven, Bruce, estimate of Coolidge, 477
- Boas, Franz, 32, 222
- Bolsheviks, early American, 366 ff.
- Bolton, Herbert Eugene, 39
- Bopp, Francis, 219
- Boston police strike, 464
- Breasted, James Henry, 31 ff.
- Bryan, William Jennings, 20, 347, 536
- Bryce, James, on nationalism, 151, 153, 156, 169
 on democracy, 421 ff.
- budget and accounting act of 1921, 482 ff.
- Butler, Nicholas Murray, 475
- Burgess, John William, 213
- Bury, John Bagnell, 35, 38
- Cabell, James Branch, 14
- Carlyle, Thomas, 203
- "Centinel Letters" on constitution, 335 ff.
- Chafee, Zechariah, 519, 522
- Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 13, 221
- Chase, Stuart, 497
- "Chronicles of America," 42
- civil service, growth of in United States, 480, 486 ff.
- class bias in history, 22
- classical civilization, recent tendencies in history of, 34 ff.

- Cobb, Frank Irving, 517
 "Columbia School" of historians, 29, 90
 comedy of man, 135 ff.
 Commons, John Rogers, 467
 community political importance of, 449
 Constitution of United States, economic interpretation of, 324 ff.
 mode of adoption of, 341
 views of contemporaries on, 332 ff.
 contemporary age, novel characteristics of, 568 ff.
 contemporary history, importance of, 129 ff.
 Cooley, Charles Horton, 423
 Coolidge, Calvin
 Congressional opinion of, 476
 estimates of, 455 ff.
 political good fortune of, 464 ff.
 reasons for popularity of, 466, 477 ff.
 "Coolidge Myth," 454 ff.
 bases of, 456 ff.
 Cramb, J. A., 204
 Croly, Herbert, 422
 culture concept in history, 54
 Curtis, George William, 446
- Darwin, Charles, racial ancestry of, 225 ff.
- Daugherty, Harry Micajah, 471
 Dawes Plan, 274 ff.
 Debs, Eugene, 581
 Deism, American, 348
 De Morgan, Jacques, 31
 Déroulède, Paul, 201
 democracy,
 cost of in United States, 479 ff.
 historical setting of problems of modern, 562 ff.
 history, of, 394 ff.
 rise of modern, 406 ff.
 theories of, 404 ff., 419 ff.
- Dimitrievitch, Dragutin, plots assassination of Franz Ferdinand, 239
 diplomacy before the World War, 231 ff.
- Dodd, William Edward, 506 ff., 526
 doubt, social intolerance of, 3
 Doughty, Leonard, 13
 "Drool Method" in history, 4 ff.
 rewards of, 9
 Droysen, Johann Gustav, 196
 Dwight, Theodore, on Thomas Jefferson, 19
- economic determinism, views of "Fathers" on, 319 ff.
 economic interests and activities of the "Fathers," 328 ff.
 economic interpretation of constitution of United States, views of "Fathers" on 324 ff.
 economic waste of sin, 501 ff.
 economic waste in the United States, 497 ff.
 election expenses, increase in, 444
 elections in the United States, lack of rationality in, 452 ff.
 Ellwood, Charles Abram, 423 ff.
 England and World War, 263 ff.
 epic tendencies in history, 23, 72 ff., 288 ff.
- Estabrook, Henry D., on constitution, 332
 European society and thought in 1750, 563 ff.
- Ewart, John S., on World War guilt, 103 ff.
- Fabre-Luce, Alfred, 44
 Farrand, Max, 289 ff.
 "Fathers,"
 activities and views of, 313 ff.
 assumed superhuman wisdom of, 23 ff., 313
 economic interests and activities of, 328 ff.
 political methods of, 342 ff.
 religious views of, 347 ff.
 revolutionary views of, 314 ff.
 sexual life of, 358 ff.
 views of on economic determination of the constitution, 324 ff.
 views of on economic determinism, 319 ff.
- Faulkner, Harold Underwood, 41

- Fay, Sidney Bradshaw, 42, 46, 93, 226 ff.
- Febvre, Lucien, 62 ff.
- federal employees, increase of, 479 ff., 485 ff.
- federal expenditures in the United States, unscientific nature of, 481 ff.
- Fergusson, Harvey, 486
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 219
- Fiske, John, 213 ff.
- Follett, Mary Parker, 450
- Ford, Henry Jones, 224, 490
- Ford, Worthington Chauncey, 211
- France, Anatole, 4
- France, responsibility of for World War, 256 ff.
- Franklin, Benjamin,
religious views of, 349
sexual experiences of, 359 ff.
- Freeman, Edward Augustus, 202
- Freudian interpretation of history, 116 ff.
- Froude, James Anthony, 101, 203
- Fueter, Eduard, 127 ff.
- geography and history, 62 ff.
- Germany, responsibility of in World War, 243 ff.
- Giddings, Franklin Henry, 29, 191, 423 ff., 431
- Gillespie, James E., 125 ff.
- Gobineau, Count Joseph Arthur de, 6, 179, 193, 220 ff.
- Goldenweiser, Alexander A., 52 ff.
- Gooch, George Peabody, 97
- Graetz, Heinrich, 208
- Grant, Madison, 13, 218 ff.
- Gras, Norman Scott Brien, 69 ff.
- Great Britain, responsibility of for World War, 263 ff.
- Green, John Richard, 203
- Grosse Politik*, 43, 209, 229
- Guthrie, William D., 24
- Hale, William Bayard, 510, 520
- Hamilton, Alexander,
affair with Mrs. Reynolds, 360 ff.
constitution of the United States, 333
- Hamilton, Alexander (*cont.*)
economic determinism, 322
economic determination of the constitution, 325
revolutionary views, 317
- Hankins, Frank Hamilton, 186 ff., 190 ff., 219 note
- Hanna, Mark, 444
- Harding, Warren Gamaliel, 441
- Harvey, George, 513 ff., 535
- Haskins, Charles Homer, 102 ff.
- Hayes, Carlton Joseph Huntley, 8, 90, 141, 164, 165
- Hazen, Charles Downer, 46, 87 ff.
- Henry, Patrick, criticism of constitution, 338
- herd versus historian, 24 ff.
- Herrick, Myron T., 442
- Hillis, Newell Dwight, 11
- historian,
fear of sex problems, 25, 74
inevitable biases of, 9 ff.
- historians,
"Columbia School" of, 29 ff.
humility of disillusioned, 26
- historical biography, 116 ff.
- historical epic, spontaneous generation of, 23 ff.
- history,
anthropology and, 30 ff., 52 ff.
archeology and, 30 ff.,
bibliography of recent books in, 47 ff.
class bias in, 22 ff.
dangers of originality in, 4 ff., 24 ff.
difficulty of arriving at truth in, 9 ff.
effect of nationalism upon, 193 ff.
epic tendencies in, 23 ff.
geography and, 62 ff.
history of, 65 ff.
international intelligence and, 271 ff.
nationalistic, 193 ff.
new, 28 ff.
partisan bias in, 19 ff.
patriotic bias in, 15 ff.
peace and, 285 ff.
pre-literary, 30 ff., 52 ff.

- history (*cont.*)
 "pure," 4 ff.
 race bias in, 12 ff., 179 ff., 218 ff., 555
 religious bias in, 10 ff.
 truth and, 1 ff.
History of Civilization Series, 55 ff.
 history of democracy, 394 ff.
 history teachers, timidity of, 25 ff.
 House, Edward Mandell, 559
 Hughes, Charles Evans, myth of liberalism of, 559
 "Hundred Percenter" and history, 16, 24
 "Hundred Percentism," 16
 Italy and World War, 267
 interest-group, 427 ff.
 international good-will, history and, 285 ff.
 international intelligence, history and, 271 ff.
 international realities in the World War, 278 ff.
 international situation before World War, 231 ff.
 internationalism, development of, 188 ff.
 Irwin, Will, 573
 Izvolski and World War, 249 ff.
 Jameson, John Franklin, 4, 211
 Jefferson, Thomas,
 Alien and Sedition Laws, 373 ff.
 economic determinism, 321
 opinion of Constitution, 334
 recreational activities of, 361 ff.
 religious views of, 352 ff.
 revolutionary views, 315 ff.
 Jewish problem in history, 110 ff.
 Jews, nationalism and, 207 ff.
 Johnson, Allen, 42
 Kaiser,
 opposed to World War in 1914, 244 ff.
 supports Austria in punishing Serbia, 241
 Kallen, Horace Meyer, 110 ff.
 Kent, Frank, estimate of Coolidge, 465, 473
 Kingsley, Charles, 203
 Knopf, Alfred A., 32, 55 ff.
 Kroeber, Alfred L., 55
 La Follette, Robert Marion, 466 ff.
 Lamprecht, Karl, 29, 56
 Latin America, history of, 42
 Lawrence, David, estimate of Woodrow Wilson, 544 ff.
 Lea, Homer, 204
 liberalism,
 historical justification of, 578 ff.
 history and, 578 ff.
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 519
 Lowie, Robert Harry, 53
 Lybyer, Albert Howe, 38
 MacCracken, Henry Noble, estimate of Coolidge, 474
 MacCurdy, George Grant, 31
 MacIver, Robert Morrison, 450
 Madison, James, on economic determinism, 322
 Mahan, Admiral, 213
 Mantoux, Paul, 39
 Marshall, John, economic basis of Constitution, 326
 Martin, Henri, 201
 Mason, George, criticism of Constitution, 340
 McCombs, William F., 535
 McMaster, John Bach, 78, 345
 mediocrity, triumph of in American politics, 471 ff.
 Mencken, Henry Louis, 14, 455 ff., 458 ff., 472, 501
 Menken, Stanwood, 24
 mental tests, democracy and, 421
 metropolitan economy, nature and significance of in history, 69 ff.
 Michelet, Jules, 201
 Michels, Robert, 433 ff.
 middle ages, recent historical works on, 35
 modern times, recent historical works on, 37 ff.
 Monroe Doctrine, origins of, 392

- Montgelas, Max, 43
 moral views of the "Fathers," 355 ff.
 Morhardt, Mathias, 43
 Morley, John, on lack of interest in truth, 3
 Morrow, Dwight Whitney, 190, 456 note, 475
 Motley, John Lothrop, 213
 Muller, Max, 219
 Myers, Gustavus, 23
- nationalism,
 early city-states, 148 ff.
 early modern times, 157 ff.
 Far East, 184 ff.
 French Revolution and Napoleonic period, 164 ff.
 history and, 179 ff., 193 ff.
 history of, 145 ff.
 imperialism and, 174 ff.
 internationalism and, 188 ff.
 "Jingoism" and, 177 ff.
 latest stage in, 168 ff.
 modern times, 154 ff.
 nature of, 145 ff.
 patriarchal empires of antiquity, 151
 Revolutions of 1848, 169 ff.
 since the Industrial Revolution, 168 ff.
 small nations and, in 1914, 173 ff.
 tribal society, 147 ff.
 United States, 181 ff.
 World War, 185 ff.
- nationalistic historical writing, 179 ff., 193 ff.
 results of, 215
 nationalistic history, 194 ff.
 among the Jews, 207 ff.
 England, 201 ff.
 France, 197 ff.
 Germany, 194 ff.
 minor countries, 204
 United States, 210 ff.
- Newberry case, 444
 new history,
 nature of, 28 ff., 578 ff.
 partial bibliography of, 47 ff.
- New York *Tribune*, on Bryan and Cox, 20
 nomination and election costs in the United States, increased cost of, 490 ff.
 "Nordic Myth," 13 ff., 218 ff.
 criticism of, 221 ff.
- Oberholtzer, Ellis Paxson, 77 ff.
 Ogburn, William Fielding, 573
 Ogden, C. K., 55 ff.
 O'Higgins, Harvey, 42, 116 ff.
 oil scandals, 443
 Olmstead, Albert TenEyck, 53
 "Omnibus bill," 483
 Orient, recent tendencies in history of, 32 ff.
 originality in history, dangers of, 4 ff.
 origins of modern civilization, recent interpretations of, 37 ff.
 Osgood, Herbert Levi, 40
 Ostrogorski, Mosei, 422
- Palfrey, John Gorham, 212
 party bias in history, 19
 party government in America, weaknesses of, 452
 party, political, 427 ff.
 party shibboleths, psychological power of, 445, 448
 patriotism,
 history and, 15 ff.
 nature of, 186 ff.
 peace, plans for, 188 ff.
 pensions, waste in federal, 484 ff.
 Pickering, Timothy, treachery of, 386 ff., 390
 Pierce, Bessie L., 289
 Platt, Thomas Collier, 441
 Poincaré and World War, 249 ff., 258 ff.
 political education, need for, 450
 political independence, decline of in the United States, 469 ff.
 political methods of the "Fathers," 342 ff.
 political parties,
 abuses in, 440 ff.

- Political Parties (*cont.*)
 corruption in, 440 ff.
 development cf, 436 ff.
 development in the United States, 438 ff.
 efforts to reform abuses in, 446 ff.
 futility of present type in the United States, 445, 451
 political party,
 an interest-group, 427 ff.
 in democracy, 427 ff.
 theory of, 427
 political reaction, triumph of in 1924, 271 ff.
 "pork-barrel" system, 483 ff.
 Post, Louis Freeland, 519 ff.
 post-offices, waste in federal buildings for, 484
 Potsdam Conference, myth of, 241 ff.
 pre-literary history, 30 ff., 52 ff.
 pre-war situation, 231 ff.
 progress, critical view of, 122
 Progressive Party in 1924, reasons for defeat of, 467, 469 ff.
 "pure history law," 4 ff.

 race bias in history, 12 ff., 179 ff., 218 ff.
 "race myth," 12 ff., 179 ff., 218 ff., 555
 Ratzehofer, Gustav, 429
 Reed, James A., 486
 religious bias in history, 10 ff.
 religious views of "Fathers," 347 ff.
 Renard, Georges, 32, 56
 Renouvin, Pierre, 45
 revolution, views of "Fathers" on, 314 ff.
 Revolutionary War,
 causes of, 296 ff.
 nature of, 296 ff.
 Rhodes, James Ford, 81 ff.
 Ripley, William Zebina, 221
 Robinson, James Harvey, 29, 56, 66, 169, 420, 588
 Rogers, Robert William, 33
 Ross, Edward Alsworth, 423 ff.
 Russell, Bertrand, 1
 Russia, responsibility of for World War, 248 ff.

 Russian mobilization brings on World War, 253 ff.

 Schapiro, J. Salwyn, 8, 175
 Schevill, Ferdinand, 93
 Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, 19, 40, 42, 72 ff.
 Schmitt, Bernadotte Everly, 236, 258
 Scott, Walter Dill, 585
 Second War of Independence, 381 ff.
 Seeley, John Robert, 204
 Serbia, responsibility of for World War, 238 ff.
 Shafer, Robert, 122 ff.
 Shapley, Harlow, 568 ff.
 Shepherd, William Robert, 38, 126
 Shotwell, James Thomson, 29, 56, 65 ff., 141
 sin, economic waste of, 501 ff.
 Sloane, William Milligan, 89
 Small, Albion Woodbury, 429 ff.
 Smertenko, Johan J., 222
 Smith, Alfred E., 497
 Smith, Preserved, 30, 38
 "Sneer Method in History," 4 ff.
 social psychology and democracy, 423 ff.
 social science,
 democracy and, 584 ff.
 necessity for cultivation of, 584 ff.
 Sombart, Werner, 38
 Stearns, Frank, 473
 Stephens, Henry Morse, 215
 Stieve, Friederich, 44
 Stoddard, Lothrop, 218
 Strunsky, Simeon, 519, 523
 Stubbs, William, 202 ff.
 Sullivan, James, 5 ff.
 Sumner, William Graham, 2, 422
 Sybel, Heinrich von, 196

 Taft, Donald Reed, 216, 286
 Taft, William Howard, 475
 teachers of history, timidity of, 24 ff.
 Tenney, Alvan Alonzo, 189, 423
 Thayer, William Roscoe, 507
 Thorndike, Edward Lee, 15
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 422 ff.

- Treaty of Versailles, theory of war guilt in, 226
- Treitschke, Heinrich von, 196
- truth, difficulty of attaining historic, 9 ff.
- history and, 1 ff.
- Turner, Frederick Jackson, 41, 183, 289
- Turner, John Kenneth, 46, 516 ff., 523
- twentieth century, importance of in history, 129 ff.
- Tylor, Edward Burnett, 52
- United States,
development of nationalism in, 181 ff.
- nationalistic history in, 210 ff.
- Van Loon, Hendrick Willem, 135 ff.
- Wallas, Graham, 422, 432 ff., 448
- war guilt, order of, 270
- "War Hawks" of 1812, 388
- war, financial waste and, 492 ff.
- War of 1812,
causes of, 382 ff.,
nature of, 390 ff.
- Ward, Lester Frank, 431
- wars, cost of modern, 494
- Washington, George,
distillery of, 358
economic determination of constitution, views on, 324
economic sagacity of, 329
liquor bill of, 344
love of dancing, 355 ff.
- Washington job-holder, 486
- waste in state governments, 495 ff.
- Wells, Herbert George, contributions to history, 139 ff.
- West, Andrew F., 527, 529 ff., 557
- Weyl, Walter, 423 ff., 523.
- White, William Allen, estimate of Woodrow Wilson, 551 ff.
- Wilson, Woodrow,
career of in apology and criticism, 512 ff.
- character of, 523 ff., 560
- destruction of political career by World War, 537 ff.
- estimates of, 505 ff., 526 ff.
- historian, 511 ff.
- interpretations of political career of, 516 ff., 534 ff.
- liberalism, disappearance of, 519 ff.
- personality of, 522 ff., 540 ff.
- political career of, 512 ff., 534 ff.
- political scientist, 509 ff.
- president of Princeton University, 528 ff.
- reason for failure of his peace plans, 518 ff.
- relation of physical health to political career, 549
- scholar and writer, 508 ff.
- sexual purity of, 524, 560
- Wissler, Clark, 53
- Wood, Leonard, nomination expenses of, 444
- world outlook in history, 125 ff.
- World War,
Austria's responsibility in, 237 ff.
- "bunk" and propaganda in, 278 ff.
- historians and, 17 ff., 42 ff., 87 ff., 103 ff., 215, 226 ff.
- international intelligence and, 274 ff.
- international realities and, 278 ff.
- French responsibility in, 256 ff.
- German responsibility in, 243 ff.
- responsibility for, 226 ff.
- responsibility of Great Britain in, 263 ff.
- Russian responsibility for, 248 ff.
- Serbian responsibility for, 238 ff.
- World War guilt, 226 ff.
- Zionism, 110 ff.

A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN
WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET

The type in which this book has been set (on the Linotype) is Old Style No. 1. In design, the face is of English origin, by MacKellar, Smith and Jordan, and bears the workmanlike quality and freedom from "frills" characteristic of English old styles in the period prior to the introduction of the "modern" letter. It gives an evenly textured page that may be read with a minimum of fatigue. Old Style No. 1 was one of the first faces designed and cut by the Linotype Company, and it is still one of the most popular.



SET UP, ELECTROTYPED, PRINTED AND
BOUND BY THE VAIL-BALLOU PRESS,
INC., BINGHAMTON, N. Y. • PAPER
FURNISHED BY W. F. ETHERING-
TON & CO., NEW YORK.

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



141 692

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

